Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review arose from competing claims of right to the pore space in a large limestone formation about a mile underground. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC (CINGSA) had leases with the holders of the mineral rights, the State of Alaska and Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI), that allowed it to use the porous formation as a reservoir for storing injected natural gas. But the City of Kenai, which owned a significant part of the surface estate above the reservoir, claimed an ownership interest in the storage rights and sought compensation from CINGSA. CINGSA filed an interpleader action asking the court to decide who owns the storage rights and which party CINGSA should compensate for its use of the pore space. On summary judgment CINGSA argued that CIRI and the State owned the pore space and attendant storage rights because of the State’s reservation of certain subsurface interests as required by AS 38.05.125(a). The superior court granted CINGSA’s motion. The City appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to CIRI. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the State and CIRI indeed owned the pore space and the gas storage rights, and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to award attorney’s fees to CIRI. View "City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC" on Justia Law

Wasilla landowner, appellant Ray Pursche appealed the tax foreclosure against his property, arguing that the property was exempt from local property taxes because it was originally transferred to his predecessor by federal patent. He claimed that the federal patent made this property beyond state court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the tax foreclosure, finding that after a patent issues, property disputes must generally be resolved in state court. Land once owned by the federal government was subject to local property taxes after it was conveyed to a private party. View "Pursche v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough" on Justia Law

John and Xong Chao Beeson owned and lived in the Palmer West Subdivision in the City of Palmer. Since they moved to the property in 1985, the Beesons have experienced several flooding incidents on their land, which they attributed to water backing up against Helen Drive, a two-lane road adjacent to their property originally built by Matanuska-Susitna Borough but controlled by the City since 2003. After the City installed a water line under Helen Drive and repaved the road surface in 2005, the flooding became more severe and caused serious damage to the Beesons’ home. The Beesons brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City, arguing that the City was liable for the damage to their property. After a three-day bench trial the superior court found that the City’s road reconstruction project was not a substantial cause of the flooding and therefore the City could not be liable in inverse condemnation. The superior court also granted attorney’s fees to the City. The Beesons appealed both rulings. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision with respect to the inverse condemnation claim and remanded for further proceedings regarding attorney’s fees. View "Beeson v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Brett and Josephine Ambridge defaulted on their home loan. Alaska Trustee, LLC sent the Ambridges a notice of default that failed to state the full amount due as required by the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Ambridges filed suit against Alaska Trustee and its owner, Stephen Routh, seeking damages under the FDCPA and the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA), as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. The superior court held that both Alaska Trustee and Routh were “debt collectors” subject to liability under the FDCPA, awarded damages under the Act, and awarded injunctive relief under the UTPA. Alaska Trustee and Routh appealed, arguing that neither of them is a debt collector as defined by federal law and that injunctive relief was improperly awarded. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Superior Court's judgment and affirmed. View "Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Ambridge" on Justia Law

In 2014, a petition was filed on behalf of the Seacliff Condominium Association for an order requiring Heather R., the owner of a condominium in Seacliff, to undergo an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric evaluation. The petition alleged that Heather was a threat to “herself . . . and her neighbors” based on “[y]ears of confrontation, threats, aberrant and widely swinging behavior suggesting drug use,” including “taking pictures inside people’s houses, inability to have normal social interactions, [and] lying [in] wait to confront neighbors.” After conducting a statutorily required ex parte screening investigation, which did not include an interview with Heather, the superior court master determined that there was probable cause to believe that she was mentally ill and presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. Heather appealed the evaluation order, claiming that the ex parte investigation violated due process and that the master failed to properly conduct the statutorily required screening investigation. Although this appeal was technically moot, the Supreme Court reached the merits of these claims under the public interest exception. The Court vacated the evaluation order because the superior court master failed to conduct the interview as part of the screening investigation required by statute; the Court did not reach the due process question. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Heather R." on Justia Law

Property owners granted a utility easement to the City of Wasilla in exchange for the City’s promise to build an access road across their property, subject to obtaining permits and funding. The access road was not built, and the property owners sued the City, claiming that it fraudulently induced them to sign the easement agreement, breached the agreement, and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After trial the superior court made findings of fact and conclusions of law about the parties’ negotiations, their reasonable expectations, the key provisions in the easement agreement, and the City’s efforts to satisfy the agreement’s conditions, and it ruled against the property owners on all their claims. The property owners appealed and the City cross-appealed, contending that the property owners’ claims should have been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error with the superior court's findings of fact or final judgment. View "Laybourn v. City of Wasilla" on Justia Law

The central issue in this case is whether Duane Sykes has a right to access his property across his neighbors’ lots. Sykes sued neighboring property owners, claiming that he had access rights across their land because of both an express easement and a right of way created by federal law, dating back to when the original owner first obtained the land through federal homestead laws. Sykes also sought damages for a number of alleged torts. Following trial, the superior court found that both the express easement and the federally created right of way existed but found against the easement holder on all his tort claims. The owners of the burdened property appealed the finding of a federally created right of way, and the easement holder cross-appealed the superior court’s dismissal of his damages claims and its rulings on a number of procedural issues. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s finding of a federally created right of way, concluding that the court erred in determining when the land at issue became private land not subject to the federal law. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment in all other respects, including its finding of an express easement. View "Luker v. Sykes" on Justia Law

Clifton Tweedy began leasing property from the Matanuska-Susitna Borough on Big Lake in May 1988. When Tweedy assumed the lease, the existing structure was exempt from the Borough’s 75-foot shoreline setback ordinance because it was constructed before any setback requirement existed. Shortly after he took possession of the property, Tweedy constructed a stairwell addition on the exterior of the house. In 2010 Tweedy applied with the Borough to purchase the property. Because structures on the property were located less than 75 feet from the shoreline, the sale required an exemption or variance from the Borough’s setback requirement. The Borough Planning Director determined that Tweedy’s addition was unlawful and that the application could not be processed until Tweedy removed it. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment Appeals affirmed the Planning Director’s decision. Tweedy appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed. Because the 75-foot setback applied to Tweedy’s property when he constructed the addition, the addition was unlawful when it was built and he was not entitled to an exemption or variance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals" on Justia Law

Appellant Sheila Brandner appealed the Anchorage Municipal Board of Equalization's valuation of her home for the 2012 tax year. She argued the Municipal assessor's office used an improper appraisal method and that the Board overestimated the value of her property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board made a clerical error in the calculation of the value of Brandner's property. Therefore the case was remanded to the Board to adopt a final assessment consistent with the Board's intent. View "Brandner v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

A fire broke out at a mobile home owned by Leo Regner near North Pole. The North Star Volunteer Fire Department, the North Pole Fire Department, and the Fort Wainwright Fire Department responded to the fire but were unable to prevent damage to the mobile home. Regner sued the fire departments and several of their employees, alleging negligence. Regner voluntarily dismissed his claim against the Fort Wainwright Fire Department and its employee, and the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that they were immune from suit. The superior court granted complete summary judgment. Regner appealed only the superior court’s decision that he failed to make a sufficient showing of negligence to defeat summary judgment. Because the defendants did not move for summary judgment on the merits of Regner’s negligence claims and the merits of those claims were not otherwise addressed in the summary judgment proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Regner v. North Star Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc." on Justia Law