Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between the developers of an aviation-centric community and the homeowners' association regarding the transfer and use of special declarant rights associated with a unique lot. The developers sold the lot to new owners, but the deed did not clearly convey the special declarant rights, and the homeowners' association was not informed about the transfer of these rights. The new owners sought a declaratory judgment that they held the special declarant rights, allowing them to bypass the association's oversight for construction, rent aircraft facilities to non-lot owners, and permit those non-lot owners to use the airstrip. The association argued otherwise and also contended that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other community members.The Superior Court of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of the association, ruling that the new owners did not obtain the special declarant rights, that construction on the lot required the association's approval, that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other members, and that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities. The court also awarded attorney's fees to the association.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the statutory warranty deed was ambiguous regarding the transfer of the special declarant rights. The court reversed the summary judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the new owners obtained the special declarant rights. The court affirmed the requirement for the lot owners to make tiedowns available to other members but reversed the determination that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities, finding the declaration ambiguous on this point. The court vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded for a new prevailing party determination. View "Meyers v. Sky Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

A company that leased space to a government agency lost its bid to renew that lease to another landowner in a different zoning district. The new lessor requested the municipal planning department to approve the government agency’s proposed use of its space, which the planning department determined was appropriate for the property’s zoning designation. The former lessor challenged this determination by appealing to the municipal zoning board, which affirmed the planning department’s decision.The former lessor then appealed the zoning board’s decision to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The superior court, on its own initiative, questioned the former lessor’s standing to appeal. After briefing, the court determined that the former lessor was a “party aggrieved” and therefore had standing. On the merits, the court found the zoning board’s findings insufficient and remanded the case for reconsideration. The new lessor petitioned for review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the former lessor’s interest as a business competitor was insufficient to show that it was a “person aggrieved” with standing to appeal a zoning decision to the superior court. The court held that a general interest in upholding the zoning plan is not sufficient for aggrievement and that the former lessor’s competitive interest did not meet the statutory requirement of being a “person aggrieved.” Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the former lessor’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Winco Anchorage Investors I, LP v. Huffman Building P, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Soldotna sought to expand its boundaries by annexing adjacent land and submitted an annexation petition to the Local Boundary Commission (Commission) for legislative review. The Commission, however, decided to convert the petition to a local vote, exercising its authority under a regulation that had not been previously used. Soldotna appealed the Commission’s decision, arguing that the Commission exceeded its authority, the regulation was invalid due to lack of standards and required rulemaking, there was insufficient basis for the decision, and the decision was internally inconsistent.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, upheld the Commission’s decision. The court found that the regulation under which the Commission acted was authorized by the Alaska Constitution and that the Commission’s decision to convert the petition was reasonable. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory grant of authority and had a reasonable basis for converting the petition.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the Commission had the authority under the Alaska Constitution and relevant statutes to adopt the regulation allowing it to convert a legislative review petition to a local action petition. The court found that the regulation provided a standard by requiring the Commission to balance the best interests of the locality and the state. The court also determined that the Commission’s decision had a reasonable basis in the record, considering the public opposition to the annexation and the support for local action from the Kenai Peninsula Borough. The court concluded that the Commission acted within its discretion and expertise in deciding to proceed by local action. View "City of Soldotna v. State" on Justia Law

A couple owning a lot in Homer, Alaska, added a second dwelling made from a shipping container and obtained a permit from the city. A neighboring property owner challenged the permit, arguing that the container dwelling required a conditional use permit and was a nuisance under the city’s zoning code. The city’s zoning board determined that the container dwelling was an accessory building to the existing mobile home and did not require a conditional use permit. The board also found that the container dwelling was not a nuisance because it had been modified and no longer functioned as a shipping container.The neighboring property owner appealed to the Homer Board of Adjustment, which upheld the zoning board’s decision. The Board of Adjustment concluded that the container dwelling was an accessory building and did not require a conditional use permit. It also agreed that the container dwelling was not a nuisance. The neighboring property owner then appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board of Adjustment’s decision and awarded attorney’s fees to the city.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Board of Adjustment’s interpretation of the zoning code was reasonable and that the container dwelling qualified as an accessory building. The court also found that the Board’s conclusion that the container dwelling was not a nuisance had a reasonable basis. However, the court vacated the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further proceedings, noting that fees cannot be awarded for defending against nonfrivolous constitutional claims, and some of the challenger’s constitutional claims were not frivolous. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

A man sued his neighbors, claiming that an access road on their property caused flooding on his property. After settling with the neighbors and dismissing his claims with prejudice, he sued them again over continued flooding, alleging nuisance, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and breach of contract.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the neighbors on the tort claims, citing res judicata, but allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed. After a bench trial, the court found the neighbors had breached the settlement agreement and awarded specific performance, consequential damages, and attorney’s fees, but denied punitive damages. The neighbors appealed the breach of contract ruling, and the man cross-appealed the dismissal of his tort claims and the denial of punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling on the breach of contract claim, finding it was filed outside the three-year statute of limitations. The court held that the man was on inquiry notice of the breach when the driveway reconstruction was completed, as he observed defects at that time. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision that the tort claims were barred by res judicata, as they stemmed from the same transaction as the prior lawsuit. The court also upheld the denial of punitive damages, finding no evidence of egregious conduct by the neighbors.In summary, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the breach of contract ruling and associated awards, affirmed the dismissal of the tort claims under res judicata, and upheld the denial of punitive damages. View "Williams v. Strong" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two lakefront property owners, the McCavits and the Lachers, over a dock extension built by the McCavits. The Lachers claimed that the extension interfered with their riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The superior court agreed and ordered the removal of the dock extension. The McCavits appealed, leading to the articulation of a new rule of reasonableness to determine whether the dock unreasonably interfered with the neighbors' rights. The case was remanded for the superior court to apply this new rule, and the court again ruled in favor of the Lachers.Initially, the superior court found that the dock extension unreasonably interfered with the Lachers' riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The court ordered the removal of the dock extension and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lachers. The McCavits appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to apply a newly articulated rule of reasonableness. On remand, the superior court reaffirmed its earlier findings and again ruled in favor of the Lachers, ordering the removal of the dock extension and awarding attorney’s fees.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying the new rule of reasonableness or in finding that the dock constituted a private nuisance. However, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further consideration, noting that fees related to the litigation against the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) should not be charged to the McCavits. The main holding is that the superior court's application of the reasonableness rule and its finding of a private nuisance were upheld, but the attorney’s fees award was vacated and remanded for recalculation. View "McCavit v. Lacher" on Justia Law

Austin and Regena Joy owned property in Anchorage and leased it to Randy Hahn for his firewood business, Best Split Firewood, LLC (BSF). The lease included a purchase option for BSF to buy the property at a specified price and terms. Hahn signed the agreement, adding "Best Split Firewood" as the occupant, but Regena did not sign. Hahn later sought to exercise the purchase option, but the Joys refused, doubting the option's enforceability and Hahn's financial capability.Hahn filed a complaint in the Alaska Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment to enforce the purchase option. The Joys denied the enforceability of the option and moved for summary judgment, arguing BSF could not enforce the option. Hahn opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting the agreement was valid and enforceable. The Superior Court granted Hahn's motion, finding the agreement contained essential terms for a purchase option and that there was a meeting of the minds. The court also provided gap fillers for missing details and ordered specific performance, directing the Joys to sell the property to BSF.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that the agreement contained all essential terms for an enforceable purchase option and that BSF could exercise the option as Hahn's assignee, given Hahn's personal guarantee of BSF's obligations. The court also found that Hahn did not waive the purchase option by rejecting the Joys' offer, which contained errors and differed from the original agreement. Finally, the court rejected the Joys' unclean hands defense, finding no evidence of wrongdoing by Hahn related to the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment and order of specific performance. View "Joy v. Hahn" on Justia Law

A group of landowners (the Andersons) sued their neighbors (the Wilsons) over a property dispute involving access to remote parcels near a lake. The Andersons argued that a public easement existed over the Wilsons' property, providing access from a highway to their properties. They claimed this easement was established by patent, subdivision agreement, prescription, and under Revised Statute 2477 (RS 2477). The Wilsons contended that any access was permissive and private. The dispute arose after the Wilsons blocked access due to perceived excessive use by unauthorized individuals.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a 12-day bench trial. The court found in favor of the Wilsons, concluding that no public easement existed. It determined that the Andersons had only a private easement over the Wilsons' property. The court also awarded the Wilsons 75% of their attorney’s fees, finding them to be the prevailing party. The Andersons appealed both the easement determination and the attorney’s fee award.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It affirmed the Superior Court's decision that no public easement existed, agreeing that the Andersons had not provided clear and convincing evidence of public use before the land was withdrawn from the public domain. The court also upheld the finding that no easement by implication, necessity, or estoppel existed. However, the Supreme Court vacated the attorney’s fee award and remanded it for further consideration. It found that the billing records were insufficiently detailed and included fees unrelated to the litigation. The court also noted that the hourly rates charged by the Wilsons' attorney were significantly higher than those customarily charged in the locality, requiring further examination of their reasonableness. View "Anderson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a small triangular portion of land in south Anchorage, Alaska, between two neighbors, Janice Park and the Browns. The land in question was enclosed by a fence that had been in place since at least 1991, but a 2016 survey revealed that the fence veered slightly into the Browns' property. The Browns sued Park for trespass and to quiet title, while Park claimed adverse possession.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska ruled in favor of the Browns, concluding that Park failed to establish the required elements of adverse possession. The court found that Park's possession of the disputed area was open, notorious, exclusive, and hostile, but she did not exercise continuous possession of the area for the required ten-year statutory period.Park appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, arguing that the lower court misapplied the law and displayed bias against her. The Supreme Court agreed that the lower court erred in rejecting Park's claim of adverse possession. The court found that Park had established continuous and uninterrupted possession of the disputed area for the ten-year statutory period between 2005 and 2015, satisfying the continuous-possession requirement under the doctrine of tacking. The court also held that Park presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to satisfy the other elements of adverse possession. However, the court found insufficient evidence to support Park's claim of judicial bias. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Park. View "Park v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between a condominium association and the owner of two commercial units over parking and storage space. The commercial owner, Cooper Leasing, claimed ownership of certain parking spots and a storage area within the condominium property. The condominium association, Woronzof Condominium Association, disputed this claim.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska ruled that the condominium’s governing documents did not grant the commercial owner ownership of any parking spots. However, it ruled in favor of the commercial owner on the storage dispute, finding that the association had agreed decades earlier to swap the condominium’s general storage area with the area designated for commercial storage.Cooper Leasing appealed the ruling on parking, and the association cross-appealed the ruling on storage. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the ruling on parking, but vacated the ruling on storage. The court held that the terms of the declaration, in light of relevant extrinsic evidence, were ambiguous as to whether it was intended to give the commercial units the exclusive rights to use certain parking spots. The court also held that owners of condominiums have a property interest in both their own units and in the common areas of the condominium. Because a special test for when the doctrine of quasi-estoppel can be used to defeat record title to real property was not applied to the commercial owner’s quasi-estoppel claim to the storage space, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooper Leasing, LLC v. The Woronzof Condominium Association" on Justia Law