Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

John Kelly appealed a divorce decree granting Christy Kelly a divorce, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in finding that Christy's stock in Tarco Roofing Materials (TRM) was nonmarital property, and (2) the circuit court erred in finding John liable for one-half of the deficiency resulting from the sale of the marital home. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding Christy acquired an enforceable right when she acquired her shares of TRM stock during her marriage, and therefore the circuit court erred in finding that the TRM stock was nonmarital property. Because the case was reversed for further proceedings relating to the division of property, the Court did not address John's second issue.

Jay Carter appealed an order of the circuit court awarding Ernie and Karen Cline money damages pursuant to a jury verdict, in addition to attorneys fees and costs, on the Clines's complaint for breach of contract to purchase real estate. On appeal, Carter argued that Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) was not complied with, that the circuit court erred in denying Carter's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and that the award of costs and attorneys fees was warranted based on the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court remanded, holding it was precluded from reaching the merits of Carter's arguments due to a deficient abstract pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(5) and ordering Carter to file a substituted brief.

In 2009, the Arkansas Teacher Retirement System (ATRS) petitioned the county court seeking a determination that a shopping center it owned was exempt from ad valorem taxation. The county court rejected ATRS's contention that the property qualified for an exemption. ATRS appealed. The circuit court held that the shopping center was not exempt under article 16, section 5 of the Arkansas Constitution because the property was not used exclusively for public purposes. ATRS appealed, arguing the shopping center is public property used exclusively for public purposes and therefore is exempt from taxation under the constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court's decision was not clearly erroneous. The evidence was undisputed that the property in question is a retail shopping center that is leased to private business. As such, the ATRS failed to demonstrate the structure is used exclusively for public purposes.

Appellant Kim Crockett appealed the circuit courtâs order in favor of Appellee C.A.G. Investments, Inc. (CAG). CAG was created as an investment vehicle to provide funds to Omni Holding and Development Corporation (Omni). Omni operated a crop-dusting and farm-equipment export business. CAG purchased equipment and land for Omniâs operations and a house for Omniâs manager. Ms. Crockett became Omniâs sole stockholder, president and chairman of the board in 2005. CAG made a series of loans to Omni. The loans were secured by the property Omni used in the businessâ operation, and by the house in which Ms. Crockett lived. In late summer 2003, Omni suffered numerous financial difficulties, resulting in the deterioration of the business relationship between the management of CAG and Omni. While Omni contemplated filing for bankruptcy protection, CAG sought to recover the collateral pledged for the loans it had made to Omni. CAG asked Omni to remove all personal property Omni owned from the premises, and demanded to take possession of the real property. Omni refused to comply, and CAG sued for possession, believing the property to be unlawfully detained. The circuit court entered an order against Omni for unlawful detainer, and found that CAG was entitled to a writ of possession. Omni did not vacate the premises, and appealed the circuit courtâs order. The appellate court dismissed Omniâs appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the circuit and appellate courts.

Appellant Reagen Kirkland appealed the circuit courtâs order in favor of Appellees Jay and Allison Sandlin (The Sandlins). The Sandlins owned a residential lot adjacent to Mr. Kirklandâs. The Sandlins had notified the original owners of Mr. Kirklandâs lot that they intended to build a fence between the two lots, but their boundary differed from that which was on the recorded plat of the subdivision. The Sandlins attempted to purchase the strip of land outside the official boundary, but they could not reach an agreement with their neighbors. When the neighbors sold their lot to Mr. Kirkland, they advised him that the Sandlinsâ fence encroached on his property line, and that he could sell that portion, or ask the Sandlins to move their fence. Mr. Kirkland asked the Sandlins to move the fence, and the Sandlins refused. Mr. Kirkland filed a suit for ejectment. The circuit court found that the Sandlins had entered into a valid boundary agreement with the original owners of Mr. Kirklandâs lot, and he took possession of the lot subject to that agreement. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Kirkland argued that he could rescind the agreement as a successive owner. The Court found a valid agreement existed between the Sandlins and the original owners of Mr. Kirklandâs lot. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Appellee, the City of Russelville (City), filed a complaint in November, 2008, that sought to condemn a property which fronts a public roadway in order to improve the surrounding drainage and flood control mechanisms. The property was owned by Appellant, the Lois Marie Combs Revocable Trust (Trust). The circuit court issued an eminent domain order to take possession of the property in December 2009 and a jury awarded the Trust compensation for the taking in June 2010. The Trust asked the court to award it the mandatory attorneyâs fees as set out in the state law that governs condemnation proceedings. The court ruled that the Trust had not brought the case and it was, therefore, not entitled to fees. The Trust appealed this decision to the Supreme Court alleging that any award of attorneyâs fees as a result of an eminent domain or condemnation action balances on the land use categorization of the property at the time it was condemned. Attorney fees had been, previously, awarded in similar cases where the government taking was deemed to involve the improvement of public waterworks. The Trust argued that the improvement of a roadwayâs drainage and flood control mechanism was analogous to a waterworks project and it was, therefore, entitled to attorney's fees. The Supreme Court disagreed finding that the primary reason for this eminent domain action by the City was for road improvement and not the improvement of the City's supply of drinking water. Subsequently, the Court held that the lower court correctly denied the Trustâs motion for attorneyâs fees.