Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff executed a promissory note to Dollar Mortgage Corporation (DMC) secured by a mortgage on Plaintiff's real property. The mortgage was held by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee and nominee for DMC. Eventually, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company became the holder of Plaintiff's note as custodian for OneWest Bank. Later, MERS assigned Plaintiff's mortgage to the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). AFter Plaintiff defaulted on his mortgage, FNMA purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff subsequently file this action seeking declaratory relief as to the validity of the foreclosure sale and the ownership of the property, an order quieting title to the property, and damages for negligent misrepresentation. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding, among other things, that Plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of the mortgage because he was a stranger to the assignment. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to challenge the validity of the assignment of the mortgage; and (2) the superior court did not err in the remainder of its judgment. View "Mruk v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Shellie and Robert Symonds executed a lease agreement granting AT&T Mobility the right to use a portion of their property to build a wireless communication tower. The town planning board approved AT&T's application seeking approval for the project. William Horton and others appealed, and the town zoning board of appeals (ZBA) upheld the planning board's approval of AT&T's application. Horton appealed, arguing that the lease agreement created a new lot that did not meet the minimum space and setback requirements of the town's zoning ordinances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease did not create a new lot and that the setback requirements of the relevant zoning ordinance were satisfied. View "Horton v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law

The Brattons brought an action against CitiFinancial, Inc. (Citi) alleging that Citi erroneously placed a mortgage on their property and did not release the mortgage after it was notified of the error. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Brattons and awarded damages pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 382.365. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Brattons failed to comply with the requirements of section 382.365(4) because they did not give notice by certified mail. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that section 382.365 simply did not apply to the situation in this case. View "Bratton v. CitiFinancial, Inc." on Justia Law

The County of Kauai Planning Commission approved a subdivision application for a Trust's development of land in Koloa, Kauai. During the Commission's consideration of the application, the parties assumed that a historic road (Road) that the Trust needed to breach to provide access into the subdivision belonged to the County of Kauai. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint alleging several claims against Defendants, including breaches of the public trust. Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint because he discovered that the road belonged to the State and not the County and asserted two additional claims against the Trust for allegedly breaching the Road. The circuit court dismissed the claims, concluding (1) because the State had not given its approval to breach the Road, the issues raised in Plaintiff's complaint were not ripe; and (2) even if Plaintiff had claims that were ripe and severable, the court had the discretion to dismiss the claims in the interest of judicial economy. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's final judgment, holding (1) all of Plaintiff's claims were ripe for adjudication; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing claims on the basis of judicial economy. Remanded. View "Blake v. County of Kauai Planning Comm'n" on Justia Law

In each of these three consolidated cases plaintiff banks brought summary process actions against defendants, former homeowners-mortgagors, after foreclosure. Each defendant raised several defenses and counterclaims in his or her answer to the complaint, including challenges to the bank's right to possession and title as derived through foreclosure sale. Each bank filed a motion to strike the affirmative defenses and to dismiss the counterclaims, arguing that the only defenses and counterclaims available in summary process are those related to landlord-tenant relationships between the parties and those challenging title based on a failure to strictly comply with the power of sale provided in the mortgage. The housing court judge (1) granted the defendants' motions as to landlord-tenant-related defenses and counterclaims, and (2) denied the defendants' motions as to the other defenses and counterclaims, including those challenging title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the housing court has jurisdiction to hear defenses and counterclaims challenging the title of a plaintiff in a post-foreclosure summary process action and has the authority to award damages in conjunction with such counterclaims. View "Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Borrower Gregory Renshaw refinanced the mortgage on his home in 2007. Borrower did not make the payments due under the promissory note, and in 2010, the trustee under the deed of trust commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Borrower filed this action against the mortgage broker, the lender, MERS, and the trustee. Ultimately, summary judgment was granted in favor of MERS and a partial judgment was entered dismissing this action as to it. Borrower appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Renshaw v. MERS" on Justia Law

The Debtor leased a building and, during liquidation in bankruptcy, assumed the lease, 11 U.S.C. 365, and sold the leasehold interest (and other assets) to Tenant. The bankruptcy judge approved the transaction in 2007, after Landlord did not object to the Debtor’s assertion that Landlord did not have any outstanding claim against the Debtor. The approval barred any claims based on pre‐sale events. The lease requires Tenant to maintain the roof. In 2010 the Landlord sued Tenant in state court, based on that obligation. By motion in the closed bankruptcy proceeding, Tenant asked the bankruptcy court to interpret the 2007 order as blocking the claim. The bankruptcy judge concluded that the order did not affect continuing obligations such as the duty to keep leased premises in good repair; Landlord requested a prospective remedy, not damages. The district court disagreed, ruling that Landlord can enforce the good‐repair clause only to the extent that defects in the roof first occurred after the lease’s assumption in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the district court did not enter an injunction. The court expressed hope that the bankruptcy judge or the district judge will attend to several issues inherent in both opinions. View "Harrison Kishwaukee, LLC v. Rockford Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

PPM Atlantic Renewable (“PPM”) unsuccessfully requested that the Fayette County Zoning Board grant it numerous special exceptions and variances for it to build 24 windmill turbines on leased land. This matter involved whether an objector must comply with a county court order to post bond as a condition of appealing to the Commonwealth Court, where the developer was the appellant in the county court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court should not have quashed the objector's merits appeal based on the the objector's failure to post bond. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "PPM Atlantic Renewable v. Fayette County Zoning Hearing Board" on Justia Law

Appellees (husband and wife) created The Dorothy M. Miller Family Irrevocable Trust, naming Mrs. Miller as settlor, and her and her husband as co-trustees. The sole beneficiaries of the trust were appellees and their only child. Appellees transferred title to their house and farm to the trust, but did not pay realty transfer tax on the transfer, claiming it was an excluded transaction under the Realty Transfer Tax Act as a transfer to a "living trust." The Department of Revenue issued a Realty Transfer Tax Notice of Determination providing the transfer was subject to realty transfer taxes, plus applicable interest and fees. Appellees unsuccessfully petitioned for redetermination with the Department’s Board of Appeals. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that Mrs. Miller's testimony that she intended the Trust to be a substitute for her will was sufficient to define it as a living trust. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court found the Miller Trust failed to meet the statutory definition of a living trust or will substitute. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for calculation of transfer tax. View "Miller v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Bremer, LLC and KGG Partnership (collectively "Bremer") appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment to East Greenacres Irrigation District ("EGID") and the district court’s denial of several additional motions. This case arose after EGID looped its pressurized water system to a main water line extension that Bremer constructed to serve Bremer’s land. Bremer claimed the extension was an illegal tax. The district court granted EGID summary judgment on the grounds that Bremer and EGID had an agreement under I.C. 43-330A where Bremer was responsible for constructing water line improvements to serve their land. Bremer argued on appeal that the district court erred because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) whether the parties reached an agreement under I.C. 43-330A; and (2) whether EGID had authority to require Bremer to pay for the extension. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all regards. View "Bremer v. E. Greenacres Irrig Dist" on Justia Law