Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1989, the Poksays built their Novato home, including a 150-foot long driveway within the 30-foot wide easement running to the site, which was hidden from the street. The easement was over property then owned by the Schaefers and was for access and utility purposes only. The Poksays hired a landscaper, who dug holes, added plants and trees along both sides of the driveway, and installed a drip irrigation system with a line under the driveway. Water fixtures were installed along the driveway for fire safety. The Poksays added lighting, regularly tended to the landscaping, and paid maintenance, water, and other costs. Respondents purchased the property from the Poksays in 2000. The landscaping was mature. Appellants purchased the Schaefer property in 2004. In 2010, without notice, appellant cut the irrigation and electrical lines on both sides of the driveway, including those irrigating respondents’ own property and sent a letter demanding removal of all landscaping and supporting systems from the easement. Respondents filed suit. The court granted respondents an irrevocable parol license. The court of appeal agreed that it would be inequitable to deny respondents an irrevocable license given the substantial investment of time and money and years of acquiescence. View "Richardson v. Franc" on Justia Law

In 1979, plaintiff Morristown Associates purchased commercial property located in Morristown. The property contained a strip-mall-style shopping center known as Morristown Plaza. Among the tenants was Plaza Cleaners, a dry cleaning business owned at the time by Robert Herring. Herring and his wife had entered into a lease with the property's previous owner, Morris Center Associates, in 1976. Due to construction, Herring was unable to occupy and operate Plaza Cleaners until 1978. At some point before moving in, Herring installed a steam boiler in a room at the rear of the leased space and an underground storage tank (UST) for fuel to operate the boiler. In 1985, Herring sold Plaza Cleaners to defendants Edward and Amy Hsi. The Hsis owned the business until 1998 when it was sold to current owner and third-party defendant, Byung Lee. In August 2003, a monitoring of a well installed near Plaza Cleaner's UST revealed fuel oil contamination. A subsequent investigation revealed that although the UST was intact, the fill and vent pipes were severely deteriorated, with large holes along a significant portion of their lengths. Plaintiff's experts concluded that those holes had developed as early as 1988 and, since that time, oil had been leaking from the pipes each time the tank was filled. Each of the named oil company defendants in this case allegedly supplied fuel oil to Plaza Cleaners at various times between 1988 and 2003. The issue in this appeal was whether the general six-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applied to private claims for contribution made pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a). Based on the plain language of the Spill Act, reinforced by its legislative history, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 s six-year statute of limitations was not applicable to Spill Act contribution claims. The Court therefore rejected the contrary determination of the Appellate Division and reversed and remanded this case to the Appellate Division for its consideration of other issues raised on appeal that were unaddressed. View "Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Co." on Justia Law

In 1920, the Beckton Ranch Trust (BRT) was formed by members of the Forbes family to hold parcels of land in Sheridan County, Wyoming and their appurtenant water and ditch rights for the benefit of their descendants. In 2007, Waldo Forbes (Spike) resigned as trustee after a dispute with his siblings. Later that year, the remaining trustees - Spike’s brother, Cam, and his sisters, Julia, Sarah, and Edith - began a series of land and water transactions. Spike subsequently sought the removal of the trustees. The district court (1) concluded that Cam and Julia had breached their duty of loyalty and should be removed as BRT trustees; and (2) made no finding as to Sarah and Edith, and therefore, they continued as BRT trustees.The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Cam and Julia breached their duty of loyalty, but because the evidence did not demonstrate that they acted dishonestly or with want of capacity, or that any serious harm had been done, the breaches did not warrant their removal as trustees; and (2) the district court correctly decided not to remove Sarah and Edith. View "Forbes v. Forbes" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the attempted foreclosure of two mechanic's liens on property encumbered by deeds of trust. In "ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson," 302 P.3d 18 (2013) (ParkWest II), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien on property encumbered by a deed of trust must "name the trustee who holds legal title to the property" within the six-month statutory limitation to lien enforcement. Appellant ACI Northwest Inc. challenged the holding from ParkWest II after the district court determined that ACI lost its mechanic's liens for failing to name the trustees in its foreclosure action against Respondents Monument Heights LLC, Dan Jacobson, Sage Holdings LLC, Steven Lazar, the Mitchell Martin and Karen C. Martin Family Trust dated August 9, 2005, Devon Chapman, HLT Real Estate LLC, Anthony St. Louis, Andrea Stevens, and Lilly Properties Inc. (collectively "the Monuments Heights group"). Due to this determination, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Monuments Heights group. ACI appeals to this Court. Finding no reason to disturb the holding in ParkWest II, and finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "ACI Northwest, Inc. v. Monument Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned three small, adjacent parcels of land in Bear Lake County which lined up in a north to south direction and are bordered by State Highway 89 on the west and Bear Lake on the east. In 1998, the northern parcel was owned by Peggy and David Everton; the middle parcel was owned by Annette and Sterling Wallentine; and the southern parcel was owned by Jeanne Macvicar. Historically, Macvicar had accessed her property by a driveway that went through the Everton and Wallentine properties. The driveway left State Highway 89 at the northwestern edge of the Everton parcel, traveled along the western edge of the Everton and Wallentine parcels, and terminated at Macvicar's property. in 1998, Macvicar filed a complaint against the Evertons and Wallentines, requesting that the district court declare an easement existed along the western edge of their parcels. In 2000, the parties filed a Stipulation for Settlement. The district court accepted the stipulation and entered its Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title (the 2000 Judgment). The Evertons, the Wallentines, and Macvicar subsequently sold their parcels to the parties to this appeal. Macvicar sold her property to Jim and Maryann Plane, who transferred the property to the Jim and Maryann Plane Family Trust (the Trust). The Planes had actual knowledge of the 2000 Judgment and the Stipulation when they purchased Macvicar's property. Jason and Janae Skinner purchased the parcels owned by the Evertons and Wallentines. This controversy arose after September 27, 2012, when the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) wrote the Skinners a letter demanding that the Skinners remove their "illegal" driveway. However, the letter also enclosed a permit application for the Skinners to submit which would "allow for the continued use of this currently illegal access." On April 1, 2013, the Trust filed a motion, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), requesting that the district court void three sentences of the 2000 Judgment. The Trust argued these provisions were void because the district court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction to address the State's right-of-way because the State was not a party to the litigation. The effect of eliminating these three sentences would be to expand the width of the easement over the Skinners' parcels from a maximum of five feet to ten feet. On April 18, 2013, the Skinners filed an application with ITD, seeking permission to continue to access the State right-of-way for purposes of a driveway. ITD issued a permit authorizing the Skinners and the Planes to use up to five feet of the State right-of-way. The district court denied the Trust's motion, and the Trust appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed it. View "Plane Family Trust v. Skinner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted to sell Defendants certain real property. The contract provided that Plaintiff would retain ownership of a sixty-foot wide strip of property to provide access to her remaining property, but the warranty deed failed to include the reservation. When it became difficult for Plaintiff to access her property due to improvements on the purchased real property, Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging, among other claims that were subsequently dismissed, breach of contract. The trial court ruled for Plaintiff on the breach of contract claim and awarded her $650,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the gravamen of Plaintiff’s prevailing claim was injury to real property, and therefore, the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to “actions for injuries to personal or real property.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s prevailing claim was breach of contract, to which the six-year statute of limitations for “actions on contracts not otherwise expressly provided for” applied. View "Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enters., LP" on Justia Law

The Rudgears, the owners of Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC, borrowed money, through Wildwood, from the predecessor to BMO Harris Bank to finance construction of a home on a vacant lot. The loan was secured by a deed of trust. The home was never built, and the property remained undeveloped. Wildwood later defaulted on its loan, and BMO foreclosed on the property. A third party successfully bid for the property. BMO subsequently sued Wildwood and the Rudgears for the deficiency. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the Rudgears intended to use the property for a single-family residence and therefore qualified for anti-deficiency protection. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Arizona’s residential anti-deficiency statute does not bar a deficiency judgment against an owner of vacant property. Remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of BMO. View "BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

In the late 1990s, the Township of Ocean began a comprehensive planning process in anticipation of population growth and increased development. In April 2007, plaintiffs, who owned a significant amount of land in the Township, filed a complaint against the Township, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs (DCA) challenging the validity of three ordinances affecting their property. They alleged that they were arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and illegal and that the rezoning constituted inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs lived in a single-family residence on the eastern portion of one of several lots they owned; the remainder of the property consisted of undeveloped woodlands. When plaintiffs acquired the property, it was subject to mixed zoning. As a result of the Planning Commission s endorsement of the Township s Petition, all but one of plaintiffs lots were converted to PA-5 Environmentally Sensitive Planning Areas. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the circumstances under which municipal zoning ordinances represent a legitimate exercise of a municipality s power to zone property consistent with its Master Plan and Land Use Law (MLUL) goals. Upon review, the Court concluded that the ordinances represented a legitimate exercise of the municipality's power to zone property consistent with its MLUL goals, and held that plaintiffs did not overcome the ordinances presumption of validity. The inclusion of plaintiffs property in the EC district rationally related to the municipality's comprehensive smart growth development plan, which concentrated development in a town center surrounded by a green-zone buffer. The Court declined to invalidate ordinances that fulfill MLUL goals and other legitimate land-use planning objectives through plaintiffs as-applied challenge. "Rather, we reassert the importance of exhausting administrative remedies and conclude that plaintiffs claim for redress for the downzoning of their property is better addressed through their inverse condemnation claim, which, as the trial court held, plaintiffs may pursue if they are denied a variance." View "Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean" on Justia Law

When the father of Daniel Albert and Carlton Albert died, the father’s company was left in trust for the benefit of Daniel and Carlton. In 1984, Daniel bought the land from company and later conveyed it to Carlton in exchange for Carlton’s shares in the company. In 1992, Daniel purchased the land from Carlton and, in turn, released Carlton from his debt on a loan Daniel had previously extended to him. In 2010, Carlton commenced this action seeking imposition of a constructive trust on the land, alleging that, at the time of the 1992 land transfer, Daniel breached a confidential relationship existing between them. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) in finding that Daniel and Carlton did not have a confidential relationship at the time of the land conveyance; and (2) in concluding, alternatively, that even if a confidential relationship did exist, the 1992 land transaction was free of any undue influence affecting Carlton’s interests. View "Albert v. Albert" on Justia Law

Getty Properties Corp. leased certain properties to Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. by way of a master lease. Getty Marketing sublet the properties to Green Valley Oil, LLC. Thereafter, Green Valley entered into an individual sub-sublease with each Defendant, the owners of retail gasoline stations. Getty Properties subsequently terminated the master lease. Getty Marketing then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court rejected the master lease and ordered that Getty Marketing relinquish possession of the properties to Getty Properties. Getty Properties and NECG Holdings Corp. served Defendants with notices to quit, but Defendants refused to vacate the properties. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced summary process actions against Defendants. The trial court rendered judgment of immediate possession for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiffs’ notices to quit were valid; (2) admitting into evidence the lease between Getty Properties and Getty Marketing, as well as the sublease between Getty Marketing and Green Valley; (3) interpreting the various pleadings in Getty Marketing’s bankruptcy case as terminating the lease and the sublease; (4) finding that Plaintiffs proved a prima facie case for summary process; and (5) failing to dismiss the summary process action as premature. View "Getty Props. Corp. v. ATKR, LLC" on Justia Law