Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After the City initiated a "quick take" proceeding to take the property of Clear Sky Car Wash, Clear Sky filed suit to challenge the City's actions. Clear Sky alleged that the City's conduct violated the mandatory real property acquisition policies set forth in the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA), 42 U.S.C. 4651, which were applicable to state agencies when, as here, federal funds were involved. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss. The court affirmed, concluding that section 4651 did not create enforceable rights. Therefore, Clear Sky lacked any basis for a private action to remedy violations under the URA. Further, 42 U.S.C. 1983 did not give Clear Sky enforceable rights to file suit. The court rejected Clear Sky's argument that it had an Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., claim against the USDOT to require it to enforce the policies of section 4651. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Clear Sky Car Wash LLC v. City of Chesapeake, VA" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a continuing dispute between Appellants, David and Connie Finneman and Rock Creek Farms Partnership (RCF), and Ann Arnoldy concerning the ownership of 16,700 acres of farmland. After a series of lawsuits, appeals, and various filings, the circuit court granted Arnoldy equitable ownership of the real estate outlined in two contracts for deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, primarily, that the circuit court did not err in granting Arnoldy equitable ownership of the real estate in the contracts for deed and the right to cure the contracts for deed default under S.D. Codified Laws 21-50-3. View "L&L P'ship v. Rock Creek Farms" on Justia Law

Appellant purchased property in 2004 for $7.4 million. For the tax-year 2006, the County auditor set the value at $8 million. Appellant filed a complaint with the County Board of Revision (BOR) seeking a decrease in value to $5 million, an amount close to the sale price of the property in 2003. After a hearing, the BOR reduced the property value from $8 million to the 2004 sale price of $7.4 million. Appellant appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA upheld the $7.4 million sale price as the best evidence of value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA’s decision to adopt the $7.4 million sale price from 2004 as the property’s value for the tax-year 2006 was not unreasonable or unlawful. View "HIN, LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The Town Assessor valued Taxpayer’s real property at $27,500, classified the property as “productive forest land,” and assessed the property at $27,500. Taxpayer claimed that the Assessor’s classification of his property was erroneous and that the Town Board of Review should change the classification to “undeveloped land,” which would result in an assessment of $13,750. The Board refused to lower the assessment. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the evidence that the Board received, the Board could reasonably conclude that Taxpayer did not demonstrate that the classification was incorrect and that the assessment should be lowered. View "Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Homeowners filed a complaint against the County and certain Developers, alleging that the Mayor had unlawfully exempted certain projects from a height restriction law (“Law”). On December 31, 2008, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Homeowners and entered an order for declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court subsequently denied Homeowners’ request for attorneys’ fees under the private attorney general doctrine. After the parties appealed, the Maui County Council passed a bill making the Mayor’s previously illegal conduct legal. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) (1) vacated the circuit court’s December 31, 2008 order because the Law issue was frustrated based on mootness, and (2) concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court (1) vacated that portion of the ICA’s judgment that vacated the circuit court’s judgments and order, holding (i) when a case is mooted while on appeal, the appellate could should remand the case to the trial court for a consideration of the vacatur issue, and (ii) the ICA did not properly analyze the vacatur issue; and (2) affirmed that portion of the ICA’s judgment that affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Homeowners’ request for attorneys’ fees. Remanded. View "Goo v. Arakawa" on Justia Law

The Zavadils alleged they loaned Jon and Hollie Rud $32,000 under an April 2008 verbal agreement. The loan was to be repaid when the Ruds sold their home or within six months. When the Ruds failed to repay the loan, the Zavadils agreed to renew and extend the original verbal loan agreement. In 2009, the Ruds executed a third mortgage on their property in favor of the Zavadils, and on a few months later, the Ruds executed a promissory note for $32,000 plus interest due and payable to the Zavadils a year later. The Ruds divorced in June 2009, between executions of the third mortgage and the promissory note. The Zavadils sued the Ruds to foreclose the third mortgage after the Ruds failed to make all payments required under the promissory note. Wells Fargo Bank subsequently brought an action against the Ruds, the Zavadils and others to foreclose its first position mortgage on the property. The Zavadils admitted their third mortgage was subordinate to the bank's mortgage on the property and stipulated to dismissal of their foreclosure action against the Ruds. Jon Rud appealed the grant of summary judgment that awarded Zavadils $33,490.19 in their action to recover on the promissory note. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in ruling no genuine issues of material fact existed and the Zavadils were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Zavadil v. Rud" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs entered into a loan agreement with Potomac Realty Capital LLC (PRC) to rehabilitate and renovate certain property. As security for the loan, NV One granted a mortgage on the property. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against PRC, asserting violations of the Rhode Island usury law, among other claims. The trial justice granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs with respect to the usury claim, entered an order declaring the loan usurious and void, and voided the mortgage. At issue on appeal was whether a usury savings clause in the loan document validated the otherwise usurious contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their usury claim because (1) the loan was a usury; and (2) the usury savings clause was unenforceable on public policy grounds. View "NV One, LLC v. Potomac Realty Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner purchased an apartment building on Staten Island. Petitioner’s parents lived in the building, and Petitioner stayed in their apartment on occasion to attend to their medical needs. Petitioner leased the other two apartments in the building to tenants. For the tax years in question, Petitioner filed nonresident income tax returns in New York. The Department of Taxation and Finance later issued a notice of deficiency, determining that Petitioner owed additional New York income taxes because he maintained a “permanent place of abode” at the Staten Island property during the relevant years. The Tax Appeals Tribunal sustained the deficiency, concluding that in order to qualify as a statutory resident under the Tax Law, a taxpayer need not actually dwell in the permanent place of abode but need only maintain it. Petitioner challenged the Tribunal’s determination, contending that the standard to be applied when determining whether a person “maintains a permanent place of abode” in New York should turn on whether he maintained living arrangements for himself to reside at the dwelling. The Court of Appeals agreed with Petitioner, holding that in order for an individual to qualify as a statutory resident, there must be some basis to conclude that the dwelling was utilized as the taxpayer’s residence. View "Gaied v. N.Y. State Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

Petitioners owned thirty-six acres of land in Hampden. The Division of Fisheries and Wildlife (Division), a unit of the Department of Environmental Protection, restricted Petitioners’ ability to construct a home on their land by delineating the property as a “priority habitat” for the eastern box turtle, a “species of special concern” under 321 Mass. Code Regs. 10.90. Petitioners challenged the validity of the priority habitat regulations insofar as they allowed the Division to designate priority habitat without affording landowners the procedural protections due under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act (MESA) to those owning property within significant habitats. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the Division, concluding that the regulations did not exceed the scope of the Division’s authority as granted by MESA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the priority habitat regulations were a reasonable implementation of the enabling statute. View "Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

A commercial tenant (Tenant) remained in possession of property for over ten years after Tenant lost its lease when the property was sold through foreclosure. The new owner (Owner) continually insisted that Tenant vacate the premises, and Tenant ultimately conceded that it had become a tenant at sufferance. Owner filed suit against Tenant, alleging claims for breach of the terminated lease, for trespass and other torts, and for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The trial court entered summary judgment for Tenant on all claims. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) a tenant at sufferance cannot be liable for breach of a previously terminated lease agreement; (2) a tenant at sufferance is trespassing and can be liable in tort, including tortious interference with prospective business relations; (3) Tenant in this case could not be liable under the DTPA; and (4) Owner in this case could not recover attorney’s fees under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. View "Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp." on Justia Law