Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Andrew and Kathi Kalnoki (the Kalnokis) appealed a judgment dismissing their second amended complaint for wrongful foreclosure-related causes of action after the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend (case No. C073207, the foreclosure appeal). They separately appealed an order after judgment awarding attorney fees to defendants (case No. C075062, the attorney fees appeal), and an order disbursing funds the Kalnokis deposited with the court under Code of Civil Procedure section 1170.5 to delay the trial in an unlawful detainer action filed against them regarding the residential property at issue here (case No. C079144, the rental disbursement appeal). The Court of Appeal consolidated all three appellate cases for argument and decision. Finding that the Kalnokis failed to allege a cause of action on any theory, the Court affirmed the judgments dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice. The Court also concluded the trial court properly awarded attorney fees. The Court found, however, that the court erred in disbursing to Wells Fargo the rental funds on deposit with the court. The Court therefore reversed the rental disbursement order and order that the funds be returned to the Kalnokis. View "Kalnoki v. First American" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs borrowed $110 million in 2007 from Bear Stearns to finance the purchase of Rincon Towers, a San Francisco apartment complex. In 2010, after plaintiffs failed to repay the loan and after changes in the ownership of the loan, CP III purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued CP III and other entities who were involved in administering the loan, unsuccessful workout negotiations, and the eventual foreclosure sale. The trial court rejected all of their claims. The court of appeal remanded plaintiffs’ legal claims (breach of contract, fraud, slander of title, trade secret misappropriation), finding that the trial court erred in striking their demand for a jury trial, but affirmed as to the equitable claims (unfair competition, to set aside the foreclosure sale, and for an accounting). View "Rincon EV Realty, LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her neighbor for trespass and negligence after the neighbor hired workers to cut down the limbs and branches of six trees located on plaintiff's property. The trial court trebled plaintiff's economic damages but did not apply the multiplier for her damages for annoyance and discomfort. The trial court explained that the use of the term "actual detriment" in Civil Code section 3346 limits the damage multiplier to actual economic damages and does not extend to intangible, noneconomic damages. The court found, however, no such limitation in section 3346 or the plain language of California's other applicable timber trespass statute, Code. Civ. Proc., 733; found no indication that the Legislature intended to limit the availability of annoyance and discomfort damages under these statutes; and concluded that annoyance and discomfort damages are subject to the statutory damage multiplier for trespass to timber. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Fulle v. Kanani" on Justia Law

Plaintiff OC Interior Services, Inc. (OCI) purchased real property knowing about a recorded default judgment in the chain of title that vacated the lien interest of the predecessor-in-interest to appellants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, in Trust for the Harborview Mortgage Loan Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-7 (Deutsche Bank) and Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Nationstar, together appellants). The default judgment was later adjudicated as void. The question presented for the Court of Appeals was whether OCI, a purported bona fide purchaser for value, took title to the property subject to appellants' lien. The trial court found that OCI was a bona fide purchaser for value that took title to the property free of appellants' lien. The Court reversed as the void default judgment was a nullity for all purposes, including as against a purported bona fide purchaser for value. View "OC Interior Services v. Nationstar Mortgage" on Justia Law

Acqua Vista Homeowners Association ("the HOA") sued MWI, Inc. ("MWI"), a supplier of pipe used in the construction of the Acqua Vista condominium development. The operative third amended complaint contained a claim for a violation of Civil Code section 8951 et seq. ("the Act") standards in which the HOA alleged that "[d]efective cast iron pipe manufactured in China [was] used throughout the building." At a pretrial hearing, the HOA explained that it was not pursuing a claim premised on the doctrine of strict liability, only that it was alleging a single cause of action against MWI for violations of the Act's standards. During a jury trial, near the close of evidence, MWI filed a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the HOA failed to present any evidence that MWI had caused a violation of the Act's standards as a result of MWI's negligence or breach of contract, as required. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the HOA was not required to prove that any violations of the Act's standards were caused by MWI's negligence or breach of contract. On appeal, MWI claimed that the trial court misinterpreted the Act and, as a result, erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict and motion for JNOV. After review, the Court of appeal agreed, reversed and remanded for entry of MWI’s directed verdict. View "Acqua Vista Homeowners Assn. v. MWI, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a series of lawsuits challenging Chase's efforts to foreclose upon his real property. In this appeal, plaintiff challenges a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of Chase. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for violation of the Homeowners Bill of Rights, lack of standing to foreclose, illegal substitution of trustee, and fraud. The court also concluded that the trial court properly considered the declaration of Chase's counsel, among other things, before denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Finally, the court explained that principles of res judicata are fatal to the present lawsuit and theoretical future lawsuits seeking to vindicate the same primary right. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gillies v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

From 1980 through 2012, the City of Escondido (City) supplied water through a single water meter to a residential condominium homeowners association, and starting in 2006 billed for sewer services per gallon of water that flowed through that meter. The association used some of that water for its swimming pool and related bathroom facilities, which were connected to the City's sewer system. However, according to the association, upwards of 97 percent of the water was used for irrigating landscape common areas. In 2012 the City determined those landscape areas were not connected to the City's sewer system and at the association's request installed a separate, second water meter to supply water exclusively to that part of the property. The primary issue in this appeal was whether, from 2006 to before the second water meter was installed, the homeowners association was entitled to a refund under Government Code section 53082 of sewer service fees paid for the water used for irrigating the common area landscaping, for which no sewer services were provided. The Court of Appeal concluded section 53082 did not apply because liability for wrongfully collecting sewer service fees under this statute did not depend on a property owner's subjective or particular use of City-supplied water through a single water meter, but rather on whether the premises serviced by that meter are or are not connected to the sewer system. Here, during the period the property was supplied by a single water meter, the premises was, in fact, connected to the City's sewer system. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order denying the association's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Cape Concord Homeowners Assn. v. City of Escondido" on Justia Law

Landlord Beach Break Equities, LLC. (Beach Break) filed an unlawful detainer action against tenant Martin Lowell. The court granted Beach Break's summary judgment motion on the possession issue, and issued a writ of possession (reserving damage issues). Lowell appealed the possession order to the appellate division of the superior court (appellate division). While the appeal was pending, Beach Break evicted Lowell under the authority of the writ of possession. The appellate division reversed the possession order, finding triable issues of fact on the possession issue and remanded for a trial. In so doing, the appellate division expressly ordered that Lowell was entitled to seek restitution for any damages caused by the premature eviction. After the matter was transferred to an unlimited civil department, the trial court ruled Lowell was not entitled to a restitution hearing because he had not filed an affirmative cross-complaint. Over Lowell's objection, Beach Break then dismissed its action and the court entered a final judgment. Lowell appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in denying Lowell's request for a hearing on his restitution claim. Under settled law, Lowell was entitled to a restitution hearing even without filing a cross-complaint. View "Beach Break Equities v. Lowell" on Justia Law

The California Supreme Court's narrow ruling on a borrower's standing to challenge the validity of the chain of assignments involved in the securitization of her loans in "Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp." (62 Cal.4th 919 (2016)) clarified what was the dispositive issue in this appeal, but expressly did not decide how to resolve it. In "Yvanova," the Court held a borrower had standing to allege that an assignment of the promissory note and deed of trust to the foreclosing party is void, not voidable; yet it did not decide whether a post-closing date transfer into a New York securitized trust is void or voidable. New York law, as interpreted by an overwhelming majority of New York, California, and federal courts, however, provided that defects in the securitization of loans can be ratified by the beneficiaries of the trusts established to hold the mortgage-backed securities and, as a result, the assignments are voidable. Following this precedent, the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiff Maria Mendoza did not have standing to challenge the alleged irregularities in the securitization of her loan. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of the second amended complaint for wrongful foreclosure, declaratory relief, and quiet title was affirmed. View "Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs 569 East County Boulevard, LLC, and others filed an action against numerous entities and individuals. Plaintiffs' complaint named Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (BAD) as a defendant and alleged a single cause of action against BAD for unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage. BAD moved to strike the action pursuant to the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. After BAD's anti-SLAPP motion was granted, it sought attorney fees and costs in a total amount of $152,529.15 pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). Plaintiffs did not contest defendant's entitlement to a fees and costs award, but argued the amount sought was exorbitant. The court found BAD was entitled to attorney fees and costs incurred for the successful anti-SLAPP motion, but awarded a reduced amount of $30,752.86. BAD appealed that order, arguing the reduced award was an abuse of discretion. Upon reconsideration after ordering a rehearing in this matter, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "569 East County etc. v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc." on Justia Law