Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Purchasers of a lot in a newly formed airpark subdivision prepared and properly executed an easement agreement granting them access to the subdivision's aviation facilities. The purchasers later claimed the easement agreement gave them a priority right to use the subdivision's common areas, distinct from use rights granted to other lot owners. The subdivision's homeowner's association disputed that claim. The superior court ruled that the easement agreement did not grant the purchasers the right to exclude other lot owners from common areas. The court also issued a variety of orders on related issues, declaring the subdivision a common interest community and quieting title to its common use areas as superior to the easement agreement. The court awarded attorney's fees against the purchasers. One of the purchasers appealed but subsequent events rendered all issues except the attorney's fees decision moot. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that the easement agreement did not grant priority rights to the purchasers, the Court affirmed the superior court's award of attorney's fees against the purchasers.

Petitioner Sherman "Red" Smith built and operated a sawmill on 14 acres of land under a special-use permit from the U.S. Forest Service. He alleged that Alaska acquired title to the land and conveyed it to a third party without acknowledging his claim or compensating him for his improvements. The last disputed conveyance of the land took place in 1983. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's claim, finding it to be time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations. The superior court also ruled in favor of the State on two alternative grounds: first, concluding that sovereign immunity bars fraud actions against the State and second, determining that res judicata bars the relitigation of a claim the superior court previously dismissed in 2007. Petitioner appealed, arguing that statutes of limitations cannot bar claims brought for the vindication of constitutional rights. Because statutes of limitations do apply to constitutional claims, and because Petitioner did not allege harm amounting to a continuing violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Petitioner's claim as time-barred. The Court also affirmed the superior court's alternative finding that the 2007 dismissal of Petitioner's previous claim bars his current action.

Citizens sought a ballot initiative to eliminate the special regulations that govern real property transactions in a local economic development area. After the municipal clerk twice denied their petition for a ballot initiative, the sponsors sued for an order placing the initiative on the ballot. Finding the petition to be both contrary to existing law and misleading, the superior court upheld the municipal clerk's denial. The sponsors appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the petition is neither contrary to existing law nor misleading, it reversed.

This case concerned the ownership of James "Jim" and Terrie Gottstein’s former marital home. Jim paid for the property, but Terrie’s name alone was on the deed. The Gottsteins lived in the home for 15 years before moving out; they later separated. Terrie entered into a deal to sell the property to another couple, the Krafts, for significantly less than its appraised value, and Jim objected. One month before closing, Jim recorded a notice of interest under AS 34.15.010, which forbid a spouse from selling "the family home or homestead" without the consent of the other spouse. Neither the Krafts nor Terrie knew about the notice of interest, and the sale went ahead as planned. Following the sale, Jim filed suit against the Krafts, requesting that the superior court recognize his ownership interest in the property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Krafts. The superior court concluded that it was not "the family home or homestead," rendering Jim’s notice of interest under AS 34.15.010 ineffectual. Jim appealed, arguing: (1) that the statute protected his interest in the property; (2) that the Krafts had constructive notice of his interest and therefore were not bona fide purchasers; and (3) that Jim has an equitable interest in the property and the superior court was mistaken in not granting his request for an equitable remedy. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase "family home or homestead" in AS 34.15.010 refers to a family’s residence. Because the disputed property was vacant, and the couple had moved to another home at the time of sale, it did not fall under the spousal consent requirement of AS 34.15.010(b). Jim thus did not put the Krafts on notice of any legally valid claim to the property.

Margery Kniffen, as Trustee for the Margery T. Kniffen Family Trust and Darrell Kniffen II, purchased an undeveloped tract in Fairbanks North Star Borough, planning to develop a subdivision. They also purchased a lot in Gold Country Estates, an existing subdivision adjacent to the undeveloped tract. The Kniffens sought a variance allowing them to construct a road across their Gold Country Estates lot to provide access to the planned subdivision. After hearing public testimony, the local Platting Board unanimously voted to deny the variance based on safety concerns. But after a subsequent site visit, the Board reconsidered the variance request and approved it. Gold Country Estates homeowners appealed to the Planning Commission, which upheld the Platting Board’s decision. The homeowners filed suit in superior court, arguing that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act and that the proposed road violated Gold Country Estates’ covenants. The superior court ruled that Gold Country Estates’ covenants did not allow a Gold Country lot to be used as access for the new subdivision. Though the Kniffens’ access proposal was defeated, Gold Country continued to pursue its due process and Open Meetings Act claims against the Borough. The superior court ultimately ruled in favor of the Borough on those claims. The homeowners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court erred by not finding that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Borough on the homeowners' Open Meetings Act and due process claims, as well as the superior court's order declining to award attorney’s fees.

Appellee Wayne Manning told Appellant Diane Roberson he would give her his share of their jointly purchased mobile home. Without her knowledge, he then transferred title of the mobile home to his name only and sold it to co-Appellee Dennis Wilson. Wilson attempted to terminate Roberson's tenancy in the mobile home. Roberson filed suit in the superior court to be declared the owner of the home. The court concluded that Manning did not give his share of the home to Roberson and that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser and therefore the owner. Roberson appealed, arguing that she is the owner because Manning's gift to her was valid and the sale to Wilson was invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court's conclusion that Manning did not give Roberson the home. The Court also vacated the superior court's determination that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser. The case was remanded for additional findings.

Petitioner Eleanor Oakes owned a 7/8 undivided interest in a 20-acre parcel of land in Council, while Respondents David and Sine Holly owned a 1/8 undivided interest in the property. The parties went to court to partition the property, and each agreed to submit up to three partition proposals for the court’s selection after it heard evidence about the choices. The superior court selected one of Petitioner's proposals, and she hired a surveyor to implement the division of the property. The survey revealed a significant error in the map presented to the superior court of the selected proposal. The error resulted in the Hollys acquiring more river frontage than Petitioner had intended in her proposal which was selected by the superior court. Petitioner moved to amend the proposal, but the Hollys urged that the selected proposal be implemented as surveyed. The superior court concluded that under the doctrine of mutual mistake, Petitioner bore the risk of the drafting mistake in her proposals, and it enforced the proposal with the drafting error. But because the error in the property description did not occur in the formation of contract, the Supreme Court in its review concluded that the doctrine of mutual mistake was inapplicable. "Instead, the error occurred during the evidentiary hearing and formed a mistaken factual premise for the trial court's decision." The Court therefore remanded the case back to the superior court to determine whether it was appropriate to grant relief for mistake, and if so, to repartition the property in compliance with state law.

Thirty seven years ago, two business partners bought a 160-acre property bordering the Kenai River which they subdivided into 114 lots (Holiday Park Subdivision). The partners reserved an easement across Lot 30 for the benefit of all Holiday Park owners, but disagreements arose over the permissible uses and geographic boundaries of the easement. In 2004, the owner of Lot 30 sold it to Kenai River Airpark, LLC. One of the developers of Holiday Park sued Kenai River Airpark and the Airpark Owners Association to prevent their use of Lot 30. The superior court ruled that members of the Airpark Owners Association could use Lot 30 as long as they did not interfere with Holiday Park owners’ use of the easement. The superior court also ruled that the easement’s scope was limited to a defined path shown on the Holiday Park plat, but that permissible uses of the easement included boat launching, bank fishing, and river access. The Holiday Park developer appealed. Because Holiday Park’s plat unambiguously described the easement’s scope as “30' BOAT LAUNCH ESM’T,” the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s ruling permitting more expansive use. However, the Court affirmed the superior court’s order regarding the geographic bounds of the easement; the original developer did not establish an expanded easement by prescription, implication, inquiry notice, or estoppel.

Native nonprofit corporation Dena Nena Henash (d/b/a Tanana Chiefs Conference) applied to the Fairbanks North Star borough assessor for charitable-purpose tax exemptions on several of its properties. The assessor denied exemptions for five of the parcels, concluding that they did not meet the exemption’s requirements. The superior court affirmed the denial as to four of the properties and remanded the case for consideration of one property back to the assessor, who granted the exemption. The Nonprofit appealed the denial of exemptions for three of the remaining properties plus a portion of the fourth, and appealed the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Borough. Because the properties in question were used exclusively for charitable purposes, the Supreme Court reversed the assessor’s determination on the four appealed properties, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for an award of fees.

Renaissance Resources Alaska, LLC (Renaissance) partnered with Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation (Rutter) to develop an oil field. Renaissance and Rutter acquired a lease to the entire working interest and the majority of the net revenue interest of the field. They then formed a limited liability company, Renaissance Umiat, LLC (Umiat), to which they contributed most of the lease rights. But when they formed Umiat, Renaissance and Rutter did not contribute all of their acquired lease rights to the new company: they retained a 3.75% overriding royalty interest (ORRI). Rutter was eventually unable to meet the capital contributions required by Umiat's operating agreement and forfeited its interest under the terms of the agreement. Rutter filed suit against Renaissance seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to half of the retained 3.75% ORRI. Renaissance argued why it deserved the entire 3.75%: (1) Renaissance held legal title to the 3.75% ORRI; and (2) Rutter could only obtain title through an equitable remedy to which Rutter is not entitled. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that Renaissance's characterization was inaccurate and that Rutter was entitled to title to half of the 3.75% ORRI. Furthermore, Renaissance argued that the superior court should have found an implied term that Rutter would forfeit its share of the 3.75% ORRI if Rutter failed to contribute its share of expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that there was not such an implied term in the agreement.