Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A property owner appealed a judgment that allowed foreclosure on a borough property tax lien, arguing that the boroughâs foreclosure was legally flawed and that the boroughâs attorney should have been sanctioned for maintaining the foreclosure against his property. Because the superior court did not err in concluding there were no legal flaws in the foreclosure, and because therefore there was no basis to sanction the boroughâs attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all respects.

Two men bought an island. After a dispute, they agreed that one would keep the island, while the other would receive a one-time payment and an option to buy the island at a fixed price, adjusted for inflation, if the owner ever chose to sell it. Years passed, the value of the island rose, far outpacing inflation. But the owner never elected to sell. Instead, he eventually conveyed the island to his sister, as a gift. The option holder sued. The superior court held on summary judgment that the option remained viable, but that the gift was not improper. The option holder appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the option agreement, but because material facts were in dispute concerning contractual claims and allegations that the option holder's conveyance was fraudulent, the Court reversed and remanded the superior court's grant of summary judgment on those claims.

The superior court interpreted a statutory preference for the purchase of state land in a manner that disqualified Appellant Melvin Gillis, from which he appealed. Appellant is a professional sport hunting and fishing guide. He obtained a 25-year lease of five acres of state land in April 1989. Appellant built a lodge on the land, and the operation of the lodge and his guiding business were his principal sources of income. In 2005, the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) conveyed lands, including the land Appellant leased, to Aleutians East Borough. DNR also transferred its interest in Appellant's lease to the Borough. Appellant offered to purchase the land in November 2005. The Borough Assembly rejected Appellant's offer but proposed a new lease agreement. Appellant did not execute the proposed lease, and in 2007 he claimed he was eligible to purchase the land under state law. The Borough then filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the superior court to determine whether Appellant qualified for a preference right to purchase the land. The issue on appeal was whether the applicable statute required an applicant to enter land while it was under federal ownership as a condition of the preference right. The superior court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute required an applicant to enter land when it was under federal ownership before the federal government conveyed the land to the state. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Borough and DNR. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the applicable statute and its summary judgment decision.

Landowner Appellant Charles Miller contracted with Handle Construction Company, a manufacturer of pre-fabricated steel hangars, to erect a steel hangar on his land. After completing its work, the Company sued Appellant for unanticipated costs it incurred as a result of manufacturing defects in the hangar. Appellant made an offer of judgment which the Company accepted. When the Company received a separate payment from the hangar's manufacturer, Appellant refused to pay the full amount, arguing that an offset was warranted. The superior court rejected Appellant's argument and ordered him to pay the full amount of the offer. The case was submitted to the Supreme Court for review, but the Court determined that the basis for the superior court's decision was unclear. The Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for additional factual findings.

Appellant Thomas Price, Jr. posted "no trespassing" signs on his property in 1998 in an attempt to quell what he believed were an excessive number of snow machiners using a trail that crossed his land, damaging it, traveling at high speeds, and causing a great deal of noise. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that a group of snow machiners had established a public prescriptive easement over the trail but twice remanded the case to the superior court to define the scope of the easement. The superior court held additional hearings, and in 2007 issued a memorandum that defined the easement. Appellant appealed the court's definition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the volume of snow machine traffic exceeded the scope of the easement. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that found the easement includes non-snow machine users. The Court remanded the case again for further clarification on the permissible scope of the snow machine easement, including seasonal limits, width and speed limit.

Gas producers that lease land from Alaska must pay royalties calculated on the value of the gas produced from the leased area. The royalty may be calculated in one of two methods: the âhigher ofâ pricing or contract pricing. âHigher ofâ pricing is the default method of calculating royalties and is calculated using market data and the prices of other producers. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) usually does not calculate the royalty payments under âhigher ofâ pricing until years after production. Under contract pricing, the lesseeâs price at which it sells gas is used to determine the royalty payment. Appellant Marathon Oil requested contract pricing from 2008 onward and sought retroactive application of contract pricing for 2003-2008. The DNR approved contract pricing from 2008 onward but denied the retroactive application. The superior court affirmed the DNRâs decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Marathon argued that the statute that governs contract pricing permitted retroactive application of contract pricing. Upon review of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that though the statute was ambiguous, it would defer to the DNRâs interpretation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior courtâs decision to uphold the DNRâs order.

Appellant Frank Griswold appealed the Homer Advisory Planning Commissionâs grant of a conditional-use permit to a mariculture association. The city clerk rejected his appeal for lack of standing because Appellant did not show that the permitted action would have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment or value of his property. Appellant appealed that rejection to the superior court. The court affirmed the Planning Commissionâs decision. Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior courtâs decision. The Court found that the Homer City Code restricted standing in land use appeals and that the city clerk correctly rejected Appellantâs appeal.

This appeal stemmed from the 2008 valuation of a parcel of real property owned by Appellant Martha Dunnagan. Larry Varilek, the personal representative of Ms. Dunnaganâs estate, argued that the Board of Equalization overvalued the property and appealed the Boardâs decision. The superior court held that Mr. Varilek failed to prove that the property was overvalued. Mr. Varilek appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Boardâs assessment. The Court found that Mr. Varilek failed to meet his burden by showing that the Boardâs valuation was improper.

In 1956, Appellants Harold and Ellen Cowan were deeded half of a tract of land that contained a "perpetual right of way running with the land" over a thirty-foot strip along its southeastern side. Between 1960 and 1973, Appellee Sharon Yeisley was deeded the other half that ran adjacent to the Cowan's land. The Yeisley deed made no mention of the right-of-way. Ms. Yeisley applied to subdivide her tract in 1980. The plat was approved and recorded. The new plat showed the right of way. In 2006, the Cowans filed suit against the Borough of Ketchikan, Sharon Yeisley and other parties seeking to quiet the title to the right of way. The Cowans argued that their 1956 deed conveyed it, or in the alternative, they acquired the strip by adverse possession. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. The superior court ruled that the 1956 deed did not convey the strip to the Cowans and that they had not adversely possessed it. The court applied the then-current adverse possession statute instead of the statute in effect when the Yeisley land was subdivided. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Cowans argued that the superior court erred in using the 2003 adverse possession statute. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the lower court should not have used the 2003 statute. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.