Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Two young children, ages four and two, suffered severe injuries after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in their apartment, which had recently undergone renovations. The property owner and manager had replaced the window without installing a fall prevention device, despite the window’s low sill height and significant drop to the ground. The children, through their guardian ad litem, sued the owner and manager for negligence, alleging both general negligence and negligence per se based on an alleged violation of the California Building Standards Code, which requires fall prevention devices on certain windows.The Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, heard the case. Before trial, the defendants sought summary adjudication and moved in limine to exclude expert testimony regarding the Building Code, arguing that the property was exempt from current requirements due to compliance with the code at the time of original construction and the use of “like-for-like” materials during renovation. The trial court denied these pretrial motions but, after plaintiffs presented their case at trial, granted a nonsuit on both negligence theories, finding no duty under general negligence and that the code exemption applied to the negligence per se claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling on general negligence, holding that the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty on the landlord under the circumstances. However, it reversed the nonsuit on negligence per se, holding that the trial court misinterpreted the Building Code: a window is not an “original material” exempt from current safety requirements. The appellate court remanded the case for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

After purchasing a home with wooded acreage in Santa Cruz, the buyers discovered issues they believed the sellers had failed to disclose, including matters related to the septic system, property condition, and logging operations. The real estate transaction was governed by a standard form agreement that required the parties to attempt mediation before resorting to litigation or arbitration, and provided that the prevailing party in any dispute would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, except as limited by the mediation provision.Following the sale, the buyers sued the sellers for breach of contract and fraud. The sellers filed a cross-complaint. After a three-day bench trial in the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, the court found in favor of the sellers on all claims and on their cross-complaint, determining that the sellers were the prevailing parties and entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, with the amount to be determined in post-trial proceedings. The sellers then moved for attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees, concluding that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate the dispute, as required by the contract, barred them from recovering attorney fees, even though they later expressed willingness to mediate before the buyers filed suit. The court also denied the motion for costs without prejudice due to procedural deficiencies.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, held that the trial court’s initial statement regarding entitlement to attorney fees was interlocutory and not a final judgment on the issue. The appellate court further held that the sellers’ initial refusal to mediate did not automatically preclude them from recovering attorney fees if they later agreed to mediate before litigation commenced. The court reversed the postjudgment order denying attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the sellers effectively retracted their refusal to mediate before the lawsuit was filed. The denial of costs was affirmed due to the sellers’ failure to file a proper costs memorandum. View "Evleshin v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC is the developer of a mixed-use condominium project in San Francisco known as GS Heritage Place, which includes both timeshare and whole residential units. Stephen Schneider owns a timeshare interest in one of the fractional units and has voting rights in the homeowners association. In 2018, Schneider filed a class action lawsuit against Cocoa and others, alleging improper management practices, including the use of fractional units as hotel rooms and misallocation of expenses. The parties settled that lawsuit in 2020, with Schneider agreeing not to disparage Cocoa or solicit further claims against it, and to cooperate constructively in future dealings.In 2022, Schneider initiated another lawsuit against Cocoa. In response, Cocoa filed a cross-complaint against Schneider, alleging intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract (the settlement agreement), unjust enrichment, and defamation. Cocoa claimed Schneider engaged in a campaign to prevent the sale of unsold units as whole units, formed unofficial owner groups, made disparaging statements, and threatened litigation, all of which allegedly violated the prior settlement agreement and harmed Cocoa’s economic interests.Schneider moved to strike the cross-complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that Cocoa’s claims arose from his protected activities—namely, petitioning the courts and speaking on matters of public interest related to association management. The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco granted Schneider’s motion, finding that all claims in the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that Cocoa failed to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that Cocoa’s claims were based on Schneider’s protected litigation and association management activities, and that Cocoa did not establish a likelihood of success on any of its claims. View "Cocoa AJ Holdings, LLC v. Schneider" on Justia Law

The case centers on a long-standing dispute involving three churches over ownership and sale of real property in Los Angeles. Attorney Steven C. Kim represented one of the churches, Central Korean Evangelical Church, which granted him a deed of trust on the property to secure payment of attorney fees. Central Korean had contracted to sell the property to New Life Oasis Church but later reneged, leading to litigation. The trial court ordered Central Korean to honor the sale and expunged Kim’s deed of trust, which was obstructing the transaction. Kim’s client appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of standing, and Kim did not pursue his own appeal. The judgment became final in 2018.Following the final judgment, Kim filed a new lawsuit against New Life Oasis Church and Bank of Hope, seeking a declaration that his deed of trust was still valid and challenging the prior expungement order. New Life and Bank of Hope moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that issue preclusion barred Kim from relitigating the validity of his lien. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County agreed and entered judgment against Kim. Additionally, New Life filed a cross-complaint alleging that Kim’s recording of a lis pendens constituted slander of title and abuse of process. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of New Life, awarding damages and not addressing Kim’s defense based on the litigation privilege.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court’s application of issue preclusion, holding that Kim could not relitigate the validity of his deed of trust. However, it reversed the judgment on the cross-complaint, holding that the litigation privilege protected Kim’s recording of the lis pendens from claims of slander of title and abuse of process. The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with these holdings. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs leased a 2,400-acre parcel of undeveloped land in San Luis Obispo County, California, from the predecessor of the defendant, Eureka Energy Company. The lease, originally executed in 1968 and later novated, provided for a 99-year term with an option to renew for another 99 years. The property, known as Wild Cherry Canyon, was historically used for cattle grazing, but the lease itself stated that the premises could be used for “any lawful purpose.” The parties understood that cattle grazing would continue, primarily to reduce wildfire risk rather than for commercial livestock production. In 2018, the plaintiffs exercised their option to renew the lease, but Eureka asserted that the lease was limited to 51 years under California Civil Code section 717, which restricts leases for agricultural purposes.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County held a court trial and issued a detailed statement of decision. It found that the lease was for agricultural purposes, specifically cattle grazing, and concluded that section 717 applied, limiting the lease to 51 years. The court entered judgment for Eureka, declaring that the lease expired in 2019 and that the plaintiffs had no further interest in the property. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the lease was not for agricultural purposes within the meaning of section 717, given the fire prevention intent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that, although cattle grazing generally constitutes an agricultural purpose under section 717, the particular circumstances here—where grazing was intended for fire prevention and not for commercial agriculture—meant the lease was not for agricultural purposes as defined by the statute. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment, finding that the lease was valid beyond the 51-year limit and that the plaintiffs’ leasehold interest should not be forfeited. View "Pacho Limited Partnership v. Eureka Energy Co." on Justia Law

The case concerns the City of San Diego’s approval of a 2022 ballot measure to remove the longstanding 30-foot building height limit in the Midway-Pacific Highway Community Planning area. This height restriction, established by a 1972 voter initiative, was intended to preserve coastal views, community character, and mitigate issues such as congestion and pollution. In 2018, the City updated the community plan and prepared a program environmental impact report (PEIR) under the assumption that the height limit remained in effect. In 2020, the City attempted to remove the height limit via a ballot measure, but the measure was invalidated for failing to adequately consider environmental impacts as required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).Following the invalidation, the City prepared a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR) and approved a second ballot measure in 2022. Save Our Access, a nonprofit, challenged this new measure, arguing that the City’s environmental review remained inadequate. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Save Our Access’s petition for writ of mandate, finding that the City’s SEIR sufficiently addressed the environmental impacts by focusing on visual effects and neighborhood character, and by relying on the 2018 PEIR for other impact categories.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found that the City’s SEIR was inadequate under CEQA. The court held that the City failed to meaningfully analyze the environmental impacts of allowing buildings above 30 feet, such as effects on noise, air quality, biological resources, and geological conditions. The court concluded that relying on the prior PEIR and deferring analysis to future site-specific projects did not satisfy CEQA’s requirements. The judgment was reversed and remanded, with instructions to grant Save Our Access’s petition and direct the City to comply with CEQA. View "Save Our Access v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (DWR) planned to conduct preconstruction geotechnical work, such as soil and groundwater testing, in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh as part of preparations for the Delta tunnel project, which aims to improve water conveyance and environmental protection. Various municipal, tribal, and public interest entities objected, arguing that DWR could not begin this work until it certified that the tunnel project was consistent with the Delta Plan, as required by the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Reform Act of 2009. The disputed geotechnical work included soil borings, groundwater monitoring, test trenches, and other activities intended to inform the project’s design and mitigation measures.The Superior Court of Sacramento County reviewed several related actions brought by these entities. The plaintiffs sought and obtained preliminary injunctions preventing DWR from conducting the preconstruction geotechnical work until it submitted a certification of consistency with the Delta Plan. The trial court found that the geotechnical work was an integral part of the tunnel project, which was a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act, and concluded that DWR was required to certify consistency before initiating any part of the project, including the geotechnical work.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that the Delta Reform Act does not require DWR to submit a certification of consistency before engaging in preconstruction geotechnical work, distinguishing the requirements of the Delta Reform Act from those of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court found that the geotechnical work was not itself a “covered action” under the Delta Reform Act and that the Act does not incorporate CEQA’s prohibition against “piecemealing.” The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the motions for preliminary injunction in light of this holding. View "Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The case concerns the City of San Diego’s approval of a 2022 ballot measure to remove the longstanding 30-foot building height limit in the Midway-Pacific Highway Community Planning area. This height restriction, established by a 1972 voter initiative, was intended to preserve coastal views, community character, and environmental quality. In 2018, the City updated the community plan for the area, assuming the height limit remained in place. In 2020, the City attempted to remove the height limit via a ballot measure, but the measure was invalidated for failing to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), as the environmental impact report (EIR) did not analyze the effects of taller buildings.Following the invalidation of the first ballot measure, the City prepared a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR) and approved a second ballot measure in 2022 to remove the height limit. Save Our Access, a nonprofit organization, challenged the City’s actions, arguing that the SEIR failed to adequately analyze the environmental impacts of allowing buildings taller than 30 feet, except for visual effects and neighborhood character. The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Save Our Access’s petition for writ of mandate, finding the City’s environmental review sufficient.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed whether the City complied with CEQA’s requirements to inform the public and decisionmakers of the potential environmental impacts of removing the height limit, to identify mitigation measures, and to disclose reasons for approval despite significant impacts. The appellate court held that the City’s SEIR was inadequate because it failed to analyze the full range of environmental impacts associated with taller buildings, relying improperly on the 2018 EIR. The court reversed the lower court’s judgment, ordered the petition for writ of mandate to be granted, and directed the City to comply with CEQA. View "Save Our Access v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

A property owner and developer challenged a city’s adopted housing element, which is a required component of a local general plan in California that must identify how the city will accommodate its share of regional housing needs, including for lower-income households. The city, a charter city, used a “residential overlay” zoning approach, superimposing new residential development rights over existing commercial and industrial zones, to identify sites for affordable housing. Some of these sites were nonvacant, including parking lots serving shopping centers and a site leased to a grocery store with contractual restrictions. The developer argued that the city’s approach did not comply with state law because it did not ensure that the identified sites would realistically be developed for lower-income housing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the developer’s petition for writ of mandate and entered judgment for the city. The trial court found that the city’s housing element constituted a “major change in allowable land use” under the city charter, but held that state housing law preempted the charter’s voter approval requirement. The court also found the city’s use of overlay zoning and its identification of nonvacant sites to be permissible under the Housing Element Law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reversed. The appellate court held that the city’s use of a residential overlay did not comply with Government Code section 65583.2(h)(2) because the overlay allowed development of identified sites without requiring any residential component, thus failing to meet the mandatory minimum density and residential use requirements. The court also found that the city failed to provide substantial evidence that one of the nonvacant sites, occupied by a grocery store with restrictive lease terms, was realistically available for redevelopment. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded with directions to issue a writ of mandate compelling the city to revise its housing element in compliance with state law. View "New Commune DTLA LLC v. City Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

A proposed residential development in downtown Livermore, California, was the subject of a dispute between a community group and the city. The city had entered into agreements with a developer, Eden Housing, to build affordable workforce housing and, as part of a 2022 resolution, authorized the construction and improvement of a new public park, Veterans Park. Move Eden Housing, a local group, sought to challenge this resolution through a referendum, arguing that the city’s approval of the park was a legislative act subject to voter review.The Alameda County Superior Court initially denied Move Eden’s petition for a writ of mandate, finding the city’s resolution to be administrative and not subject to referendum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed, holding that the park approval was a legislative act and ordered the city to process the referendum petition. In response, the city repealed the 2022 resolution and enacted a new 2024 resolution that reaffirmed the development agreement but omitted the Veterans Park provisions.Move Eden then argued that the city’s adoption of the 2024 resolution violated California Elections Code section 9241, which prohibits reenactment of a repealed ordinance for one year. The trial court agreed and granted Move Eden’s motion to compel compliance with the writ of mandate.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that section 9241 did not prohibit the city from adopting the 2024 resolution because it involved only administrative acts implementing prior legislative determinations not challengeable by referendum. The court clarified that the referendum power and section 9241’s restrictions apply only to legislative acts, not administrative actions. The matter was remanded with instructions to deny Move Eden’s motion. View "Move Eden Housing v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law