Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Gordon and Carol Lane took out a loan secured by a piece of commercial real estate. John Serpa executed a personal guaranty upon the loan. The Lanes defaulted on their obligation, and Serpa failed to fulfill his guarantor duties. Before the original lender exercised its right to foreclose, the FDIC was appointed its receiver and assigned the interest in the Lanes’ loan to First Financial Bank, N.A. (FFB). FFB foreclosed and sold the property to itself. FFB then brought a deficiency judgment and breach of guaranty action against the Lanes and Serpa (collectively, Respondents). The district court entered judgment in Respondents’ favor under Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.451 because the fair market value of the property exceeded the consideration the FFB paid the FDIC to acquire a lien on the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of “indebtedness” found in section 40.451 does not limit the amount a successor lienholder can recover in an action for a deficiency judgment to the amount of consideration such a lienholder paid to obtain its interest in the note and deed of trust. Remanded. View "First Fin. Bank v. Lane" on Justia Law

The Morris Family LLC (Morris Family) owns certain property abutting U.S. Highway 212 in the City of Watertown. In a 1970 condemnation action against Morris Family’s predecessor in title, the State sought to acquire the necessary “right of way and rights of access” in accordance with its plan to turn Highway 212 into a four-lane, controlled-access highway. The parties to the condemnation action eventually settled. In 2010, Morris Family filed a complaint against the City and State, claiming unconstitutional taking or damaging of property for the loss of access from their property to Highway 212 and violation of due process stemming from the State’s and City’s denial of access. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State was granted complete control of access for the land in the 1970 judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion for summary judgment was properly before the circuit court and that the court did not err when it granted summary judgment on all claims and dismissed the case. View "Morris Family LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law

In 2011, a tornado ripped through the downtown area of the City of Springfield, Massachusetts and caused significant damage. City officials quickly determined that the South Commons Condominiums were among the properties that suffered substantial damage. The City hired a private company to demolish most of those buildings the next evening. The owners of the condos brought suit against the City, its officials, and the demolition company that took down the buildings, claiming violations of the owners’ procedural and substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as various violations of Massachusetts state law. The district court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state claims without prejudice as an exercise of its discretion to deal with pendent claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a city decides buildings are so damaged that they must be immediately demolished, and when the city does so pursuant to a state law that authorizes the use of summary procedure to respond to such an emergency, the remedy for any wrong, absent behavior that objectively “shocks the conscience,” must come from the remedies the state itself supplies rather than from a federal suit premised on the U.S. Constitution’s due process clause. View "South Commons Condo. Ass’n v. Charlie Arment Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary separating the parties’ parcels of land and the ownership of an eleven-acre triangular area of land. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking to quiet title to the disputed area and alleging claims of trespass and slander of title. Defendants counterclaimed. The trial court entered judgment (1) in favor of Plaintiff on her claims of adverse possession and acquiescence, on Plaintiff's common law trespass claim, and on all of Defendant’s counterclaims, and (2) in favor of Defendants on each of the remaining claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiff had established the elements of adverse possession; (2) rejecting Plaintiff’s slander of title claim and statutory trespass claim pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. 7551-B; and (3) refusing to award treble damages pursuant to 14 Me. Rev. Stat. 7552(4)(B). View "Harvey v. Furrow" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the boundary between land owned by the parties to this case and an area of land with disputed ownership. Christopher and Diana Grondin filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment establishing the common boundary between their property and the property owned by Susan Hanscom. Hanscom filed a counterclaim also seeking a declaratory judgment as to the common boundary and alternatively seeking title to the disputed area through the doctrines of acquiescence and adverse possession. The superior court declared that the properties’ boundaries were as indicated on a certain survey, concluded that Hanscom had not gained title by acquiescence, and found only partially in Hanscom’s favor on her claim of adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Marchese survey was sound in law and fact, and the superior court was free to accept its findings; (2) the superior court did not err in determining that Hanscom had not obtained title to the disputed area by acquiescence; and (3) the superior court did not err in finding that Hanscom had sustained her adverse possession claim only in part. View "Grondin v. Hanscom" on Justia Law

Minneapolis imposes an annual vacant building registration fee on owners of vacant buildings “to recover all costs incurred by the city for monitoring and regulating vacant buildings, including nuisance abatement, enforcement and administrative costs.” If unpaid, the city can levy and collect the fee as a special assessment against the property. DRB owns a vacant building in Minneapolis and for several years failed to pay that registration fee. In 2011, DRB received notice the city intended to assess $6,550 for DRB’s unpaid 2010 fee. After a hearing attended by DRB, an administrative hearing officer levied the fee. This process repeated in 2012 and a fee of $6,746 was levied. DRB did not appeal either assessment, but brought a separate suit, on behalf of itself and similarly situated landowners. A magistrate judge recommended judgment in favor of the city, concluding the city had provided DRB with proper notice of the assessments and DRB did not bring its challenges to the assessments within the statutory 30-day appeal period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adoption of the recommendation. View "DRB #24, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, applicants sought to change their use of an absolute water right. Applicants conducted a historical consumptive use (HCU) analysis to determine the amount of water previously used in accordance with its decreed right. Applicants performed the analysis on acreage not contemplated by the original appropriation nor any subsequent decree. The water court rejected the HCU. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether applicant could conduct an HCU on acreage not associated with the relevant water right. After review of the parties' arguments in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that a HCU on acreage beyond its associated water right is impermissible. The Court affirmed the water court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Widefield Water v. Witte" on Justia Law

Craig and Julie Nelson appealed a judgment quieting title in certain real property in Harry and Linda Chornuk and awarding the Chornuks damages for conversion, and from an amended judgment modifying the damage award. In January 1986, Norman and Mildred Dahl conveyed the property to the Chornuks by warranty deed, but the deed was not recorded until June 24, 2010. On June 17, 2005, after Norman Dahl's death, Mildred Dahl conveyed the same property by warranty deed to the Nelsons as part of the conveyance of approximately 44.5 acres. The deed was recorded on July 5, 2005. In September 2010, the Chornuks sued the Nelsons to quiet title to the property and sought damages for claims of trespass and conversion. The Nelsons moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and to have title quieted in their favor because they recorded their deed to the property more than five years before the Chornuks recorded their deed. The trial court found the Chornuks mowed the property three or four times per year, planted trees on the property, installed drip irrigation lines for the trees, installed flower boxes on the property and performed other general maintenance. The court found that the Chornuks' actions were sufficient to put a prudent person on notice someone else had an interest in the property and that the Nelsons were required to conduct further inquiry before purchasing the property from Mildred Dahl. The court found the Nelsons had constructive notice of the Chornuks' interest and were not good-faith purchasers. The court awarded the Chornuks $2,830 in damages for trees the Nelsons cut down on the property. The Nelsons moved for reconsideration, arguing the damage award was not supported by the evidence. The court granted the Nelsons' motion. After a hearing, the court ordered the damage award be reduced to $360 and entered an amended judgment. The Nelsons argued the district court erroneously found they did not purchase the property in good faith and erred in quieting title of the property in favor of the Chornuks. Finding no reversible error after its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Chornuk v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Based on Hardy’s 2006 refinance of his Modesto residence, Hardy, acting pro se, sued ABHL for fraud, breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of California’s unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200). Hardy claimed that he was not given a copy of the loan application, that an agent inflated his assets and income on that application without his knowledge, and that he would not have consented to a negative amortization clause, had he been aware of it. In an earlier federal action, the district court declined to dismiss Hardy’s claim based on RESPA and his claims for fraud and violations of the UCL, dismissed his claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and ordered Hardy to file a second amended complaint. Hardy did not timely file and the court dismissed. In the state case, ABHL successfully moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground of collateral estoppel. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the prior federal action was not terminated by a judgment on the merits and the issues were not actually litigated. View "Hardy v. America's Best Home Loans" on Justia Law

In building their home, Plaintiffs purchased SuperFlex, a stucco-like material, to cover the house’s exterior. GrailCoat Worldwide, LLC and GrailCo, Inc. (collectively, GrailCoat), the manufacturers of SuperFlex, provided an express twenty-year warranty for the product. Several years after the construction of their home was completed, the product failed. Plaintiffs brought suit against GrailCoat and Hartley Construction, Inc., the company that had designed and built the home, for damages. Hartley moved for summary judgment under N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-50(a)(5), North Carolina’s six-year statute of repose for claims arising out of improvements to real property. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of express warranty against GrailCoat, holding that GrailCoat knowingly and freely entered into a valid contract of sale with Plaintiffs that provided for a warranty term that exceeded the repose period, and therefore, GrailCoat waived the protections provided by the statute of repose. View "Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc." on Justia Law