Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Barley Mill, LLC appealed a Court of Chancery judgment invalidating a vote of the New Castle County Council on a rezoning ordinance. Barley Mill planned to develop a piece of property to house office space and a regional shopping mall. The increase in traffic associated with the development was of considerable concern to both the public and members of the Council itself. But the Council was advised that: (1) it could not obtain the traffic information and analysis that Barley Mill was required to provide to the Delaware Department of Transportation as part of the overall rezoning process before the Council exercised its discretionary authority to vote on the rezoning ordinance; and (2) that the traffic information was not legally relevant to the Council's analysis. That advice was incorrect and there were no legal barriers that prevented the Council from obtaining the information or considering it before casting its discretionary vote on the rezoning ordinance. After the rezoning ordinance was approved, nearby resident homeowners and Save Our County, Inc. challenged the zoning ordinance, arguing that not only was the Council allowed to consider the traffic information, but the New Castle County Unified Development Code required it to consider that information before its vote. They also argued that, even if the Council was not required to consider the information before the vote, the vote on the rezoning ordinance was arbitrary and capricious because the Council had received erroneous legal advice that the information was both unavailable and irrelevant at the time the Council cast its vote. The Court of Chancery held that the mistake of law caused the Council to vote without first obtaining the information, rendering the vote arbitrary and capricious. On appeal, Barley Mill argued that the Court of Chancery erred when it invalidated the Council's vote. Save Our County and New Castle County cross-appealed, arguing that the Court of Chancery erred in holding that neither 9 Del C. Sec. 2662 nor the UDC required the Council to consider a traffic analysis before casting its discretionary vote on the rezoning ordinance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's decision. View "Barley Mill, LLC v. Save Our County, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, IndyMac Bank foreclosed on a certain property. JAS, Inc. purchased the property and subsequently initiated a quiet title action. Defendants Countrywide Home Loans and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) defaulted. Bank of America (BOA), which had acquired Countrywide in 2008, was not named as a party defendant and did not appear in the proceeding. Final judgment was issued quieting title to the property in JAS’s name. Countrywide and MERS subsequently moved to have the entries of default entered against them set aside, and BOA filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding and sought to have the default entered against Countrywide set aside. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in granting BOA’s motions to intervene and to set aside the default judgment entered against Countywide, as BOA met the express requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and Countrywide had no present interest in the subject property at the time suit was filed; and (2) did not manifestly abuse its discretion by granting MERS’s motion to set aside the default judgment entered against it, as MERS established good cause to set aside the default judgment. View "JAS, Inc. v. Eisele" on Justia Law

Appellant filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that a gravel road running along the edge of his property belonged to him and was not a public road. The trial court granted summary judgment against Appellant, concluding that the road was a public county road by operation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 228.190.2, which provides that a road for which a county receives county aid road trust funds for at least five years is “conclusively deemed to be a public county road.” The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding that because Appellant failed to show he had a current ownership interest in the strip of land on which the road runs, Appellant failed to show an interest in the lawsuit sufficient to give him standing to bring this action. View "Brehm v. Bacon Township" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a forfeiture order in connection with a conviction for, inter alia, three counts of mortgage fraud (Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine). At issue was whether the district court erred by ordering forfeiture on Count Seven under a statute which, while applicable to Count Seven, was onlly charged in the indictment in connection with Counts Eight and Nine - an oversight that was not corrected by the Government or the district court before or during sentencing. The court concluded that forfeiture was limited to that authorized by the statute listed in the indictment, even if greater forfeiture would have been authorized by a different statute, where the government fails to invoke the harsher forfeiture provision prior to or during sentencing; 28 U.S.C. 982(a) authorizes forfeiture of the full amount of the loans fraudulently obtained in Counts Eight and Nine, without an offset for any portion of the loan that has been repaid; and 28 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(c), the only forfeiture provision charged in Count Seven, permitted an offset for that portion of the loan that was repaid with no loss to the victim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the forfeiture order on Counts Eight and Nine, and remanded with instructions to vacate the forfeiture order on Count Seven. View "United States v. Annabi" on Justia Law

The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, 31 U.S.C. 6301, states that an executive agency must use: “a procurement contract . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to acquire … property or services for the direct benefit or use” of the government and must adhere to the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation However, an “agency shall use a cooperative agreement . . . when . . . the principal purpose … is to transfer a thing of value … to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation … instead of acquiring . . . property or service” and can avoid procurement laws. Under Section 8 of the Housing Act, HUD provides rental assistance, including entering Housing Assistance Program (HAP) contracts and paying subsidies directly to private landlords. A 1974 amendment gave HUD the option of entering an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) with a Public Housing Agency (PHA), which would enter into HAP contracts with owners and pay subsidies with HUD funds. In 1983, HUD’s authority was amended. HUD could administer existing HAP contracts, and enter into new HAP contracts for existing Section 8 dwellings by engaging a PHA if possible, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(b)(1). Later, HUD began outsourcing services and initiated a competition to award a performance-based ACC to a PHA in each state, with the PHA to assume “all contractual rights and responsibilities of HUD.” After making an award, HUD chose to re-compete, seeking greater savings, expressly referring to “cooperative agreements,” outside the scope of procurement law. The Government Accountability Office agreed with protestors that the awards were procurement contracts. HUD disregarded that recommendation. The Claims Court denied a request to set aside the award. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the awards are procurement contracts, not cooperative agreements.View "CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Smiths appealed from the district court's order condemning portions of their property for the construction of a natural gas pipeline owned and operated by Alliance and granting Alliance immediate use and possession of the condemned land. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Smiths' statutory challenges based on 18 C.F.R. 157.6(d) and North Dakota Administrative Code (NDAC) 69-06-08-01. The court also concluded that the Smiths received reasonable notice that Alliance was applying to FERC for the right to condemn their land; the court rejected the Smiths' allegation that Alliance violated several state procedural rules in bringing the condemnation action because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1 preempted all of these state procedures; Alliance satisfied any duty to negotiate with the Smiths in good faith pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717f(h); and the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Alliance was entitled to immediate use and possession pursuant to Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. 4.360 Acres of Land, et al." on Justia Law

Liquidators challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Brazil, concluding that a forfeiture judgment entered by a Brazilian court pursuant to Brazil's successful criminal prosecution of Kesten's former principals and owners took precedence over the Liquidators' Cayman Islands civil default judgment against Kesten. The court concluded that the penal law rule awarding summary judgment in favor of Brazil based on a forfeiture judgment of that sovereign grounded in a violation of Brazil's penal laws; however, the court recognized that 28 U.S.C. 2467 is a statutory exception to the penal rule; while no section 2467 request from Brazil is presently before the Attorney General, that nation's counsel advised the court at oral argument that if the challenged summary judgment decision were vacated based on the penal law rule, Brazil would promptly file a section 2467 petition pursuant to the nations' mutual legal assistance treaty; and therefore, the court remanded with instructions to the district court that it afford Brazil and the Attorney General a reasonable period of time to satisfy the section 2467's exception to that rule before reaching a final decision in this interpleader action. View "Federative Republic of Brazil v. Fu" on Justia Law

Kenneth Jakeman appealed the trial court's dismissal of his claims against defendants Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, Montgomery Memorial Cemetery ("MMC"), and Judy A. Jones. Lawrence Group owned and operated Montgomery Memorial Cemetery. Lawrence Group purchased the cemetery from Alderwoods, Inc. in or around 2002. In 1967, Jakeman's father, Ben, purchased a 'family plot' in the cemetery containing 10 separate burial spaces. The plot Ben selected was specifically chosen because of its location adjacent to plots owned by Ben's mother, Frances O'Neal. Pursuant to the terms of the purchase agreement, burial within Ben's plot was limited to members of either the Jakeman family or the O'Neal family. In 2002, MMC allegedly mistakenly conveyed two spaces in Ben's family plot to James Jones and his wife, Judy. James was interred in one of those two spaces. In 2006, Kenneth Jakeman learned that James had been buried in Ben's family plot, at which time, Kenneth says, he immediately notified MMC and Ben. In response to demands by Kenneth and Ben, MMC disinterred James and moved both his body and his marker; however, James was reinterred in another space on Ben's family plot. Ben died in 2008. At the time of Ben's death, James's body remained buried in one of the spaces in Ben's plot. Despite the offer of an exchange of burial spaces, and based upon their purported refusal to again exhume and move James's body and marker, in May 2010 Kenneth Jakeman filed suit against Alderwoods, Lawrence Group, MMC, and Judy Jones, alleging breach of contract; trespass; negligence, willfulness, and/or wantonness; the tort of outrage; and conversion. In her answer to Kenneth's complaint, Judy asserted her own cross-claim against Alderwoods, Lawrence Group, and MMC, based on their alleged error in conveying to her spaces already owned by Ben and the initial erroneous burial of James, his disinterment, and his subsequent erroneous reburial in another of Ben's spaces. Alderwoods moved to dismiss Kenneth Jakeman's complaint, arguing he lacked 'standing' to pursue the stated claims, that the asserted tort claims did not survive Ben's death, and that some of the claims were barred by the expiration of the applicable limitations periods. Lawrence Group and MMC later joined Alderwoods's dismissal motion. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that Kenneth Jakeman was entitled to pursue his individual breach-of-contract claim concerning MMC's reinterment of James Jones in one of the his family's plots, and that he was entitled to pursue his claim for injunctive relief. View "Jakeman v. Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, et al. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the owner of two adjacent unimproved lots in the town of Scituate. The lots were located in a flood plain and watershed protection district (FPWP district). Plaintiff applied for special permits from the Town’s planning board to construct residential dwellings on the lots. The Board denied the applications, concluding that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that her lots were not “subject to flooding” within the meaning of the applicable zoning bylaw. A land court judge affirmed the Board’s decision. The appeals court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the appeals court adopted an incorrect definition of the phrase “subject to flooding,” and the land court judge adopted the correct meaning of the phrase. View "Doherty v. Planning Bd. of Scituate" on Justia Law

After the Unified School District No. 365 initiated condemnation proceedings on property owned by Donald and Susan Diebolt, the trial judge appointed three appraisers, who valued the property at $278,800. During the trial, the trial court allowed Donald to express a valuation opinion as to the property but excluded Donald’s testimony regarding the value of the property that was not relevant to the jury’s determination and that was beyond Donald’s expertise. The Diebolts appealed the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence, where Donald was not qualified to perform a cost appraisal and did not have appraisal expertise. View "Unified Sch. Dist. No. 365 v. Diebolt" on Justia Law