Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Buyers purchased two condominium units pursuant to contracts entered into in 2006. Buyers later contended that the contracts were voidable because Seller failed to maintain Buyers’ deposits in escrow in the manner required by the Condominium Act (the Act). The trial court dismissed the claims against Seller. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding (1) the contracts were voidable under the escrow provisions of the Act that were in force in 2006; and (2) the application of a 2010 amendment to the Act that was intended to have retroactive effect and that removed a statutory ground for determining that the contracts were voidable violated the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of vested contractual rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2010 amendment did not make a substantive change in the law; and (2) the contracts were not voidable under the statutory provisions in force in 2006. View "N. Carillon, LLC v. CRC 603, LLC" on Justia Law

The County Assessor reassessed two mobile home parks owned by resident-controlled nonprofit corporations after some residents sold both their mobile homes and their interests in the corporation. The mobile homes, classified as personal property, were assessed separately. The Assessor appraised the real property interest subject to reassessment by the extraction method of appraisal. The Appeal Board rejected the appraisals submitted by the Assessor and instead used those submitted by the corporations to calculate the value of the interests subject to reassessment. The Assessor filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the Assessor’s method for the taxation of changes in the mobile home ownership was not the method set out in Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 62.1(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 62.1(b) simply describes a unit of real property that is subject to reassessment and does not mandate any particular formula for appraising this unit; and (2) because the Appeal Board’s decisions were premised on an erroneously interpretation of section 62.1(b), the Appeal Board abused its discretion, and the Assessor’s petition for a writ of mandate should have been granted. View "Holland v. Assessment Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff executed a promissory note secured by a mortgage on his property. After Plaintiff defaulted on the loan, foreclosure proceedings commenced. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Then then-holder of the mortgage sought relief from the automatic stay imposed by bankruptcy law. Relief from the stay was given in two bankruptcy cases filed by Plaintiff, the second of which was initiated after a foreclosure sale had been completed. Plaintiff then filed an action seeking a declaration that the foreclosure deed was void and that he owned the property in fee simple absolute. The superior court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff based on the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded from raising issues regarding the foreclosure again in the superior court after the propriety of the foreclosure was examined by the bankruptcy court and the foreclosure sale was declared valid. View "Reynolds v. First NLC Fin. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal from Chancery Court, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether plaintiff Ralph Saulters alleged sufficient ownership interest in a disputed piece of land to sustain his complaint to clear title to his alleged remainder interest; whether the various allegations in his complaint fell under the ten-year statute of limitations to recover land or the general three-year statute of limitations governing fraud; and whether the relevant statute of limitations had expired. The chancellor denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff's valid claims were not time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s holding that the claim to quiet title was not barred by the statute of limitations. However, because any claims for actual and punitive damages were barred as untimely, the Court reversed the chancellor’s holding as applied to plaintiff's claims for damages. View "Lott v. Saulters" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a forty-nine acre parcel of land. After the County of Hawai’i and the County Planning Director (collectively, County Defendants) gave the subject property’s owners approval to subdivide the property, Plaintiff, an adjacent land owner, filed an action challenging the subdivision approval. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment on all counts for the County Defendants, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed in this case. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for an order dismissing the case, concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to act on the complaint. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded to the ICA for consideration of the remaining issues raised by Plaintiff in his appeal, holding that Appellant did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Kellberg v. Yuen" on Justia Law

In 2008, the county auditor assigned a value of approximately $5 million to certain property located in the Mason City School District. The former owner of the property subsequently filed a valuation complaint seeking a reduction from the auditor’s valuation. The Warren County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the value. The Mason City School District Board of Education appealed. After a hearing, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) raised the value of the property, concluding that the 2006 sale price of $5,350,000 was the value of the property as of 2008. After the BTA hearing and before the BTA issued its decision, Squire Hill Properties II, LLC acquired the property. Squire Hill appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding (1) under the circumstances, the BTA was not required to give Squire Hill notice of the BTR hearing; but (2) the BTA erred by not properly considering the finding of the BOR that the 2006 sale was not recent in regard to the tax-lien date. Remanded. View "Mason City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Warren County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Ruby Valley National Bank (RVNB) obtained and recorded a deed of trust (DOT) on certain real property subsequent to a previously recorded DOT. Wells Fargo Delaware Trust Co. (Wells Fargo) claimed to be the beneficiary of the first DOT. RVNB filed for judicial foreclosure of its interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for RVNB, holding that RVNB’s DOT was entitled to priority over the earlier DOT held by Wells Fargo because Wells Fargo had not proven the elements necessary for judicial foreclosure and was unable to do so because its trial witness and exhibit list had been stricken. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Wells Fargo was not required to file a counterclaim for foreclosure to protect its interest in the property; and (2) because the undisputed facts established that Wells Fargo was the current beneficiary of the first DOT, the undisputed facts established that Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that its indenture held priority over RVNB’s indenture. View "Ruby Valley Nat'l Bank v. Wells Fargo Del. Trust Co., N.A." on Justia Law

Then-owners of real property entered into a “Waiver of Right to Protest” the creation of special improvement districts (SIDs) for the purpose of making road and intersection improvements to Cottonwood Road between Huffine Lane and West Babcock Street. The waiver stated that the parties to the waiver would participate in alternate financing methods for completion of the road improvements if the SIDs were not utilized. No SIDs were implemented, and Covenant Investments, Inc. (Covenant) undertook and paid for all improvements to the intersection of Huffine and Cottonwood. First Security Bank (FSB), a successor to the original covenantor, subsequently constructed a building at the intersection. After FSB refused to reimburse Covenant for the costs of the street improvements, Covenant sued FSB seeking enforcement of the waiver agreement. The district court dismissed Covenant’s complaint, concluding that the waiver did not contain the essential elements of a contract and therefore did not bind FSB. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding (1) the waiver’s alternative financing provision was void for lack of certainty, (2) by acting unilaterally Covenant waived its right to belatedly demand enforcement of the waiver provision, and (3) Covenant’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Covenant Invs., Inc. v. First Sec. Bank" on Justia Law

The City of Boonville passed an ordinance to annex 1,165 acres of real estate located west of the city limits. Later that year, numerous landowners opposed to the annexation filed written remonstrance and complaint for declaratory relief. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that the Landowners did not satisfy the statutory requirement that at least sixty-five percent of landowners in the annexed territory sign the remonstrance. At issue in this case was whether the sixty-five percent remonstrance threshold was to be determined by separately counting the multiple parcels acquired by the State for an adjoining public roadway or collectively as one parcel. The trial court ultimately determined that the threshold was not satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the land in this case, which comprised the portion of the public roadway included in the annexed territory, should be considered and counted as a single parcel in determining whether the remonstrating landowners comprised sixty-five percent of the owners of the annexed territory. View "Am. Cold Storage v. City of Boonville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land that was subject to and had the benefit of several easements, including Way A, which was created so the easement holder could access his lot, which otherwise had no direct access from a public way. Defendant held title to three lots over which Way A extended and made improvements that protruded to some extent into Way A. Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting acts of encroachment upon its right to use the easement over Way A. The Land Court judge found that Defendant had no obligation to remove any of the encroachments. The Appeals Court reversed in part, concluding that because Plaintiff’s parcel was held under a Land Court certificate of registration, the dimensions of all easements appurtenant to it indicated on the Land Court plan were immutable, and therefore, Plaintiff had had right of access over the full width of Way A as shown on the plan. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Land Court judge, holding that the width of the easement may be reduced since Plaintiff did not dispute that he had been able to use the remaining unobstructed portion of the easement for the purpose of travel to and from his parcel. View "Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC" on Justia Law