Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant-taxpayer Elaine Hoiska appealed the Vermont State Appraiser’s valuation of her property in the Town of East Montpelier. She argued that the appraisal incorrectly treated her property as comprising two contiguous lots under common ownership, and accordingly assigns a higher value to the property than if it were a single developable lot. More specifically, appellant took issue with the appraiser’s legal conclusion that she legally subdivided the land in 1978 by procuring a survey, not filed in the land records, that includes a line purportedly dividing the lot into two parcels. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the state appraiser’s findings did not support the legal conclusion that appellant effectively subdivided her property in 1978, and reversed. View "Hoiska v. Town of East Montpelier" on Justia Law

Olive Lane Industrial Park owned real property that was taken by eminent domain. Within four years after the eminent domain order, Olive Lane acquired another parcel of property. About five years after the eminent domain order, for purposes of calculating property taxes on its new property, Olive Lane filed a request with the San Diego County tax assessor to transfer the condemned property's base year value to the replacement property, as permitted by California Constitution, article XIIIA. The County denied Olive Lane's request as untimely. After evaluating the constitutional and statutory provisions as a whole, the Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend to deprive a taxpayer who loses property through eminent domain of the right to obtain prospective application of the base year value transfer in the event the replacement property is acquired within the four-year statutory period but the claim is filed after the four-year period. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Olive Lake Industrial Park v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

John and Lori Finstad owned 80 acres of a section of land in Ransom County and leased 240 adjacent acres in the same section from Willis and Doris Olson. The Ranson-Sargent Water Users District was considering this tract of land as a potential site to drill water wells. In 1997, the Finstads and the Olsons granted to the District options to purchase the land. The options also allowed the Finstads and the Olsons to lease back the property for five years, after which they had a nonassignable right of first refusal to lease back the property for an additional five years. The Finstads appealed from a judgment awarding them $53,000.99 in damages and interest in their action against the District for breach of the lease-back provisions of an option agreement between the parties. The District cross-appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the economic duress doctrine relieved the Finstads of their obligations under a subsequent agreement and release they had entered into with the District. Because the agreement and release is valid and enforceable, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc." on Justia Law

Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor were married and lived most of their lives together in Minnesota. Ragna Mesling, a widow and Carolyn Vizenor's mother, owned real estate outside of New England, in Hettinger County. The Stechers were long-time renters of the Mesling farmland. The Vizenors sued Mesling and the Stechers, seeking to avoid a deed executed in 2006, in which Mesling, as Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, transferred certain real estate to the Stechers. The Vizenors alleged the transaction directly resulted from improper conduct by the Stechers. The Estates of Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor appealed a judgment dismissing their action against Clifford and Linda Stecher and orders denying their post-judgment motions. The Stechers cross-appealed the judgment. The Supreme Court concluded Ragna Mesling, as her daughter Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, was authorized under a power of attorney to transfer real estate to the Stechers and sufficient evidence supported the district court's findings the transfer was not the product of undue influence. Because the court did not err in dismissing the action and denying the post-judgment motions, the Court therefore affirmed. View "Estates of Vizenor and Vizenor v. Mesling" on Justia Law

Willard and Christi Pankonin owned real property in Logan County, which was mortgaged with Dakota Heritage Bank. The Bank brought a foreclosure action and a judgment was entered. Before the Pankonins' redemption period expired, Willard Pankonin filed for bankruptcy protection in federal court, his interest in the property was transferred to his bankruptcy estate and Michael Iaccone was appointed bankruptcy trustee. Pankonin and Iaccone (defendants), on behalf of Willard Pankonin's bankruptcy estate, moved for relief from the judgment. Attorney Timothy Lamb represented the defendants. The district court denied the motion for relief and awarded the Bank costs and disbursements without prejudice to any subsequent claim for attorney's fees. Christi Pankonin appealed award of attorney's fees to the Bank. Finding no abuse of the district court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dakota Heritage Bank v. Pankonin" on Justia Law

The Cote Corporation filed a mechanic’s lien against real property owned by Kelley Earthworks, Inc. Cote subsequently brought a complaint to enforce the lien against Kelley. Kelley did not respond to the complaint or to Cote’s motion for summary judgment. The superior court entered Kelley’s default and then entered judgment for Cote, plus interest and attorney fees, and ordered that the property be sold to satisfy the judgment. Kelley appeared ten days after the judgment was entered on the docket and filed motions to set aside its default and for relief from the judgment. The court declined to set aside the default but did strike its order to sell the real property, instead awarding Cote a money judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court erred in striking the provision of its order requiring a sale of the property. Remanded for entry of an order for the sale of at least a portion of Kelley’s land. View "The Cote Corp. v. Kelley Earthworks, Inc." on Justia Law

Buyers agreed to buy a condominium from Seller pursuant to a purchase agreement. Buyers demanded that Seller fix a minor electrical problem as a condition of purchase, which led to this protracted litigation. In the first appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Buyers breached the contract with their unreasonable demand and remanded for the trial court to determine damages. The trial court awarded Seller $93,972 in damages. Seller appealed, arguing that she reasonably mitigated her damages and that the trial court erred in calculating damages. Buyers cross-appealed. The court of appeals reversed and awarded only $117 in damages, concluding that Seller could have avoided all damages except a $117 repair bill if she had responded to Buyers’ demand to fix the electrical problem, thus preserving the agreement. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion (1) by finding that Seller could have mitigated her damages by selling her condo in 2007 rather than waiting until 2011; and (2) in refusing to find that Seller’s duty to mitigate required yielding to the Buyers’ breach. View "Fischer v. Heymann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was the victim of a fraudulent scheme in which he allowed an attorney to take title to his home and strip it of its equity by granting a new mortgage. Plaintiff filed suit against the mortgagee in an effort to avoid foreclosure. A federal district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that the mortgage was void. The district court denied Plaintiff’s subsequent motion to amend his complaint. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and the denial of his motion for leave to amend, holding (1) Plaintiff’s complaint provided no legal basis for making the bank liable for the attorney’s wrongdoing; and (2) Plaintiff failed adequately to plead facts supporting his proposed amendments to his complaint, and therefore, his new claims were also futile. View "Giuffre v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Frank Schmidt Sr. and other former parishioners of the St. Paul Catholic Church in Pass Christian appealed the second dismissal with prejudice of their claims against the Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc., Most Reverend Thomas J. Rodi, and Rev. Dennis Carver. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The storm caused extensive damage to the St. Paul Catholic Church and its ancillary properties. The actual church building was also damaged, although the extent of the damage is disputed by the parties. Plaintiffs insisted that the church remains structurally sound, that many of its sacred articles were unharmed, and that repair costs should be less than $2.5 million. Church Defendants maintain that the church and its most sacred places were “destroyed in large part.” Bishop Rodi issued a decree merging the St. Paul and Our Lady of Lourdes Parishes to form a new parish called the Holy Family Parish. The decree stated that the Holy Family Parish would maintain two church edifices, St. Paul Church and Our Lady of Lourdes Church. A number of St. Paul’s former parishioners, including some of the Plaintiffs in this case, filed a canonical appeal through the Roman Catholic Church’s ecclesiastical tribunals. In 2007, the Vatican issued a decree which stated that Bishop Rodi had acted in accordance with the requirements and procedures set forth under canon law. While the canonical appeal was pending, 157 former parishioners filed suit asserting, in part, that Bishop Rodi held the St. Paul Church property in trust for the members, that any financial contributions designated for reconstruction of the church were held in trust for that particular purpose, that Church Defendants had violated said trusts, and that Father Carver had made misrepresentations in soliciting donations for the rebuilding efforts. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the St. Paul property was held in trust for their benefit. However, the Court reversed and remanded the chancellor’s dismissal of the diversion-of-designated funds claim, as well as the claim against Father Carver for intentional misrepresentation, finding subject-matter jurisdiction existed over these claims. On remand, the chancellor denied Plaintiffs’ motions for additional discovery and granted Church Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the chancellor erred in dismissing their claims for diversion of designated funds and intentional misrepresentation. Because none of the Plaintiffs established the requisite elements for a diversion of designated funds, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on this issue. In addition, because no Plaintiffs could establish a claim for intentional misrepresentation, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on this issue. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Chancery Court's judgment. View "Kinney v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joanne Peake purchased a home from Marviel and Deanna Underwood. About two years later, Peake brought an action against the Underwoods and the Underwoods' real estate agent, Paul Ferrell. Peake sought to recover damages for defendants' alleged failure to disclose defective subfloors in the home. After the case had been pending for more than one year, Ferrell moved to dismiss and for monetary sanctions against Peake and her counsel Norman Shaw under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, arguing Peake's claims were factually and legally frivolous because the undisputed evidence showed Ferrell had fulfilled his statutory and common law disclosure duties, and Peake had actual notice of facts disclosing prior problems with the subfloors. Peake declined to dismiss the action during the statutory safe harbor period, and instead amended her complaint to add claims similar to claims she had previously dismissed. The trial court found Ferrell met his burden to show Peake's claims were "without legal or evidentiary support" and Peake's continued maintenance of the lawsuit demonstrated "objective bad faith" warranting sanctions. As sanctions, the court dismissed Peake's claims against Ferrell and ordered Peake and her attorney to pay Ferrell for his attorney fees incurred in defending the action. On appeal, Peake and Shaw challenged the sanction order. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding the section 128.7 sanctions. View "Peake v. Underwood" on Justia Law