Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

After purchasing their property, William and Tia Hansuld notified Lariat Diesel Corporation and Marvin Piel (collectively, “Lariat”) that it could not longer use their property for access. Litigation ensued. This matter was the third appeal of the parties’ various claims to the Supreme Court. In Hansuld I, the Court concluded that Lariat had an implied easement for access across the Hansulds’ property. On remand from Hansuld II, the district court conducted a bench trial to establish the specific location of Lariat’s implied access easement. The district court applied the law of floating easements to determine the location of Lariat’s implied access easement and accepted one of Lariat’s proposed locations with some modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court incorrectly recited the law pertaining to floating easements, but the error did not make a legal difference; and (2) the Hansulds did not demonstrate that the district court’s final decision as to the location of the implied easement was either clearly erroneous or that the court erred as a matter of law. View "Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp." on Justia Law

A property owner appealed a valuation of its real property. After the Board of Tax Appeals issued its decision on August 29, 2013, the property owner appealed. The notice of appeal was filed on September 30, 2013, but the property owner failed to initiate service of the notice of appeal on the tax commissioner. On October 24, 2013, the property owner served the tax commissioner with the appeal. On November 4, 2013, the appeal was returned from mediation to the regular docket. That order specified that Appellant’s brief was due forty days from the date of the order. On November 12, 2013, the school board filed a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the property owner failed to initiate service of the notice of appeal on the tax commissioner, a necessary party, within the thirty-day appeal period. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Blimar Team Cleaners appealed a superior court decision to uphold the Burlington Board of Tax Appeals' appraisal of its property at 150 Shelburne Road in Burlington at a value of $193,500. Taxpayer contended on appeal that: (1) there was sufficient evidence that the property was not assessed at fair market value to overcome the city appraisal's presumption of validity; and (2) the City of Burlington failed to meet its burden of proof demonstrating the property was assessed at fair market value. Finding no reason to disturb the appraisal or the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Bilmar Team Cleaners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan from Equity One, Inc. As security for the note, Plaintiff executed a mortgage on the property in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). The note was twice transferred, eventually landing in the possession of Deutsche Bank, National Trust Company. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. was retained to service the loan. Meanwhile, MERS, as nominee for Equity One, assigned its interest in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. After Litton and Deutsche Bank initiated foreclosure proceedings, Plaintiff filed an action alleging that the assignment from MERS to Deutsche Bank was invalid for lack of authority. When Plaintiff sought to depose a MERS designee, MERS filed a motion for a protective order, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignment. The superior court denied the motion. MERS filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. Litton and Deutsche Bank then moved for summary judgment, which the hearing justice granted. The Supreme Court (1) quashed the order denying MERS’ motion for a protective order, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignment in question; and (2) affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Litton and Deutsche Bank, holding that MERS had the authority to assign the mortgage. View "Genao v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were several residents in the Milatzo Subdivision who sought to permanently enjoin Defendants from operating a daycare business out of their residence in the Subdivision. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction, concluding (1) Defendants’ daycare operation violated the protective covenants governing properties in the Subdivision, (2) Defendants did not establish that those covenants had been abandoned, and (3) the violation harmed Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the protective covenants governing the Subdivision were not abandoned and that Defendants flagrantly ignored the covenants when they opened their daycare operation. View "Moore v. Wolititch" on Justia Law

This controversy arose from an easement over a right-of-way that ran along a driveway on Plaintiff’s lots allowing access to Poppasquash Road from Defendant’s property. When Defendant and her family began using the right-of-way across Plaintiff’s lots to access the road from their property, Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment to quiet title to the right-of-way and damages for trespass. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that she had an express easement permitting her to travel on the right-of-way. The trial justice granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly found that Defendant had established the existence of an express easement appurtenant. View "Kinder v. Westcott" on Justia Law

Plaintiff executed a promissory note that was secured by a mortgage on her real estate. The mortgage deed named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee. The note was transferred to USA Residential Properties, LLC, and Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC became the servicer for the loan. MERS then assigned its interest in the mortgage to ACT Properties, LLC, which assigned its interest in the mortgage to USA Residential. When Rushmore initiated foreclosure proceedings, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the assignment from MERS to ACT Properties was invalid because the signer was unauthorized. When Plaintiff filed a notice to depose a MERS designee as to the authority of the official who executed the assignment from MERS to ACT Properties, MERS moved for a protective order seeking to restrict discovery, arguing that Plaintiff had no standing to challenge the validity of the assignment. The hearing justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court quashed the hearing justice’s decision, holding that because Plaintiff merely alleged that the assignment was voidable, as opposed to void, and because she was not a party to the assignment, she lacked standing to challenge it and was not entitled to engage in discovery pertaining to the authority issue. View "Cruz v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In order to finance her purchase of a home, Plaintiff executed a note payable to New Century Mortgage Corporation. The note was secured by a mortgage on the property naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as mortgagee. New Century, the lender, subsequently filed for bankruptcy and filed a notice of rejection of executory contract regarding its membership agreement with MERS and its status as a MERS member. MERS then assigned the mortgage to UBS Real Estate Securities, and UBS assigned the mortgage to USA Residential Properties. Thereafter, USA Residential and its loan servicer, Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, commenced foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this complaint against MERS, UBS, USA Residential, and Rushmore, declaring that the mortgage assignments were void and the foreclosure sale was invalid. The superior court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the assignments of the mortgage and, alternatively, that the assignments were valid and the foreclosure proper. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the assignment of the mortgage on her home and adequately stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. View "DiLibero v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Metropolitan National Bank agreed to finance construction of a residential subdivision. As security for the note, Ruskin Heights executed a mortgage on the real property in favor of Metropolitan. The afternoon after construction commenced, Metropolitan filed its mortgage. Approximately two years later, Crafton, Tull, Sparks & Associates, Inc. (CTSA) filed an engineering lien against the property. Metropolitan filed a foreclosure complaint against Ruskin Heights and others. CTSA then filed a complaint asserting an engineer’s lien against Ruskin Heights and an amended complaint against Ruskin Heights and Metropolitan, requesting that its lien be declared superior to Metropolitan’s mortgage lien. The cases were consolidated. The circuit court concluded that CTSA’s lien was second in priority to Metropolitan’s lien. CTSA appealed, arguing that its lien should relate back to the commencement of construction and have priority over Metropolitan’s mortgage pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 18-44-110. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Metropolitan’s lien did not have priority over CTSA’s engineer’s lien because section 18-44-110 does not allow for an engineer’s lien to relate back to the date of construction. View "Crafton Tull Sparks & Assocs., Inc. v. Ruskin Heights, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cogswell Farm Condominium Association filed a declaratory judgment action with respect to two exclusions in insurance policies issued by respondents Tower Group, Inc. and Acadia Insurance Company. The trial court held that the two exclusions at issue precluded coverage for petitioner's underlying lawsuit against Lemery Building Company, Inc. In 2009, Cogswell sued Lemery and others, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and negligent supervision in the construction of 24 residential condominium units. Cogswell asserted that the "weather barrier" components of the units – including the water/ice shield, flashing, siding, and vapor barrier – were defectively constructed and resulted in damage to the units due to water leaks. Because the units were sold at different times and the policies were in effect during two different time periods, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in holding that one policy exclusion served as a bar for coverage for each unit after it was sold. Furthermore, the Court found that the other exclusion was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting respondents summary judgment with respect to that exclusion. The trial court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Cogswell Farm Condominium Ass'n v. Tower Group, Inc." on Justia Law