Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Georgina Stephens and Andrew Alexander appealed from the district court's decision affirming an order of the bankruptcy court giving possession of disputed property to the trustees of the individual bankruptcy estates of Ms. Stephens and Larry Alexander. Ms. Stephens and Mr. Alexander were previously married, Andrew is their son. This case stemmed from the separate bankruptcy petitions that Ms. Stephens and Mr. Alexander filed during their marriage and concerned the ownership and possession of certain property. Because Andrew had not challenged the district court's determination that he lacked standing to appeal the bankruptcy court's decision, the court deemed the issue waived; the court had jurisdiction to evict Ms. Stephens; the court rejected Ms. Stephens' res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments; and the court court rejected Ms. Stephens' remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alexander, et al v. Jensen-Carter, et al" on Justia Law

Debtors filed a Chapter 13 petition and the Trustee objected to debtors proposed bankruptcy plan on the ground that it was not proposed in good faith because of the "miniscule" payments to unsecured claims while debtors were living in a $400,000 home, making payments on various luxury and unnecessary items, and failing to commit one hundred percent of their disposable income to the plan. The bankruptcy court overruled the objection and the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirmed. The court concluded that Congress's adoption of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. 1325(a), foreclosed a court's consideration of a debtor's Social Security income or a debtor's payments to secured creditors as part of the inquiry into good faith under section 1325(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the BAP. View "In re: David Welsh, et al" on Justia Law

NABC appealed from the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 Trustee. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that NABC lost its possessory lien when it turned debtor's account funds over to the Trustee without first seeking adequate protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "North American Banking Co. v. Leonard" on Justia Law

The Debtors, five single-asset limited partnerships holding apartment complexes developed under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program, 26 U.S.C. 42, filed for relief under Chapter 11 in 2010. The properties were put into service in 2005 and 2006, and their tax credit recapture periods expire in 2019 and 2020. The bankruptcy court conducted a valuation hearing and concluded that, for purposes of determining the value of the secured portion of the (mortgage holder) Bank’s claims under 11 U.S.C. 506(a), a determination of the fair market value of the properties included consideration of the remaining federal low-income housing tax credits. The Bankruptcy Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s Valuation Order. The Debtors failed to amend their plan or disclosure statement to reflect the values set by the bankruptcy court until ordered to do so in 2012. The court ultimately dismissed the petitions, based on continuing loss to or diminution of the estate, coupled with absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation; the Debtors’ inability to effectuate a plan; and bad faith under 11 U.S.C. 1112(b). The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. View "In re: Creekside Senior Apts." on Justia Law

Debtor appealed from the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 Trustee on his objection to debtor's claimed homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that debtor had abandoned the property at issue as his homestead by removing himself from the property with no fixed or actual intent to return, and was not, therefore, permitted to claim a homestead exemption. View "Paul, Jr. v. Allred" on Justia Law

In 2006, debtor Denise Codrington executed a security deed with appellant Wells Fargo that was recorded with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County on October 13, 2006. The deed provided: "[i]f one or more riders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this Security Instrument, the covenants of each such rider shall be incorporated into ...this Security Instrument as if the rider(s) were a part of this Security Instrument." The security deed specifically identified the "ARM Rider" as being incorporated. The last page of the deed was signed by the debtor, the co-debtor (Alvina Codrington), and a notary, but the signature line for an "Unofficial Witness" was left blank. Contemporaneously recorded with the security deed were a number of other exhibits, including a "Waiver of Borrower's Rights." The waiver provided that "the provisions hereof are incorporated into and made a part of the security deed." The parties agreed that the waiver was signed by the debtor, the co-debtor, an unofficial witness, and a notary. In June 2008, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Appellee Neil Gordon, Trustee for the debtor's bankruptcy estate, commenced an adversary proceeding against Wells Fargo seeking to avoid Wells Fargo's interest in the property. Appellee asserted that because the security deed lacked the signature of an unofficial witness, it was not duly recorded and it did not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser, rendering the security deed avoidable per 11 U.S.C. 544. Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of appellee. Wells Fargo appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals which certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should be considered "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" as required by OCGA 44-14-33; and (2) if no, whether such a situation would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice. Upon review, the Supreme Court answered both certified questions in the negative. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In 2007, Tellado heard a Spanish-language radio advertisement for mortgage refinancing, called the number, and spoke in Spanish to arrange refinancing of an existing mortgage. Bloom, a closing agent acting as a representative of IndyMac, conducted the closing at the Tellados’ home. The loan documents, including the notice of the right to cancel, were in English. Oral communications between Bloom and the Tellados, were conducted through the Tellados’ daughter, who served as an interpreter for verbal instructions and Bloom’s explanations of the loan documents. IndyMac subsequently failed and was placed in FDIC receivership. In 2009, the Tellados sent a notice of cancellation under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-7. The district court held that IndyMac had failed to provide proper notice and that the three-day cancellation period had never begun; it ordered refund to the Tellados of all payments, termination of the security interest, and payment of a $10,000 penalty. The Third Circuit reversed; the claim is precluded by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D) because the claim is predicated upon an act or omission of IndyMac. Tellados failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under FIRREA. View "Tellado v. Indymac Mortg. Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought to surrender their home. When Plaintiffs' mortgage lenders (collectively, Beneficial) refused to foreclose or otherwise take title to the residence, Plaintiffs demanded that the mortgage lien be released. After Beneficial also refused to release the mortgage lien, Plaintiffs began an adversary proceeding claiming a discharge injunction violation. The bankruptcy court found Beneficial did not violate the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that because the facts of this case so closely mirrored those in Pratt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the same result should follow. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, holding that the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions were correct and that the court did not err in its judgment. View "Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc." on Justia Law

The Trustee for debtor TRM appealed the dismissal of his adversary action against real estate development companies, alleging that TRM and the development companies engaged in a scheme to sell properties at inflated prices in recently developed subdivisions in North Carolina and South Carolina. The court held that the development companies were potentially independently liable to TRM's purchasers because it participated in TRM's sales and marketing efforts. But, because TRM was not entitled to statutory contribution, the Trustee's action failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Total Realty Mgmt. LLC v. R. A. North Development, Inc." on Justia Law

The IRS assigned a taxpayer identification number to Crystal Cascades, LLC. The company changed its name to Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC (CCC), but did not notify the IRS and continued using the original number. A Nevada bank made loans to CCC and recorded trust deeds. CCC failed to pay employment taxes in 2003 and 2004. The IRS filed tax lien notices in 2004-2005, under the identification number and directed to “Crystal Cascades, LLC.” In 2005 RHB made loans to CCC. The Nevada bank initiated foreclosure. CCC filed under Chapter 11. RHB argued seniority over the tax liens. During foreclosure, RHB purchased the property. Under I.R.C. 7452(d), the IRS may redeem properties against which it has a valid tax lien. The parties negotiated for RHB to pay $100,000; the IRS released its right of redemption. The bankruptcy court concluded that the lien notices did not impart constructive notice to third parties and awarded RHB surplus sale proceeds. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. RHB sought return of the $100,000, asserting that the agreement was void for lack of consideration because the right of redemption was illusory. The Court of Federal Claims held that RHB failed to prove that the IRS acted in bad faith. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Rd. & Hwy. Bldrs., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law