Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1967, Severt Kvalheim conveyed certain real property to Gordon Holsti by warranty deed. Kvalheim reserved fifty percent of the mineral rights for himself. That same year, Kvalheim executed a will devising to each of his heirs a one-eighth interest in his estate. Kvalheim died in 1969. In 2007, Gordon Holsti conveyed the surface estate to his sons (the Holstis). Believing Kvalheim’s mineral interest had lapsed and been abandoned because of nonuse, the Holstis published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the official county newspaper. When no one filed a statement of claim asserting ownership of the mineral interest severed from the property, the Holstis brought a quiet title action. The circuit court ruled that the Holstis were the owners of the entire mineral interest, concluding (1) Kvalheim’s mineral interest had been abandoned under section S.D. Codified Laws 43-30A-2, -3; and (2) the Holstis gave proper notice of the lapse of the mineral interest even though they did not serve notice of the lapse on Kvalheim’s heirs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mineral interests were not abandoned under section 43-30A-2. Remanded. View "Holsti v. Kimber" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellants entered into a mortgage with Countrywide Home Loans that secured a promissory note in the amount of $165,750 and encumbered certain property. Plaintiffs later refinanced the loan by executing a promissory note in favor of Countrywide in the amount of $236,900 and executed a mortgage in the property in favor of BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP. In 2009, Appellants defaulted under the terms of the subject note and mortgage. In 2011, BAC filed an amended complaint to foreclose the mortgage. The circuit court granted BAC’s motion for summary judgment. The court also awarded attorney fees to BAC and reformed the mortgage by changing the legal description. The property was subsequently sold to BAC at a sheriff’s sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting BAC summary judgment to foreclose the mortgage; (2) the circuit court did not err in awarding BAC attorney fees and costs; and (3) the circuit court’s revision of the mortgage reflected the true intention of the parties and therefore, was not error. View "BAC Homes Loans Servicing, LP v. Trancynger" on Justia Law

Lessee leased property owned by Owners pursuant to a lease agreement. A billboard was located on the property that had been declared illegal because it exceeded the permitted height limitations. Lessee and Owners filed a joint application for a variance with the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) to allow the billboard to remain at its existing height. The BZA denied the variance. The circuit court upheld the BZA’s decision. Lessee appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by applying an improper standard of review when considering the BZA’s decision to deny the request for a variance. Remanded. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

The City of Richmond brought an enforcement action against the owners of real property (Owners) and the lessee of the property (Lessee), seeking removal of a billboard that Lessee maintained on the property, or, in the alternative, an order requiring the billboard to be lowered to a conforming height. Owners and Lessee filed separate complaints for declaratory judgment against the City, alleging that the City could not require removal of the billboard if the City had been paid taxes for more than fifteen years pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2307. The circuit court sustained the demurrers filed by the City and dismissed the complaint, concluding that section 15.2-2307 was “merely enabling” legislation and that private property owners did not have the statutory vested rights protections unless a local government chose to adopt an implementing ordinance thereunder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by holding that section 15.2-2307 was “merely enabling” legislation. View "Lamar Co., LLC v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

Jerry Ferguson constructed a causeway extending to an island in the Rappahannock River. Plaintiffs later acquired the property adjacent to the island and causeway and all riparian rights appurtenant to the shoreline. In 1988, Ferguson acquired the island and causeway via quitclaim deed. In 2006, Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a judgment against Ferguson for interfering with their riparian rights. The suit ended with a settlement agreement in which Ferguson agreed to purchase Plaintiffs’ shoreline property. Ferguson defaulted on his payment. In 2010, the circuit court entered an order concluding that Plaintiffs were the owners of the shoreline property and Ferguson owned no shoreline property or riparian rights in the area claimed by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an ejectment action against Ferguson alleging that his oyster house on the island was located within their riparian zone. The circuit court awarded Plaintiffs fee simple possession of the oyster house. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that Ferguson could not rely on Va. Code Ann. 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) to defeat Plaintiffs’ claim for ejectment or to establish ownership rights in the bottomlands under the island and causeway; and (2) the circuit court did not err in ordering Ferguson to vacate the oyster house. View "Ferguson v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, acting as subcontractor to Builder, performed work on a property in the City of Providence owned by Owner and leased by Lessee. A dispute subsequently arose regarding payment, and Plaintiff sought to enforce a mechanics’ lien against Owner, Lessee, and Builder. After Owner and Lessee deposited a bond, with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as surety, the superior court discharged the lien. Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to add Liberty as a defendant. Plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment on the mechanics’ lien claim. The trial justice denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment in favor of Owner and Lessee. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in entering judgment in favor of Owner and Lessee because they, as well as Builder and Liberty, were all directly liable to it for any rights it had under the lien statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of the mechanics’ lien statute mandates the dismissal and discharge of the lien once a bond, which replaces the property as security for the claim, is deposited with the registry of the court. View "Nat'l Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital Props., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of four felonies, with forfeiture specifications, for running a marijuana-distribution operation out of a building he and his brothers owned on Scranton Road. Common Pleas Court Judge Nancy McDonnell issued a sentencing entry listing the property at Scranton Road as property to be forfeited. On October 11, 2011, Appellant appealed the sentencing order. On January 13, 2012, Judge McDonnell issued a journal entry reiterating Appellant’s sentence and ordering transfer of the property. On October 23, 2012, Appellant sought a writ of prohibition to vacate Judge McDonnell’s January 13, 2012 order, arguing that Judge McDonnell lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. The court of appeals dismissed Appellant’s petition, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 2981.04 vested Judge McDonnell with jurisdiction to conduct forfeiture proceedings even after the notice of appeal was filed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McDonnell did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that any errors in the proceedings should be addressed on appeal. View "State ex rel. West v. McDonnell" on Justia Law

Ozark Mountain Regional Public Water Authority filed a complaint for condemnation and declaration of taking, seeking to take property owned by Appellants. That same day, Ozark deposited $66,986, the fair-market-appraisal amount of the property, with the clerk of court. Appellants challenged the amount deposited, claiming it was not sufficient compensation. After a trial, the jury awarded Appellants $341,500 in compensation for the property. Thereafter, Appellants filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 18-15-605(b). The circuit court denied the motion, finding that section 18-15-605(b) was not applicable to Appellants’ case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that section 18-15-605(b) was not applicable to Appellants’ case and in thereby denying Appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees. View "Giles v. Ozark Mountain Reg'l Pub. Water Auth." on Justia Law

In 2006, the City of Phoenix started installing light rail tracks along Jefferson Street, which abutted Appellant’s property. As part of the installation, the City erected a permanent concrete barrier between the tracks and Appellant’s property, thus blocking two driveways providing vehicular access from Jefferson Street to Appellant’s property. The property, however, still had access via Madison Street. The City subsequently filed an eminent domain action to determine the compensation it owed to Appellant for a temporary construction easement Appellant granted the City. Appellant counterclaimed, seeking damages for his permanent loss of access to Jefferson Street. The superior court granted summary judgment to the City on that claim, concluding that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for loss of access if he retains “free and convenient access” to the property. The court of appeals vacated the superior court’s ruling, concluding that the government may not eliminate a property owner’s established access to an abutting roadway without providing just compensation to the property owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, an owner may claim compensable damage to private property within the meaning of Ariz. Const. art. II, 17, even if other streets provide access to the property. View "City of Phoenix v. Garretson" on Justia Law

Debtor transferred her interest in real property to AGC, a corporation wholly owned by her husband. Seven months later, debtor declared bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court concluded that the conveyance was constructively fraudulent. The bankruptcy court found AGC did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it paid for the property or intended to pay for it on the date of the property's purchase. The bankruptcy court also found that, at the time of the purchase, the parties intended that AGC would serve as the property's tenant, not the property's owner. AGC also did not prove that it intended to own the property on the date of acquisition. Therefore, the bankruptcy court found no justification for a resulting trust. The district court found no fault in the bankruptcy court's findings of fact, but nonetheless reversed. The court reversed the district court insofar as it found a resulting trust to sever debtor's legal and equitable interests in the property. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Architectural Glass Construction" on Justia Law