Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees brought this suit against the City of Little Rock for just compensation for the taking of Appellees’ property in connection with a modification of the I430/I630 Interchange. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Appellees. The City filed a notice of appeal and later filed a motion for extension of time to lodge the record. The circuit court denied the motion for extension. The City subsequently filed a second motion for extension. A special judge granted an extension to lodge the record. Appellees filed an amended and substituted motion to dismiss, contending that the circuit court erred in granting the extension of time because the City did not strictly comply with the requirements of Ark. R. App. P-Civ. 5. The Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, holding that the City failed strictly to comply with Rule 5, and therefore, the circuit court erred in granting the motion for extension of time to file the record. View "City of Little Rock v. Hermitage Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2014, the City of Siloam Springs filed a second amended complaint for condemnation of land and order of immediate possession of property owned by Appellees. The complaint alleged that the amount of $13,950 would be just compensation for the taking. Appellees denied that $13,950 was just compensation. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of Appellees, concluding that they were entitled to just compensation in the amount of $22,253. Appellees subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees, alleging that their property had been taken by the State through the Arkansas State Highway Commission and that they were entitled to attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. 27-67-317(b). The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Appellees and awarded attorney’s fees and expenses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the City in this case proceeded under its authority as a municipality in exercising eminent domain over the property; and (2) there is no statutory authority for an award of attorney’s fees against a municipality in a condemnation proceeding. View "City of Siloam Springs v. La-De LLC" on Justia Law

Ozark Mountain Regional Public Water Authority filed a complaint for condemnation and declaration of taking, seeking to take property owned by Appellants. That same day, Ozark deposited $66,986, the fair-market-appraisal amount of the property, with the clerk of court. Appellants challenged the amount deposited, claiming it was not sufficient compensation. After a trial, the jury awarded Appellants $341,500 in compensation for the property. Thereafter, Appellants filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 18-15-605(b). The circuit court denied the motion, finding that section 18-15-605(b) was not applicable to Appellants’ case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that section 18-15-605(b) was not applicable to Appellants’ case and in thereby denying Appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees. View "Giles v. Ozark Mountain Reg'l Pub. Water Auth." on Justia Law

CenterPoint Energy Gas Transmission Co., a gas pipeline company that has the power of eminent domain, filed a petition to condemn an easement on property owned by GSS, LLC. The circuit court entered an order of possession, and, after a trial, awarded GSS $64,000 as just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of value of a contiguous parcel of land from a separate case; (2) did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of CenterPoint on GSS’s counterclaims; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment to CenterPoint. View "GSS, LLC v. Centerpoint Energy Gas Transmission Co." on Justia Law

Dan and Brenda Billingsley owned and operated Floors and More, Inc. on certain property (“West Bank Property”). Benton NWA Properties purchased the property across from the West Bank Property in 2008 (“East Bank Property”). Appellants, the Billingsleys and Floors and More, filed a second amended complaint against Benton NWA, alleging that Appellants suffered damages after the West Bank Property flooded due to the owners of the East Bank Property placing fill material in the floodplain. The parties settled, and the circuit court subsequently granted a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in favor of Benton NWA. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in ordering that the settlement agreement should contain a release of all liability for future flooding of property owned by the Billingsleys. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice because the circuit court’s order failed to contain specific factual findings in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). View "Billingsley v. Benton NWA Props., LLC " on Justia Law

Debtors executed a promissory note in favor of First State Bank to purchase a condominium. After Debtors defaulted on their loan, First State subsequently filed a complaint against Debtors, the loan’s guarantor, and the condominium property owners’ association (Metro POA), claiming that it was entitled to collect money owed it from the Debtor and guarantor, and that any interest Metro POA had in the real property related to unpaid assessments was inferior to and subject to State Bank’s mortgage. The circuit court granted First State judgment against Debtors and the guarantor, gave First State the right to foreclose on the property, and ruled that Metro POA’s interest would survive the foreclosure action and become the liability of the purchaser. Thereafter, First State purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. On appeal, First State argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to extinguish Metro POA’s lien for unpaid assessments and in awarding Metro POA attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to extinguish Metro POA’s interest and in awarding attorney’s fees to Metro POA. View "First State Bank v. Metro Dist. Condos. Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Steve Rose and Harbor East, Inc. entered into a consent judgment that awarded Rose $176,000. In 2009, Rose filed a motion to revive the judgment, and an order reviving the judgment was entered. Rose then filed a complaint in foreclosure against Harbor East Property Owners Association (the POA) and Recreational Management, Inc. (Recreational) maintaining that the judgment had not been satisfied. In 2012, the POA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that because no writ of scire facias had been issued prior to the 2009 order of revivor, Rose's judgment was not revived under the terms of Ark. Code Ann. 16-65-501, and therefore, the 2009 order of revivor was void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the POA and Recreational were allowed to collaterally attack Rose's 2009 order of revivor because the order was void due to Rose's failure to satisfy the requirements of section 16-65-501. View "Rose v. Harbor E., Inc." on Justia Law

Diamante, LLC (Diamante) operated a private-membership golf club. There were 450 privately owned lots around the golf club and clubhouse that were located in two subdivisions. Supplemental declarations of covenants and restrictions ran with the land and created certain obligations and restrictions, called tie-in rights, that required, among other things, lot owners to become full golf members of the Diamante Country Club and to pay monthly dues to the Club. Appellees filed a declaratory judgment action asking the circuit court to declare the tie-in rights unenforceable due to Diamante's failure to collect monthly dues from all full golf members. Appellees filed a motion for class certification. The circuit court certified the class, defining the class as current owners of the 450 lots in the subdivisions with limited exclusions. Diamante appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting class certification. View "Diamante, LLC v. Dye" on Justia Law

Appellant and her two uncles each owned as tenants in common an undivided one-third interest in two tracts of farmland. Both of Appellant's uncles separately sold their interest in the property to Appellee. Appellee subsequently sold one of the farms. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a partition of the lands and damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a tenant in common, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices. Appellant claimed that Appellee prevented a family partnership from entering into seven-year renewal leases with farmers who leased the farmland and prevented the partnership from implementing a long-term plan for improving the farms. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Appellee's favor and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's three claims, as Appellant failed to meet proof with proof that she sustained any damages as a result of Appellee's alleged breach of fiduciary duty, alleged tortious interference, and alleged deceptive trade practice. View "Skalla v. Canepari" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant for breach of a real estate contract after Defendant was unable to acquire financing to purchase a home owned by Plaintiffs. Defendant filed a third-party complaint against his real estate agent and the agent's employer. A jury returned a verdict in the Clines' favor on the breach of contract claim and in favor of Defendant on the third-party negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed the award to Plaintiffs, holding that there was no contract between the parties. On remand, the circuit court dismissed the complaint and third-party complaint. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs based on a provision in the real estate contract. The trial court awarded Defendant fees and costs but at an amount significantly less than the amount Defendant had requested. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's finding that Defendant was not entitled to recover fees and costs under the contract was consistent with the Court's holding in Carter I that there was no contract; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellant was not entitled to recover fees and costs related to his third-party claim and those fees and costs associated with his attorney. View "Carter v. Cline" on Justia Law