Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Stephen Shapiro was a licensed real estate broker and the principal of plaintiff Westside. Shapiro's friends, James and Eleanor Randall, agreed to have Shapiro represent them in a residential real estate purchase. However, the agreement was never put in writing. The Randalls later worked with their attorney, Richard Meaglia, to buy the $65 million dollar estate Shapiro had originally identified and negotiated offers and counteroffers on. Westside then filed suit against the Randalls for breach of an implied contract and filed suit against Meaglia for intentional interference with an implied contract. Westside sought compensatory damages of $925,000, the same amount as the broker’s fee Meaglia eventually collected. Westside subsequently dismissed its case against Meaglia, and the trial court entered a final judgment dismissing the first amended complaint (FAC) against all defendants. The court concluded that the trial court correctly ruled that the statute of frauds applies to Westside's claim; the FAC alleges no written agreement between Westside and the Randalls; and thus Westside’s claim for its commission is subject to—and barred by—the statute of frauds. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend its claim against the Randalls. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Westside Estate Agency v. Randall" on Justia Law

Howard Rich purchased a single-family residence at an execution sale conducted to satisfy a judgment against Yung-Shen Steven Lee. Rich was a third party purchaser; the plaintiff and judgment creditor was Spyglass Hill Community Association (the HOA), which managed the common interest development of which the residence was a part. After the sale, the trial court granted Lee’s motion to vacate the judgment on the ground it had been obtained by the HOA through fraud. Soon thereafter, the court granted Lee’s motion for restitution and cancelled the sheriff’s deed to Rich. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the order granting Lee’s motion for restitution and cancellation of the sheriff’s deed of sale, finding that Code of Civil Procedure section 701.680(a) unequivocally stated that an execution sale is “absolute and shall not be set aside for any reason.” Because Rich was not the judgment creditor, the remedies available for Lee as the judgment debtor, were recovery of the proceeds of the sale under Code of Civil Procedure section 701.680(b), or to seek equitable redemption. Lee was not entitled to equitable redemption because Rich was not guilty of unfairness, and did not manipulate the system or take undue advantage, and the record showed the property was not sold for a grossly inadequate price. "The record demonstrates, to the contrary, that Lee sought to manipulate the system." View "Lee v. Rich" on Justia Law

The Foundation provides performing arts and social justice programs. Presidio Trust granted the Foundation a lease (through 2013) at below-market rates for Building 1158. The Foundation remodeled at a cost of over $300,000. Building 1158 offered a safe drop-off area for children, adequate parking, and exclusive use of the building. The Foundation’s operational revenues increased from $300,000 in 2007 to $464,000 in 2010. In 2009, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) began to construct a south access to the Golden Gate Bridge, which required the use of property controlled by Presidio Trust. The Trust agreed to deliver specified property—including Building 1158. Caltrans informed the Foundation it would demolish Building 1158. The Foundation began to search for another location; no comparable space was immediately found. The Foundation cancelled its 2010 summer program and its Annual Benefit. It lost students, donors, staff, and partners. The Foundation vacated Building 1158 in 2011. Caltrans paid $107,000 as just compensation for the Foundation‘s lost improvements. Weeks after vacating, the Foundation leased space in Building 386, which costs more, offers less functional space, lacks a safe drop-off zone, has less parking, lacks evening public transportation, shares restrooms with a business, and is an historical building that limits configuration of space. The Foundation sought compensation for loss of goodwill. Caltrans denied the claim and sought declaratory relief. The trial court found that, although the Foundation demonstrated it had goodwill before the taking and lost goodwill due to the taking, it did not prove a calculated “quantitative” loss. The court of appeal reversed, finding that an expert‘s quantification based on a change in cash flow was sufficient for the threshold determination of entitlement to compensation. View "Department of Transportation v. Presidio Performing Arts Foundation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William O. Jamison owned large parcels of land near Sierraville in Sierra County, commonly referred to as Alpers Ranch. Plaintiff grazed cattle on the land for about seven months each year. The trial court enjoined the state Department of Transportation (Caltrans) from removing an obstruction plaintiff placed against a ditch culvert within a state highway right-of-way without an encroachment permit. But after review of this matter, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred in granting the injunction, as no evidence supported an exception to the statutory bar prohibiting injunctions that prevent the execution of a public statute by public officers for public purposes. View "Jamison v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. (UMMP) appealed a trial court judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate, which challenged the City of San Diego's enactment of an ordinance adopting regulations for the establishment and location of medical marijuana consumer cooperatives in the City. UMMP argued that the City did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when enacting the ordinance. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance did not constitute a "project" within the meaning of CEQA, and accordingly the City was not required to conduct an environmental analysis prior to enacting the ordinance. View "Union of Med. Marijuana Patients v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

A horse ran away from a meadow owned by defendants Gregory Nibbelink, Bevlee Nibbelink, Gary D. Nibbelink, Linda A. Nibbelink, Robert G. Goulding, Diane K. Goulding, and Nibbelink Revocable Family Trust (meadow landowners) onto adjacent property known as Strawberry Lodge (Lodge) and trampled plaintiff Yan Wang as she and her husband, plaintiff Tyler Raihala, got out of their car to dine at the Lodge. This appeal involved plaintiffs’ negligence claims against the meadow landowners who invoked Civil Code section 846. In this case of first impression, the Court of Appeals held section 846 paragraph 3(c) shielded landowners from liability where such recreational users of the land cause injury to persons outside the premises who are uninvolved in the recreational use of the land, even where the plaintiffs also allege that the landowners’ neglect of their own property-based duties contributed to the injury. Plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the meadow owners. Plaintiffs had argued: (1) the meadow owners forfeited section 846 by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense in their answer; (2) the statute does not apply to off-premises injury to a person who was not a participant or spectator of the recreational use; (3) even if section 846 applied, triable issues of fact preclude summary judgment; and (4) even if section 846 relieved the landowners from liability for negligence of the recreational users -- Highway 50 Association (HFA) and horse rider Robert Donald Burnley -- in failing to secure the horse, the landowners were liable for their own negligence in failing to ensure adequate secure containment for the event’s horses, failing to build a fence, and failing to warn those nearby who were not participating in the event. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded section 846 applied; no triable issues existed; and plaintiffs failed to show any potential for liability independent of section 846. Accordingly, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the meadow landowners. View "Wang v. Nibbelink" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from the City of San Ramon to build 48 townhouses on two parcels. Because an analysis showed that the cost to the city of providing services to the new development would exceed the revenue generated by the project, the city conditioned its approval on the developer providing a funding mechanism to cover the difference. Using California’s Mello-Roos Act, the developer petitioned the city to create a “community facilities district” and then, as landowner, voted to approve a tax within the district to raise the necessary revenue. Building Industry Association-Bay Area unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the tax. The court of appeal affirmed. The tax will provide “additional services” to meet increased demand for existing services resulting from the townhouse development and meets the requirements of the Mello-Roos Act; the tax is a special (and not a general) tax because it is imposed for specific purposes and not for general governmental purposes, and therefore meets the requirements of the California Constitution; and the property owners’ constitutional and statutory rights are not burdened by an ordinance explaining that the services funded by the special tax will not be provided by the city if the tax is repealed. View "Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of the Bay Area v. City of San Ramon" on Justia Law

Festival Fund guaranteed a loan made to an affiliate in connection with the purchase of a retail property. After default on the loan and a nonjudicial foreclosure, Clover sought to enforce the guaranty. The trial court concluded that the guaranty was unenforceable and found that Festival Fund was protected by antideficiency laws. The court concluded, however, that evidence does not support a conclusion that Festival Fund was a principal obligor on the loan. The court concluded, instead, that Festival Fund itself structured the transaction and determined that its affiliate—a separate legal entity—would take out the loan and take title to the property. Therefore, the trial court erred in applying a sham guaranty defense and entering judgment for Festival Fund. View "LSREF2 Clover Property 4 v. Festival Retail Fund 1" on Justia Law

In February 2014, a jury found defendant Kenneth Davis guilty of two 2010 misdemeanors, diverting the natural course of a stream and petty theft (of water). It also found him guilty of a trespass injuring wood or timber in 2010 in another case (which was consolidated solely for purposes of trial) that involved a road he had bulldozed across neighboring property to his own. The court placed him on a three-year period of informal probation, conditioned on a 90-day jail term. Defendant appealed his conviction of petty theft of water, arguing there could not be a theft in this case as a matter of law because the natural stream at issue was nuisance groundwater that the owner was diverting from its property, and the State of California had only a regulatory interest in use of these public waters that otherwise were not personalty that can be the subject of a larceny. The Court of Appeal agreed that there could not be a simple larceny of uncaptured flowing water. The Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of that count. View "California v. Davis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (landlords), challenged San Francisco Planning Code 317(e)(4) as conflicting with the Ellis Act of 1985, Government Code section 7060, which protects property owners’ right to exit the residential rental business. The ordinance was enacted in 2013 in response to a growing concern by the Board of Supervisors (and others) about the shortage of affordable local housing and rental properties. Under section 317(e)(4), certain residential property owners (those undertaking no-fault evictions) including “Ellis Act evictions” were subject to a 10-year waiting period after withdrawing a rental unit from the market before qualifying to apply for approval to merge the withdrawn unit into one or more other units. The trial court found that the ordinance impermissibly penalized property owners for exercising their rights under the Ellis Act and was facially void on preemption grounds. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Section 317(e)(4) is preempted by the Ellis Act to the extent it requires a landlord effectuating a no-fault eviction to wait 10 years before applying for a permit to undertake a residential merger on the property. View "San Francisco Apartment Ass'n v. City & Cnty.. of San Francisco" on Justia Law