Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners purchased a house for $234,000. Six months later, the County Assessor appraised the property and found its fair market value was $355,200. The Board of Review upheld the Assessor's valuation. The circuit court affirmed. On appeal, Petitioners asserted that the circuit court erred by failing to apply caselaw holding that the price paid for real estate in a recent arm's length transaction is a substantial indicator of the property's true and actual value and that the purchase of the property was in an arm's length transaction on the open real estate market. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order affirming the Board of Review, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to consider the purchase price of Petitioners' property. Remanded. View "Wright v. Banks" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between a condominium association (the Council) and one of its co-owners (Ballard) regarding the need to replace and who should bear the cost of replacement of a two-story wall of windows in Ballard's condominium. Ballard filed suit against the Council seeking damages for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. The Council, meanwhile, replaced the wall of windows and filed a lien statement and lis pendens to serve as notice that it was asserting a lien against Ballard's condominium. The Council counterclaimed. Ballard amended her complaint to assert, inter alia, a slander of title claim. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded judgment to Ballard and ordered the Council to release its lis pendens notice and statement of lien from Ballard's condominium. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Ballard's slander of title claim was properly submitted to the jury; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the Council did not have a fiduciary duty to Ballard, and therefore, the fiduciary claim should have been dismissed rather than a new trial ordered. Remanded. View "Ballard v. 1400 Willow Council of Co-Owners, Inc." on Justia Law

McCluskey executed a promissory note for $330,186, on a Naperville property, with Wells Fargo as the mortgage holder. After service in foreclosure proceedings, McCluskey did not answer or plead. An order of default and judgment of foreclosure entered. After failed negotiations on a loan modification and a rescheduled sale date, Wells Fargo was the successful bidder on the property for a price of $235,985.69. Before Wells Fargo moved to confirm the sale, McCluskey moved to vacate the default judgment and set aside the sale under section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, rather than the Foreclosure Law (15-1508(b)). The trial court denied her motion and confirmed the sale. The appellate court reversed, holding that the court could exercise discretion under civil procedure law, even after a judicial sale, if the movant could present a compelling excuse for lack of diligence and a meritorious defense. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. After a motion to confirm a judicial sale, foreclosure law governs and provides standards for exercise of discretion in dealing with a motion to vacate. At that point, it is not sufficient under the foreclosure statute to merely raise a meritorious defense to the complaint. In this case, the motion to vacate preceded the motion to confirm, so the trial court could have considered the motion to vacate under civil procedure law. Under these facts, however, the court did not err in denying the motion, even under that more liberal standard. McCluskey admitted her default, was properly served, and had notice of the default, the judgment of foreclosure, and the sale, then later raised pleading defenses for the first time.View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., v. McCluskey" on Justia Law

After prevailing against the United States on the issue of just compensation in a condemnation proceeding, Granby and Marathon appeal the district court's denial of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412. The district court concluded that, although the prelitigation position of the United States was admittedly unreasonable, the United States' overall position was substantially justified under the totality of the circumstances. The court vacated and remanded with instructions regarding how to properly weigh the government's prelitigation position in determining whether its position as a whole was substantially justified, and to consider, if necessary, whether special circumstances existed in the first instance. View "United States v. 515 Granby, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Plano adopted the 2003 International Property Maintenance Code (IMPC) as part of its local Property Maintenance Code. Appellee was charged by complaint with two violations of section 6-46 and the specific subsections of the IPMC for: (1) not maintaining the exterior of a structure in good repair and in a structurally sound manner; and (2) not supplying hot and cold running water to plumbing fixtures in a house. He was convicted of both counts after separate bench trials. Appellee appealed both cases to the county court at law for trial de novo and filed motions to dismiss the complaints because the State failed to allege that he was given notice that he was in violation of the code and then continued to violate the code as required under subsection 106.3. Appellee's motions were granted, and the State appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, which consolidated the two cases. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, holding that individual provisions of the code could not be taken in isolation and that, when taken as a whole, the code clearly required notice. The City filed a petition for discretionary review, arguing that the municipal code created two offenses: the one contained within the original IMPC and the one created by Plano that did not require notice. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether appellee was entitled to notice of violations of a municipal code before his subsequent violations of the code could result in convictions. Holding that he was, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the courts below. View "Texas v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In December 2004, Atlantic Carolina Retail, LLC loaned $3,075,000 to Monarch Development, LLC. Atlantic collateralized the loan by taking a mortgage on three properties. Atlantic purchased a title insurance policy from First American Title Insurance Company to insure these mortgage interests against potential title defects. Subsequently, Atlantic assigned the mortgages and secured debt to Preservation Capital Consultants, LLC. In 2008, Monarch Development sold its parcel and paid Preservation Capital money to release its lien on that property. Then, Monarch defaulted on its loan agreement with Preservation Capital. Preservation Capital discovered Monarch Development never owned the parcel; instead, Monarch Holdings owned it. Monarch Holdings later transferred the property to a third party without payment or notice to Preservation Capital. Preservation Capital ultimately foreclosed. Atlantic purchased the property at the foreclosure sale by way of a credit bid. After foreclosing on the parcel, Monarch Development owed Preservation Capital a remaining balance. Preservation Capital filed a claim under its policy with First American for the amount it was unable to collect on the one of the other parcels due to the title defect. First American denied coverage. Preservation Capital filed this action when First American refused its claim. Both parties moved for summary judgment. First American Title Insurance Company appealed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Preservation Capital. First American argued the circuit court misconstrued the terms of the title insurance policy in finding Preservation Capital was entitled to recover under the policy. Finding the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Preservation Capital, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Preservation Capital v. First American" on Justia Law

After Susan Cavanaugh defaulted on her loan, which was secured by a deed of trust on the home she shared with her husband, the bank that was the beneficiary of the deed of trust made two forestalled attempts at a trustee's sale. The bank then elected to proceed by judicial foreclosure. The district court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure, finding that the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a statutory right of redemption. The Supreme court affirmed, holding (1) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a one-year right of redemption because their property was foreclosed by judicial procedure rather than by advertisement and sale; and (2) the Cavanaughs were not entitled to a right of redemption because their property was a multi-family residence, as the Cavanaughs' home was a single family residence at the time the deed of trust was executed. View "Cavanaugh v. Citimortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that she possessed a prescriptive easement and an easement by implication over Defendant's property. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that she had an easement giving her the right to use a paved driveway on Defendant's property. The trial court justice found that Plaintiff had acknowledged Defendant's superior title, that she had not occupied the disputed property with hostility and under a claim of right, that she had used the disputed property openly but not notoriously, and that she did not establish an easement by implication. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the superior court with respect to Plaintiff's claim of an easement by implication; but (2) vacated the judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claim of a prescriptive easement, holding that the superior court erred in finding that Plaintiff (i) had not established that she used the disputed property in a hostile manner under a claim of right, and (ii) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that her use of the disputed property was notorious in nature. Remanded. View "Caluori v. Dexter Credit Union" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between two developers over the payment of property assessments allegedly due under certain restrictive covenants. The plaintiff-below, The Reserves Management, LLC appealed two Superior Court rulings that granted summary judgment to defendants R.T. Properties, LLC, Mountain Range, LLC, Fountain, LLC, Waterscape, LLC, and Wind Chop, LLC. In April 2005, Reserves Development LLC, together with The Reserves Development Corporation, entered into a contract to sell seventeen lots to R.T. Properties, LLC. The Sale Agreement recited that R.T. Properties was “acquiring the Property in order to construct homes thereon for sale to the general public.” In November 2005, R.T. Properties transferred all seventeen lots to four affiliated entities—Mountain Range, LLC, Fountain, LLC, Waterscape, LLC, and Wind Chop, LLC. Three years later, the declaration of the sales contract was amended that obligated each lot owner to pay approximately $4,000 to Reserves. In September 2010, Reserves filed an action in the Superior Court against R.T. Properties to enforce the payment of the assessments allegedly due. R.T. Properties moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that under the Sale Agreement, the payment of assessments for each lot was to be deferred until the lot was transferred to a third party homebuyer and a certificate of occupancy was issued. The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss, but ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties with respect to all claimed assessments, except for a sewer connection assessments. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties on a forbearance agreement defense, because material facts were in dispute. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "The Reserves Management Corporation, et al. v. R.T. Properties, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Steve and Karen Donatelli hired D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers Inc. to help the Donatellis develop their real property. Before development could be completed, the Donatellis suffered substantial financial losses and lost the property in foreclosure. The Donatellis sued D.R. Strong for breach of contract, violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. D.R. Strong moved for partial summary judgment on the CPA and negligence claims. D.R. Strong argued that the negligence claims should have been dismissed under the economic loss rule because the relationship between the parties was governed by contract and the damages claimed by the Donatellis were purely economic. The trial court and Court of Appeals held that as a matter of law, the Donatellis' negligence claims were not barred. Finding no error in that analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng'rs, Inc." on Justia Law