Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

JHVS Group, LLC and its members, Jasanjot Singh and Harshana Kaur, purchased a 66.4-acre pistachio orchard from Shawn Slate and Dina Slate for approximately $2.6 million. The Slates agreed to carry a loan for $1,889,600, and JHVS made a $700,000 down payment. The agreement included interest payments and additional payments tied to crop yields. JHVS alleged that the Slates and their brokers, Randy Hayer and SVN Executive Commercial Advisors, misrepresented critical information about water rights and crop values, leading to financial losses and a notice of default filed by the Slates.The Superior Court of Madera County issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale of the property, based on JHVS's claims of fraud and misrepresentation. The court granted the injunction after the defendants failed to appear or respond to the motion. The order was intended to preserve JHVS's right to rescind the contract.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the Slates because they were never properly served with the summons and complaint. The appellate court determined that the preliminary injunction was void as to the Slates due to this lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the preliminary injunction against the Slates and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The appellate court awarded costs to the Slates. View "JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate" on Justia Law

A vintner challenged the County of Los Angeles's decision to ban new vineyards in the Santa Monica Mountains North Area. The area is largely rural, with a small portion used for agriculture, including vineyards. The County had previously regulated vineyards through a 2015 ordinance requiring conditional use permits and development standards. In 2016, the County initiated a comprehensive update to the North Area Plan and Community Standards District, which required an environmental impact report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The draft EIR proposed continued regulation of vineyards but did not include a ban. After public comments, the final EIR maintained this approach. However, the County Board of Supervisors ultimately decided to ban new vineyards entirely when they approved the project in 2021. The vintner argued that this change rendered the EIR's project description unstable and required recirculation for further public comment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the vintner's petition for a writ of mandate, finding no CEQA violation. The vintner appealed, arguing that the vineyard ban fundamentally altered the project and violated Government Code section 65857 by not referring the modification back to the planning commission.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the vineyard ban did not alter the nature or main features of the project, thus not destabilizing the project description in the EIR. The court also found that the vintner failed to demonstrate prejudice from the County's procedural error under Government Code section 65857, as there was no evidence that a different outcome was probable if the planning commission had reconsidered the ban. View "Gooden v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the County of Los Angeles's decision to ban new vineyards in the Santa Monica Mountains North Area. The area is a significant ecological and scenic resource, with most of its land designated as open space. In 2016, the County began updating the North Area Plan and Community Standards District, which included regulations for vineyards. Initially, the draft environmental impact report proposed stringent regulations but did not ban new vineyards. However, after public comments, the County Board of Supervisors decided to impose a total ban on new vineyards.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the petition for a writ of mandate filed by John Gooden and the Malibu Coast Vintners and Grape Growers Alliance, Inc. The petitioners argued that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by not recirculating the environmental impact report after the vineyard ban was added and that the County failed to follow Government Code section 65857 by not referring the ban back to the Department of Regional Planning.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the addition of the vineyard ban did not alter the nature or main features of the project described in the environmental impact report, thus not rendering the project description unstable. The court also found that the petitioners had waived any claim for recirculation. Additionally, the court assumed a procedural error under Government Code section 65857 but concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate that this error was prejudicial or that a different outcome was probable if the error had not occurred. View "Gooden v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. JCCrandall objected to the use of its easement for cannabis transportation. Despite the objection, the County granted the CUP, and the County’s Board of Supervisors upheld the decision, finding the road adequate for the project.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, challenging the County’s determination. JCCrandall argued that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, required JCCrandall’s consent under state law, and violated County standards for private roads. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County’s decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall’s right to exclude unauthorized persons from its property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court also found that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court concluded that the County’s reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b) was misplaced, as it defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over two adjacent properties, each containing a multi-unit apartment complex with on-site parking. The plaintiffs, Eli and Maha Batta, sought to establish easement rights for additional parking and trash dumpsters on a disputed area of the adjacent property owned by the defendant, Therese Hunt. The Battas purchased their property from Hunt in 1994 and claimed that their tenants had used the disputed area for parking and dumpsters since then. Hunt refused to sign a parking covenant in 2019, leading the Battas to file a lawsuit seeking to quiet title to an easement by grant, prescription, or irrevocable license, and for breach of contract.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Battas, finding they had established easement rights by oral grant, prescription, and implication. The court ordered that the easement would expire upon a bona fide sale of either property. Both parties appealed the decision. Hunt argued that the trial court erred in granting the easement rights, while the Battas contended that the court abused its discretion by ruling that the easement would expire upon a sale.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and found that the trial court's findings were inconsistent. The trial court had found both that Hunt had granted an easement and that the Battas' use of the property was adverse, which are mutually exclusive conditions. The appellate court concluded that these inconsistent findings required reversal. Additionally, the appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Battas to amend their complaint to add a cause of action for an easement by implication without giving Hunt the opportunity to rebut the evidence. Consequently, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Batta v. Hunt" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization challenged the County of Los Angeles's approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. The project included a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map. The organization alleged that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to adequately analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts and by not providing proper procedural notices. They also claimed violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and local zoning laws.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted the developer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the organization's claims were barred by the 90-day limitations period under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA. The court ruled that the organization failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map, which was required for any action challenging a subdivision decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 of the SMA did not bar the organization's CEQA claims to the extent they alleged procedural violations and failures to analyze and disclose environmental impacts, as these claims were unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that the CEQA claims challenging the adequacy of mitigation measures imposed as conditions of the project's approval were barred by the SMA's 90-day limitations period. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the CEQA cause of action and grant it concerning the SMA and zoning law violations. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

A company, A.D. Improvements, Inc. (ADI), leased property from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Caltrans had initially acquired the property, which was undeveloped at the time, for a freeway project. ADI used the property commercially as a staging area for equipment and machinery. In 2021, Caltrans deemed the property "excess real property" as it was no longer needed for the freeway project. ADI sought to purchase the property under Streets and Highways Code section 118.1, which requires Caltrans to offer to sell excess commercial property to the current occupant. Caltrans denied the application, arguing the property was not commercial when acquired.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County agreed with Caltrans, interpreting the statute to mean that the property had to be commercial at the time of acquisition. The court denied ADI's petition for a writ of mandate to compel Caltrans to offer the property for sale.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history indicated that the property only needed to be commercial at the time it was deemed excess, not when it was acquired. The court concluded that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ requiring Caltrans to offer the property for sale to ADI at fair market value. The court held that Caltrans must comply with its ministerial duty under section 118.1 to sell the excess commercial property to the current occupant. ADI was awarded its costs on appeal. View "A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2016, the plaintiff purchased a shopping center from the defendants, which included a dry cleaning business. Before the sale, the defendants provided a 2013 visual inspection report but did not disclose a more detailed soil vapor survey report, which the plaintiff later discovered. After the purchase, the plaintiff incurred significant costs for cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had withheld critical information about the property's condition.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging fraud and violations of the Civil Code. During discovery, the defendants served requests for admission, which the plaintiff failed to respond to on time. The defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. The plaintiff later served a response with objections, but the trial court deemed the responses non-compliant and granted the defendants' motion, imposing sanctions. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to withdraw the deemed admissions was denied for failing to show mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the presence of waived objections in the plaintiff's proposed response did not necessarily prevent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiff's responses were substantially compliant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including vacating the order deeming the requests admitted, reconsidering sanctions, and allowing additional discovery. The plaintiff was awarded costs for the appeal. View "Katayama v. Continental Investment Group" on Justia Law

In this case, the decedents, Robert and Elise Sandiford, and Deon Detes Abrams, Sr., died after their vehicles collided on State Route 99 (SR 99) and struck a tree on land owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific). The relatives of the decedents sued Union Pacific, alleging negligence for failing to remove the tree or take measures to protect the public from the dangerous condition it posed. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to remove the tree. The trial court denied the motion, finding no judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care under Civil Code section 1714.The trial court's denial of summary judgment was based on the application of factors from Rowland v. Christian, which did not support creating an exception to the ordinary duty of care. Union Pacific then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking to overturn the trial court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that Union Pacific did not have a duty to remove the tree or take other measures to protect the driving public from the alleged dangerous condition posed by the tree. The court considered the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury, and the closeness of the connection between Union Pacific’s conduct and the injury. It also weighed public policy factors, including moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, and the availability of insurance. The court concluded that public policy clearly supported creating a judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care, thus granting Union Pacific's petition for a writ of mandate and directing the trial court to grant Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In May 2017, the City of Alameda leased residential property to Shelby Sheehan. Sheehan stopped paying rent in December 2020 and did not pay for over 17 months. On April 5, 2022, the City served Sheehan with a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate, specifying payment to be made to "City of Alameda c/o River Rock Real Estate Group." Sheehan neither paid nor vacated, prompting the City to file an unlawful detainer action.Sheehan moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the notice was defective because it did not name a natural person as the payee and was ambiguous about the payment method. The trial court agreed, finding the notice invalid for not identifying a natural person and for being ambiguous about acceptable payment methods. Consequently, the court dismissed the action, and the City appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court disagreed with the trial court's narrow interpretation of "person" under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2), holding that "person" includes corporations as well as natural persons. However, the court found the notice defective because it did not provide the correct and complete name of the corporation to whom rent should be paid, creating ambiguity and confusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Sheehan, concluding that the notice did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. The court did not address the trial court's finding of ambiguity based on payment method due to the notice's other deficiencies. View "City of Alameda v. Sheehan" on Justia Law