Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Timmy and Stephanie Blackmon sued Eddie Powell (d/b/a Powell Plumbing Company) for negligence, wantonness, breach of implied warranties and breach of contract following a water-line rupture that caused extensive flooding and water damage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Powell, and the Blackmons appealed. Finding the evidence in the trial court record supported the motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Blackmon v. Powell" on Justia Law

Fred and Nancy Eagerton petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a judgment as a matter of law in their favor and against SE Property Holdings, LLC, consistent with the Court's mandate in "Eagerton v. Vision Bank," (99 So. 3d 299 (Ala. 2012)). SE Property Holdings, LLC, is the successor by merger to Vision Bank. The underlying suit arose from a loan that the Eagertons personally guaranteed, secured by a mortgage on property within the Rock Creek Tennis Club in Fairhope. The bank declared the original and second loans in default and accelerated balances due under both. The bank sued the primary obligor, and the Eagertons as person guarantors on one of the original loans. The primary obligor declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The reorganization plan consolidated the two loans. The obligor eventually defaulted on the terms of the reorganization plan. The bankruptcy was dismissed, the property foreclosed, and the money obtained in the foreclosure sale was applied to the consolidated loan. The Eagertons argued that the Chapter 11 reorganization of the debts of primary obligor (the consolidation of the original loan with the second loan), created a new indebtedness not encompassed by their guaranty contracts. The Eagertons therefore argued that the creation of this new indebtedness, without their knowledge or consent, operated to discharge them from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. The bank, on the other hand, argued, among other things, that the consolidated loan was a replacement note contemplated by the guaranty contracts and that the Eagertons had waived the material-modification defense. The Supreme Court in "Eagerton v. Vision Bank" concluded that the Eagertons' guaranty contracts were unambiguous; that based on the language in the guaranty contracts the Eagertons did not intend to guarantee any indebtedness other than that indebtedness arising out of the original loan and any extensions, renewals, or replacements thereof; and that, once the Eagertons' original loan was modified pursuant to the Chapter 11 reorganization of Dotson 10s, the Eagertons were at that point discharged from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. Because the circuit court did not follow the mandate in the Court's prior decision in "Vision Bank," the Supreme Court granted the Eagertons' petition and issued the writ. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Eagerton" on Justia Law

Defendants The Pantry, Inc., and Herndon Oil Corporation appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs Kaycee Mosley and Alana Byrd. The appeals primarily concerned whether Kaycee and Alana's mother, Murel Mosley, unreasonably withheld consent to Herndon Oil's assignment of a lease between Murel and Herndon Oil. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case, concluding that Murel unreasonably withheld consent to the assignment of the lease from Herndon Oil to The Pantry. Thus, Herndon Oil had the right under the lease agreement to assign the lease to The Pantry despite Murel's failure to consent. Furthermore, neither Herndon Oil nor The Pantry could be liable on a conversion claim. View "The Pantry, Inc. v. Mosley" on Justia Law

Appellants R & G, LLC, George D. Copelan, Sr., Gilman Hackel, and Robert Yarbrough appealed a $1.3 million circuit court judgment entered against them and in favor of RCH IV-WB, LLC ("RCH"). In July 2005, Wolf Bay Partners, L.L.C., executed a promissory note with Wachovia Bank in the original principal amount of $2.5 million. That note was secured by a mortgage on two parcels of property in Baldwin County and guaranteed by each of the appellants, as well as by Defendants GDG Properties, LLC, David W. Mobley, and George D. Gordon. By written agreement of the parties, the amount of the indebtedness was subsequently increased to $2.9 million. Wachovia Bank thereafter assigned its interest in the note and mortgage to RCH Mortgage Fund IV, LLC. Wolf Bay Partners subsequently defaulted on its payment obligations under the terms of the promissory note, and RCH Mortgage Fund IV accordingly commenced foreclosure proceedings on the property secured by the mortgage. In early 2009, RCH, a newly created affiliate of RCH Mortgage Fund IV, purchased the property at a foreclosure sale for $2 million and RCH Mortgage Fund IV thereafter assigned RCH all of its rights under the loan. In June 2009, RCH sued the defendants, seeking to recover $1.1 million allegedly still due on the promissory note, plus interest after the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were applied to the debt. A bench trial was held, at which the defendants challenged the evidence put forth by RCH indicating that the foreclosed-upon mortgage had been properly assigned to RCH Mortgage Fund IV by Wachovia Bank. The defendants also argued that it was improper for RCH Mortgage Fund IV to sell the foreclosed property as a single unit instead of as two separate parcels and that RCH Mortgage Fund IV accepted an allegedly unconscionably low purchase price at the foreclosure sale. The trial court ultimately excluded the evidence put forth by RCH indicating that the mortgage had been assigned to RCH Mortgage Fund IV and set aside the foreclosure and sale because, for all that appeared, the wrong party had conducted the foreclosure and sale. The trial court made no ruling on the defendants' other arguments because it found that RCH Mortgage Fund IV was the wrong party to conduct the foreclosure and sale. RCH appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court, which held that RCH's evidence of mortgage assignment should have been considered by the trial court. On remand, RCH in light of the Supreme Court's reversal, all that was left for the trial court but to enter a final judgment in RCH's favor. RCH's brief was served on all defendants; however none filed a response. The trial court entered judgment in favor of RCH. Defendants Hackel and Yabrough moved the trial court to alter, amend or vacate its judgment in favor of RCH. Unsuccessful, they appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court's new judgment in favor of RCH, and affirmed. View "R & G, LLC v. RCH IV-WB, LLC " on Justia Law

Alamo Title Company ("Alamo"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied Alamo's motion to dismiss an action filed against it by P.B. Surf, Ltd., and to enter an order dismissing the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. This dispute concerned the disbursement of proceeds from the sale of the an apartment complex in Houston, Texas. According to P.B. Surf, at the time the sale was scheduled to close in late 2011, a dispute arose over who was entitled to the net proceeds of the sale and where the net proceeds were to be deposited after the closing. After the closing, Alamo wired a portion of the net proceeds from the sale to a Birmingham Wells Fargo bank account pursuant to instructions from several of the sellers. P.B. Surf sued Alamo and several other defendants, alleging, among other things, conspiracy. Alamo moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss P.B. Surf's claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. In an amended complaint, P.B. Surf alleged that Alamo was partially responsible for what it alleged was the improper distribution of the proceeds among Defendants Guy Savage and Willem Noltes, and P.B. Surf. When the trial court denied its motion to dismiss, Alamo moved to reconsider which was also denied. Considering the minimum-contacts analysis in the context of specific personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court concluded that the requisite minimum contacts for the trial court's exercise of specific jurisdiction over Alamo did not exist. Furthermore, the Court found that Alamo's contacts with Alabama were not continuous and systematic so as to support the trial court's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over Alamo. Therefore, the petition for a writ of mandamus established clear legal right to dismissal of P.B. Surf's complaint. View "In re: P. B. Surf, Ltd. v. Savage" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Nandean Sanders appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Defendants E.I. Campbell, Averline Campbell and Jerry Lawrence. The parties owned adjoining properties in Dallas County. Sanders sought declarative and injunctive relief regarding a disputed strip of property that the the parties all claimed to own. Defendants counterclaimed to ask the court to establish a boundary line between Sanders and their property and to enjoin Sanders' "encroachment." Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's judgment was nonfinal, and therefore the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction for further consideration. The appeal was dismissed. View "Sanders v. E. I. Campbell et al. " on Justia Law

Lowell and Deborah Fuller, and Ronald and Sheila M. Turner, appealed a circuit court judgment which found that, although the Town of Magnolia Springs held no riparian rights in and to the Magnolia River, the Town was entitled to construct improvements on the shores of the River and extending into the River for a boat launch, a boat dock, and/or a pier to be used in connection with Rock Landing, a public landing on the River, and that Rock Street, a public street in the Town that adjoined the lands owned by the Fullers and the Turners and that terminated at Rock Landing, could be used for temporary parking "for the purpose of launching a boat, kayak, canoe or other float at Rock Landing." The Town cross-appealed that part of the judgment that declared the Town was without authority to convert a portion of Rock Street from a public street to a parking facility and recreational area. On appeal, the Fullers and Turners argued that the remedy ordered by the circuit court was inconsistent with the underlying factual findings and conclusions of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the conclusions of law were indeed contradictory to the remedy the circuit court fashioned. The Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for the court to either revise its conclusions of law or the relief it ordered. Furthermore, because the Town's cross-appeal directly related to the issues raised on appeal, the Court ordered the cross-appeal to be reconsidered by the circuit court on remand. View "Fuller v. Town of Magnolia Springs " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joe F. Watkins, Patricia M. Smith, and RE/MAX Lake Martin Properties, LLC sued Bear Brothers, Inc., ETC Lake Development, LLC ("ETC Lake"), and E.T. "Bud" Chambers, among others, asserting claims related to the construction and development of a condominium project on Lake Martin. ETC Lake and Chambers crossclaimed against Bear Brothers seeking to recover losses suffered on the project as well as indemnification for the costs of litigating the plaintiffs' action and any damages for which they might be found liable to the plaintiffs. In January 2010, Bear Brothers moved the circuit court to compel arbitration of the cross-claim against it. The circuit court did not rule on that motion. Bear Brothers renewed its motion in July 2011, and the circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim in December. Bear Brothers then moved the circuit court "to stay [the] proceedings [in the plaintiffs' action] pending the outcome of a related arbitration." After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion to stay. Bear Brothers appealed the circuit court's order denying the motion to stay to the Supreme Court; ETC Lake and Chambers moved to dismiss the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the motion at issue in this case was a motion to stay related proceedings pending the arbitration of a crossclaim between codefendants and was filed separately from the initial motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim and subsequent to the circuit court's order granting the motion. Thus, Bear Brothers did not demonstrate a right to appeal the denial of the motion to stay at this time, and accordingly the Court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "Bear Brothers, Inc. v. ETC Lake Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Irondale appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment which declared its annexation of a parcel of property owned by the Black Warrior-Cahaba Rivers Land Trust adjacent to the Cahaba River as void. The property at the time did not lie within the corporate limits of any municipality, but fell within the police jurisdiction on the City of Irondale and the City of Leeds. Leeds sought a judgment to declare the annexation as invalid. In entering a summary judgment in favor of Leeds, the trial court concluded that "the Cahaba River, under Alabama state law, is a public waterway" and that the conditions for finding contiguity across a public waterway were not met. Accordingly, the trial court concluded, Irondale's annexation of the Land Trust property was improper and void. Agreeing with the circuit court's conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Irondale v. City of Leeds " on Justia Law

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation ("the defendants"). In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years. In 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, but that they were not. Wallace asserted that, as a result of reported water leaks that were left unrepaired, the office was infested with toxic mold. Therefore, he had to close his practice to avoid exposing his employees and his patients to the toxic mold. The defendants successfully filed a motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. In 2010, Wallace filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that Wallace did not timely file his notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wallace v. Belleview Properties Corp." on Justia Law