Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff J. Albert Lynch, Trustee of FIN-LYN Trust, appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss his action seeking to enforce restrictive covenants contained in a deed between the Trustee and the Town of Pelham. The trial court ruled that the covenants at issue are appurtenant and personal, and that the Trustee lacked standing to enforce them. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the covenants at issue were gross and enforceable by the Trustee, and that the record established that he had a legitimate interest in enforcing them on behalf of the Trust. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Lynch v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

At the center of this appeal was ABC Agra, LLC's action seeking a declaratory judgment against Critical Access Group, Inc. ("CAG") regarding the enforceability of a real property use restriction. Because there were no existing or proposed uses that implicated the restriction, the district court determined that the claim was not ripe and granted CAG's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed this dismissal.View "ABC Agra v. Critical Access Group" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a 1983 Ground Lease of over four acres of property in Pocatello which Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC leased from Pocatello Hospital, LLC (d/b/a/ Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC (PMC)). Quail Ridge appealed a declaratory judgment which held that PMC was entitled to an adjustment in the annual rent owed by Quail Ridge from $9,562.50 annually to $148,500 annually, and that Quail Ridge was obligated to pay PMC $416,812.50 in rent for the period of 2010 to 2012. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Pocatello Hospital v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor" on Justia Law

Richard Giesler and Idaho Trust Deeds, LLC appealed a district court's judgment declaring the rights and obligations on a contract. This case arose out of several oral and written agreements between Giesler and Gregory Hull that related to purchasing and subdividing property. After a bench trial, the court found that Hull sold the property to Giesler, but the parties had a later oral contract where Hull promised to pay off Giesler's loans in exchange for half of the subdivision's net profits. The court held that neither party materially breached the contract and ordered Hull to timely pay Giesler's loans and Giesler to complete the subdivision within certain deadlines. On appeal, Giesler argued Hull failed to prove damages and the district court's remedies were erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that substantial and competent evidence supported the district court's findings of fact, but that the district court erred in its remedies. The Court vacated the portions of the district court's decision regarding: (1) the conversion payment of half the irrigation equipment's value; (2) the deadlines for completing Parcels 2 and 3; and (3) the provisions that order consequences to encourage performance under the contract.View "Hull v. Giesler" on Justia Law

DAFCO LLC sought recovery against Stewart Title Guaranty Co. on a lender's title insurance policy and against AmeriTitle, Inc., the closing agent for the lending transaction, claiming that it sustained injury as a result of a defective deed of trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stewart and AmeriTitle, resulting in this appeal by DAFCO. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "DAFCO v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co" on Justia Law

Northwest Farm Credit Services recovered a deficiency judgment against the Appellants following the foreclosure of two mortgages on property located in Valley County. Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC, Donald Miller, and Candace Miller appealed the judgment, contending that the reasonable value of their foreclosed property was substantially more than the value determined by the district court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "NW Farm Credit Svcs v. Lake Cascade Airpark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the named Defendant in this action, and others formed a limited liability company (the LLC) to purchase and redevelop certain property. After the LLC acquired the property, Plaintiff guaranteed the payment of two loans from a Bank. In the meantime, Plaintiff, Defendant, and others entered into backstop guarantee agreements that provided protection to Plaintiff in the event he was required to honor his personal guarantees to the Bank. The Bank later commenced foreclosure proceedings against the LLC and Plaintiff as guarantor. The court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, and the Bank sought a deficiency judgment against the Plaintiff. The Bank and Plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced the present action against Defendants to enforce the backstop guarantee agreements. The trial court concluded that the backstop guarantee agreements were unenforceable. The Appellate Court reversed. Defendant appealed, claiming that Plaintiff’s tax treatment of the debt that Defendant guaranteed effectively divested Plaintiff of his interest in the debt, and therefore, Plaintiff had no standing to enforce the backstop guarantee agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff had standing to enforce the agreement.View "One Country, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Richard Myers owned the property at issue in this case. At the time, the property was subject to a deed of trust in favor of First Horizon Home Loans. Myers enlisted Michael Horn and his company, Frontier Development Group (FDG) to build a residence on the property, which First Horizon financed. However, in April of 2007, Myers filed for bankruptcy, and First Horizon rescinded the construction loan and instructed FDG to halt construction when the project was only fifty percent complete. The structure was left exposed to the elements for fourteen months. Following Myers' bankruptcy, foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and Myers hired Kathleen Horn (Michael Horn's wife), of Windermere Real Estate/Teton Valley to list the property for sale. The Caravellas, who were Ohio residents, looking for property in the Teton Valley, contacted their real estate agent who put them in touch with Kathleen Horn who provided them with information on the stalled Myers project. Kathleen Horn eventually put the Caravellas in touch with Michael Horn. The Caravellas traveled to Idaho, met with Kathleen Horn, and spent two days inspecting the property. The Caravellas testified that Kathleen Horn minimized issues with the house, telling them that it was "in good shape,""structurally sound,"and a "great house."The Caravellas chose not to have a professional inspection performed and closed on May 5, 2008. After closing, the Caravellas and Michael Horn agreed that Horn would complete construction on the house in accordance with Myers' original plans. In reaching this agreement, the Caravellas testified that they believed they were dealing with Horn as an individual. The total contract price for the first phase of work that the Caravellas authorized was $88,500. However, the Caravellas paid FDG $138,097.24 for the first phase before refusing to pay any more. Much of the money that the Caravellas paid to FDG was for unauthorized work or work that was completed in a nonconforming or substandard manner. The Caravellas hired a second builder to complete the first phase and to remedy the substandard work. FDG initiated this action by filing a complaint to foreclose on a lien for construction services and building materials provided to, but not paid for by, the Caravellas. The Caravellas filed an amended counterclaim alleging that FDG and Horn: (1) breached the parties' contract; (2) breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (4) breached the implied warranty of habitability; (5) committed slander of title; (6) committed fraud and misrepresentation; (7) engaged in a civil conspiracy; and (8) acted negligently. The district court held that FDG's lien was defective and dismissed it. The district court also held that FDG breached its contract with the Caravellas by: (1) failing to complete agreed upon work in conformity with the plans and in a workmanlike manner; (2) charging the Caravellas for unauthorized and defective work; and (3) substantially overbilling the Caravellas for work and materials that were not authorized and never provided. As to the Caravellas' fraud counterclaim, the district court concluded that the Caravellas failed to establish all nine elements of fraud and dismissed the claim. The district court also concluded that Horn was not personally liable. The district court awarded the Caravellas $113,775.45 in attorney fees, $5,484.83 in costs as a matter of right, and $200.00 in discretionary costs. The Caravellas timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by applying the incorrect evidentiary standard to the Caravellas' fraud counterclaim, but that error was harmless. The Court affirmed that portion of the district court's judgment dismissing the Caravellas' fraud claim, and reversed that portion of the judgment dismissing the Caravellas' claims against Michael Horn personally. In all other respects, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision.View "Frontier Development Grp v. Caravella" on Justia Law

In 2007, Robert (Bob) Perry quitclaimed a house to defendant Charlotte (Jeanne) Teegarden, who was his friend and one of his caregivers. Teegarden prepared the quitclaim deed. In her deposition, Teegarden admitted that the only consideration that she gave for the quitclaim consisted of one dollar and her friendship. At trial, however, she testified that, pursuant to an oral agreement with Perry, she also gave $100,000 (for improvements to the house), her $45,000 equity in a different house, and her services. Plaintiff Merilou Jenkins is Perry’s stepdaughter and, since Perry’s death, the trustee and beneficiary of his trust. Jenkins contended that the quitclaim was invalid under Probate Code former section 21350, which, at the time, provided that a "donative transfer" was invalid under specified circumstances, including when the recipient drafted the instrument that effected the transfer. Jenkins also contended that the quitclaim deed was ineffective because it was executed by Perry in his individual capacity instead of as trustee and because it had an erroneous legal description. The trial court found that the quitclaim was not a donative transfer because Teegarden gave good consideration for it. It then reformed the quitclaim deed so as to fix the mistakes in it regarding the grantor’s capacity and the legal description. Jenkins appealed. The Court of APpeal held that, though Probate Code former section 21350 et seq. has been repealed and replaced by Probate Code section 21380 et seq., the former section 21350 et seq. still governed an instrument executed before January 1, 2011. The issue concerning a "donative transfer" for purposes of Probate Code former section 21350 was a question of first impression. The Court held that a transfer is a donative transfer if it is for inadequate consideration; the mere fact that the recipient gave good consideration, sufficient to support a contract, does not prevent the transfer from being donative. Finally, the Court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the quitclaim was a donative transfer under this definition as a matter of law. Hence, the quitclaim was invalid.View "Jenkins v. Teegarden" on Justia Law

In this replevin action, a tenant sued his landlord and a towing company, alleging wrongful possession of several vehicles towed from the property he leased from the landlord. The County Court granted the defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal, and also found that the landlord's use of self-help was lawful. The Circuit Court affirmed. Finding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to maintain the replevin action, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the replevin action for a trial de novo between the plaintiff and the towing company. It also found the landlord's use of self-help to be unlawful, and reversed and rendered that issue in favor of the plaintiff. Because the Supreme Court find that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly addressed the issue of the landlord's use of self-help, it reversed the judgments and remanded the replevin action to the trial court for a trial de novo.View "Crowell v. Butts" on Justia Law