Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Kawaharas loaned the Allisons $400,000. The Allisons executed a note to the Kawaharas in that amount secured by a deed of trust on a Reno property. The note was delivered in 2009 but was not recorded until 2011. When the Allisons’ car dealership became delinquent in taxes, the State Department of Taxation recorded certificates of tax lien against the Allisons. The lien was created and recorded in 2010. The Allisons filed for bankruptcy in 2011. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada approved the sale of the Reno property. The bankruptcy court certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court concerning the priority of the competing liens on the Reno property. The Supreme Court concluded (1) a recorded tax lien cannot be recognized as a mortgage lien, and therefore, the Department cannot claim to have recorded a mortgage lien when it filed a tax lien certificate; (2) the deed of trust had priority over a tax lien levied under Nev. Rev. Stat. 360.473; and (3) the Department’s tax lien is considered a judgment lien under section 360.473(2), and Nevada recording statutes do not protect judgment creditors against prior unrecorded conveyances. View "State, Dep't of Taxation v. Kawahara" on Justia Law

This dispute stemmed from a house that Debra Stevenson and her son Eugene Smith both own. After Stevenson refinanced her mortgage twice and then filed for bankruptcy, HSBC filed suit in Bankruptcy Court seeking equitable subrogation, which permits courts to declare that the owner of a mortgage (HSBC) has the same rights as an earlier-in-time owner of another mortgage (Wells Fargo). Only Stevenson signed the paperwork for the second refinancing with HSBC and Smith refused to sign because he thought the interest rate was too high. HSBC went ahead with the mortgage in full without Smith's signature. The court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that HSBC is entitled to equitable subrogation and rejected Stevenson and Smith’s claims that the mortgage is invalid under D.C. and federal lending laws. The court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Debra M. Stevenson" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiffs' complaint to cancel and discharge a creditor's judgment lien held by defendant Citi Mortgage, Inc. (Citi). Following the conclusion of Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings the Superior Court entered a default judgment in favor of Citi against plaintiffs, and by virtue of its docketing of that judgment, Citi obtained a lien on all of plaintiffs real property in New Jersey. Four years later, plaintiffs instituted a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court. Because plaintiffs listed the law firm that had represented Citi, rather than Citi itself in their Chapter 7 petition, the bankruptcy court did not provide notice of the proceeding to Citi. After the bankruptcy trustee abandoned two of plaintiffs' New Jersey properties, the bankruptcy court discharged plaintiffs' debt and closed their Chapter 7 case. Citi did not attempt to levy on plaintiffs property at any time prior to the bankruptcy filing and did not seek to enforce its lien in the wake of plaintiffs bankruptcy discharge. More than three years after the bankruptcy discharge, plaintiffs filed this action under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-49.1, which permits a debtor whose debts have been discharged in bankruptcy, to apply to the state court that has entered a judgment against the debtor, or has docketed the judgment, for an order directing the judgment to be canceled and discharged. The trial court granted Citi's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' claim. The court acknowledged that a judgment creditor, such as Citi, who has not levied on the debtor's property prior to the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition, may enforce its valid lien following the bankruptcy discharge, but must do so within the year following the discharge. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division for substantially the same reasons. View "Gaskill v. Citi Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants were creditors of Plaintiff who obtained final judgments against Plaintiff. A levy of execution was made on Plaintiff’s real property. Plaintiff subsequently received a discharge under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Plaintiff did not seek or obtain a ruling from the Bankruptcy Court avoiding any of Defendants’ liens. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint to remove the judicial liens. The judge entered judgment in favor of all three defendants, including two defaulting defendants, ruling that Defendants’ liens remained. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendants’ liens survived the bankruptcy discharge as a matter of federal and state law. View "Christakis v. Jeanne D’Arc Credit Union" on Justia Law

Mark and Tammy Davis owned property that secured a credit line deed of trust held by Huntington National Bank. The Davises failed to pay their 2005 and 2006 real property taxes, resulting in a notice of delinquency being published. The Davises subsequently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A second notice of delinquency was then published announcing that the tax lien would be sold. A notice of the tax lien sale was mailed to the Davises but was returned undeliverable. The Davises received a discharge in bankruptcy, after which the tax lien was sold. No party redeemed the property, and the tax deed was issued to Rebuild America, Inc. The Davises then filed this action seeking to set aside the tax sale. The circuit court granted relief, finding that the issuance of the two statutory notices of delinquency while the Davises were under the protection of a bankruptcy stay voided the tax deed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy stay rendered the statutory notices void ab initio, and therefore, the tax lien sale did not comply with the required statutory procedure. Accordingly, the tax deed issued in this matter must be set aside. View "Rebuild America v. Davis" on Justia Law

Michael's brother, Kevin, purchased a lakefront lot. Michael was to cover expenses and ultimately purchase the lot. A dispute arose and Kevin put the lot up for sale. Kevin offered to reimburse Michael $54,049.10 and directed Michael to stop tampering with “For Sale” signs. Michael recorded a lien. Although Michael had about a 5% interest in the lot, the lien stated that Kevin “acquired title for convenience only.” Kevin sought a declaration of quiet title, and alleged slander of title, partition, and breach of contract. The jury was instructed, based on Wis. Stat. 706.13(1), which defines slander of title as submitting, entering, or recording, claim of lien, lis pendens, writ of attachment, financing statement or other instrument relating to a security interest in or the title to property, if the submitter “knows or should have known” that any part of the instrument was false, a sham, or frivolous. An interlocutory judgment of $281,000 was entered for Kevin. Michael filed a bankruptcy petition. Kevin asserted that their judgment was precluded from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6) as a “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court concluded that the issue was preclusively decided and entered judgment for Kevin. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The state court jury’s slander of title findings did not preclusively established that Michael acted “willfully.” The verdict could have been based on negligence. View "Gerard v. Gerard" on Justia Law

In this bankruptcy case, Bank of America obtained a junior foreclosure judgment and received the Debtor’s equity of redemption for a senior mortgage. Bank of America did not sell this interest within the specified time period, nor did it appear in the senior foreclosure to assert its interest in redeeming the senior mortgage within the redemption period. Peoples United Bank, the holder of the senior mortgage, then filed a foreclosure complaint. Bank of America and the Debtor failed to appear in the action and were defaulted. Thereafter, Peoples United was granted a foreclosure judgment. Bank of America was not named as a distributee in the resulting judgment. Bank of America subsequently purchased Peoples United’s interest in the Debtor’s senior mortgage debt, and Peoples United postponed the foreclosure sale. Bank of America successfully moved to substitute itself in place of Peoples United as the plaintiff in the senior foreclosure. The Trustee then moved to sell the premises free of liens, interests, and encumbrances. Bank of America objected. The bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of Bank of America. The federal district court disagreed with the bankruptcy court and certified an unsettled state law question to the Maine Supreme Court. The Court answered that Bank of America, who failed to appear in the senior foreclosure and was not named as a distributee in the resulting judgment, did not have any rights to the excess proceeds from that foreclosure sale. View "Bankruptcy Estate of Everest v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

The Borrower defaulted on a nonrecourse Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) loan secured by property located in Detroit. CMBS loans are packaged as a trust to attract investors; in return for nonrecourse liability, CMBA borrowers promise to refrain from certain financial behavior likely to increase the risk of default and bankruptcy; the loan at issue included a solvency clause. Michigan’s 2012 Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act applies retroactively to render solvency covenants in nonrecourse loans unenforceable, declaring them “an unfair and deceptive business practice . . . against public policy [that] should not be enforced.” The lender foreclosed. Purchaser bought the property at auction with a winning bid of $756,000, and, standing in the lender’s shoes and citing the solvency clause, sued Borrower and its guarantor to collect a $6 million deficiency. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Borrower. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that that the NMLA: rendered the solvency covenant in Borrower’s CMBS loan unenforceable; violated neither the Contract nor Due Process Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions; and comported with Michigan’s constitutional provision mandating the separation of governmental powers. View "Borman, LLC v. 18718 Borman, LLC" on Justia Law

Getty Properties Corp. leased certain properties to Getty Petroleum Marketing, Inc. by way of a master lease. Getty Marketing sublet the properties to Green Valley Oil, LLC. Thereafter, Green Valley entered into an individual sub-sublease with each Defendant, the owners of retail gasoline stations. Getty Properties subsequently terminated the master lease. Getty Marketing then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court rejected the master lease and ordered that Getty Marketing relinquish possession of the properties to Getty Properties. Getty Properties and NECG Holdings Corp. served Defendants with notices to quit, but Defendants refused to vacate the properties. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced summary process actions against Defendants. The trial court rendered judgment of immediate possession for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) determining that Plaintiffs’ notices to quit were valid; (2) admitting into evidence the lease between Getty Properties and Getty Marketing, as well as the sublease between Getty Marketing and Green Valley; (3) interpreting the various pleadings in Getty Marketing’s bankruptcy case as terminating the lease and the sublease; (4) finding that Plaintiffs proved a prima facie case for summary process; and (5) failing to dismiss the summary process action as premature. View "Getty Props. Corp. v. ATKR, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2004, Paint Rock Turn, LLC purchased a sod farm and related farm equipment. To partially finance the purchase, Paint Rock borrowed $1,706,250 from First Jackson Bank. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the sod farm and a security interest in the equipment used on the farm. By February 2009, reflecting in part a drop in demand for sod caused by the collapsing market for new homes, Paint Rock had defaulted on the loan. In early 2009, Paint Rock filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The filing of the petition operated as an automatic stay and precluded First Jackson from foreclosing on the sod farm or retaking the equipment. The bankruptcy petition was dismissed later that year, and a few months later, First Jackson moved forward with its intent to foreclose by publishing the first of three notices of a foreclosure sale on the Paint Rock property. On the morning of the scheduled sale, Paint Rock filed a second bankruptcy petition, which stayed the sale. This second petition was dismissed a month later for failure to file the proper schedules and statements. First Jackson published another notice that the foreclosure sale was rescheduled for December 30, 2009. December 26, Paint Rock filed a third bankruptcy petition. Four days later, the bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay, expressly finding that Paint Rock misused the bankruptcy process to "hinder and delay First Jackson's efforts to foreclose its mortgage and security agreement." First Jackson was the high bidder at the sale, purchased the property, and sent Paint Rock a letter demanding possession of the sod farm. In early 2010, First Jackson filed an ejectment action. The same day, Paint Rock demanded access to the farm to recover "emblements in the form of sod which is being grown on the real property recently foreclosed upon ...." Paint Rock also requested the return of its equipment. First Jackson denied Paint Rock's request. Paint Rock, relying on a section of the Alabama Code that permits a tenant at will to harvest its crop, counterclaimed for damages for harm suffered as the result of being unable to harvest the sod. Paint Rock also sought damages for conversion of "plats of sod" contained on the sod farm. First Jackson sold the sod farm to Mrs. Goodson, subject to any claim Paint Rock may have to the emblements growing on the property. Paint Rock filed a joint third-party complaint against First Jackson and Mr. and Mrs. Goodson, alleging conversion and detinue, as well as the emblements claim. After the trial court denied motions for a summary judgment filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons, the case proceeded to trial. At the close of Paint Rock and Jones's case, the trial court granted a motion for a JML filed by First Jackson and the Goodsons on Paint Rock's counterclaim for emblements on the ground that Paint Rock was not an at-will tenant. After Paint Rock withdrew its detinue claims and the trial court granted a JML on the wantonness claims, leaving only the conversion and negligence claims. The jury awarded Paint Rock damages against First Jackson for conversion of a sod cutter and cut sod that had been loaded on a tractor-trailer when First Jackson took possession of the property. The jury also awarded Paint Rock damages against the Goodsons for conversion of business property and equipment. Paint Rock appealed the JML in favor of the defendants on the emblements claim; First Jackson cross-appealed the judgment awarding Paint Rock damages for conversion of the cut sod. The Supreme Court affirmed with regard to Paint Rock's emblements claim, but reversed on the conversion of the cut sod claim.View "Paint Rock Turf, LLC v. First Jackson Bank et al. " on Justia Law