Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Debtors executed a promissory note in favor of First State Bank to purchase a condominium. After Debtors defaulted on their loan, First State subsequently filed a complaint against Debtors, the loan’s guarantor, and the condominium property owners’ association (Metro POA), claiming that it was entitled to collect money owed it from the Debtor and guarantor, and that any interest Metro POA had in the real property related to unpaid assessments was inferior to and subject to State Bank’s mortgage. The circuit court granted First State judgment against Debtors and the guarantor, gave First State the right to foreclose on the property, and ruled that Metro POA’s interest would survive the foreclosure action and become the liability of the purchaser. Thereafter, First State purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. On appeal, First State argued that the circuit court erred in refusing to extinguish Metro POA’s lien for unpaid assessments and in awarding Metro POA attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in refusing to extinguish Metro POA’s interest and in awarding attorney’s fees to Metro POA. View "First State Bank v. Metro Dist. Condos. Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Steve Rose and Harbor East, Inc. entered into a consent judgment that awarded Rose $176,000. In 2009, Rose filed a motion to revive the judgment, and an order reviving the judgment was entered. Rose then filed a complaint in foreclosure against Harbor East Property Owners Association (the POA) and Recreational Management, Inc. (Recreational) maintaining that the judgment had not been satisfied. In 2012, the POA filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that because no writ of scire facias had been issued prior to the 2009 order of revivor, Rose's judgment was not revived under the terms of Ark. Code Ann. 16-65-501, and therefore, the 2009 order of revivor was void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the POA and Recreational were allowed to collaterally attack Rose's 2009 order of revivor because the order was void due to Rose's failure to satisfy the requirements of section 16-65-501. View "Rose v. Harbor E., Inc." on Justia Law

Diamante, LLC (Diamante) operated a private-membership golf club. There were 450 privately owned lots around the golf club and clubhouse that were located in two subdivisions. Supplemental declarations of covenants and restrictions ran with the land and created certain obligations and restrictions, called tie-in rights, that required, among other things, lot owners to become full golf members of the Diamante Country Club and to pay monthly dues to the Club. Appellees filed a declaratory judgment action asking the circuit court to declare the tie-in rights unenforceable due to Diamante's failure to collect monthly dues from all full golf members. Appellees filed a motion for class certification. The circuit court certified the class, defining the class as current owners of the 450 lots in the subdivisions with limited exclusions. Diamante appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting class certification. View "Diamante, LLC v. Dye" on Justia Law

Appellant and her two uncles each owned as tenants in common an undivided one-third interest in two tracts of farmland. Both of Appellant's uncles separately sold their interest in the property to Appellee. Appellee subsequently sold one of the farms. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a partition of the lands and damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a tenant in common, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices. Appellant claimed that Appellee prevented a family partnership from entering into seven-year renewal leases with farmers who leased the farmland and prevented the partnership from implementing a long-term plan for improving the farms. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Appellee's favor and dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's three claims, as Appellant failed to meet proof with proof that she sustained any damages as a result of Appellee's alleged breach of fiduciary duty, alleged tortious interference, and alleged deceptive trade practice. View "Skalla v. Canepari" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant for breach of a real estate contract after Defendant was unable to acquire financing to purchase a home owned by Plaintiffs. Defendant filed a third-party complaint against his real estate agent and the agent's employer. A jury returned a verdict in the Clines' favor on the breach of contract claim and in favor of Defendant on the third-party negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed the award to Plaintiffs, holding that there was no contract between the parties. On remand, the circuit court dismissed the complaint and third-party complaint. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs based on a provision in the real estate contract. The trial court awarded Defendant fees and costs but at an amount significantly less than the amount Defendant had requested. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's finding that Defendant was not entitled to recover fees and costs under the contract was consistent with the Court's holding in Carter I that there was no contract; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellant was not entitled to recover fees and costs related to his third-party claim and those fees and costs associated with his attorney. View "Carter v. Cline" on Justia Law

Appellant was in the business of extending high-risk loans to customers with poor credit ratings and operated primarily in Louisiana. Appellees, who resided in Arkansas, obtained four loans from Appellant at its location in Louisiana. After Appellees failed to make payments on the loans, Appellant filed in an Arkansas circuit court a notice of default and intention to sell Appellees' home. Appellees asserted the defenses of usury, unconscionability, esoppel, unclean hands, predatory lending practices, and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The circuit court found that the loans constituted predatory lending by a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in Arkansas and that the contract between the parties was unconscionable and could not be given full faith and credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's findings of unconscionability and predatory lending practices were not clearly erroneous; and (2) court did not err in refusing to enforce the mortgage, as to do so would contravene the public policy of the State of Arkansas. View "Gulfco of La. Inc. v. Brantley" on Justia Law

The City of Conway and Conway Corporation (collectively, "Conway") filed a land condemnation action against Petitioners, property owners. The morning of trial, Petitioners requested a continuance. The circuit court granted the continuance on the condition that Petitioners would be responsible for Conway's attorney's fees and costs associated with preparing for the trial. The continuance order also prohibited Petitioners from filing any additional pleadings until the attorneys' fees and costs were paid. Petitioners subsequently filed this motion for writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, writ of certiorari to rescind the order. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition but granted the writ of certiorari, holding that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a manifest, clear and gross abuse of discretion in ordering Petitioners to pay Conway's attorney's fees and costs. View "Cooper v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

The Hernandezes (Hernandez) entered into a real-estate contract to buy 100 acres of land in Van Buren County from the Humphries (Humphries). The sales contract included the mineral rights to the property. However, Humphries subsequently leased the oil-and-gas rights to New Century, which assigned the rights to SEECO. Humphries then sold the oil-and-gas rights to Paraclifta and Claughton. Therafter, Hernandez entered into a contract for sale of the property to the Walls (Walls). Hernandez and Walls (Appellants) filed suit against New Century, SEECO, Paraclifta, and Claughton (Appellees), alleging that Appellees were not innocent purchasers the oil-and-gas rights and seeking cancellation of the lease issued to New Century and the assignment to SEECO, as well as the deed conveying the rights to Paraclifta and Claughton. The circuit court granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment and Appellees' requested attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a question of fact remanded as to whether Hernandez was in exclusive possession of the property, thus imputing notice of Hernandez's interest in the property; and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. View "Walls v. Humphries" on Justia Law

SEECO, Inc. owned oil-and-gas leases and possessed rights authorizing it to explore for and develop minerals from several tracts of land. SEECO filed an interpleader action to determine the ownership of the oil, gas, and minerals in the land. Appellee requested that the circuit court quiet title and confirm title in Appellees. Several defendants were named in the action. The circuit court ruled that a 1929 mineral deed, even with a blank left empty in the granting clause, conveyed one hundred percent of the mineral interest in three tracts of land to J.S. Martin. Appellees included the Stanton Group, as Martin's heirs and successors in interest, and SEECO. Appellants appealed, arguing that the 1929 mineral deed was void because the description of the interest was so vague that it was unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1929 mineral deed was unambiguous, and the circuit court did not err by refusing to consider the parol evidence of a subsequent 1930 deed. View "Barton Land Servs., Inc. v. SEECO, Inc." on Justia Law

This dispute centered on a contract for the construction of a residence. The contract between the general contractor (Contractor) and the owners (Owners) was contingent upon Owners obtaining financing. After construction was completed, Contractor asserted a materialman's lien on the house, arguing that Owners had refused to fully compensate Contractor. After Owners filed suit to protest the lien, the parties agreed to discharge the lien. Contractor later sued Owners based on Owners' failure to disclose that they had obtained inadequate financing. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Contractor's claims were statutorily barred for failure to strictly comply with requirements for the notice of its lien. The order was silent as to the other two grounds Owners had asserted for dismissal and with respect to any of the arguments raised in defense of Owners' motion to dismiss. Contractor appealed, arguing reversal based on other arguments raised below but not ruled on. The Supreme Court affirmed, as (1) the circuit court did not provide a ruling on Contractor's first three arguments, and they were therefore not preserved for appellate review; and (2) Contractor's fourth argument had no merit given the Court's summary affirmance on the first three points. View "TEMCO Constr., LLC v. Gann" on Justia Law