Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Gas producers that lease land from Alaska must pay royalties calculated on the value of the gas produced from the leased area. The royalty may be calculated in one of two methods: the âhigher ofâ pricing or contract pricing. âHigher ofâ pricing is the default method of calculating royalties and is calculated using market data and the prices of other producers. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) usually does not calculate the royalty payments under âhigher ofâ pricing until years after production. Under contract pricing, the lesseeâs price at which it sells gas is used to determine the royalty payment. Appellant Marathon Oil requested contract pricing from 2008 onward and sought retroactive application of contract pricing for 2003-2008. The DNR approved contract pricing from 2008 onward but denied the retroactive application. The superior court affirmed the DNRâs decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Marathon argued that the statute that governs contract pricing permitted retroactive application of contract pricing. Upon review of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that though the statute was ambiguous, it would defer to the DNRâs interpretation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior courtâs decision to uphold the DNRâs order.

Appellant Frank Griswold appealed the Homer Advisory Planning Commissionâs grant of a conditional-use permit to a mariculture association. The city clerk rejected his appeal for lack of standing because Appellant did not show that the permitted action would have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment or value of his property. Appellant appealed that rejection to the superior court. The court affirmed the Planning Commissionâs decision. Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior courtâs decision. The Court found that the Homer City Code restricted standing in land use appeals and that the city clerk correctly rejected Appellantâs appeal.

This appeal stemmed from the 2008 valuation of a parcel of real property owned by Appellant Martha Dunnagan. Larry Varilek, the personal representative of Ms. Dunnaganâs estate, argued that the Board of Equalization overvalued the property and appealed the Boardâs decision. The superior court held that Mr. Varilek failed to prove that the property was overvalued. Mr. Varilek appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Boardâs assessment. The Court found that Mr. Varilek failed to meet his burden by showing that the Boardâs valuation was improper.

In 1956, Appellants Harold and Ellen Cowan were deeded half of a tract of land that contained a "perpetual right of way running with the land" over a thirty-foot strip along its southeastern side. Between 1960 and 1973, Appellee Sharon Yeisley was deeded the other half that ran adjacent to the Cowan's land. The Yeisley deed made no mention of the right-of-way. Ms. Yeisley applied to subdivide her tract in 1980. The plat was approved and recorded. The new plat showed the right of way. In 2006, the Cowans filed suit against the Borough of Ketchikan, Sharon Yeisley and other parties seeking to quiet the title to the right of way. The Cowans argued that their 1956 deed conveyed it, or in the alternative, they acquired the strip by adverse possession. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. The superior court ruled that the 1956 deed did not convey the strip to the Cowans and that they had not adversely possessed it. The court applied the then-current adverse possession statute instead of the statute in effect when the Yeisley land was subdivided. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Cowans argued that the superior court erred in using the 2003 adverse possession statute. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the lower court should not have used the 2003 statute. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.