Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Mary Jane Nelson and other litigants appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to the Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes and other entities in a quiet title action. In their sole contention of error in this appeal, Nelson argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment without the final report of the special master being filed. As the Georgia Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]f no demand for a jury trial is filed prior to the time he hears the case, the special master is the arbiter of law and fact and decides all issues in the case." And, as in this case, there was a demand for a jury trial filed before the special master holds a hearing, the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed to trial. The fact that a demand for a jury trial was filed pursuant to OCGA 23-3-66 does not mean that the trial court cannot grant summary judgment when warranted. Accordingly, Nelsons did not show an error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "Nelson v. Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Ute Mesa, a Colorado real estate developer, received a multi-million dollar loan to construct a single family home on property it owned in Aspen. To secure the loan, United Western Bank prepared a deed of trust incorrectly identifying Ute Mesa's sole member as the owner rather than Ute Mesa. The Bank filed suit seeking a reformation of the deed of trust and a declaration that it had a first priority lien on the property. Days later, the Bank filed notice of lis pendens in the county real property records. Ute Mesa filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, and continued as debtor-in-possession of the property. Ute Mesa then filed an adversary proceeding against the Bank to avoid the lis pendens as a preferential transfer. The bankruptcy court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss, and the federal district court affirmed. Ute Mesa argued on appeal that a "transfer of an interest in property" occurs when a bona fide purchaser cannot acquire an interest superior to that of a creditor. According to Ute Mesa, because the lis pendens prevented a bona fide purchaser from acquiring an interest in the property superior to the Bank’s interest, the lis pendens qualified as a transfer of an interest in the property. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that a lis pendens is "merely a notice" and does not constitute a lien, therefore, no transfer occurred. View "Ute Mesa Lot 1, LLC v. First Citizens Bank & Trust, et al" on Justia Law

Patrick Wagner appealed the grant of summary judgment that held as a matter of law that his property was burdened by either an express or an implied roadway easement, and that dismissed his claims for injunctive relief and damages against Crossland Construction Company, Inc., Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., M & K Hotshot & Trucking, Inc., and Titan Specialties, Ltd. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of law, the language in the warranty deed at issue in this case did not create or reserve an express easement. Furthermore, the Court concluded genuine issues of material fact precluded the district court from resolving whether an implied easement exists. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wagner v. Crossland Construction Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Earl and Harold Van Sickle appealed, and Hallmark & Associates, Inc., Frank Celeste, William R. Austin, Phoenix Energy, Bobby Lankford, and Earskine Williams, and Missouri Breaks, LLC, cross-appealed an amended judgment that held Missouri Breaks liable to the Van Sickles for unpaid pre-bankruptcy confirmation royalties and awarding the Van Sickles interest and attorney's fees. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not err in holding Missouri Breaks liable under state law for pre-bankruptcy confirmation royalties owed to the Van Sickles. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Van Sickles attorney's fees and did not err in awarding them simple interest under the statute. View "Van Sickle v. Hallmark & Assoc., Inc." on Justia Law

A commercial tenant remained in possession of premises for six years after it lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The tenant ultimately conceded that the foreclosure terminated the lease and the tenant became a tenant at sufferance. The property owner sued the tenant for breach of the terminated lease, trespass and other torts, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court granted summary judgment for the tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of the previously-terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is a trespasser and can be liable in tort, including, in this case, tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) the tenant here was not liable under the DTPA because the property owner was not a consumer; and (4) the owner in this case could not recover under the attorney's fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Remanded. View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law

Ruth Fulp placed her family farm in a revocable trust with trust assets going to her three children upon her death. Fulp decided to sell the farm to her son, Harold, a few years later. The proposed sale was for a low price to pay for Fulp's retirement home care and to keep the farm in the family. Ruth's daughter, Nancy, opposed the action, arguing that a bargain sale would breach Ruth's fiduciary duty to her children and deprive Nancy of her share of the trust. The trial court found that Ruth breached her fiduciary duty to the children by selling the farm at a low price. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the terms of the trust and the Indiana Trust Code, Ruth did not owe her children a fiduciary duty to sell the farm at less than fair market price and that Ruth did not effectively amend the trust by selling the farm. Remanded. View "Fulp v. Gilliland" on Justia Law

The City of Springfield enacted two local ordinances that imposed new legal duties on (1) property owners to maintain property during the foreclosure process and provide a $10,000 cash bond per foreclosure to the City, and (2) mortgagees to attempt a settlement through negotiations before foreclosing. In dispute was the definition of "owner" in the first ordinance, which included mortgagees who were not in possession and had begun the foreclosure process. The ordinance imposed the duties on the mortgagees whether the mortgagors were still in possession. Six banks sued in state court, seeking to have the ordinances invalidated as inconsistent with and preempted by comprehensive state laws governing foreclosure and property maintenance and as inconsistent with state and federal constitutional guarantees. The case was removed to federal district court, which concluded that the ordinances were valid. The banks appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals certified dispositive state law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court because the outcome of the case depended on unresolved questions of Massachusetts law and raised significant policy concerns better suited for resolution by that state court. View "Easthampton Savings Bank v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law

Jeffery and Allison Rhodes petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss the ejectment action filed against them by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Supreme Court found that the defect in the foreclosure process alleged by the Rhodeses did not implicate Fannie Mae's standing to bring the ejectment action against the Rhodeses or, in turn, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain that claim. The only basis upon which the Rhodeses sought interlocutory mandamus relief from the order of the trial court denying their motion to dismiss the complaint against them was an alleged lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the trial court as a result of the alleged lack of standing. Because the problem alleged by the Rhodeses did not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court had no basis on which to consider this petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Federal National Mortgage Association v. Rhodes" on Justia Law

Debtors owed delinquent real estate taxes to Summit County, Ohio, which sells outstanding tax obligations to investors as tax lien certificates. An investor purchasing such a certificate obtains a lien against the property and the right to pursue the taxpayer for the unpaid taxes, O.R.C. 5721.30-43. Plymouth filed a certificate showing its purchase of the Debtors’ tax obligation for $4,083.73 with a negotiated interest rate of 0.25%, “offered, sold, and delivered on November 3, 2010.” On October 3, 2011, Plymouth filed a second certificate, with a price of $2,045.44 and a negotiated interest rate of 18.00%. On April 17, 2012, Summit County filed a tax lien foreclosure complaint against the Debtors pursuant to pursuant to Plymouth's request for foreclosure. In May, 2012, the Debtors filed a chapter 13 plan and petition, proposing to pay interest on the tax certificates at the interest rates listed on the certificates. Plymouth filed a proof of claim based on both certificates in the amount of $10,521.46, including $2,120.00 in fees and the principal balance of $7,781.19 plus 18% interest from June 1, 2012 on both certificates. The Bankruptcy Court held that under Ohio law the appropriate interest rate for Plymouth’s tax claim was 0.25%. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Bowers" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for unlawful trespass. Green Mountain Power Corporation (GMP) is an electric utility that operates several wind-power sites throughout Vermont. Construction required cutting trees, excavating, and blasting rock to produce a "crane road" on which the turbines could be erected by crane. Because a portion of the crane road would be within 100 feet of the GMP's leased property's boundary line, some blast safety zones actually extended into neighboring land owned by Donald and Shirley Nelson, who strongly opposed the project. The Nelsons allowed a group to protest the wind-power site by setting up camp on the portion of the Nelsons' land that fell within a blast safety zone. This prompted GMP and its blasting subcontractor to increase their safety measures, risking a delay of construction of more than five weeks and threatening GMP's eligibility for the federal tax credits. In Fall 2011, GMP initiated a civil suit against the Nelsons for nuisance and interference with contract. While the suit was pending, Defendants passed through an existing property line and entered a portion of the crane-road construction site located on land disputed by the Nelsons and GMP. GMP halted construction, and a representative asked defendants to leave. Although aware of the boundary dispute, defendants refused to leave, claiming permission from the Nelsons, who they maintained owned the disputed land. GMP then contacted local police, who arrived at the scene and asked defendants to leave. Defendants again refused and were arrested. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not dismissing the case in the interests of justice. View "Vermont v. Gillard" on Justia Law