Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented to the Georgia Supreme Court centered on a dispute over the legal ownership of mineral rights to land located in Bartow County. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that appellee James Dellinger, Jr. held a legally enforceable interest in the mineral rights and granted summary judgment in his favor on claims filed by appellant Cartersville Ranch, LLC. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in the main appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Cartersville Ranch, LLC v. Dellinger" on Justia Law

The Board of Commissioners of the County of Teller filed a petition seeking the district court's review of the City of Woodland Park's annexation of certain real property. Upon review of the petition and the district court's order denying the City's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order: the district court indeed did not have jurisdiction to review the County's petition under 31-12-116 C.R.S. (2013). View "County of Teller Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Woodland Park" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Town after a decade of dealing with the Town in plaintiff's efforts to apply for subdivision approval. The court reversed the district court's decision to dismiss plaintiff's federal takings claims, concluding that his claim became ripe because of the way the Town handled his application under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City where the Town employed a decade of unfair and repetitive procedures, which made seeking a final decision futile. The Town also unfairly manipulated the litigation of the case in a way that might have prevented plaintiff from ever bringing his takings claim. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's non-takings claims based on ripeness grounds and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim, to deny plaintiff leave to amend to add a 42 U.S.C. 1982 claim, and to dismiss plaintiff's procedural due process claim based on the consultants' fee law. View "Sherman v. Town of Chester" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James and Elise Brault appealed a trial court's order granting judgment to defendant Jeanne Welch in a dispute over a right-of-way. The deed in question purported to convey "a right of way five feet wide leading to the lake along the existing block wall and southerly thereof." The court found this language unambiguous. Its plain meaning was that the right-of-way was located on the south side of the block wall. The court explained that the words "southerly thereof" modified the term right-of-way, and it found this interpretation strongly reinforced by the word "thereof," which meant "of that" or "concerning that." In arguing that the right-of-way had to be located on the northern side of the block wall, the Braults asserted that the words "southerly thereof" modified the words "the existing block wall," that is, the block wall was "southerly" of the right of way. The court found this to be an unreasonable interpretation of the deed language, and one that was inconsistent with how English was spoken and read. The Braults maintained that language in the original deed from the Griffiths to their son and daughter-in-law, "southerly thereof" must mean that the right-of-way was actually northerly of the block wall, primarily because a location northerly of the wall avoided any encroachment over the property line with the neighboring lot. The difficulty with the Braults' argument, the court explained, was that it violated the parol evidence rule. The court found that the question of the circumstances that might have produced the disputed provision in the deed also suffered from a shortage of evidence. Because the exact dimensions of the Welch lot were not established, the court found that it was not known whether the block wall marked the exact boundary on the south side of the lot. Nor could the court discern what circumstances led to the use of the word "southerly thereof" due to "a shortage of evidence." The court concluded that the Braults failed to meet their burden of proof, and it entered judgment in Welch's favor. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Braults maintained that the trial court should have found the description of the right-of-way to be ambiguous because it was a simple scrivener's error that misstated which side of the wall the easement is on. Finding no error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Brault v. Welch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the recipients of a home equity loan, reached two loan modification agreements with Defendant, which reduced the interest rate and payments. Plaintiffs subsequently brought this class action against Defendant in the United States District Court, alleging that the loan modifications violated Tex. Const. art. XVI, 50, which sets forth requirements for a new home equity loan. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asked the Supreme Court whether the requirements of Article XVI, Section 50 apply to the type of loan restructuring in this case. The Supreme Court answered that, as long as the original note is not satisfied and replaced, and there is no additional extension of credit, the Constitution does not prohibit the restructuring of a home equity loan that already meets its requirements in order to avoid foreclosure. View "Sims v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a home. To finance the transaction, Plaintiffs executed a note payable to Accredited Home Lenders. The note was secured by a mortgage on the property naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee. MERS assigned the mortgage to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. Because Plaintiffs stopped making their payments as set forth in the note Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the property. Accredited REO Properties purchased the property. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief seeking orders declaring that they were owners of the property as a matter of law and that the foreclosure sale, conveyance, and assignment were void. Defendants - MERS, Deutsche Bank, Accredited REO Properties, Accredited Home Lenders, and others - filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a legal and valid foreclosure occurred in this case. View "Moura v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Frederick Carrozza, Sr. filed a petition seeking to impose a resulting trust on four properties and caused notices of lis pendens to be filed with respect to each of the properties at issue. Counterclaimants, in turn, filed a counterclaim alleging slander of title. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Counterclaimants with respect to the resulting trust issue. After a trial on the slander of title counterclaim, the trial justice held the counterclaim defendants - Frederick Sr. and his three living children - liable for slander of title. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in all respects except that part of the judgment awarding $845,00 in punitive damages, holding that the award of punitive damages should be reduced to $422,500. View "Carrozza v. Voccola" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Roe appealed circuit court decision awarding plaintiffs Leigh Mae Friedline and Zebadiah Kellogg-Roe a writ of possession. In 1959, the defendant purchased property in Greenville. In 1971, he conveyed the property to Brookwood Ecology Center, Inc. Brookwood reconveyed the house and barn on the property to defendant in 1999. In 2004, defendant conveyed the house and barn to his son, plaintiff Kellogg-Roe. In 2009, Kellogg-Roe transferred a twenty percent interest in the buildings to Friedline. That same year, Kellogg-Roe gave Friedline a power of attorney to act as his agent. Defendant has lived on the property since he purchased it. In 2012, Friedline served him with an eviction notice, ordering him to vacate the premises within thirty days. Although the eviction notice stated that the buildings were owned by both Kellogg-Roe and Friedline, only Friedline signed the notice. When defendant did not vacate the premises, plaintiffs filed a landlord and tenant writ. Following a hearing, the district division awarded plaintiffs a writ of possession. On appeal, defendant argued that he properly asserted a plea of title and, consequently, the district division erred by not transferring the case to superior court. He further argued that the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling on the issues raised in his plea of title. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the district division had jurisdiction in this case. Rather than providing defendant with the opportunity to enter his action in superior court, the district division held a hearing during which it addressed, among other issues, the merits of his claim to a life estate in the property. Because jurisdiction to resolve questions of title and matters of equity lies with the superior court, the Supreme Court concluded the district division erred by ruling on this claim. Consequently, the Court vacated the district division’s order. View "Friedline v. Roe" on Justia Law

Appellant-mortgagee filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on property owned by Appellees-mortgagors. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant. The court of appeals dismissed Appellees’ appeal, finding that the district court’s order was not final and appealable because it did not set forth the dollar amount of the balance due on the mortgage. On remand, the trial court stated a dollar amount of the balance due on the mortgage and included in its judgment decree unspecified amounts advanced by Appellant for inspections, appraisals, property protection, and maintenance. The court of appeal dismissed Appellees’ appeal, concluding that the trial court again failed to issue a final, appealable order because it did not include in its judgment specific itemization of the amounts expended by Appellant for inspections, appraisals, and the like. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a judgment decree in foreclosure that allows as part of recoverable damages unspecified amounts advanced by the mortgagee for inspections, appraisals, and the like is a final, appealable order; and (2) a mortgagor may challenge those amounts as part of the proceedings to confirm the foreclosure sale and appeal the order of confirmation. Remanded. View "CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski" on Justia Law

East Bank Condominiums II, LLC filed valuation complaints challenging the county auditor’s assessment of twenty-one units in a condominium complex owned by East Bank. The county auditor valued each unit as a separate parcel. The Dublin City Schools Board of Education filed countercomplaints seeking to retain the auditor’s valuations. The Board of Revision (BOR) disagreed with the assessment and accepted the bulk-appraisal valuation that East Bank submitted. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reinstated the county auditor’s valuations. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA, holding that the BTA erred in reverting back to the auditor’s determination of value. The school board moved for reconsideration. The Supreme Court granted in part the school board’s motion, holding (1) the BTA was correct in rejecting East Bank’s bulk-appraisal valuation for the units; but (2) the BTA was incorrect in adopting the auditor’s valuations. Remanded to the BTA for an independent determination of value. View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law