Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

First Union National Bank of Florida (First Union) appealed a judgment in favor of the Lee County Commission (Commission) and Philip Summers. Mr. Summers executed a mortgage on property he owned within the County on which he built a summer home. The home was ultimately subject to a tax sale by the County. The trustee for Mid-State Trust IV sued the Commission and Mr. Summers in 2009 seeking the excess redemption proceeds from the tax sale of the Summers property. The trustee later filed a motion to substitute First Union as the real party in interest. The trial court eventually entered a judgment finding that Mr. Summers was entitled to the excess funds from the tax sale because he was the last "owner" as defined by state law against whom the taxes were assessed. Upon careful consideration of the trial courtâs record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Petitioner Beverly Scannelly petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate all orders it entered after she filed a notice of dismissal. Furthermore, Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from future attempts to exercise jurisdiction over her case. Petitioner sued her brother, Respondent Gary Toxey, in 2009, seeking to void certain real-estate transfers her father made to Mr. Toxey. Petitioner filed, sought dismissal, and refilled her complaint three times in three different circuit courts. Mr. Toxey "answered" Petitionerâs complaint approximately one year later by filing a responsive pleading that collaterally attacked her complaint under "res judicata." The circuit court dismissed her case in 2010, finding that Mr. Toxey essentially filed a motion for summary judgment and that Petitionerâs claims presented no issues of material fact. In affirming the circuit courtâs decision, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate she had a clear legal right to her requested writs. Accordingly, the Court denied her petition.

EB Investments, LLC and Pavilion Development, LLC filed separate appeals to challenge an a court order that held Pavilion was entitled to redeem certain property in Madison County in which EB Investments, and multiple other parties, held legal interests. In 1997, Pavilion sought to redeem nineteen acres of land purchased by JBJ Partnership at a foreclosure sale. The land was purchased from a development project that went bankrupt. In 1995, the bankruptcy trustee supervised a settlement agreement through which the developer would make payments on the development to its creditors. When the developer defaulted on the settlement agreement, the property was foreclosed and sold. Over the following months and years, a host of counterclaims, cross-claims, and separate lawsuits were filed by various parties who had interests in the property. At issue in this particular case was which party is entitled to redeem the disputed property. The trial court determined that Pavilion was entitled to redeem the property. In its order, the court specified how Pavilion should perfect its redemption. If Pavilion failed to pay all sums required by the court's order, it would waive its right to redeem the property. The court denied the remaining post-judgment motions and certified its judgment as final. EB Investments and Pavilion both appealed that judgment. Though they took opposing sides on most issues in the case, both EB Investments and Pavilions challenged whether the trial court's order was indeed final. They argued that the judgment did not address all other pending issues before the court. JBJ and other parties responded and essentially asked the Court to end this long-running dispute. Upon careful review of the sixteen-year history of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's attempt to end it was ultimately insufficient. The Court found that the trial court exceeded its discretion by certifying its judgment as final. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Brady Farr appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Respondents The Gulf Agency, Orange Beach Insurance Agency and Lexington Insurance Company. Mr. Farr finished renovating his house in 2003. In 2004, he decided to sell his property to a developer who wished to turn the property into condominiums. In anticipation of the sale, Mr. Farr obtained a $1 million loan, secured by a mortgage. As part of the loan process, the mortgage company ordered an appraisal of the property. The property was appraised at $1.3 million and the improvements were valued at $313,000. In 2004, Mr. Farr contacted Orange Beach to insure the property against "total loss." Lexington, acting as Orange Beach's agent, submitted an insurance application for policy limits based on the appraisal to The Gulf Agency, who ultimately served as underwriter for the policy. In the fall of 2004, Mr. Farr was concerned that the policy limits were not sufficient to adequately cover a total loss of the property. In September, Mr. Farr's concerns were realized when Hurricane Ivan destroyed the property. He filed a claim with Orange Beach. In November, Mr. Farr sold his property for $1.18 million. The sales agreement was amended to reflect the total loss he suffered as a result of the hurricane. Lexington's adjuster visited the property to determine the cause of Mr. Farr's loss. The adjuster found the hurricane was the "proximate cause". Lexington subsequently paid Mr. Farr $50,000 for the damage. Alleging that the policy did not provide adequate coverage and that Lexington failed to pay the proper benefits under the policy, Mr. Farr sued the insurance companies for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, conspiracy, and bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim. The trial court granted the companies' motion for summary judgment, finding that some of Mr. Farr's claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment pertaining to Mr. Farr's tort claims. The Court found that those claims were indeed barred by a statute of limitations. The Court however found that the breach of contract and bad faith claims should not have been dismissed through summary judgment. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Virginia McClung appealed a circuit court judgment that reformed a deed that conveyed an interest in land to her and her brother. In 1979 Ms. McClungâs parents divorced. Their separation agreement conveyed two parcels of property to their adult children, Ms. McClung and Charles Green, as "tenants in common, reserving unto [the parents] a life estate therein." At that time, none of the parties recognized a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the actual deed, which conveyed the property to the siblings as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The deed was recorded, the parents divorced, and the divorce decree "ratified and confirmed" the separation agreement. In 1992, Charles Green died. His sole heir was his 21-year-old daughter, Bridget Williams. Loretta Green, Ms. McClungâs mother died in 2007 leaving Ms. McClung as her sole heir. Subsequently, a dispute arose between Senior Green and his daughter over who was entitled to the rental income Loretta had previously received from the property. The father sued his daughter seeking all rents received from the property. In his suit, Mr. Green argued that he and his ex-wife intended that his children take the property as tenants-in-common after his and Lorettaâs life estates expired. But owing to a mutual mistake, the deed had erroneously conveyed the property as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Mr. Greenâs granddaughter joined in the lawsuit because she inherited her fatherâs interest in the property if the court reformed the deed. A month after he commenced his suit, Mr. Green died. The trial court ruled in his (and his granddaughterâs) favor, and Ms. McClung appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record, the court found that before the 1979 deed could be reformed, there must be evidence to indicate that Loretta Green did not intend to convey the property to her children as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Neither the separation agreement nor the recorded deed accurately reflected Lorettaâs intent at the time either document was executed. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial courtâs reformation of the 1979 deed was inappropriate. The Court reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Monica Ware appealed a summary judgment in favor of Respondent Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, the trustee for HSI Asset Securitization Corporation. The Bank foreclosed on Petitioner and published notice of the foreclosure in a local Birmingham newspaper. The court entered summary judgment against her. Petitioner then filed a motion to amend or vacate the judgment and requested a hearing. The trial court refused to rule on Petitionerâs motion or hold a hearing. The motion was deemed denied by operation of law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner challenged the timing and propriety of the summary judgment and its refusal to rule on her motion to amend or vacate. In affirming the trial courtâs judgment, the Supreme Court "searched [Petitionerâs] briefs in vain for the argument that she actually made in the trial court, namely, that the foreclosure was "null and void. . . .[A] remand . . . would serve no purpose other than to afford her a 'second bite at the apple.'" The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.