Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The case arose out of a dispute over the reasonableness of the level of noise generated during outdoor festivities held at the Rancho Valencia Resort (the Resort). Plaintiffs, who shared a property line with the Resort, became frustrated with the noise emanating from the Resort when it hosted outdoor events on a lawn created for that purpose. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the Resort's outdoor events constituted a private nuisance, and sought to enjoin the Resort from continuing to create noise that would travel onto plaintiffs' property and disturb them there. The trial court appreciated the difficulties inherent in this situation, but after a trial on the merits, concluded that the Resort's outdoor events did not amount to a private nuisance. Despite plaintiffs' contentions that the trial court failed to properly address purported violations of various San Diego County ordinances, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiffs have demonstrated no reversible error in the trial court's decision. View "Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a borrower of a home loan, filed suit against lending banks, seeking an injunction to prevent a foreclosure. The trial court sustained the lenders’ demurrers and entered a judgment of dismissal. The court held that the availability of injunctive relief under the 2013 Homeowner's Bill of Rights (HBOR) is governed exclusively by its two provisions - Civil Code, sections 2924.12, subdivision (a)(1) and 2924.19, subdivision (a)(1) - in which the Legislature authorized the courts to interpose such relief into the nonjudicial foreclosure scheme. Neither provision authorizes a court to enjoin a violation of section 2924(a)(6). Thus, no injunctive relief is available for a violation of that section. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show a reasonable possibility of amending his complaint to plead any of the grounds for injunctive relief that the HBOR authorizes. The court also affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining without leave to amend a demurrer to a separate breach of contract cause of action. View "Lucioni v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

In 1975, TNMC purchased property in Cazadero, for use as a monastery and retreat center, including the printing of sacred Buddhist texts in the Tibetan language for shipment to Asia and free distribution to Buddhist practitioners whose libraries have been destroyed by Chinese authorities. In 1983, the county approved a conditional use permit for Timberhill, a Cazadero resort within an area designated as Resources and Rural Development in the county’s general plan. Timberhill’s permit allowed construction of a lodge, a dining room, and 15 guest cabins. In 2000, the county adopted a mitigated negative declaration (MND), allowing five additional cabins, a new dining room and other guest facilities, and 10 staff dwelling units. In 2004, TNMC purchased Timberhill and designated it as the Ratna Ling Retreat Center. The county adopted an MND in lieu of a formal environmental impact report, approving a third master use permit for expansion of the Center. Opponents filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act, maintaining that an EIR was required because the proposed project greatly expands an existing printing operation and that the approval violated the general plan and zoning provisions. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the arguments, finding that the approvals did not constitute spot zoning and that the county imposed adequate mitigation measures. View "Coastal Hills Rural Pres. v. County of Sonoma" on Justia Law

The Permanente Quarry is a 3,510-acre surface mining operation, producing limestone and aggregate for the manufacture of cement, in unincorporated Santa Clara County. The Quarry has been in existence since 1903. The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors conducted a review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code section 21000, certified an environmental impact report, and, in 2012, approved a reclamation plan amendment for closing and reclaiming the Quarry’s mining operations over a 20-year period. Opponents challenged the approval, asserting claims under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (SMARA), Pub. Resources Code section 2710, and CEQA. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed the approval, upholding a determination that the reclamation plan amendment satisfied SMARA’s regulatory standards for water quality and wildlife habitat. Statements by the Office of Mining Reclamation were properly considered by the county and provided substantial evidence to support the county’s findings. The county’s findings regarding the direct and indirect environmental impacts from the reclamation plan amendment were sufficient under CEQA. View "Bay Area Clean Env't, Inc. v. Santa Clara Co" on Justia Law

Schellinger planned commercial development of a large Sebastopol tract that it had agreed to purchase from Cotter. Certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) was stalled for five years. In the first lawsuit, the court of appeal rejected Schellinger’s contention that CEQA section 21151.1 imposed a mandatory deadline of one year for EIR approval of an EIR and noted that a significant portion of the delay was attributable to Schellinger’s changes to its proposal. Cotter then sued Schellinger for breach of the contract, arguing that the prior litigation established that Schellinger took an unreasonably long time to secure approval. The trial court rejected that argument, but fixed a date by which Schellinger must secure final approval. The court of appeal affirmed. Schellinger then sued Cotter for breaching the contract and obtained a $2,855,431.77 judgment, plus costs and attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that Cotter committed a breach of contract “animated by egregious bad faith” after failing to obtain relief in prior litigation, by undermining Schellinger’s efforts to obtain approval and by Cotter’s management of the property and efforts to transfer the property to others. View "Schellinger Bros. v. Cotter" on Justia Law

Appellant Danilo Sese sought to challenge an order denying his motion for interim attorney fees under Civil Code section 2924.12 after he secured a preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale of his residential real property. The trial court denied the motion on grounds section 2924.12, subdivision (i) did not provide for interim attorney fees. Sese argued on appeal that the order should have been reversed because section 2924.12 provided attorney fees to a borrower immediately after successfully obtaining a preliminary injunction. Respondent Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo) argued the appeal should have been dismissed because the trial court’s order was interlocutory in nature and nonappealable under the one final judgment rule. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s order was nonappealable because it was interlocutory in nature. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Sese v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

At the center of this appeal was a dispute over the ownership of certain real property between appellant Scott Walters, as the administrator of his father Randy Walters' estate and Randy's former girlfriend, respondent Valerie Boosinger. A 2003 deed named Randy and Boosinger as owners in joint tenancy of the Property. Upon Randy's death in 2013, Boosinger claimed sole ownership of the Property as the surviving joint tenant. Scott brought a quiet title claim premised on the theory that the grant deed was void ab initio. The Court of Appeal rejected Scott's claim on appeal that such a claim could be brought "at any time." Instead, the Court concluded that the claim was subject to a statute of limitation and that Scott failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that his quiet title cause of action was time barred. Scott also contended that he properly stated a claim for quiet title premised on the alternative theory that Randy and Boosinger severed their joint tenancy in the Property prior to Randy's death. As to this contention, the Court of Appeal concluded that Scott failed to sufficiently allege facts demonstrating such severance and that he did not demonstrate that he could amend his complaint to properly allege a severance of the joint tenancy. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Scott did not properly state a quiet title claim pursuant to this alternative theory either. View "Walters v. Boosinger" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Thomas and Lynn Hazelbaker owned a condominium in the Rancho Mirage Country Club development. Defendants made improvements to an exterior patio, which plaintiff-respondent Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association contended were in violation of the applicable covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). The parties mediated the dispute pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, the results of which were memorialized in a written agreement. Subsequently, the Association filed this suit alleging that defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the mediation agreement to modify the property in certain ways. While the lawsuit was pending, defendants made modifications to the patio to the satisfaction of the Association. Nevertheless, the parties could not reach agreement regarding attorney fees, which the Association asserted it was entitled to receive as the prevailing party. The Association filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, seeking an award of $31,970 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. The trial court granted the motion in part, awarding the Association $18,991 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. Defendants argued on appeal that the trial court’s award, as well as its subsequent denial of a motion to reconsider the issue, was erroneous in various respects. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award. View "Rancho Mirage Country Club HOA v. Hazelbaker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his lender, Impac, and others, alleging causes of action arising from the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of his residence. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer to the entire pleading without leave to amend, and thereafter entered a judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that plaintiff offered no citation to federal or California authority (other than Glaski v. Bank of America, which the court declined to follow) to support his assertion that a 2009 assignment is void because it was made after the ISA Trust’s closing date; plaintiff has the burden to prove that the nonjudicial foreclosure was wrongful; even if language in the deed of trust might have provided plaintiff with standing to assert a defense to prevent a foreclosure, it does not help him in this instance; the problem with plaintiff's claims is not that the deed of trust precludes him from alleging an invalid assignment, but that he has not sufficiently alleged an invalid assignment; and, because he has not alleged sufficient facts to establish that critical allegation, the proposed new cause of action would also fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Yhudai v. Impac Funding Corp." on Justia Law

In 2007, Naifeh and Ristic obtained a loan from WaMu for San Francisco property. WaMu provided a disclosure of the loan terms as required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA, 15 U.S.C. 1601). After the borrowers defaulted, Naifeh sent letters, asserting that she and Ristic were rescinding the loan under “Regulation Z” (12 C.F.R. 226.33(b)) based on TILA disclosure deficiencies. A month before the scheduled foreclosure sale Naifeh caused several documents to be recorded with the county, purporting to show she owed nothing on the loan. Naifeh was present at the trustee’s sale, distributing notices representing that the trustee knew there were contrary claims to title. No one bid. A Trustee’s Deed was recorded, granting title to BofA. Naifeh continued to record documents. BofA filed suit, seeking cancellation of instruments and quiet title. The trial court held that Naifeh’s notice of rescission was insufficient. Because of a decision subsequently issued by the U.S. Supreme Court, the court of appeal vacated and remanded for adjudication of the rescission defense. A borrower may rescind the loan transaction under TILA without filing suit, but when the rescission is challenged, a court may decide whether the notice was timely and whether the TILA procedure should be modified in light of particular circumstances. View "U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as Tr. v. Naifeh" on Justia Law