Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose when petitioners filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and then sold their farm. Under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, farmer debtors could treat certain claims owed to a governmental unit resulting from the disposition of farm assets as dischargeable, unsecured liabilities. 11 U.S.C. 1222(a). The Court held that federal income tax liability resulting from petitioners' post-petition farm sale was not "incurred by the estate" under 11 U.S.C. 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and thus was neither collectible nor dischargeable in the Chapter 12 plan. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

Debtor appealed an order of the bankruptcy court granting relief from the automatic stay to Bank of the West. At issue was whether the bankruptcy court properly granted relief from the automatic stay to Bank of the West to exercise its rights under state law with respect to real property that it purchased at a foreclosure sale. The court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court where Bank of the West was a "party in interest" under Bankruptcy Code 362(d) and where the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion when it granted relief from the stay to Bank of the West for "cause."

A Trustee was appointed in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The estate included 44 lots, subdivided and zoned for mobile homes. Lot 45 contained an assisted living facility. The lots shared infrastructure and were subject to restrictions, including one prohibiting transfer of lots for construction of residences and requiring that title remain in the developer. GCL purchased Lot 45. The township solicitor agreed and the Bankruptcy Court declared the sale free of the restriction. The Trustee discovered that some residents had affixed mobile homes to the land. To resolve the matter, the Trustee agreed to sell lots to the residents. The trustee and the township entered agreement, abrogating the restriction as to the lots. CGL, not a party to that agreement, alleged that the sales damaged its property interests in Lot 45 and that the agreement deprived CGL of its property rights without notice and without due process of law. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the claims were not frivolous and could be filed in state court. The district court and Third Circuit affirmed. The Barton doctrine, which requires a party seeking to sue a court-appointed receiver, to obtain leave of the appointing court, continues to apply to bankruptcy trustees.

Plaintiff's bank, Firstar, erroneously dishonored her check for her April 2002 monthly mortgage payment to Aames. Firstar issued an "official check" to Aames on April 8, 2002 but also failed to honor that check. Aames notified plaintiff of default on April 20 and assessed a late fee. Firstar ultimately honored her personal check as well as one of two official checks, resulting in two mortgage payments received for the month of April. Plaintiff did not submit a payment for May. Aames sent notice that it had assigned the mortgage to Ocwen, which began dunning plaintiff and her husband, who is not a co-borrower, for the May payment, despite proof of the double payment. No assignment was recorded. Ocwen made endless collection calls, despite cease and desist requests and registry on the federal “Do Not Call” directory; threatened foreclosure; assessed late fees; and reported derogatory information to the credit reporting agencies. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court dismissed, concluding that neither defendant was covered under the Act as neither was a debt collector. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that defendants cannot "have it both ways."

Debtor appealed an order of the Bankruptcy Court directing that a third party receive a portion of a check made payable jointly to the third party and debtor for rent of debtor's property. At issue was whether the third party had a right to funds for rent of debtor's property when the rent check was made payable jointly to debtor and the third party. The court held that the third party had an interest in the funds by virtue of a contract between the parties and, therefore, the third party was entitled to the portions of the funds that the bankruptcy court required debtor to remit to him.

This appeal grew out of an adversary proceeding in debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint against debtor and her husband, claiming that certain money and property belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought turnover to the bankruptcy estate of certain proceedings from the sale of the couple's homestead, a rental property held in the husband's name, and income earned from the rental property. The bankruptcy court rejected all of the trustee's claims and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The court concluded that the proceeds of the homestead sale belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate but that the rental property held in the husband's name and the income did not. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

In 2009, Debtor filed a chapter 13 petition that was dismissed for failure to file a plan or schedules. Two months later, she filed a pro se chapter 7 petition which was dismissed for failure to produce proper documentation. She soon filed another pro se petition, under chapter 11. Debtor is the owner of 10 parcels of real estate from which she earns $5,340.00 per month in rental income, although she asserts that most of the properties are currently vacant. One of her creditors asserted, and the court agreed, that she was using bankruptcy stays to prevent foreclosure and live rent free. In dismissing the petition the court ordered that: "Debtor, or anyone in contractual privity with the Debtor or anyone having or purporting to have a possessory interest in the real property located at… is permanently barred from ever listing said Property or the debt owed to Creditor in a future bankruptcy petition," 11 U.S.C. 105; 362(d)(4). The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice for 180 days and the order granting in rem relief against the specific property, insofar as it applies to Debtor and anyone in contractual privity with the Debtor.

Appellants David and Barbara Moore defaulted on the Note to their mortgage in 2008. U.S. Bank, National Association, commenced foreclosure proceedings later that year, not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee on behalf of GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 (Appellee). According to the verified petition, the Appellee was "the present holder of said Note and Mortgage having received due assignment through mesne assignments of record or conveyance via mortgaging servicing transfer." The original petition did not attach a copy of the note in question sued upon. Appellants answered, pro se in 2009, disputing all allegations and requesting that the Appellee "submit additional documentation to prove [its] claims including the representation that they were the "present holder of said Note." Appellee subsequently filed an amended petition and a second amended petition to add additional defendants. Neither of these amendments included a copy of the note. Appellee submitted its Motion for Summary Judgment to the court, again representing that it was the holder of the Note. Documentation attached to the Motion attempted to support this representation: including the Mortgage, the Note, an Assignment of Mortgage, and an Affidavit in Support of Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the first time, Appellee submitted the Note and Mortgage to the trial court. The note was indorsed in blank and contained no date for the indorsement. Appellants did not respond to Appellee's Motion, and the trial court entered a default judgment against them. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the Appellee. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no evidence in the record establishing that Appellee had standing to commence its foreclosure action: “[t]he trial court's granting of a default judgment in favor of Appellee could not have been rationally based upon the evidence or Oklahoma law.” The Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Debtors appealed from the Bankruptcy Court's Order Granting the Trustee's Motion for Approval of Compromise or Settlement of Controversy, relating to claims that they asserted against the Bank for lender liability and discrimination. Debtors also requested oral argument on appeal. The source of the dispute between the parties was a loan secured by debtors' property, which consisted of their residence and an adjacent commercial lot. The court held that the settlement proposed by the Trustee was within the range of reasonable compromises and the Bankruptcy Court did not err in approving it. The court also held that the facts and legal arguments were adequately represented in the briefs and record and that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.

Debtor appealed the BAP's decision affirming a bankruptcy court order that her homestead was not exempt from the Bank's antecedent debts. The court agreed with the bankruptcy court and the BAP that the plain language of section 561.20 of the Iowa Code limited the "new homestead" exemption to cases where "a new homestead has been acquired with the proceeds of the old." Therefore, the court rejected debtor's contention that there was a conflict in the published bankruptcy court decisions and held that debtor was properly denied a new homestead exemption. The court also held that the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that the homestead was not exempt from the Bank's antecedent debts under section 561.21(A) of the Iowa Code as construed by the Supreme Court of Iowa and in lifting the automatic stay in bankruptcy as to that property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision.