Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Citation Oil & Gas Corp., Petro-Hunt LLC, and other working interest owners appealed a district court summary judgment quieting title to an oil and gas lease in Greggory Tank. In 1982, George and Phyllis Tank executed an oil and gas lease in favor of Petro-Lewis Funds, Inc. The parties agreed to extend the primary term of the lease for three more years, ending July 15, 1989. In May 1983, the Tank 3-10 well was spudded in the northwest quarter. The well produced until October 1996. In June 1998, the Tank 3-10R well was spudded and replaced the Tank 3-10 well. The Tank 3-10R well continues to produce oil or gas. In June 1988, the Tank 13-10 well was spudded in the southwest quarter. The well continuously produced oil or gas until October 2008, and intermittently produced oil or gas until January 2012. Tank was the successor in interest to George and Phyllis Tank and was the owner of minerals in the southwest quarter of section 10. In September 2011, Tank sued the defendants, seeking to cancel the oil and gas lease to the extent it covered the southwest quarter. The defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Tank's claims. The defendants argued the continued drilling and operation of oil and gas wells on the leased property maintained the lease beyond the primary term and the lease remained in full force and effect. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling the lease had expired and was no longer valid on the southwest quarter. The court determined summary judgment was appropriate because there were only issues of law to resolve, including the interpretation of an unambiguous contract and the application of undisputed facts. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

Robert Hale, individually and on behalf of the State of North Dakota, and Susan Hale appealed a summary judgment dismissing their public nuisance claim against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales had a house on agricultural land about one mile southeast of a shooting range in Ward County, which was used to train local, state, and federal law enforcement officers. Several other farms and homes are located near the Hales' property and the law enforcement shooting range, and County Road 12 runs adjacent to the west side of that shooting range. In "Gowan v. Ward Cnty. Comm.," (764 N.W.2d 425), the Supreme Court affirmed a Ward County Commission zoning decision denying an application to rezone neighboring land, which is about one-quarter mile downrange from the law enforcement shooting range, from agricultural to residential for construction of a residential subdivision. The Ward County Commission denied Gowan's application, citing safety concerns resulting from the proximity of his land to the law enforcement shooting range. In "Hale v. Ward Cnty.", the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Hales' public nuisance claim. The Court discussed the differences between a private and a public nuisance and explained different evidence was relevant to the Hales' claims for a private and a public nuisance. The Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the Hales' private nuisance claim, concluding they failed to present competent evidence supporting their claim the law enforcement shooting range posed a danger to their property. The Court reversed the summary judgment on the Hales' public nuisance claim about use of County Road 12 and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. The Court recognized, however, that Ward County and Minot had not argued the Hales failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. 42-01-08, and neither the parties nor the district court had addressed the propriety of the Hales bringing an action to abate the law enforcement shooting range under N.D.C.C. ch. 42-02. On remand, the district court concluded "private citizens can bring an action 'ex rel.', but as a threshold matter, such citizens must first satisfy the special injury showing of N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08 or their public nuisance claim must be dismissed." The court granted Ward County and Minot summary judgment on the remanded claim for public nuisance regarding the Hales' use of County Road 12, concluding as a matter of law they failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a private person to maintain a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08. The court also denied the Hales' request to join additional neighbors as parties to their action. The Hales argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their public nuisance claim, and in denying their joinder request. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hale v. Ward County" on Justia Law

American General Contractors, Inc. ("AGC"), appealed a judgment assessing liability and awarding damages and interest for the cost of delays in the construction of the Williams County Law Enforcement Center in Williston. C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP ("C&C"), the successful bidder for the mechanical prime contract, filed suit when construction the center was delayed approximately two years after "substantial completion" was supposed to have happened. The district court concluded it was appropriate for the County and AGC to share responsibility for providing temporary shelter and heat on the project. The court apportioned 47 percent of the liability for the costs of the delay for the three and one-half months of active interference to the County and 53 percent to AGC, for the four months delay inherent to the industry. The court awarded C&C approximately $73,000 on its claim against the County. After offsetting amounts owed between the parties, the court awarded AGC approximately $424,000 on its claim against the County. The court awarded Davis Masonry approximately $96,000 from AGC for masonry work completed under its subcontract with AGC, and rejected AGC's claimed offsets to that amount. Davis had provided heat, cover and shelter for the project during cold weather and sought $649,000 from the County and AGC for that expense including prompt payment interest. Davis had settled with the County for $530,000, and the court ruled AGC was responsible for 53 percent of the remaining $119,000, or $63,070. AGC argues the district court erred in determining AGC was liable for any of the costs incurred from the delay under its contract with the County. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County" on Justia Law

The Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) condemned a fifteen-acre parcel owned by Michael Carlson despite the fact that it needed just over one acre for its planned project. At issue in this case was whether Utah Code 72-5-113 authorized UDOT’s condemnation of the excess property and whether the taking failed for lack of a “public use” as required under the Takings Clause of the Utah Constitution or United States Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed with UDOT’s construction of section 113 and granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT without expressly addressing the constitutionality of the taking. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s endorsement of UDOT’s statutory authority to condemn excess property for transportation purposes; but (2) reversed and remanded to allow the district court to determine the constitutionality of UDOT’s condemnation of Carlson’s excess property. View "Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Appellant owned property located within the heart of a planned development. The City of Baltimore sought to condemn the property. When the City and Appellant were unable to agree upon a price to be paid for the property, the City filed a petition for condemnation. Prior to trial, the City filed a petition for immediate possession and title, alleging that immediate possession of the property was necessary. Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that Appellant was a “hold-out,” which justified a “quick-take” condemnation of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the facts of this case justified a “quick-take” condemnation action. View "Makowski v. Mayor & City of Baltimore" on Justia Law

In 2009, David and Debra Sawyer defaulted on a mortgage held by U.S. Bank N.A. In 2012, the Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure. At the time the complaint was filed, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. had taken over as loan servicer. Four court-ordered mediations subsequently took place, during which time the Sawyers attempted to negotiate a modification with Chase. The mediations were unsuccessful, largely due to Chase’s repeated delays and requests to submit documentation that the Sawyers had already submitted. At a show cause hearing, the superior court subsequently dismissed the Bank’s complaint with prejudice, concluding that the Bank was not prepared to proceed at the hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sanction was not excessive under the circumstances, and (2) there was evidence that the Sawyers were prejudiced by the Bank’s failure to participate in the mediation process in good faith. View "U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

When Douglas Going did not inherit land owned by his parents, Going sent a notice of demand to his cousin, Alayna Laprel, and her husband, Neal Smith, who had lawfully purchased the land from Going’s father. In the notice, Going called Laprel a “thief.” Going then purported to place and record a “commercial lien” on the property. Laprel and Smith filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the purported lien was baseless and alleging claims for, inter alia, slander, libel, and slander of title. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Laprel and Smith on their declaratory judgment claim and on their claim for slander of title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court did not lack jurisdiction to act in this case; and (2) the superior court did not err in failing to dismiss without prejudice Laprel’s and Smith’s own slander of title claim. View "Laprel v. Going" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a transfer of real property between affiliated business entities constituted a "sale" for purposes of the Documentary Stamp Tax Act. Defendants Homesales, Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and EMC Mortgage, LLC, f/k/a EMC Mortgage Corporation appealed an order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Murray County, Oklahoma, County Commissioners ex rel. Murray County, Oklahoma and Johnston County, Oklahoma, County Commissioners ex rel. Johnston County, Oklahoma (the Counties). Chase filed four foreclosure cases and was the successful bidder at each sheriff's sale. Therefore, Chase was entitled to a sheriff's deed to each of the properties. However, Chase did not take title. Instead, sheriff's deeds were granted to Chase's affiliated entities. The deeds were recorded with the respective county clerks. The grantees noted on the conveyances that the deeds were exempt from documentary taxes. No documentary taxes were paid. The Counties contended the conveyances involved in this case were not exempt and filed suit to collect the applicable documentary taxes. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Counties finding that the conveyances were not exempt from the DSTA, and that the Counties could sue to enforce the provisions of the DSTA and collect the documentary taxes that were not paid on these transactions. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the Counties were not authorized to prosecute violations of the DSTA. The Counties did have standing to challenge the exemptions from the documentary tax claimed for these conveyances. The Court reversed the order granting partial summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Murray County v. Homesales, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CitiMortgage's responses to requests for information about her mortgage violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601-2617; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p; and N.Y. General Business Law (GBL) section 349. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege that CitiMortgage did not properly designate a qualified written address (QWR) or that any or her lawyer's letters were sent to the designated address. Because plaintiff's lawyer's letters are not QWRs, CitiMortgage's RESPA duties were not triggered, and therefore the district court properly dismissed the RESPA claims. The district court did not err in dismissing the FDCPA claims where the amended complaint failed to alleged that CitiMortgage qualified as a debt collector under the FDCPA. The district court did not err in dismissing the section 349 claim where CitiMortgage's QWR address notice was not inadequate. Finally, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied her request for leave to amend. View "Roth v. CitiMortgage Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners obtained a loan from a Lender by taking out a second mortgage on their residence secured by a deed of trust on that property. The Lender sold the loan to another entity, to whom it assigned the loan instruments. That entity, in turn, sold the loan and assigned the loan instruments. After Petitioners had paid off the note and Respondent had released the deed of trust, Petitioners sued the Lender and Respondent, alleging that Lender had violated the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (SMLL) at the time of the original transaction. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Respondent. The court of special appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ sole recourse against an assignee such as Respondent for the Lender’s violations of the SMLL would be by way of recoupment, but (2) because Petitioners filed suit only after they had paid off the loan, that remedy was not available to them. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Respondent was not liable for violations of the SMLL committed by the Lender when the loan was originated, and (2) Respondent was not derivatively liable under statute or the common law for a violation of the SMLL committed by the Lender. View "Thompkins v. Mountaineer Invs., LLC" on Justia Law