Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Laura Saterbak appealed the dismissal of her first amended complaint (FAC) after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. Saterbak claimed the assignment of the deed of trust (DOT) to her home by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) to Structured Asset Mortgage Investment II Trust 2007-AR7 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 2007-AR7 was invalid. Arguing the assignment occurred after the closing date for the 2007-AR7 trust, and that the signature on the instrument was forged or robo-signed, she sought to cancel the assignment and obtain declaratory relief. At the time of the foreclosure, Saterbak owed approximately $1.6 million. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Saterbak lacked standing and affirm the judgment. View "Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase" on Justia Law

In 1982, the Salazars purchased 10 rural acres near Covelo, containing only a cabin. They resided in San Francisco and visited the property. Defendant purchased an adjoining 20-acre property in 2007 after aggressively trying to buy the Salazar property, which has a water source above flat land, so that gravity can move the water. Defendant’s hilly land has no water. In 2010, Salazar discovered work near the property line. He hired a surveyor, who noted a road, built on the Salazar property, with a gated fence and water tanks. Areas had been cleared and culverts constructed, with pipes extending up the hill, and a marijuana garden on the Salazar property. Salazar and the survey crew encountered defendant, who was carrying a sidearm. Defendant offered Salazar $50,000 and a land swap to resolve the matter, but changed his mind. After additional excavation and tree removal on the Salazar property, a CalFire manager issued a notice of violation to defendant for illegal timberland conversion. The Salazars sued. The court of appeal affirmed an award of $39,600 for encroachment; a trebled award of damages for intentional tree removal ($202,500); an order that defendant remove the fencing, irrigation lines, culverts and implement erosion control measures; an order restraining him from coming within 100 yards of any Salazar; and an award of surveying fees. View "Salazar v. Matejcek" on Justia Law

The City of Poway (Poway) was known as the "City in the Country." Harry Rogers had operated a horse boarding facility called the Stock Farm in Poway, but he decided to close the Stock Farm and build 12 homes in its place (the Project). Having the Stock Farm close down impacted members of the Poway Valley Riders Association (PVRA), whose 12-acre rodeo, polo, and other grounds were across the street from the Stock Farm. Over the objections of the PVRA and others, Poway's city council voted unanimously to approve the Project under a mitigated negative declaration (MND). Subsequently, project opponents formed Preserve Poway (Preserve) and instituted this litigation, asserting the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) required an environmental impact report (EIR) to be prepared instead of an MND. The trial court ruled an EIR was necessary because there was substantial evidence that the Project's elimination of the Stock Farm may have a significant impact on Poway's horse-friendly "community character" as the "City in the Country." The Court of Appeal reduced the real issue in this case to not what was proposed to be going in (homes with private horse boarding), but what was coming out (the Stock Farm, public horse boarding). Project opponents contended that because Rogers obtained a conditional use permit to operate horse stables they have enjoyed using for 20 years, the public had a right under CEQA to prevent Rogers from making some other lawful use of his land. "Whether the Project should be approved is a political and policy decision entrusted to Poway's elected officials. It is not an environmental issue for courts under CEQA." The trial court's judgment was reversed insofar as the judgment granted as to an issue of community character. The judgment was also reversed insofar as the judgment directed the City of Poway to "set aside its adoption of the Mitigated Negative Declaration for the Tierra Bonita Subdivision Project located on Tierra Bonita Road in the City of Poway ('Project')"; "set aside its approval of Tentative Tract Map 12-002 for the Project"; and "not issue any permits for the subject property that rely upon the Mitigated Negative Declaration or Tentative Tract Map for the Project." Additionally, the judgment was reversed to the extent the judgment provided that the trial court "retain[ed] jurisdiction over the proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ of mandate until the court has determined the City of Poway has complied with the provisions of CEQA." The trial court was directed to enter a new judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate as to community character. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Preserve Poway v. City of Poway" on Justia Law

In this unlawful detainer action, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs, Jon and Kimberly Taylor, owners of real property located in Auburn, and against defendant Nu Digital Marketing, Inc., that acquired possession of the property through an agreement titled, “Contract of Sale Residential Property,” but that the trial court found to be a lease notwithstanding the title. Defendant appealed, contending plaintiffs' complaint did not state a cause of action for unlawful detainer because the agreement was a contract of sale, and a defaulting buyer in possession of property under such a contract is not subject to removal by the summary method of unlawful detainer. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the agreement was both a lease and a contract of sale, but because possession was achieved through the lease terms of the agreement, unlawful detainer was properly used to regain possession. View "Taylor v. Nu Digital Marketing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jon Ellis appealed the dismissal of his suit against County of Calaveras, the Assessment Appeals Board for the County of Calaveras (the AAB), the Assessor for the County of Calaveras (the assessor), and the Auditor-Controller for the County of Calaveras (the auditor-controller) to Ellis’s petition and complaint relating to property taxes assessed against his real property. Ellis owned real property in Calaveras County on which he was constructing a large detached garage. In 2009, he was assessed property taxes based on an appraised value of the garage set by the assessor at $140,000 (90 percent of the estimated total cost of construction of $156,800). Ellis sought a reduction of the assessment from the AAB. The AAB reduced the value of the garage to $117,600, based on a finding that construction was only 75 percent complete. In February 2011, Ellis contested that finding by seeking writ relief from the trial court, but the parties reached a settlement before the trial court ruled on the merits. In 2010, Ellis was assessed property taxes based on the partially constructed garage having a “ ‘base year value’ ” in 2010 of $117, 600. In light of this assessment, in December 2011, after he had received a property tax assessment as of the 2011 lien date, Ellis sought a writ to enforce the settlement agreement. When his attempts to enforce the settlement agreement failed, Ellis filed an application with the AAB to reduce the assessment for his 2010 property taxes. He designated the application, which was filed November 29, 2012, as a claim for a tax refund, and he indicated his challenge was premised on the base year value being incorrect and there having been no new construction as of the 2010 lien date. By the time Ellis filed his application, construction of the garage had been deemed complete and a supplemental assessment had been issued. He also received a regular assessment as of the 2012 lien date. In July 2013, the AAB heard Ellis’s appeal of his 2010 tax assessment and determined Ellis’s appeal was not timely filed, and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. In March 2014, Ellis petitioned the trial court seeking a traditional or administrative writ of mandate, refund of his property taxes, and declaratory relief. The trial court found that Ellis had not exhausted his administrative remedies, he had an adequate remedy at law, and that to the extent the pleading could be construed as a complaint, it was barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because the trial court’s previous denial of Ellis’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement “amounted to a determination of the merits of the same legal arguments raised [here.]” Therefore, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and subsequently entered a judgment of dismissal. Ellis appealed that judgment, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Ellis v. County of Calaveras" on Justia Law

Picerne Construction Corp. agreed to build an apartment complex for Castellino Villas. After construction started, Castellino refinanced the property, replacing the original lender with Bank of the West. Picerne subsequently claimed money due, recorded a mechanic’s lien, and brought this action against Castellino and Bank of the West to foreclose on the lien. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Picerne. Castellino argued on appeal: (1) Picerne did not have a valid mechanic’s lien because it did not record its claim within 90 days after substantial completion of the project; (2) the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevented Picerne from taking contrary positions at arbitration and at trial; (3) Picerne did not timely record a claim of mechanic’s lien as to nine distinct buildings within the project; and (4) the trial court erred in calculating the amount of the lien. Bank of the West agreed that Picerne failed to timely record its claim of mechanic’s lien. In addition, Bank of the West contends (5) that Picerne’s complaint against it is time-barred because Picerne did not name Bank of the West as a defendant in the original complaint even though it was aware of facts indicating it had a claim against the bank. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Picerne timely recorded its mechanic’s lien; (2) Castellino failed to demonstrate the applicability of judicial estoppel; (3) the property constituted one residential unit; (4) the trial court overstated the principal sum due and failed to subtract the $115,453.50 setoff from the principal sum, but the other claims of error with regard to the lien amount have no merit; and (5) the action against Bank of the West was not time-barred because Picerne timely substituted Bank of the West in place of a Doe defendant when Picerne learned of the bank’s interest in the property. The Court modified the judgment to provide that the mechanic’s lien was in the amount of $2,416,855.06 and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Picerne Construction v. Castellino Villas" on Justia Law

The Orcillas are Filipino and English is their second language. Virgilio is unable to work due to a medical condition. In 2006, in response to marketing materials, Teodora contacted Quick Loan and applied to refinance their San Jose home for $525,000. At the Quick Loan agent’s recommendation, Teodora did not include Virgilio on the loan application. Teodora told the agent she could not afford the loan modification because the monthly payments would be more than her monthly income, but eventually accepted the agent’s false representation that she could afford the loan modification. After two notices of default (allegedly “robo-signed”) and attempts to obtain loan modification, they lost the property through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in 2010. The Orcillas and their three minor grandchildren were forced to vacate. The California Department of Corporations revoked Quick Loan’s lending license. The Orcillas allege Quick Loan never assigned the Note or its interest in the Deed of Trust and filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure and various statutory violations. The court of appeal reversed, in part, the dismissal of their complaint. The Orcillas alleged an actionable unlawful or unfair business practice by the defendants as well as standing to assert an unfair competition claim. View "Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc." on Justia Law

On March 28, 2014, real party in interest PCH Enterprises, Inc. sued defendants Sallie Cribley-Cole and Anna Gonzalez for breach of contract, specific performance, and declaratory relief. It alleged defendants failed to perform on a written agreement to sell a certain parcel of real property to PCH. PCH recorded a lis pendens on the same day it filed the complaint. No proof of service accompanied the lis pendens. Petitioner Rey Sanchez Investments sought to intervene, claiming it was the true owner of the property pursuant to a grant deed recorded April 2, 2014. Petitioner moved to expunge the lis pendens on grounds that there were technical defects in the service. PCH offered a proof of service that the lis pendens was personally served on Cribley-Cole in November 2014. The trial court denied the motion to expunge. On appeal, petitioner argued the lis pendens was completely void and subject to expungement because service was improper. The Court of Appeal agreed service was improper and reversed the trial court's judgment by way of a writ of mandate. View "Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In an inverse condemnation action, the issue facing the Court of Appeal was a unique situation, where a state agency assumed control of a local flood control process, and it determined to provide less flood protection than historically provided by a local agency in order to protect environmental resources. Plaintiffs, whose properties suffered flooding damage when the lagoon level rose above eight feet msl, filed this action in 2007 for inverse condemnation. They alleged they suffered a physical taking from the Department’s actions, and a regulatory taking by the Commission retaining land use jurisdiction over the subdivision throughout this time instead of transferring it to the County. Plaintiffs also sought precondemnation damages and statutory attorney fees. The trial court found the Department and the Commission (collectively, the State) liable for a physical taking and awarded damages, but it concluded plaintiffs’ claim for a regulatory taking was barred. It rejected the State’s arguments that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ complaint. It awarded plaintiffs attorney fees in the amount they incurred under a contingency agreement, but it denied plaintiffs any precondemnation damages. Both the State and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding the state agency liable in inverse condemnation for a physical taking of plaintiffs’ properties, and not liable for a regulatory taking. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent the court found another state permitting agency liable in inverse condemnation. View "Pacific Shores v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged defendants (Bank of America, Wells Fargo Bank, Citibank and the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)) wrongfully foreclosed on his home. The trial court sustained a demurrer to a third amended complaint and entered a judgment of dismissal. On appeal, plaintiff contended the foreclosure was wrongful because irregularities in the securitization of his mortgage deprived defendants of authority to foreclose, and because the foreclosure occurred while the loan servicer was reviewing his loan for a modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). The Court of Appeal agreed with the latter contention, and reversed as to plaintiff’s cause of action against the loan servicer for violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (UCL). The Court also reversed some of the orders denying leave to amend. The Court concluded that plaintiff has otherwise stated a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, provided the party conducting the foreclosure sale was an agent of the loan servicer. Plaintiff should be given leave to amend to allege that agency relationship, if true. Finally, plaintiff has otherwise stated a cause of action for cancellation of the trustee’s deed upon sale, but has failed to join the foreclosing trust deed beneficiary as a defendant. The foreclosing beneficiary, who allegedly purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, was an indispensable party. Provided the property is still owned of record by the foreclosing beneficiary, and not by a bona fide purchaser for value, plaintiff should be given leave to amend to add the foreclosing beneficiary as a party to the cause of action for cancellation of instruments. In all other respects the judgment was affirmed. View "Majd v. Bank of America" on Justia Law