Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved the contest of several detachments and annexations of land from the city of Rockport to the city of Malvern. Rockpot contested the annexations. The circuit court granted Malvern's motion to dismiss, finding that the properties were contiguous and that Malvern had substantially complied with Ark. Code Ann. 14-40-2002. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of Malvern's motion to dismiss, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of section 14-40-2002; (2) although the lands annexed by Malvern did not compose one area, nothing in the statute provided that a municipality cannot annex the land of several separate landowners at one time; and (3) although city streets separated the annexed lands from Malvern, the circuit court did not err in finding that the land was contiguous to Malvern. View "City of Rockport v. City of Malvern" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a circuit court judgment affirming the classification of real property for tax purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that the Arkansas Constitution and the Assessment Coordination Rules and Regulations allowed the land at issue to be classified as residential and not timber land; (2) ad hoc requirements were not imposed only on Appellants by Appellee Pope County Board of Equalization (BOE); (3) Appellants failed to demonstrate that they were similarly situated to any other taxpayer or landowner within the city limits, and therefore, Appellants' equal-protection claim that the circuit court erred in denying Appellants' petition without considering similarly situated property owners with similar property classified as timber and pasture within city limits was without merit; and (4) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a site visit by BOE's expert witness between the first day of trial and the second day of trial. View "McWilliams v. Pope County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellant Benefit Bank appealed from the circuit court's order finding that the mortgage it held to certain property was second and subordinate to the interest of Appellee Marilyn Rogers obtained in her divorce. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the circuit court erred in finding that Appellee's interest was prior to Appellant's interest because the divorce court lacked authority to impose a lien on real property to secure alimony payments. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order, holding (1) the divorce court did not lack the authority to impose the lien as it did, where it was stipulated to by the divorcing parties; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that the lis pendens filed by Appellee created or perfected a lien. View "Benefit Bank v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The City of West Memphis passed an ordinance providing for a special election to vote for the annexation of 5700 acres to West Memphis. Meanwhile, property owners of 2340 acres within the same 5700 acres petitioned the county court for annexation to the City of Marion. The county court granted the petition for annexation to Marion, and Marion accepted the 2340 acres. Marion subsequently sought a writ of mandamus against West Memphis to remove the 2340 acres from the legal description of the special-election ballot. The circuit court denied the writ but issued a declaratory judgment finding that the 2340 acres belonged to Marion. West Marion held its scheduled election, and the 5700-acre legal description, including the 2340 acres that had been annexed to Marion, appeared on the ballot. The West Memphis voters approved the annexation measure. Litigation followed. Ultimately, the circuit court found (1) West Memphis was not required to amend the 5700-acre legal description, and (2) the Marion annexation frustrated only the 2340 acres annexed by Marion, and the remaining 3360 acres became part of West Memphis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court reached the right result in finding the 3360 acres became a part of West Memphis. View "City of Marion v. City of West Memphis" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the order of the circuit court dismissing their claims and quieting title to mineral interests, including oil and gas rights, in appellee Upland Industrial Development Company, Inc. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) interpreting the Strohacker doctrine and applying the doctrine to the facts of this case; (2) placing the burden of proof on Appellants; and (3) finding that this was an actino to quiet title and, thus, finding no constitutional right to a jury trial was present. In addition, the Court concluded that Appellant's had no standing to raise on appeal the argument that the circuit court erred in granting Appellee SEECO, Inc.'s motion for attorneys' fees because Appellants were not aggrieved by the court's order. View "Nicholson v. Upland Indus. Dev. Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a seventy-five-day lien notice sent by Appellant, Ground Zero Construction, to Appellees, Walnut Creek, LLC and Rees Development, complied with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 18-44-115(e)(2)(C)(i), which requires that the notice contain a "general description of the labor, service, or materials furnished." The lien notice was provided in connection with sums owed and unpaid for labor and materials provided to Appellees for the construction and improvements of water and sewer for a subdivision. The circuit court concluded that the notice did not comply with the materialman's statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ground Zero's description of the labor, service, or materials furnished did not comply with the statute because Ground Zero essentially provided no description at all.

At issue in this case was whether the proceeds from the sale of timber, which was harvested from land that was specifically devised in a will, should be considered part of the decedent's residuary estate. Appellant, the executor of decedent's will, requested that the circuit court decide whether an ademption had occurred after Appellee Gary Morgan conveyed by timber deed several trees on decedent's property and transferred a portion of the proceeds to Nancy Morgan. The court declined to rule on the issue of ademption and found that the proceeds from the sale of timber became part of the residuary estate. The Supreme Court reversed, thereby adopting the intention theory as the law in Arkansas, holding that if the property that is the subject of a specific devise is sold by an attorney in fact at a time when the testator is incompetent, and the testator does not regain testamentary capacity before his or her death, an ademption of the specific devise does not take place as to the unexpended, identifiable proceeds of the sale. Remanded.

Kenny and Shelia Staggs brought suit in circuit court seeking quiet title to the oil and gas rights on certain real property of which they claimed ownership of the surface and subsurface rights. The Staggses asserted that while Union Pacific Railroad Company claimed ownership of the oil and gas rights in the property and leased those rights to Heartland Exploration, it did so erroneously based on a 1934 deed. In the deed, Union Pacific's predecessor in title conveyed property to two individuals but reserved for itself "all the minterals" in or under the land. The Staggses contended that the oil and gas rights did not pass to Union Pacific but instead passed through the chain of title to them. Union Pacific, Heartland, and XTO Energy (collectively, Defendants) moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that the general reservation of minerals in the 1934 deed included oil and gas as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on case law, the 1934 reservation at issue included any rights to oil and gas.

In the early 1990s Appellant Kenneth Middleton was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to life in prison. In 1992, a default judgment was entered against Appellant in a wrongful death action brought by Appellees, Appellant's wife's siblings. In 1999, a chancery court entered a decree finding that a conveyance Appellant had made to Appellant Lynn Middleton after the 1992 judgment was fraudulent. In 2009, Appellees filed a petition for writ of scire facias to revive the 1999 decree. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment and ordered that the 1999 decree be revived for another ten-year period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1999 decree, which was entered in the chancery court prior to the adoption of an amendment merging law and equity, was entitled to "the same footing" as a judgment, and the circuit court did not err in concluding it could be revived by a writ of scire facias; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellees timely revived the 1999 decree where they filed their writ of scire facias on May 13, 2009, within ten years from May 25, 1999, the effective date of the decree.

The City filed a complaint in eminent domain against Zara Thomas, trustee of two revocable trusts, and a motion for an order of immediate possession, seeking to procure a portion of Thomas's property for the purpose of constructing a bike trail. The circuit court granted the City's motion for order of immediate possession, and the City commenced construction on Thomas's property. Thomas appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order did not conclude the parties' rights as to the subject matter in controversy, and therefore, was not a final and appealable order, as the circuit court had not yet addressed the issue of Thomas's right to just compensation and the amount of damages.