Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After the City decided to undertake road improvements along South Avenue in Missoula, Montana, Plaintiffs, a group of landowners who owned property along South Avenue, contested the City’s assessment of the width of the right-of-way on a section of the street. The district court concluded that the City’s actions constituted a taking. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a redetermination of damages. Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing asking the Court to award both attorney’s fees and costs incurred for the appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition. On remand, Plaintiffs agreed to reduce their “taken property” value and asked the district court to assess both attorney’s fees and costs against the City for the appeal. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party on appeal and awarded them appellate attorney’s fees and costs. The City appealed, arguing that the Court’s refusal to award fees in its order on rehearing constituted “law of the case.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s award of appellate attorney’s fees and costs, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs had a constitutional right to be made whole through an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.View "Wohl v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

In late 2013, when Paul Taylor filed a complaint seeking back rent and possession of a home he rented to James David and Elisabeth Black. Justice of the Peace Court 13 ordered an expedited summary possession trial under 25 Del. C. 5115. The Blacks appealed a Superior Court order denying their petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing that Justice of the Peace Court 13 proceeded contrary to law and denied the Blacks due process of law when it issued a forthwith summons under 25 Del. C. 5115 absent satisfaction of the statutory requirements for issuance of that summons. Furthermore, the Blacks argued the record showed that Justice of the Peace Court 13 proceeded irregularly because it created no record regarding the basis for its issuance of the forthwith summons. The Supreme Court concluded that both of the Blacks’ contentions were meritorious, and reversed the Superior Court. The case was remanded for further proceedings.View "Black v. Justice of the Peace Court 13, et al." on Justia Law

After defendants purchased the building where plaintiff was living in a rent-controlled apartment, defendants served plaintiff with a 60-day notice to quit. Plaintiff subsequently initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against defendants and then filed a complaint alleging several state claims. Plaintiff sought an order restoring him to his apartment, restitution, damages, and attorney fees. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court's denial of their Code of Civil Procedure section 426.16 special motion to strike plaintiff's first amended complaint because their conduct was protected litigation activity. Plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees in defending the motion. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint was not directed at protected activity. However, the court reversed the denial of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether defendants' motion was frivolous, whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and if so, the amount of such fees.View "Ben-Shahar v. Pickart" on Justia Law

This appeal ended a longstanding feud stemming from plaintiff David Ring's renovation of his condominium units, resulting in multiple legal proceedings and several superior court decisions. Ring argued in this appeal that the superior court erred in awarding him only a fraction of his requested attorney's fees after determining, after a lengthy bench trial, that defendants the condominium owners' association and some of its individual members had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the parties' earlier settlement agreement. He also argued that the court erred in denying his request for pre-litigation attorney's fees and prejudgment interest. Defendant Donna Beck cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in assessing punitive damages against defendants and holding her liable for punitive damages attributable to her deceased husband, defendant Edward Morrison, based on her real estate partnership with him. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the superior court's decisions.View "Ring v. Carriage House Condominium Owners' Association" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review involved the power of a court to require an estate to create a trust to satisfy potential future claims against the estate, as well as the proper application of the dead man's statutes. Developers of a residential subdivision died, triggering various claims by and against their estates relating to the estates' responsibilities for the subdivision's private roadway, water, and sewer infrastructure. The Town of Manchester appealed a superior court decision denying the Town's request that the court create a trust from the assets of the estates to pay for repairs, maintenance, and improvements to the subdivision's sewer system to protect the Town's water supply. A group of homeowners separately appealed the trial court's denial of their request for a ruling that the estates had a legal obligation to dedicate the infrastructure to the Town and, until that happened, to maintain the infrastructure at their expense. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments and the applicable statutes and Vermont case law, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's refusal to create the trust requested by the Town, but reversed the court's denial of the homeowners' request for a ruling on their claims. The case was remanded for reconsideration of those claims based on the evidence, including evidence that the trial court previously excluded under the dead man's statute, to determine whether an enforceable promise was made concerning maintenance of the infrastructure pending its dedication to the Town.View "Hayes v. Town of Manchester" on Justia Law

Petitioners Garfield and Lucille Goodrum owned 41.54 acres in Reading; all but two acres of land surrounding their home was enrolled in the UVA Program as undeveloped forest land. The Goodrums formed Turtle Hill Farm of Vermont Animal Sanctuary, Inc. (THF), a non-profit corporation whose mission is to rescue, rehabilitate, foster, and adopt out animals, including horses, chickens, rabbits, and guinea pigs. The Goodrums leased four barns and two sheds to THF. THF is funded almost exclusively by donations, which it uses to cover its operating expenses. Most of the donations come from the Goodrums. In 2010, the Goodrums applied to enroll the barns and sheds leased to THF in the UVA Program, which would exempt the buildings from property taxation, but the Department of Taxes Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) determined that the buildings were ineligible. The Goodrums appealed to the Director of PVR, who also determined that the buildings were ineligible. The Goodrums then appealed to the superior court, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted PVR's motion, concluding that the buildings are not eligible for enrollment because THF did not operate for gain or profit and is therefore not a farmer under 32 V.S.A. 3752(7). The Goodrums appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Goodrum v. Vermont Department of Taxes" on Justia Law

This case raised the issue of whether Act 250 required consideration of alternative siting in every case in which a party objects to a proposed land-use project on aesthetic grounds, pursuant to 10 V.S.A. 6086(a)(8), without regard to the presence of competent evidence supporting alternative siting as a reasonable mitigating measure. Goddard College obtained an Act 250 permit from District Environmental Commission No. 5 in 2012, authorizing it to replace individual oil-fired systems in each of twenty-three campus buildings with a new central woodchip boiler system on its campus in Plainfield. Appellant-neighbor Karen Bouffard challenged the Superior Court's grant of the Act 250 permit, arguing that the court failed to properly consider measures to mitigate the aesthetic impact of the project by siting it elsewhere on the college property. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "In re Goddard College Conditional Use, Goddard College Act 250 Reconsideration" on Justia Law

Neighbors Barbara Supeno and Barbara J. Ernst appealed a superior court's decision to uphold the Town of Addison Development Review Board's (DRB) grant of certificates of occupancy for two detached decks and a conditional use permit for an enclosed deck to applicants Linda and John Carrigan for improvements to applicants' seasonal camp on Lake Champlain. At the heart of this dispute was a series of decks that applicants constructed on their property and the efforts of the Town to bring the decks into compliance with the current zoning bylaws. Applicants' seasonal camp was located on Lake Champlain in the Town of Addison's Shoreland Residential (SR) District. Applicants purchased their property in 1984 and shortly thereafter built an attached, uncovered deck on the west side of the camp, facing Lake Champlain, adding ten feet in length to the footprint of the camp. Applicants then replaced an existing concrete platform, retaining wall, and set of stairs located on a slope down to the lakeshore, and added some decking behind the wall. As a result, applicants arguably had two decks within the setback area. In 2003, applicants applied for and received a permit to build a roof over the uncovered deck that was attached to the west side of the camp. Applicants also enclosed the deck by adding walls. In 2010, applicants applied for and received a permit to construct a detached, "standalone deck" on the west side of the camp, abutting the now-enclosed attached deck. The permit application did not disclose the presence of the decking that applicants had placed behind the retaining wall when they reconstructed the concrete platform and stairs in the 1980s. In 2011, neighbors notified the ZA that the standalone deck violated section 2.3(F)(7)(a) of the bylaws, which limited the number of detached decks an applicant could construct within the SR District. They argued that the decking behind the retaining wall constituted a "deck" and that therefore the standalone deck on the west side of the camp was not allowed under the bylaws. Applicants removed the decking from behind the retaining wall to comply with the bylaws. The ZA later discovered that, when constructed, the standalone deck was in fact attached and advised applicants to cut through the connecting boards to create a freestanding structure. The DRB then granted a certificate of occupancy for this deck (the environmental court's affirmance of this certificate of occupancy was another issue on appeal). Neighbors filed this appeal, arguing that the environmental court erred in affirming the DRB's grant of certificates of occupancy for the detached decks and a conditional use permit for the enclosed deck. Neighbors also argued the actions of the ZA and DRB directly contravened state and local policies protecting sensitive shoreland areas and lakes. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of the certificates of occupancy and reversed on the grant of the conditional use permit.View "In re Carrigan Conditional Use and Certificate of Compliance, Certificate of Occupancy, Certificate of Compliance" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs executed a promissory note in order to purchase certain real property. To secure payment obligations under the note, Plaintiffs executed a mortgage on the property. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for the original lender, assigned its interest in the mortgage to OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest), which was then authorized to service the note for Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). When Plaintiffs failed to make timely payments, OneWest initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs filed an action against MERS and OneWest seeking a declaration that the assignment from MERS to OneWest was invalid and to quiet title to the property. OneWest eventually held a sale, and the property was sold to Fannie Mae. The hearing justice granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) MERS validly assigned its interest in the mortgage to OneWest, and therefore, OneWest had the statutory power of sale; (2) Plaintiffs defaulted under the terms of the note; and (3) Fannie Mae, as the buyer at the foreclosure sale, held the record title to the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not err in determining that no genuine issue of material fact existed such that granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants was appropriate.View "Breggia v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In the 1980s, Charles Spencer and George Livingston formed a partnership to develop and sell property in rural Lincoln County near the confluence of Lake Roosevelt and the Spokane River. Over the next 20 years, the partnership and its successors built the Deer Meadows Golf Course Complex (including a golf course, restaurant, hotel, store, and club), platted several nearby parcels of property into subdivisions, and sold lots to private land owners for homes and vacation properties. A plat identifying the golf course was recorded. A local newspaper quoted Spencer as saying he built the golf course complex "so it would help sell the residential lots around here," and the lots were advertised accordingly. Ownership of the unsold lots and the golf course changed forms and hands over time. After Spencer passed away and after most of the lots were sold, Livingston closed down the golf course complex and began the process of platting the course into new residential lots. Many of those who had bought homes in the various subdivisions developed by Spencer and Livingston believed they had been promised that the golf course complex would remain a permanent fixture of their community, and relied on that promise when they made the decision to purchase their respective homes. Some of those homeowners formed the Riverview Community Group, which filed this lawsuit seeking to bar the defendants from selling off the former golf course as individual homes. Riverview sought to impose an equitable servitude on the golf course property that would limit its use to a golf course or, if that was untenable, for other equitable relief. It also sought injunctive relief. The trial judge issued a memorandum decision granting the Livingstons' motion under CR 12(b )(7) for failure to join indispensable parties. The following month, the trial court issued an order stating that "the legal issue of whether an equitable servitude can be created by implication is a question of first impression in the State of Washington" and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants to expedite review. The Court of Appeals largely reversed the trial court's legal rulings, finding that Riverview had organizational standing and the individual property owners were not essential parties, and concluding that Washington recognized equitable covenants. However, it affirmed summary judgment on the grounds that it would be "irrational to require the defendants to rebuild and operate a failing business." The Washington Supreme Court granted Riverview's petition for review, affirming most of the Court of Appeals' legal rulings but finding dismissal was based on facts not found in the record. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Riverview Cmty. Grp. v. Spencer & Livingston" on Justia Law