Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The debtor worked Saylor’s nightclub and for another entity owned by Saylor, scouting for commercial properties. Debtor obtained loans ($1,018,350) to purchase four Michigan car washes. The loan closings were conducted by another company controlled by Saylor, acting as agent for the title company, which never released loan proceeds to complete the purchases. After the debtor defaulted, Bayview, assignee of the notes, discovered that he did not hold title to the properties securing the notes. Bayview filed claims under the title commitments. The title company claimed that the loan applications contained false statements and denied the claim for failure to exercise due diligence in approving the loans. Bayview sued and the parties settled; Bayview assigned an interest in the notes to the title company, which obtained a default judgment of $10,172,840 against Saylor. The debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The title company filed an adversary complaint claiming that the Bayview notes were undischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(B). The bankruptcy court rejected the argument, holding that under Michigan law, claims for fraud cannot be assigned and that the title company had the right to pursue Saylor, but not the debtor. The district court reversed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the title company can seek nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2) View "Pazdzierz v. First Am. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2009, Epling purchased a manufactured home, borrowing funds from Vanderbilt secured by a security interest in her manufactured home. Epling resided in Magoffin County, Kentucky. Vanderbilt filed an application for first title and an application for a title lien statement in Bell County, Kentucky and later filed the Certificate of Title for the manufactured home, which listed Vanderbilt’s lien, in Bell County. In 2010, Epling filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The trustee initiated a strong-arm proceeding to avoid Vanderbilt’s lien on the manufactured home, under 11 U.S.C. 544, because the lien was not properly perfected under the Kentucky law. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee summary judgment, concluding that Vanderbilt had failed to perfect its lien because it had filed the required title lien statement in its county of residence, rather than in Epling’s county of residence. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Westenhoefer" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against the City of Lewiston by Tim Thompson, Janet Thompson, and Thompson's Auto Sales (collectively, Thompson). Thompson filed a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the City negligently designed and installed a storm water drain system on a city street adjacent to Thompson's property, which caused storm water runoff to flow onto Thompson's property and damage it. After suit was filed, Thompson entered bankruptcy proceedings and the bankruptcy trustee, C. Barry Zimmerman, was substituted as Plaintiff in the action. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity and design immunity. The district court denied the motion as to design immunity, but granted the motion on the ground of discretionary immunity. Zimmerman appealed, arguing that the discretionary immunity exception to liability under the ITCA does not grant immunity from liability for damage caused by negligent design and, alternatively, that even if discretionary immunity was considered, it was inapplicable in this case because the City's actions were not discretionary within the meaning of the exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the City was not entitled to immunity from liability under any exception to the ITCA. View "Zimmerman v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

Peoples Bank loaned Debtors $214,044, secured by a mortgage recorded in 2004. In 2008, Debtors obtained a $296,000 construction loan from Banterra, secured with a second mortgage on the same property. Banterra was aware of the first mortgage, but did not know was that in 2007, Debtors obtained a second loan from Peoples, for $400,000, secured by another mortgage on a different piece of property. The 2004 Peoples mortgage contained a cross-collateralization provision, stating that “In addition to the Note, this Mortgage secures all obligations … of Grantor to Lender … now existing or hereafter arising,” and a provision that “At no time shall the principal amount of the Indebtedness secured by the Mortgage … exceed $214,044.26 … “Indebtedness” … includes all amounts that may be indirectly secured by the Cross-Collateralization provision.” In 2010 Debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The balance due on Peoples 2004 loan was then $115,044.26. Debtors received permission and sold the property for $388,500.00. Out of these proceeds, Peoples claimed the balance due on the 2004 loan plus partial payment of the 2007, up to the cap. The Bankruptcy Court found in favor of Peoples. The district court reversed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, upholding the “plain language” of the cross-collateralization agreement. View "Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Banterra Bank" on Justia Law

Fred and Nancy Eagerton petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a judgment as a matter of law in their favor and against SE Property Holdings, LLC, consistent with the Court's mandate in "Eagerton v. Vision Bank," (99 So. 3d 299 (Ala. 2012)). SE Property Holdings, LLC, is the successor by merger to Vision Bank. The underlying suit arose from a loan that the Eagertons personally guaranteed, secured by a mortgage on property within the Rock Creek Tennis Club in Fairhope. The bank declared the original and second loans in default and accelerated balances due under both. The bank sued the primary obligor, and the Eagertons as person guarantors on one of the original loans. The primary obligor declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The reorganization plan consolidated the two loans. The obligor eventually defaulted on the terms of the reorganization plan. The bankruptcy was dismissed, the property foreclosed, and the money obtained in the foreclosure sale was applied to the consolidated loan. The Eagertons argued that the Chapter 11 reorganization of the debts of primary obligor (the consolidation of the original loan with the second loan), created a new indebtedness not encompassed by their guaranty contracts. The Eagertons therefore argued that the creation of this new indebtedness, without their knowledge or consent, operated to discharge them from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. The bank, on the other hand, argued, among other things, that the consolidated loan was a replacement note contemplated by the guaranty contracts and that the Eagertons had waived the material-modification defense. The Supreme Court in "Eagerton v. Vision Bank" concluded that the Eagertons' guaranty contracts were unambiguous; that based on the language in the guaranty contracts the Eagertons did not intend to guarantee any indebtedness other than that indebtedness arising out of the original loan and any extensions, renewals, or replacements thereof; and that, once the Eagertons' original loan was modified pursuant to the Chapter 11 reorganization of Dotson 10s, the Eagertons were at that point discharged from any further obligations under their guaranty contracts. Because the circuit court did not follow the mandate in the Court's prior decision in "Vision Bank," the Supreme Court granted the Eagertons' petition and issued the writ. View "SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Eagerton" on Justia Law

Appellant purchased a home and fell behind on her mortgage payments. Despite the bank having agreed to postpone a foreclosure sale, it proceeded with the sale. After she threatened suit, the bank re-purchased the home and entered into settlement negotiations with appellant; the bank promised to re-convey the property to appellant so that she could proceed with a sale to a third party. The bank subsequently refused to perform and appellant sued both the bank and the bank's counsel for breach of the settlement agreement and fraudulent inducement. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the woman on her breach of contract claim, finding that a binding settlement contract had been formed between appellant and the bank. Appellant then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee sold the property and the bankruptcy estate abandoned the present state court claim, placing the remaining balance from the sale of the property into the superior court registry. The superior court held a bench trial on the remaining fraud claim and on the parties' respective damages. At the conclusion of appellant's case, the court granted a directed verdict to the bank and the bank's counsel on the fraud claim. The superior court awarded the bank the unpaid loan balance as well as the fair rental value of the property for appellant's post-foreclosure occupancy of the property, and awarded the woman lost sale damages. The superior court also awarded the parties prejudgment interest, and later awarded the bank and its counsel attorney's fees. Appellant appealed the superior court's final judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank abandoned its claim for rental damages at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's award of rental damages and any accompanying award of prejudgment interest. Because any right to recover fees for work performed on behalf of the dismissed defendants was waived, because it was error to award attorney's fees to the bank's counsel in responding to the bankruptcy petition, and because the superior court did not properly calculate attorney's fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68, the case was remanded to recalculate attorney's fees. The superior court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Taylor v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

Debtors filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought to discharge their unsecured debt, strip down liens on their primary residence and a rental property, and obtain a loan modification to address mortgage arrears on the properties. The Trustee subsequently challenged confirmation orders entered by the bankruptcy court and affirmed by the district court, stripping off junior liens against debtors' residences. The Trustee argued that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 created a per se rule barring lien-stripping in so-called "Chapter 20" cases. The Act, however, dd not bar the orders entered by the bankruptcy court, and the stripping off of valueless liens - liens secured by collateral without a single penny of value to support it - was otherwise consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Branigan v. Davis" on Justia Law

Debtor filed for leave to appeal the bankruptcy court's interlocutory judgment in the district court. While the motion was pending, the bankruptcy court, sua sponte, certified its judgment for direct appeal to this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(2)(A)(i) and (iii). The court agreed with the bankruptcy court's ruling on cross-motions for partial summary judgment in favor of FGB that the Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage that FGB recorded was valid and that the property underlying that mortgage, the Deluxe Motel, secured both the loan FGB made to debtor and the loan FGB made to a second entity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hari Aum, L.L.C. v. First Guaranty Bank" on Justia Law

IPS and MPES challenged the district court's final judgment, reversing and vacating the bankruptcy court's amended judgment, that their mechanics' liens on the property of debtor did not pertain to materials or labor supplied before the date on which Metrobank perfected its deed of trust lien, September 1, 2006. Hajoca and Crescent challenged the bankruptcy court's determination that their mechanics' liens also did not pertain to materials or labor supplied before September 1, 2006, which the district court upheld. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in determining that IPS and MPES had supplied materials or labor before September 1, 2006. The court also concluded that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that Hajoca and Crescent had not supplied materials or labor before September 1, 2006. Accordingly, the court affirmed the final judgment of the district court, which reversed and vacated the amended judgment of the bankruptcy court. View "First National Bank, et al v. Crescent Electrical Supply Co., et al" on Justia Law

FHFA, as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sued UBS for fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the marketing and sale of mortgage-backed securities. The district court denied UBS's motion to dismiss and certified its decision for interlocutory appeal. The court held that the "extender statute" in section 4617(b)(12) of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, applied to this action, and thus concluded that the district court correctly denied UBS's motion to dismiss for untimeliness. The court further held that FHFA had standing to bring this action and the district court correctly denied UBS's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Federal Housing Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc." on Justia Law