Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Daniel and Luisa Burke owned a home in Anchorage. Nesavou Maka, Fungani Maka, and Alberta Maka were their next-door neighbors. A common driveway approximately 20 feet wide straddled the neighbors' properties. The Burkes wanted to build a fence down the middle of this driveway. However, a preexisting covenant to provide access granted the two lots’ owners reciprocal access to the common driveway. The Burkes filed suit to quiet title, seeking a declaratory judgment that the covenant was invalid and gave the Makas no legal right to use the Burkes’ portion of the driveway. The Makas asserted several affirmative defenses, including laches. Following a bench trial, the superior court found the Burkes used the driveway as shared; the Burkes were aware the Makas believed the driveway to be shared; and the Burkes caused the Makas prejudice by failing to object to the Makas’ visible use between 2004 and 2009. Based on those findings, the superior court ruled that laches barred the Burkes from challenging the covenant’s validity and dismissed the Burkes’ claims with prejudice. The Burkes appealed, arguing that the superior court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Because the superior court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and those facts supported the application of laches, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Burke v. Maka" on Justia Law

The center of this appeal before the Supreme Court involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. Specifically, the issue was whether the court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. The Court concluded that the court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law

Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law

In 1961, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a right-of-way grant to the Alaska Department of Public Works conveying a "road building material site" along the Denali Highway with no expiration date and no rental fee. After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was enacted in 1971, the United States conveyed the surface and subsurface estates encompassing the State's material site to Ahtna, Inc., an Alaska Regional Native Corporation. The conveyance was "subject to" the "[r]ights-of-way for Federal Aid material sites." ANCSA allowed the federal government to waive administration of the rights-of-way, which BLM did in 1984. The BLM waiver stated that the State was the grantee of the right-of-way at issue, and instead of providing an expiration date the waiver described the term of duration of the right-of-way as "[p]erpetual." The waiver entitled Ahtna to "any and all interests previously held by the United States as grantor," but the waiver explicitly stated there were no rental or other revenues associated with the right-of-way. The State removed material from the site until 1988, but the State did not use material from the site for the next 20 years. The State began using the site again in 2008. Ahtna demanded compensation for the removal of gravel from the material site and directed the State to cease and desist further entry onto Ahtna lands. The State responded that its right to remove the gravel pre-existed Ahtna's title interest. The State filed suit against Ahtna, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that the State had a valid interest in the material site right-of-way under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, and that Ahtna could not cancel the right-of-way for nonuse or abandonment so long as the State operated and maintained the Denali Highway. Ahtna appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the assumption that BLM's waiver transferred administrative authority to Ahtna, that authority did not include the right to cancel the State's interest in the material site for nonuse or abandonment without consent from the State. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities" on Justia Law

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), the agent for the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), leases the TAPS right-of-way from the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Department). Alyeska appealed the Department's 2002 appraisal of the TAPS lease price to Michael Menge, the Commissioner of the Department, and then to the superior court. Both affirmed the Department's appraisal. Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the Department misinterpreted AS 38.35.140(a); (2) the Department was required to adopt its interpretation of AS 38.35.140(a) as a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) the appraisal improperly included submerged lands within the right-of-way when the Department failed to establish that the State holds title to those lands. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Department of Natural Resources restricted the non-winter use of large vehicles on the Rex Trail. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether these restrictions were within the Department's authority. Because the Department has broad authority to manage public lands in general and specific authority to manage rights-of-way such as the Rex Trail, and the restrictions did not violate any statutory limitations on this authority, the Supreme Court concluded that they were authorized. View "Caywood v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Diana Albrecht brought a class-action lawsuit against Alaska Trustee, LLC, on behalf of a group of Alaska homeowners who had faced foreclosure on their homes. Alaska Trustee, acting as foreclosure trustee, had provided Albrecht and the other homeowners reinstatement quotes that included the costs of foreclosure. Albrecht maintained that the inclusion of foreclosure costs in her reinstatement quote violated her right to cure under a former version of AS 34.20.070(b), the non-judicial foreclosure statute, which provided that a homeowner’s "default may be cured by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default." According to Albrecht, Alaska Trustee's inclusion of foreclosure costs in addition to "attorney's fees or court costs" constituted a violation of not only the non-judicial foreclosure statute but also Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The superior court concluded that Albrecht lacked standing to sue and denied her motion for class certification. The superior court further ruled that Alaska Trustee's practice of including various fees and charges as foreclosure costs was permitted under the statute. The superior court awarded attorney's fees to Alaska Trustee as the prevailing party, enhancing those fees under AS 45.50.537(b) on the ground that Albrecht's claims were frivolous. Because the inclusion of foreclosure costs in a reinstatement quote did not violate AS 34.20.070, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court in most respects. But because the Court concluded that Albrecht’s claims were not frivolous and attorney's fees could not be awarded under Rule 82 for time spent litigating the structure of a class action, the Court remanded for recalculation of fees awarded. View "Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

Two mining companies entered a ten-year mining lease. The lessee was responsible for mining and prospecting claims owned by the lessor and its president. The companies entered a holdover tenancy after the expiration of the lease. During this time, an officer of the lessee company staked mining claims that overlapped with the claims his company had mined under the ten-year lease. In his own name, that officer filed location notices for the newly staked claims with the State Department of Natural Resources. The parties disagreed about who rightfully owned the claims staked during the holdover tenancy and broke off their lease agreement in October 2003. In 2007, the former lessor filed suit against the former lessee and its two officer-shareholders, seeking to quiet title to the disputed mining claims, to eject the former lessee and its officers from the claims, and to secure damages under several tort and contract causes of action. The former lessee denied various allegations, raised 13 affirmative defenses, and counterclaimed for the value of labor performed on the claims. Following a three-week trial, the superior court resolved the dispute in favor of the former lessor. The former lessee filed two appeals of post-trial orders, which we have consolidated for decision. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court on all but one issue: because specific findings were needed to pierce the corporate veil, the Court reversed the entry of judgment and the award attorney's fees against the wife of the officer of the lessee company and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gold Dust Mines, Inc. v. Little Squaw Gold Mining Company" on Justia Law

A homeowner sought a declaratory judgment that foreclosure fees were not properly included in the reinstatement amount necessary to halt foreclosure proceedings under Alaska law. The superior court concluded that the foreclosure fees were properly included in the reinstatement amount. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court and therefore affirmed. View "Kuretich v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

Offshore Systems – Kenai (Offshore) operates a commercial dock facility on Cook Inlet in the Kenai Peninsula Borough (Borough). Nikishka Beach Road traverses Offshore's property. The public has used this road to access the beach since the 1950s. In 2007 Offshore installed a gate blocking the road. The State and the Borough sought an injunction against Offshore, alleging a public right-of-way or prescriptive easement exists over Nikishka Beach Road. Offshore counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment quieting title to its property. The parties disputed the length and history of Nikishka Beach Road. The superior court concluded that Nikishka Beach Road provided public access to the beach on several alternative grounds. Offshore appealed the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that a 1980 patent reserved a valid easement for public access to the shoreline of Cook Inlet. The Court held that the superior court had the authority to locate an easement over Nikishka Beach Road. The Court reversed the award of attorney's fees to the Borough. View "Offshore Systems - Kenai v. Alaska" on Justia Law