Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Danielses obtained a $650,000 adjustable rate loan secured by a deed of trust on their Santa Cruz residence. When their interest rate adjusted upward, they spent years in unsuccessful attempts to obtain a loan modification from their then-loan servicer, Bank of America (BofA). In the process, they fell behind on their loan payments, allegedly at the behest of BofA. They sued BofA and several other entities to prevent a non-judicial foreclosure sale of their home and to collect monetary damages. The trial court dismissed without leave to amend. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, holding that: when a lender acquires by assignment a loan being administered by a loan servicer, the lender may be liable to the borrower for misrepresentations made by the loan servicer, as the lender‟s agent, after that assignment; and, a loan servicer may owe a duty of care to a borrower through application of the “Biakanja” factors, even though its involvement in the loan does not exceed its conventional role. View "Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

The Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Association sought to impose fines and related fees of $19,979.97 on the Carsons for alleged rule violations related to the Carsons’ use of their properties as short-term vacation rentals. The Carsons cross-complained for breach of contract, private nuisance, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The Carsons had engaged in short-term rental for many years and believed that they were exempt from new regulations and enforcement efforts. The court ruled against the Carsons on their cross-complaint but also rejected many of the fines as unreasonable. The court upheld fines pertaining to the use of Almanor’s boat slips and ordered the Carsons to pay $6,620.00 in damages. The court determined Almanor to be the prevailing party and awarded $101,803.15 in attorney’s fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the award of attorney’s fees, compared to the “overall relief obtained” by Almanor, was not so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion. View "Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Ass'n. v. Carson" on Justia Law

Appellant C. Tucker Cheadle, as administrator of the estate of Robert F. Obarr, appealed an order denying his motion to disqualify counsel for respondent DP Pham LLC. Pham made three loans to Obarr totaling nearly $3 million, and Obarr secured each loan by granting Pham a lien on a mobilehome park he owned in Westminster (Property). This action arose when Obarr allegedly agreed to sell the Property to two different buyers. In March 2013, Obarr allegedly contracted to sell the Property to S.C.D. Enterprises (SCD). SCD promptly assigned the purchase agreement to Westminster MHP Associates, LP (Westminster), which allegedly opened escrow on the Property with Obarr. According to Westminster, it satisfied all contingencies for the sale within 10 days of opening escrow. In April 2013, Westminster filed suit alleging contract claims against Obarr. Obarr died unexpectedly in August. The trial court appointed Cheadle as a special administrator for Obarr’s estate and in that capacity substituted Cheadle for Obarr as a party to this action. Cheadle then filed a cross-complaint alleging an interpleader claim against both Westminster and Pham concerning the Property. Based on Pham’s loans to Obarr, Cheadle also alleged claims against Pham for usury, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, money had and received, unjust enrichment, reformation, and violation of the unfair competition law. Cheadle contended disqualification was required because Pham’s counsel improperly obtained copies of privileged communications between Obarr and his attorney, and used those communications to oppose another party’s summary judgment motion in this case. The trial court denied the disqualification motion because it concluded the communications were not privileged. The Court of Appeal reversed. After reviewing copies of the communications, the trial court concluded they were not privileged based on their content. "A court, however, may not review the contents of a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects that communication. The attorney-client privilege is an absolute privilege that prevents disclosure, no matter how necessary or relevant to the lawsuit. The privilege attaches to all confidential communications between an attorney and a client regardless of whether the information communicated is in fact privileged. Accordingly, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to review a communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects it." View "DP Pham v. Cheadle" on Justia Law

In 2005, Crossroads Investors, L.P. borrowed $9 million subject to a promissory note. The note was secured by a deed of trust recorded against an apartment building Crossroads owned in Woodland. Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was the beneficiary of the deed. The note imposed on Crossroads a prepayment premium should Crossroads pay the unpaid principal before the note’s maturity date or should Crossroads default and Fannie Mae accelerate the loan. Crossroads defaulted on the note in late 2010. Fannie Mae served Crossroads with a notice of default, and accelerated the loan. In February 2011, Fannie Mae initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In April 2011, Crossroads entered into a contract to sell the property to Ezralow Company, LLC (Ezralow) for $10.95 million. A few weeks later, Crossroads and Ezralow proposed to Fannie Mae that Ezralow would assume Crossroads’ obligations and pay off the loan on Fannie Mae’s agreeing to waive the prepayment premium. Fannie Mae refused to waive the prepayment premium and rejected the proposal. By June, Fannie Mae recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property, stating the total unpaid amount of Crossroad’s obligations was estimated at more than $10.5 million. The day before the property was scheduled to be sold, Crossroads filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to protect its interest in the property. In its petition, Crossroads asserted it owed Fannie Mae $8.7 million. Fannie Mae sold the property after it was granted relief from the bankruptcy stay. Crossroads then sued Fannie Mae for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract actions. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint were Fannie Mae’s statements in its papers filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of Fannie Mae's special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. "The principal thrust of Crossroads’ action was to recover for violations of state nonjudicial foreclosure law, not for any exercise of speech or petition rights by Fannie Mae. Even if protected activity was not merely incidental to the unprotected activity, Crossroads established a prima facie case showing it was likely to succeed on its causes of action." View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law

In 2005, Crossroads Investors, L.P. borrowed $9 million subject to a promissory note. The note was secured by a deed of trust recorded against an apartment building Crossroads owned in Woodland. Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was the beneficiary of the deed. The note imposed on Crossroads a prepayment premium should Crossroads pay the unpaid principal before the note’s maturity date or should Crossroads default and Fannie Mae accelerate the loan. Crossroads defaulted on the note in late 2010. Fannie Mae served Crossroads with a notice of default, and accelerated the loan. In February 2011, Fannie Mae initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. In April 2011, Crossroads entered into a contract to sell the property to Ezralow Company, LLC (Ezralow) for $10.95 million. A few weeks later, Crossroads and Ezralow proposed to Fannie Mae that Ezralow would assume Crossroads’ obligations and pay off the loan on Fannie Mae’s agreeing to waive the prepayment premium. Fannie Mae refused to waive the prepayment premium and rejected the proposal. By June, Fannie Mae recorded a notice of trustee’s sale against the property, stating the total unpaid amount of Crossroad’s obligations was estimated at more than $10.5 million. The day before the property was scheduled to be sold, Crossroads filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to protect its interest in the property. In its petition, Crossroads asserted it owed Fannie Mae $8.7 million. Fannie Mae sold the property after it was granted relief from the bankruptcy stay. Crossroads then sued Fannie Mae for wrongful foreclosure, breach of contract, fraud, and other tort and contract actions. Fannie Mae filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending the actions on which Crossroads based its complaint were Fannie Mae’s statements in its papers filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. This appeal challenged the trial court’s denial of Fannie Mae's special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. "The principal thrust of Crossroads’ action was to recover for violations of state nonjudicial foreclosure law, not for any exercise of speech or petition rights by Fannie Mae. Even if protected activity was not merely incidental to the unprotected activity, Crossroads established a prima facie case showing it was likely to succeed on its causes of action." View "Crossroads Investors v. Federal National Mortgage Assn." on Justia Law

The issue at the heart of this dispute concerned the ownership of property formerly owned by decedent Kenneth Liebler. Liebler's daughter, appellant Melanie Carne (as putative successor trustee to the Kenneth Liebler Irrevocable Trust dated December 21, 2009 (the "2009 Trust")), filed a second amended petition to confirm the validity of the 2009 Trust, Carne's status as successor trustee of the 2009 Trust, and the assets of the 2009 Trust. In her petition, Carne sought to confirm that certain real property previously owned by Liebler ("the Via Regla property"), had been properly transferred to the 2009 Trust. Liebler's grandson, defendant-respondent Dillon Hasting, filed an opposition to the petition. Hasting was a beneficiary of the Liebler Revocable Declaration of Trust dated February 27, 1985 (the "1985 Trust"). In his opposition, Hasting contended that the 2009 Trust was not a valid trust because Liebler had not properly transferred title to the only asset allegedly in the 2009 Trust, the Via Regla Property. In support of this contention, Hasting noted that Liebler held legal title to the Via Regla Property as trustee of the 1985 Trust, and the 2009 Trust contained no language indicating that Liebler was acting as the trustee of the 1985 Trust at the time of the purported transfer to the 2009 Trust. The trial court entered an order denying Carne's petition for the two reasons set out in Hasting's opposition. On appeal, Carne argued the trial court erred in denying her petition. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the language in the 2009 Trust was sufficient to convey the Via Regla Property to the 2009 Trust and that Liebler was not required to execute a separate deed in order to effectuate such conveyance. Furthermore, the Court concluded that, because at the time the 2009 Trust was created, the 1985 Trust was a revocable inter vivos trust, and Liebler was the sole trustee who owned no interest in the Via Regla Property as an individual, Liebler's signature on the 2009 Trust was sufficient to "to convey good title" to the Via Regla Property from the 1985 Trust to the 2009 Trust. View "Carne v. Worthington" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over property that belonged to the Diocese before its disaffiliation with the Episcopal Church. The trial court ruled in favor of the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of San Joaquin, the Diocese, and the Episcopal Church (Plaintiffs). Kevin Gunner, as administrator of the estate of John-David Schofield, the former Protestant Episcopal Bishop of San Joaquin, and the Anglican Diocese Holding Corporation (Defendants) argued that the trial court erred by misconstruing an earlier decision by this court, Schofield v. Superior Court, and failing to apply neutral principles of law. The court concluded that the Episcopal Church is not collaterally estopped by the Illinois court’s opinion in Diocese of Quincy v. Episcopal Church; the trial court erred by not applying neutral principles of law to the property dispute as directed by Schofield; and, applying neutral principles of law, the court concluded that Schofield's property transfers were invalid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment returning the property to the Episcopal Church and the Diocese. View "Diocese of San Joaquin v. Gunner" on Justia Law

Alana, three years old, was camping with her family in Portola Redwoods State Park when a tree fell on their tent and hit her head, resulting in brain damage. Alana sued. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the state. The court of appeal affirmed, citing Government Code section 831.2, which provides no public entity “is liable for an injury caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public property.” The tree that caused her injury was a “natural condition” and the tree was on “unimproved public property.” Improvement of a portion of a park area does not remove the immunity from the unimproved areas. The nearest man-made object to the tree before it fell was a picnic table at Campsite 42, which was about 30 feet away. There is no evidence of any artificial physical change in the condition of the tree that injured Alana or of the land within 24 feet of the tree. Nor is there any evidence suggesting artificial improvements or human conduct contributed to the danger of the tree. View "Alana M. v. State of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and proposed class representatives Jeffrey Schermer, David Moravee, Tom Fisher, Janice Wenhold, Karen Vielma, Gloria Carruthers and George Rivera (collectively plaintiffs) appealed an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend to the class allegations in four of their causes of action in their second amended complaint (SAC). Plaintiffs' SAC involved 18 mobilehome parks allegedly owned and/or operated by defendants Thomas Tatum (Tatum) and Jeffrey Kaplan (Kaplan), which plaintiffs alleged were managed through defendant Mobile Community Management Company (MCM). Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of residents who live in the 18 mobilehome parks, alleging they were subjected to uniform unconscionable lease agreements and leasing practices by defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court prematurely dismissed their class allegations because their operative complaint adequately pleaded "a community of interest with typical class representatives and predominately common questions of law and fact" with respect to their four causes of action; and that in so doing, the court improperly assessed its action "on the merits and failed to properly credit [p]laintiffs' unambiguous allegations, which were supported by the actual form lease agreements attached to the [SAC]." After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, concluding the trial court properly sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the class allegations in each of the four causes of action at issue, when it found there was no reasonable possibility plaintiffs could satisfy the community of interest requirement for class certification. View "Schermer v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and proposed class representatives Jeffrey Schermer, David Moravee, Tom Fisher, Janice Wenhold, Karen Vielma, Gloria Carruthers and George Rivera (collectively plaintiffs) appealed an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend to the class allegations in four of their causes of action in their second amended complaint (SAC). Plaintiffs' SAC involved 18 mobilehome parks allegedly owned and/or operated by defendants Thomas Tatum (Tatum) and Jeffrey Kaplan (Kaplan), which plaintiffs alleged were managed through defendant Mobile Community Management Company (MCM). Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of residents who live in the 18 mobilehome parks, alleging they were subjected to uniform unconscionable lease agreements and leasing practices by defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court prematurely dismissed their class allegations because their operative complaint adequately pleaded "a community of interest with typical class representatives and predominately common questions of law and fact" with respect to their four causes of action; and that in so doing, the court improperly assessed its action "on the merits and failed to properly credit [p]laintiffs' unambiguous allegations, which were supported by the actual form lease agreements attached to the [SAC]." After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, concluding the trial court properly sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the class allegations in each of the four causes of action at issue, when it found there was no reasonable possibility plaintiffs could satisfy the community of interest requirement for class certification. View "Schermer v. Tatum" on Justia Law