Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Shalome Kaushansky, retained Stonecroft Attorneys, APC, to represent her in a legal action against her landlord due to various issues during her tenancy, including water leaks, mold, electrical problems, and harassment. Stonecroft filed a complaint but failed to advance the case, conduct discovery, or respond to the landlord's discovery requests. Shortly before the trial, Stonecroft withdrew from the case, leading Kaushansky to settle for $2,500.Kaushansky then sued Stonecroft for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair competition. The Los Angeles County Superior Court found in favor of Kaushansky, awarding her $91,734.29 for professional negligence and $25,000 for breach of fiduciary duty, totaling $116,734.29. The court found Stonecroft failed to plead all applicable causes of action, conduct discovery, and protect Kaushansky from foreseeable prejudice upon withdrawal. However, the court ruled in favor of Stonecroft on the unfair competition claim and declined to award punitive damages.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court reversed the $91,734.29 award for professional negligence, finding no substantial evidence that Kaushansky could have collected this amount from her landlord. The court noted that Kaushansky failed to prove the landlord's solvency or the collectibility of a hypothetical judgment. However, the court affirmed the $25,000 award for breach of fiduciary duty, finding substantial evidence that Stonecroft's withdrawal constituted intentional misconduct, justifying emotional distress damages. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with each party bearing its own costs on appeal. View "Kaushansky v. Stonecroft Attorneys, APC" on Justia Law

Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

Matthew V. Herron filed a petition for writ of mandate against the San Diego Unified Port District and the Coronado Yacht Club, alleging that the lease of coastal public trust land to the private club violated the public trust doctrine, the San Diego Unified Port Act, the Public Resources Code, and the Port’s Master Plan. Herron claimed that the lease was executed without public notice or competitive bidding and requested the court to compel the Port District to comply with proper procedures and award the lease to a qualified applicant who would operate the property for public benefit.The Superior Court of San Diego County sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the Port District’s discretionary decisions under a writ for traditional mandamus and that the time for filing a writ for administrative mandamus had expired. The court dismissed Herron’s petition with prejudice, leading to Herron’s appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Herron failed to establish a claim for traditional mandamus because the Port District’s decision to lease the land involved discretionary authority, not a ministerial duty. The court also found that Herron’s petition for administrative mandamus was untimely, as it was filed more than four years after the lease became final, exceeding the 90-day statutory limit. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Herron was not entitled to relief under either theory and affirmed the dismissal of his petition. View "Herron v. San Diego Unified Port District" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steve Shehyn, owns a 20-acre avocado orchard in Moorpark, California. He alleged that sediment from the Ventura County Public Works Agency and Ventura County Waterworks District No. 1's (collectively, the District) water delivery system permanently damaged his irrigation pipes and orchard. The plaintiff claimed that the sediment was a direct result of the District's water supply facilities' plan, design, maintenance, and operation.The trial court sustained the District's demurrer to the plaintiff's first amended complaint, which included causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and inverse condemnation. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend the breach of contract and negligence claims but sustained the demurrer without leave to amend for the inverse condemnation claim, citing that the plaintiff "invited" the District's water onto his property. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, maintaining the inverse condemnation claim unchanged and indicating his intent to seek a writ of mandamus. The trial court entered judgment for the District after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his contract and negligence claims without prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claim for inverse condemnation. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations that the District's water delivery system delivered a disproportionate amount of sediment to his property, causing damage, supported a claim for inverse condemnation. The court disagreed with the trial court's reliance on Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist., stating that the issue of whether the plaintiff "invited" the water goes to the merits of the claim, not its viability at the pleading stage. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. View "Shehyn v. Ventura County Public Works Agency" on Justia Law

The Town of Apple Valley (TAV) sought to condemn a private water utility system through eminent domain. In November 2015, TAV passed two resolutions of necessity (RON) to acquire the system, which was owned by Carlyle Infrastructure Partners and operated by Apple Valley Ranchos Water (AVR). In January 2016, TAV filed an eminent domain action, and Carlyle sold the system to Liberty Utilities. After a 67-day bench trial, the trial court found that TAV did not have the right to acquire the system and entered judgment for Liberty, awarding attorney’s fees. TAV appealed.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Liberty only needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the public necessity elements were not met, and that the administrative record (AR) was irrelevant. The trial court allowed Liberty to present any evidence it deemed relevant, including post-RON evidence, and found in favor of Liberty.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review by not using the gross abuse of discretion standard. The trial court also erred by not admitting the AR, failing to start its analysis with the RON’s findings, and improperly allowing Liberty to rely solely on post-RON evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the rebuttable presumption in favor of TAV’s findings should have been the starting point for the trial court’s analysis.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing the trial court to determine whether to permit TAV to take the water system, remand the matter to TAV for further administrative proceedings, or hold a new trial applying the correct standards. The judgment and attorney’s fees award were reversed, and TAV was allowed to recover its costs on appeal. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchose Water" on Justia Law

The case involves a real estate dispute where plaintiffs, represented by Kenneth J. Catanzarite, alleged they were defrauded into exchanging their interests in an apartment complex for interests in a limited liability company. The dispute was ordered into arbitration at the plaintiffs' request, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendant, Plantations at Haywood, LLC. Plantations then petitioned the court to confirm the arbitration award.The Superior Court of Orange County confirmed the arbitration award and granted Plantations' motion for sanctions against Catanzarite under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, imposing $37,000 in sanctions. The court found that Catanzarite's opposition to the petition was frivolous and factually unsupported. Catanzarite appealed the sanctions, arguing he was statutorily allowed to file an opposition and contest the arbitrator's award.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Catanzarite's arguments were without merit and unsupported by existing law or any nonfrivolous extension of existing law. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's sanction award against Catanzarite. Additionally, the court granted Plantations' motion for sanctions on appeal, finding the appeal to be frivolous and without merit. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to be awarded, with the option for Catanzarite to stipulate to the amount requested by Plantations. The order was affirmed, and Plantations was entitled to its costs on appeal. View "Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC v. Plantations at Haywood, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian L. Sheehy, as trustee, sued Chicago Title Insurance Company over a dispute involving an easement on his property. Plaintiff designated an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, as an expert witness to testify about the defendant's handling of the claim. The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this expert, arguing that the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited the attorney from testifying adversely to the defendant. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the expert.Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal, which was summarily denied. Concurrently, plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, citing Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Company/21st Century Insurance Company (2004) for the proposition that the order was appealable. The Court of Appeal stayed the preparation of the record, considered dismissing the appeal, and requested briefing from the parties. A hearing was subsequently held.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dismissed the appeal. The court held that it only has jurisdiction over direct appeals from appealable orders or judgments. The court emphasized that, in ordinary civil cases, appeals are generally only permitted from final judgments to prevent piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals. The court distinguished between orders on motions to disqualify counsel, which are appealable, and orders on motions in limine, which are not. The court disagreed with the precedent set in Brand, concluding that orders on motions in limine are not appealable as they are not final collateral orders or injunctions. The court decided that such orders should be reviewed only by writ petition or by appeal from the final judgment. View "Sheehy v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Town of Apple Valley (TAV) sought to condemn a private water utility system via eminent domain. In November 2015, TAV passed two resolutions of necessity (RON) to acquire the water system, which was owned by Carlyle Infrastructures Partners and operated by Apple Valley Ranchos Water (AVR). In January 2016, TAV filed an eminent domain action to acquire the system. A day later, Carlyle sold the system to Liberty Utilities. After extensive proceedings, including a 67-day bench trial, the trial court found that TAV did not have the right to acquire the system and entered judgment and awarded attorney’s fees to Liberty. TAV appealed.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County ruled that Liberty bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the required elements for eminent domain was not satisfied. The court also ruled that Liberty need not submit the administrative record (AR) underlying TAV’s RONs. The trial court held a bench trial and issued a Statement of Decision (SOD) finding that Liberty met its burden, rejecting TAV’s evidence and relying on Liberty’s post-RON evidence. TAV’s objections to the SOD were overruled, and the court entered judgment for Liberty and awarded attorney’s fees.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof and failed to give appropriate deference to TAV’s decision and findings. The trial court also improperly based its decision on post-RON facts and events. The appellate court remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the trial court to determine whether to allow TAV to take the water system, remand the matter to TAV for further administrative proceedings, or hold a new trial applying the correct burdens of proof and standard of review. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchose Water" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeanie Reese, acting as conservator for Leoma Musil, filed a lawsuit against Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) and other defendants, alleging violations of the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (HBOR) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The dispute arose when SPS recorded a notice of trustee’s sale while Reese’s loan modification application was pending. Reese claimed that SPS violated former section 2923.6 by proceeding with foreclosure actions during the loan modification process.The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but this decision was reversed on appeal, with the appellate court finding a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Reese had submitted a complete loan modification application. Upon remand, Reese amended her complaint, but the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, ruling that SPS had not violated former section 2923.6 because it recorded a new notice of trustee’s sale and sold the property more than a year after denying the loan modification application and Reese’s subsequent appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that SPS’s actions did not constitute a violation of former section 2923.6, as the new notice of trustee’s sale recorded in May 2018 cured any previous violation. The court also found that the 18-month delay between the denial of the loan modification application and the new notice of trustee’s sale rendered the initial violation immaterial. Consequently, the court concluded that Reese’s complaint did not state a cause of action under former section 2923.6, and the trial court’s decision to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend was appropriate. View "Reese v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc." on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to this parcel is via a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation, citing federal law and the terms of the easement deed. Despite these objections, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld this decision on appeal.JCCrandall then petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination that the easement provided adequate access for the project. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by federal law and the easement deed, that state law required its consent for such use, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court should have applied the independent judgment standard because JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The court further held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, JCCrandall cannot be forced to allow its property to be used for cannabis transportation. The court also found that the use of the easement for cannabis activities exceeded the scope of the easement, which was created when cannabis was illegal under both state and federal law. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law