Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether New Hampshire law requires a foreclosing entity to hold both mortgage and note before it can exercise a power of sale under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 479:25, which authorizes a mortgagee to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure where, as in this case, the mortgage document contains a clause allowing them. Plaintiff executed a promissory note and a mortgage. The note and mortgage document and the note were subsequently assigned to different entities. After Plaintiff failed to make mortgage payments, Defendant, the mortgagee, moved to foreclose. Defendant removed the case from New Hampshire state court to federal court. The district court allowed Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the parties’ intent to separate the mortgage and note at the beginning of the transaction trumped any common law rule requiring unity, and thus, Defendant could proceed with the foreclosure under section 479:25. Plaintiff appealed. Because controlling state precedent did not provide definitive guidance on how to resolve the questions of whether the common law or state statute mandates the unity of a mortgage and note, and if so, whether parties can override that rule by agreement, the First Circuit certified the questions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.View "Castagnaro v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Debtor lived in a rent-stabilized apartment for over forty years. Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her unexpired rent-stabilized lease as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate under N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law 282(2) as a “local public assistance benefit.” The bankruptcy court struck the claimed exemption, concluding that the value of the lease did not qualify as an exempt local public assistance benefit. The district court affirmed. Debtor appealed, arguing that the value of her lease was a local public assistance benefit that was exempted from her bankruptcy estate. The Second Circuit certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the issue. The Court of Appeals answered that section 282(2) exempts a debtor-tenant’s interest in a rent-stabilized lease.View "Matter of Santiago-Monteverde" on Justia Law

In 2009, following a joint investigation by the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General and the Centre County Drug Task Force into cocaine trafficking by appellee Gregory Palazzari, appellee was arrested and charged with multiple drug trafficking offenses under the Controlled Substances, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act). The Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section of the Attorney General’s Office petitioned the trial court for forfeiture of Appellee’s property located at 605 University Drive, State College pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, alleging that appellee had used the property for the storage and sale of cocaine, as well as a place to meet his drug supplier. In a discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the general applicability of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, specifically, the availability of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1035.2, Pa.R.C.P. in such proceedings. Although the trial court granted forfeiture of the property to the Commonwealth upon its motion for summary judgment, the Commonwealth Court reversed, broadly holding that the Rules of Civil Procedure generally and Rule 1035.2 in particular were inapplicable to forfeiture proceedings. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the Rules of Civil Procedure applied to forfeiture proceedings where they do not conflict with the Forfeiture Act, and that there was no conflict between the entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1035.2 and the Act. As such, the Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth.View "Pennsylvania v. All That Certain Lot et al (Palazzari)" on Justia Law

In Nye I, before final judgment entered awarding a judgment parcel to Plaintiff, Defendants transferred via quitclaim deed to their family trust a property that the judgment parcel was located within. In Nye II, the Court affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the transfer of the disputed property. In this case, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the transfer of the disputed property to the trust before final judgment entered in Nye I served to render the final judgment a nullity. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s negligence and fraud claims and dismissed Plaintiff’s quiet title claim on the basis that Plaintiff was ordered to, and failed to, comply with R.I. Gen. Laws 34-16-2 by submitting an abstract of title or similar report concerning the status of the title. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court justice was correct in granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff’s fraud and negligence claims and in dismissing Plaintiff’s quiet title claim.View "Nye v. Brousseau" on Justia Law

Michele Dupree sued Auto-Owners Insurance Company, seeking to recover, under her homeowners’ insurance policy, the full cost of repair or replacement for the personal property that was destroyed in a fire at her home. Because the parties did not agree on the extent of the personal property loss, the parties submitted separate appraisals to an umpire under the process set forth in the insurance policy. The umpire issued an appraisal award that set forth the full replacement cost, the applicable depreciation, and the actual cash value loss of the property. Defendant paid plaintiff the actual cash value of the property but refused to pay the full replacement cost on the ground that plaintiff had failed to submit proof, in accordance with the replacement-cost provision of her insurance policy, that she had actually replaced the damaged property. The court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to plaintiff. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam. On appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether plaintiff’s appraisal award entitled her to only the actual cash value of her damaged personal property or whether defendant was liable for the full replacement cost of that property, i.e., actual cash value plus the applicable depreciation amount. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that plaintiff was not entitled to the full replacement cost of her property because she did not submit proof of actual loss in accordance with her policy. Defendant was liable for only the actual cash value of plaintiff’s damaged personal property.View "Dupree v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Canal Winchester MOB, LLC (“MOB”), the ground lessee of a medical office building, filed a complaint challenging the tax-year-2010 valuation of the building. The Board of Revision retained the auditor’s valuation. MOB, together with the record owner of the property, appealed. In its decision, the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) sua sponte considered the jurisdictional validity of the complaint and held that MOB did not have standing to file the complaint. Accordingly, the BTA ordered dismissal. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the BTA should have afforded MOB the opportunity to plead and prove its standing. Remanded.View "Diley Ridge Med. Ctr. v. Fairfield County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an underlying fraudulent real estate sale. Plaintiffs, purchasers of the property, obtained a judgment for $1,553,800, which included $850,000 in punitive damages. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to collect the judgment and moved for various postjudgment orders. The trial court granted these motions and issued orders enjoining defendants and their agents from selling, spending, transferring or dissipating any of their assets, which included money in any deposit account. When plaintiffs learned that defendants violated the orders, they filed a motion to dismiss the appeal under the doctrine of disentitlement. Defendants filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court concluded, based on the court's review of the motion and opposition papers, including a declaration from defendant Michael Weilert that did not deny any of the 47 transactions at issue, and argument by counsel, the court concluded that the balance of the equitable considerations relevant to the disentitlement doctrine favor dismissal. The court concluded that it would be unjust to allow defendants to seek the benefits of an appeal while willfully disobeying the trial court's valid orders and frustrating plaintiffs' legitimate efforts to enforce the judgment. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss.View "Gwartz v. Weilert" on Justia Law

Petitioner Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, a not-for profit theater corporation, owned real property that it used to house its staff and summer stock actors. Petitioner filed applications for real property tax exemptions under N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 420-a. The Assessor of the City of Auburn denied the applications. Supreme Court upheld the denial, determining that Petitioner failed to establish that its summer theater was an exempt purpose and that the use of apartment buildings to house its employees was reasonably incidental to its primary purpose. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner established its entitlement to the tax exemption because the use of the property to provide staff housing was reasonably incidental to Petitioner’s primary purpose of encouraging appreciation of the arts through theater.View "Matter of Merry-Go-Round Playhouse, Inc. v. Assessor of City of Auburn" on Justia Law

Wayne Farms owned and operated a chicken processing plant in Oakwood. A fire broke out at the plant in 2003. Roughly three years later, Wayne Farms and its insurers filed suit against Crane Composites, Inc., which manufactured interior panels used in the plant, alleging Crane’s negligence caused the fire to spread extensively. In the meantime, the legislature enacted OCGA 9-11-68 (b) (1). The question for decision in this case is whether OCGA 9-11-68 (a tort reform, fee-shifting statute) could be applied to a negligence action in which the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, but in which the action was filed after that date. The Supreme Court concluded that it could, and in so doing, overruled the case law set forth in "L. P. Gas Industrial Equipment Co. v. Burch," (701 SE2d 602) (2010)).View "Crane Company v. Wayne Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that she "pooled" her $150,000 with $100,000 provided by River Forest and Elevation "in partnership for the purchase" of a residential property at a foreclosure auction for the purchase price of $250,000. The trustee's deed that was executed and recorded omitted plaintiff's name, which had been included in the unrecorded, original trustee's deed; River Forest subsequently quitclaimed the property to Elevation; and without plaintiff's knowledge, Elevation then sold the property to Coronado. Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title to the property. The court held that the alteration of the deed to omit plaintiff's name was not material because the original version of the deed showed she had no interest in the property. Consequently, Coronado, as purchaser, has title to the property.View "Lin v. Coronado" on Justia Law