Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A mineral lessee operated two wells on two contiguous tracts of land. When one of the wells stopped producing, the lessee pooled parts of the two mineral leases. Landowners subsequently bought a tract of land that included the road the lessee used to access the producing well. The road was across the surface of the lease without production. After traffic on the road increased, the landowners filed suit against the lessee, claiming that the lessee had no legal right to use the surface of their tract of land to produce minerals from the operating well. The trial court determined that the lessee did not have the right to use the road to access the producing lease and granted declaratory and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) once pooling occurred, the pooled parts of the two contiguous tracts no longer maintained separate identities insofar as where production from the pooled interests was located; and (2) therefore, the lessee had the right to use the road to access the pooled part of the tract of land containing the producing well. View "Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

Clifton Tweedy began leasing property from the Matanuska-Susitna Borough on Big Lake in May 1988. When Tweedy assumed the lease, the existing structure was exempt from the Borough’s 75-foot shoreline setback ordinance because it was constructed before any setback requirement existed. Shortly after he took possession of the property, Tweedy constructed a stairwell addition on the exterior of the house. In 2010 Tweedy applied with the Borough to purchase the property. Because structures on the property were located less than 75 feet from the shoreline, the sale required an exemption or variance from the Borough’s setback requirement. The Borough Planning Director determined that Tweedy’s addition was unlawful and that the application could not be processed until Tweedy removed it. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment Appeals affirmed the Planning Director’s decision. Tweedy appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed. Because the 75-foot setback applied to Tweedy’s property when he constructed the addition, the addition was unlawful when it was built and he was not entitled to an exemption or variance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals" on Justia Law

Stockbridge, a recognized Indian tribe, appealed from the district court's dismissal of its claims asserting title of a tract of land in upstate New York. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that it was well-settled that claims by an Indian tribe alleging that it was unlawfully dispossessed of land early in America's history were barred by the equitable principles of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility. View "Stockbridge-Munsee v. State of New York, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned property located in Lincoln County that was unplatted and zoned for agricultural use. The property owner voluntarily petitioned for its annexation to the City of Sioux Falls. Sioux Falls subsequently adopted an annexation resolution under S.D. Codified Laws 9-4-1 annexing the property to be developed for a Walmart store. Neighbors of the property, joined as “Save Our Neighborhood,” petitioned the circuit court for writs of prohibition and certiorari, seeking to invalidate the City’s annexation resolution and to prohibit the City from rezoning the property. Petitioners argued that S.D. Codified Laws 9-4-5 required the City to obtain approval from the Lincoln County Board of County Commissioners before adopting a rule to annex the property. The circuit court denied the petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Petitioners’ writs of certiorari and prohibition, holding that the Legislature did not intend section 9-4-5 to apply to a resolution adopted for a voluntary petition for annexation under section 9-4-1. View "Save our Neighborhood v. City of Sioux Falls" on Justia Law

Frank Forelle and William Fix were neighbors in a subdivision. After Forelle built a fence on his property along the border of the parties’ adjoining properties, Fix complained that the fence violated the subdivision’s covenants. Fix, an attorney who represented himself in the matter, prevailed on his claim in the district court. Relying on a covenant provision regarding reimbursement for costs incurred in enforcing the covenants, Fix subsequently sought attorney fees. The district court awarded Fix attorney fees, but later, in an amended judgment, concluded that Fix could not recover fees for the legal work he performed because he did not actually incur any fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Fix was never liable for or subject to his own attorney fees, he did not incur any fees, and therefore, Fix was not entitled to recover attorney fees for the work he performed in the litigation. View "Fix v. Forelle" on Justia Law

In tax year 2007, a county fiscal officer valued an improved 6.415-acre parcel in the county at $8,740,000, consistent with the property's 2004 sale price. The property owner filed an amended complaint seeking a reduction to $3,100,000. The board of revision issued a decision retaining the fiscal officer’s valuation of the property. The owner and the school board of education both appealed. Before the board of tax appeals (BTA), the parties presented competing appraisals. The BTA accepted the owner’s appraisal and assigned a value of $3,100,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the school board did not show that the BTA’s acceptance of the valuation presented by the owner was unlawful or unreasonable; and (2) the record supported the BTA’s decision. View "Health Care REIT, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court stemmed from a district court decision affirming the approval of a subdivision by the Board of County Commissioners of Clearwater County. In approving the subdivision, the Board approved three variances granted by the Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission with respect to the road providing access to the subdivision. A portion of the access road crossed over land owned by Edward and Donilee Shinn, who opposed the variances and petitioned the district court for judicial review. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Board erred when it failed to make the approval of the variance application expressly contingent upon judicial resolution of the access issue. The Court remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the Shinns' substantial rights were prejudiced by the Board's decision. View "Shinn v. Bd of Co Comm Clearwater Co" on Justia Law

In 2005, John Block purchased property in Lewiston from Jack Streibick to develop. Block submitted an application to resubdivide the property into three residential lots, which Lewiston approved. Prior to Block's purchase of the property, Lewiston issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing him to place and grade fill in the area of those lots. In 2006, Block received permits from Lewiston to construct homes on each of the three lots. During construction of the homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the footings on the lots. Following the construction of the homes, Lewiston issued Block certificates of occupancy for each of the homes after conducting inspections that found the homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards. In April 2007, Block sold the home and property at 159 Marine View Drive. In November of that year, the owner reported a crack in the home's basement. Around that same time, settling was observed at the other two properties. In early December 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. He also consulted with engineers regarding options for immediate repair to the homes. As early as February 2009, further settling problems were reported at the properties. After Lewiston inspected the properties in May following a gas leak at 153, it posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. Block ultimately filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with Lewiston that also named City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw as a defendant, but did not effectuate process on Lewiston and Cutshaw until ninety days had elapsed from the date he had filed the Notice of Claim. The City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Block's claims should be dismissed because he failed to timely file a Notice of Claim with Lewiston. This first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against Lewiston prior to 2009. The City defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Block's claims against them, arguing that they were immune from liability for all of these claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that Block could not establish that he was owed a duty. The district court granted this second summary judgment motion dismissing Block's claims based on the application of the economic loss rule. The court also held that immunity under the ITCA and failure to establish a duty provided alternate grounds for dismissal of Block's claims. Block appealed on the issue of immunity. Finding no reversible error as to that issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Block v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

The trustee of the United Effort Plan Trust filed a complaint against the City of Hildale and the Twin City Water Authority (TCWA) (together, Appellants) to compel the subdivision of certain parcels of Trust property located within the City’s boundaries. Because Appellants failed to appear or answer the complaint, the district court entered default judgment against them. Thereafter, Appellants filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment. While the motion was pending, Appellants filed a direct appeal from the default judgment. The district court denied Appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion, and Appellants did not appeal the denial. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Appellants’ direct appeal from the default judgment, holding that the direct appeal was the incorrect vehicle for relief because it relied exclusively on Rule 60(b) arguments made to the district court in the postjudgment motion and disposed of in the unappealed order. View "Wisan v. City of Hildale" on Justia Law

In January 2007, the Bank of Idaho made two construction loans to developers who planned to construct a fourplex on each of two adjoining lots in Idaho Falls. The bank loaned one sum of money to build a fourplex on Lot 1 and another sum for a fourplex on Lot 2. The bank secured a separate policy of title insurance for each lot that was issued by the predecessor of First American Title Insurance Company. Each policy included an endorsement that the parties understood would insure against loss or damage that the bank might sustain by reason of a multifamily residence not being constructed on the lot. After discussion with representatives of the city, the developers changed their original plans and built both fourplexes on Lot 2 and built a parking lot with storm water retention and landscaping on Lot 1. The developers later defaulted on their loans, and the bank foreclosed on both deeds of trust. At the foreclosure sale, the bank acquired each lot by making a full credit bid on all amounts due and owing on the note secured by the deed of trust. In 2010, the bank submitted a claim under the title policy issue with respect to Lot 1 to recover under the endorsement. The insurance company rejected the claim and the bank filed suit to recover under the policy. The district court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed this action. The bank then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the district court erred in holding that the title insurance company had no liability under the policy. The endorsement provided that "[t]he Company hereby insures the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage against loss or damage which the insured shall sustain by reason of the failure of [a multifamily residence to be built on Lot 1]." The endorsement insured against "loss or damage" that the bank argued was the failure of the multifamily residence to be constructed on the lot. It did not define what constituted "loss or damage." Subsections of the pertinent indemnity clause stated limits on the insurance company's liability, but it did not define loss or damage. Accordingly, the district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank of Idaho v. First American Title" on Justia Law