Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Debtor appealed from the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 Trustee on his objection to debtor's claimed homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that debtor had abandoned the property at issue as his homestead by removing himself from the property with no fixed or actual intent to return, and was not, therefore, permitted to claim a homestead exemption. View "Paul, Jr. v. Allred" on Justia Law

In 2006, debtor Denise Codrington executed a security deed with appellant Wells Fargo that was recorded with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County on October 13, 2006. The deed provided: "[i]f one or more riders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this Security Instrument, the covenants of each such rider shall be incorporated into ...this Security Instrument as if the rider(s) were a part of this Security Instrument." The security deed specifically identified the "ARM Rider" as being incorporated. The last page of the deed was signed by the debtor, the co-debtor (Alvina Codrington), and a notary, but the signature line for an "Unofficial Witness" was left blank. Contemporaneously recorded with the security deed were a number of other exhibits, including a "Waiver of Borrower's Rights." The waiver provided that "the provisions hereof are incorporated into and made a part of the security deed." The parties agreed that the waiver was signed by the debtor, the co-debtor, an unofficial witness, and a notary. In June 2008, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Appellee Neil Gordon, Trustee for the debtor's bankruptcy estate, commenced an adversary proceeding against Wells Fargo seeking to avoid Wells Fargo's interest in the property. Appellee asserted that because the security deed lacked the signature of an unofficial witness, it was not duly recorded and it did not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser, rendering the security deed avoidable per 11 U.S.C. 544. Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of appellee. Wells Fargo appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals which certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should be considered "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" as required by OCGA 44-14-33; and (2) if no, whether such a situation would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice. Upon review, the Supreme Court answered both certified questions in the negative. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In 2007, Tellado heard a Spanish-language radio advertisement for mortgage refinancing, called the number, and spoke in Spanish to arrange refinancing of an existing mortgage. Bloom, a closing agent acting as a representative of IndyMac, conducted the closing at the Tellados’ home. The loan documents, including the notice of the right to cancel, were in English. Oral communications between Bloom and the Tellados, were conducted through the Tellados’ daughter, who served as an interpreter for verbal instructions and Bloom’s explanations of the loan documents. IndyMac subsequently failed and was placed in FDIC receivership. In 2009, the Tellados sent a notice of cancellation under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-7. The district court held that IndyMac had failed to provide proper notice and that the three-day cancellation period had never begun; it ordered refund to the Tellados of all payments, termination of the security interest, and payment of a $10,000 penalty. The Third Circuit reversed; the claim is precluded by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(13)(D) because the claim is predicated upon an act or omission of IndyMac. Tellados failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under FIRREA. View "Tellado v. Indymac Mortg. Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and sought to surrender their home. When Plaintiffs' mortgage lenders (collectively, Beneficial) refused to foreclose or otherwise take title to the residence, Plaintiffs demanded that the mortgage lien be released. After Beneficial also refused to release the mortgage lien, Plaintiffs began an adversary proceeding claiming a discharge injunction violation. The bankruptcy court found Beneficial did not violate the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that because the facts of this case so closely mirrored those in Pratt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the same result should follow. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, holding that the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions were correct and that the court did not err in its judgment. View "Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc." on Justia Law

The Trustee for debtor TRM appealed the dismissal of his adversary action against real estate development companies, alleging that TRM and the development companies engaged in a scheme to sell properties at inflated prices in recently developed subdivisions in North Carolina and South Carolina. The court held that the development companies were potentially independently liable to TRM's purchasers because it participated in TRM's sales and marketing efforts. But, because TRM was not entitled to statutory contribution, the Trustee's action failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Total Realty Mgmt. LLC v. R. A. North Development, Inc." on Justia Law

The IRS assigned a taxpayer identification number to Crystal Cascades, LLC. The company changed its name to Crystal Cascades Civil, LLC (CCC), but did not notify the IRS and continued using the original number. A Nevada bank made loans to CCC and recorded trust deeds. CCC failed to pay employment taxes in 2003 and 2004. The IRS filed tax lien notices in 2004-2005, under the identification number and directed to “Crystal Cascades, LLC.” In 2005 RHB made loans to CCC. The Nevada bank initiated foreclosure. CCC filed under Chapter 11. RHB argued seniority over the tax liens. During foreclosure, RHB purchased the property. Under I.R.C. 7452(d), the IRS may redeem properties against which it has a valid tax lien. The parties negotiated for RHB to pay $100,000; the IRS released its right of redemption. The bankruptcy court concluded that the lien notices did not impart constructive notice to third parties and awarded RHB surplus sale proceeds. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. RHB sought return of the $100,000, asserting that the agreement was void for lack of consideration because the right of redemption was illusory. The Court of Federal Claims held that RHB failed to prove that the IRS acted in bad faith. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Rd. & Hwy. Bldrs., LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Debtor Jennifer Lynn Jackson purchased a horse trailer in 2003 for personal use with the proceeds of a purchase-money loan from Defendant Arvest Bank. The Oklahoma Tax Commission issued a certificate of title for the trailer. The bank filed a UCC-1 financing statement for the collateral in 2003, and a UCC continuation statement in 2008. The central issue to this case was the issuance of title by the Oklahoma Tax Commission to the debtor and the title's implications on the perfection of the bank's security interest in the trailer. That security interest was not recorded on the face of the certificate of title, nor did the bank take steps to record the security interest. The debtor did not request that a title be issued. The manufacturer of the trailer had forwarded a statement of origin to an Oklahoma tag agent, who then issued the title. Susan Manchester, as the trustee of record, sought to avoid the perfected security interest by the bank in the trailer. She asserted that because title was issued and the lien was not noted on the title, the bank did not perfect its security interest and does not have a priority position in the bankruptcy proceeding. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified a question of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: "May a certificate of title for a vehicle issued by the Oklahoma Tax Commission be deemed to have been 'properly issued', within the meaning of OKLA. STAT. tit. 47 section 1110.A.1, even though the vehicle was not one for which a certificate of title is required as proof of ownership under applicable Oklahoma law?" The Supreme Court did not believe that answering the question as formulated by the Bankruptcy Court settled the underlying issue of whether the bank properly perfected its security interest the trailer. The Court reformulated the question to: "Does the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement for a personal/recreational use horse trailer perfect the creditor's security interest where the Oklahoma Tax Commission has issued a discretionary certificate of title, and the creditor is not named on the title?" The Court answered: title may be properly issued by the Oklahoma Tax Commission to non-required trailers for the convenience of showing ownership. The use of title beyond this single purpose for non-required vehicles would be contrary to the general scheme and purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Oklahoma. The proper method for perfecting a security interest in collateral that is not required to be titled (but may be titled at the discretion of the owner) still is, and has been by the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement. View "Manchester v. Arvest Bank" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to decide whether a mortgage lienholder has standing to an agreed judgment between the property owner and the purchaser of the property owner's delinquent property tax liens. The court of appeals determined that the mortgage lienholder in this case (Appellee, Commonwealth Bank & Trust Company) did have standing to contest the agreed judgment between the property owner (Appellee, Teretha Murphy) and the owner of the owner's delinquent property tax liens (Appellant, Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Commonwealth Bank had standing to contest the monetary amount awarded in the agreed judgment. View "Tax Ease Lien Invs. 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank appealed from an order granting the motion of debtor to value U.S. Bank's allowed secured claim pursuant to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, and valuing the claim at $3,500,000. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the order was not final but that U.S. Bank's alternative request to grant leave to appeal it as an interlocutory order should be granted. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel also concluded that low income tax credits that the owner of the property was eligible to claim, as well as the obligations they imposed, did affect the value of the property and should have been considered as part of the property's value. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Lewis & Clark Apartments, et al" on Justia Law

Debtors appealed from the ruling of the bankruptcy court granting summary judgment to SunTrust and denying summary judgment to debtors, on debtors' adversary complaint that challenged SunTrust's standing to enforce a promissory note and deed of trust on debtors' property, and sought to remove the deed of trust from the chain of title to such property. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment and held that the promissory note was a negotiable instrument and that SunTrust was entitled to enforce it and the deed of trust. The bankruptcy court properly used evidence from the affidavit of SunTrust's representative and properly applied judicial estoppel. View "Knigge, et al v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law