Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from contempt sanctions issued by the bankruptcy court against the Diazes for failing to transfer a Mexican coastal villa to Kismet. The court concluded that: (1) the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to substitute Axolotl as transferee; (2) the bankruptcy court did not violate due process in imposing certain sanctions; (3) the ACJ was sufficiently specific to support a finding of contempt; (4) even if "legal impossibility" excused noncompliance, the Diazes have not demonstrated that compliance with the ACJ was legally impossible; (5) the bankruptcy court's findings of contempt for the period up to November 25 were not clearly erroneous; (6) the Diazes' claim that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to quantify fees and costs in its order of December 18, 2008 was moot where the order was vacated by the district court; and (7) the bankruptcy court properly abrogated attorney-client privilege where Mr. Diaz implicitly waived privilege with regard to communications on certain subjects. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in vacating the compulsory sanctions of $25,000 per day for the period from November 26, 2008 to December 4, 2008. Finally, the court granted requests for judicial notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re: Icenhower" on Justia Law

Makowka owns a home in a Pike County, Pennsylvania, planned community and, in 2005, fell behind on her homeowners’ association dues. In 2008, the Association obtained a default judgment of $2,436. As additional dues went unpaid, the Association sued again in 2010 and obtained another default judgment, worth $3,599.08. A writ of execution and attachment issued. A sheriff’s sale of Makowka’s property was scheduled for September 2011. Days before the sale, Makowka filed a Chapter 13 petition. In her proposed bankruptcy plan, Makowka moved to avoid the Association’s claims under 11 U.S.C. 522(f), which releases a debtor from obligations imposed by judicial liens and non-possessory, non-purchase money security interests. Although Makowka acknowledged that the Uniform Planned Community Act granted the Association a self-executing statutory lien on her residence for unpaid dues, she claimed that part of that lien had been extinguished because the Association failed to foreclose within the statutory period of three years. To the extent the claims represented fees due before September 2008, Makowka contended, it had obtained dischargeable money judgments. The Bankruptcy Court denied Makowka’s motion. The district court affirmed. The Third Circuit vacated, concluding that the district court relied on the wrong state precedent and that the Association did not enforce its statutory lien on Makowka’s residence when it pursued actions in debt. View "In re: Makowka" on Justia Law

After debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, GMAC filed this adversary proceeding claiming that it was entitled to a first-priority lien on a home and surrounding twenty-two acres of land by operation of the Arkansas doctrine of equitable subrogation, or to reformation correcting the mutual mistake in its mortgage. The court concluded that, at the time Summit and Southern State made their new loans, knowledge that GMAC made a mistake by describing the wrong property on its earlier mortgage was not knowledge that GMAC had or even claimed to have a superior unrecorded interest, because GMAC had for many months made no attempt to correct the known error, or to reform its mortgage; the principle of Killam v. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. did not apply to mortgage priority disputes; and the blame for the uncertainty regarding GMAC's lien position lies with GMAC. Had GMAC taken timely action, it would have held the senior recorded lien. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of relief for GMAC. View "Owcen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Summit Bank, et al." on Justia Law

Debtor transferred her interest in real property to AGC, a corporation wholly owned by her husband. Seven months later, debtor declared bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court concluded that the conveyance was constructively fraudulent. The bankruptcy court found AGC did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it paid for the property or intended to pay for it on the date of the property's purchase. The bankruptcy court also found that, at the time of the purchase, the parties intended that AGC would serve as the property's tenant, not the property's owner. AGC also did not prove that it intended to own the property on the date of acquisition. Therefore, the bankruptcy court found no justification for a resulting trust. The district court found no fault in the bankruptcy court's findings of fact, but nonetheless reversed. The court reversed the district court insofar as it found a resulting trust to sever debtor's legal and equitable interests in the property. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Architectural Glass Construction" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs refinanced their home in a mortgage loan transaction with Summit Mortgage. The mortgage was later assigned to Defendant, SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. Facing foreclosure, Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding against SunTrust in the pending bankruptcy case, seeking rescission of the loan transaction and damages. SunTrust filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs filed their adversary complaint more than four years after the mortgage loan transaction, the defensive rescission-by-way-of-recoupment claim was barred by section 10(f) of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (“MCCCDA”). In response, Plaintiffs asserted that the four-year statute of limitations did apply to their action because section 10(i)(3) of the MCCCDA allows for recoupment claims at any time. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts certified a question of law to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which answered by holding that a borrower who grants a mortgage in a consumer credit transaction may not rescind the transaction under the MCCCDA defensively by way of common law recoupment after the expiration of the statute of limitations set forth in section 10(f) of the MCCCDA. View "May v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

A non-debtor spouse contended that her homestead rights in the Texas residence that she shares with her husband, the debtor in bankruptcy, precluded a forced sale of the property and alternatively, that if a sale occurred, she must be compensated for the loss of her homestead interest in the property. The bankruptcy court held that the non-debtor spouse's homestead rights were limited to the dollar amount of the exemption in 11 U.S.C. 522(p) and that there was no unconstitutional taking of the value of the non-debtor spouse's interest in the homestead. The court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's holdings. View "Kim, et al. v. Dome Entertainment Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Debtor, a New York City tenant, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her apartment lease on Schedule B as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit." At issue was whether the value inherent in debtor's rent-stabilized lease as a consequence of the protections afforded by New York's Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 9, 2520.1 et seq., made the lease, or some portion of its value, exempt from debtor's bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit" within the meaning of New York Debtor and Creditor Law 282(2). The court certified this unsettled issue to the New York Court of Appeals. View "Santiago-Monteverde v. Pereira" on Justia Law

Heatherwood and FCB appealed the district court's affirmance of a final amended judgment entered by the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court determined that there was an implied restrictive covenant limiting the use of real property at issue to a golf course. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that, because FCB satisfied the person-aggrieved doctrine, FCB also met Article III standing requirements. On the merits, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it held that FCB and Heatherwood had actual, constructive and inquiry notice of the implied restrictive covenant; the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that most, if not all, of the homeowners within the Heatherwood subdivision bought their home with the expectation that the golf course property would remain a golf course; the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that the doctrine of estoppel by deed precluded the enforcement of the covenant; with respect to FCB and Heatherwood's argument that the doctrine of integration in the Agreement between HGC and Heatherwood served to destroy an implied covenant, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding integration did not apply under the facts of the case; in considering the doctrine of changed circumstances, the bankruptcy court relied on various factual findings in determining that the homeowners' benefit from the continued existence of the covenant outweighed the detriment borne by FCB and Heatherwood; and the court rejected FCB and Heatherwood's argument that HGC had no standing to enforce the implied restrictive covenant because HGC owned no property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Heatherwood Holdings, LLC v. HGC, Inc." on Justia Law

Debtor challenged the district court's determination that proceeds from the post-certification sale of an exempted homestead revert to the estate if not reinvested within six months. The "snapshot rule" of bankruptcy law holds that all exemptions are determined at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed, and that they do not change due to subsequent events. In re Zibman held that proceeds from the pre-petition of a sale of a Texas homestead are not permanently immune from bankruptcy creditors. Under the court's precedent, the sale of the homestead voided the homestead exemption and the failure to reinvest the proceeds within six months voided the proceeds exemption, regardless of whether the sale occurred pre- or post- petition. This interpretation of 11 U.S.C. 522(c) is in accordance with Texas law and the decisions of the court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Viegelahn v. Frost" on Justia Law

Amzak appealed the district court's summary judgment on its loan loss claims against its title insurance policy provider and related entities. The court concluded that Amzak failed to show that it suffered actual loss because of a failure of title and STL could not be held responsible for any harm suffered by Amzak. The court formalized the holding in First State Bank v. American Title and likewise rejected the guarantee rationale of Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., and agreed with the district court's rejection of Amzak's argument that STL breached the title policy at the time of the loan because its mortgage was voidable at that time. The court also disposed of Amzak's negligence claim where STL's delay in making a complete filing of Amzak's mortgage was not a legal cause of Amzak's loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Amzak Capital Mgmt. v. Stewart Title" on Justia Law