Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The dispute arose from a contract in which a company specializing in vehicle emissions testing equipment agreed to supply and install its products in a facility being constructed by a general contractor for a state agency. After receiving substantial payments, the equipment supplier sought additional compensation through arbitration. The general contractor defended by arguing that the supplier was not properly licensed as required by California’s Contractors State Licensing Law (CSLL), and thus could not recover payment. The supplier then initiated a lawsuit seeking a judicial declaration that it was exempt from the CSLL’s licensing requirements because its equipment did not become a “fixed part of the structure,” referencing an exemption in the law.The Superior Court of Riverside County reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The general contractor argued the exemption did not apply because the equipment became permanently affixed to the building, and the supplier had performed work before obtaining a license. The supplier contended its products were portable and not intended to be permanent fixtures, and that it acted as an equipment installer exempt under the law. The superior court granted summary judgment for the general contractor, finding that the evidence showed the equipment did become a fixed part of the structure and thus the supplier needed a contractor’s license.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found the lower court erred by deciding as a matter of law that the exemption did not apply. The appellate court held that whether the equipment became a fixed part of the structure is a factual question, not one suitable for summary judgment on the record before it. Because there was conflicting evidence—including expert declarations—on this issue, the trial court should have permitted the factual dispute to be resolved by a trier of fact. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AVL Test Systems v. Hensel Phelps Construction" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization representing manufactured home community owners and a mobilehome park owner challenged the City of Santa Rosa’s enforcement of California Penal Code section 396 during a multi-year wildfire state of emergency. Section 396 prohibits increasing the rental price of mobilehome spaces by more than 10 percent during a declared emergency. The plaintiffs argued that, under Santa Rosa’s rent control ordinance, park owners should be able to impose annual increases according to the ordinance’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) formula, even if those increases cumulatively exceeded the 10 percent cap in section 396. Alternatively, they sought to “reset” post-emergency rents as if the suppressed CPI increases during the emergency had been implemented.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and granted the City’s, finding that section 396’s 10 percent cap was fixed at the rent authorized when the emergency began and that owners could not recoup lost increases after the emergency ended. The court reasoned that allowing such recoupment would defeat the statute’s purpose to protect consumers from excessive rent hikes during emergencies. The court entered judgment for the City after the plaintiffs’ third cause of action was dismissed by stipulation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case de novo. The appellate court held that section 396’s cap applies to the rent authorized at the start of the emergency and lasts for its duration, regardless of local rent control provisions. The court further ruled that nothing in section 396 or the local ordinance entitles park owners to recoup suppressed rent increases once the emergency ends. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the City and awarded costs to the City. View "Western Manufactured Housing Cmty. Assn. v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law

A property owner operating a shopping mall in Orange County, California, faced significant restrictions on access and operations due to government orders issued during the COVID-19 pandemic. These restrictions, which included closures and limited entry, led the owner to file applications with the county tax assessor seeking disaster-related property tax relief under Revenue and Taxation Code section 170, subdivision (a)(1), on the basis that the pandemic and resulting government responses had caused a loss in property value through restricted access.The Orange County tax assessor summarily denied the applications, stating there was no physical damage to the property. The owner appealed this decision to the Orange County Assessment Appeals Board No. 1. The Board found it had jurisdiction but determined that relief under section 170(a)(1) required evidence of physical damage to the property, either direct or indirect, and that neither the pandemic nor the associated government orders constituted such damage. The Board’s decision made further proceedings unnecessary. The property owner then sought review in the Superior Court of Orange County, which, after a court trial, agreed with the Board’s interpretation and ruled that the owner was not entitled to relief because there was no physical damage to the property as required by the California Constitution and relevant statutes.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, to obtain reassessment under section 170(a)(1), physical damage to the property—either direct or indirect—remains a constitutional requirement. The court found that neither the presence of the virus nor government-imposed access restrictions amounted to physical damage. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and both parties’ requests for judicial notice were denied. View "The Retail Property Trust v. Orange County Assessment" on Justia Law

The case involves a series of petitions filed by a state agency seeking to enter privately owned properties to conduct environmental, cultural, and geological investigations related to a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The agency pursued these entries under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which allow entities with eminent domain authority to access property for studies necessary to determine suitability for public projects, before initiating formal condemnation proceedings. The landowners opposed these entries, arguing that, under specific provisions of the Water Code, the agency could not conduct such activities unless the project was fully authorized and funded.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County coordinated the various petitions and, after hearings, ultimately granted the agency’s requests to enter property and conduct the proposed activities. The trial court expressly found that the agency had eminent domain authority, did not need to initiate a classic condemnation action for these precondemnation activities, and was not required to comply with the project approval and funding prerequisites set forth in the Water Code. The landowners appealed these orders, maintaining their position that the agency’s authority was limited by the Water Code’s project approval requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the appeal. The appellate court held that the Water Code’s project approval and funding requirements apply only to formal condemnation proceedings and not to precondemnation entry and testing activities authorized by the precondemnation entry statutes. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, which established that these statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for temporary entry and testing, regardless of whether such activities amount to a taking. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the agency entry to perform the investigative activities. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law

A worker employed by an independent subcontractor was injured while performing rebar reinforcement work on a pedestrian bridge construction project. The subcontractor had been hired by a construction company serving as the turnkey contractor for the project. The worker fell while climbing rebar, claiming muddy conditions contributed to his injury. Central to the dispute was whether the construction company could be held liable under California law for the worker’s injuries, given the company’s role in preparing the worksite and its ongoing involvement in certain site safety measures.In the Superior Court of San Mateo County, the construction company sought summary judgment, arguing it was not liable under the Privette doctrine, which generally holds that a hirer of an independent contractor is not liable for injuries to the contractor’s employees. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the doctrine applied and that the worker had not raised a triable issue of fact showing an exception to the doctrine. The worker argued that the construction company owed him a nondelegable duty under Cal-OSHA regulations and that the company had not actually delegated workplace safety responsibilities to the subcontractor. He also contended that the “retained control” exception to the Privette doctrine applied because the construction company exercised control over site safety in a manner that affirmatively contributed to his injury.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Privette doctrine’s presumption of delegation applied, including to duties imposed by Cal-OSHA regulations, and that there was no evidence the construction company affirmatively contributed to the worker’s injury or interfered with the subcontractor’s means and methods. The court concluded that neither the nondelegable duty argument nor the retained control exception applied, and it affirmed summary judgment in favor of the construction company. View "Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law

A public hospital district in California established and recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) in 1991 for a common interest development known as the Tulare Medical Center. These CC&Rs included a prohibition on abortion clinics within the development. In 2001, certain property subject to these CC&Rs was transferred to individual owners, who later sought to lease it to a family planning organization that provides a range of services, including abortion. The property owners association, comprised of all parcel owners and authorized to enforce the CC&Rs, objected to the lease and sought to enjoin the operation of the clinic, arguing that any abortion services would violate the CC&Rs.The Superior Court of Tulare County reviewed the association’s request for a preliminary injunction. After considering the parties’ submissions and arguments, the court denied the injunction. The court found there was a credible threat that abortion services would be provided but concluded the association had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Specifically, the trial court noted unresolved legal questions regarding whether restrictions on abortion clinics in CC&Rs violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act or California constitutional protections, and found the association failed to demonstrate that the balance of harms favored an injunction.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the prohibition on abortion clinics, adopted by a public entity, constituted government action that interfered with the fundamental constitutional right to reproductive choice under the California Constitution. The court applied the compelling interest test, found no compelling interest justifying the restriction, and concluded the prohibition violated fundamental public policy. Additionally, the court held that the prohibition was void under Civil Code section 53 because it indirectly limited property use based on a characteristic protected by the Unruh Act. The order denying the preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Tulare Medical Center Property v. Valdivia" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old passenger was injured when a car driven by her 16-year-old friend hydroplaned, crossed over the double yellow line, and went off the road down a hillside in San Rafael, California, on a rainy day. Both teenagers knew the road was wet, and the driver was speeding slightly above the posted limit as she entered a left curve. The driver attempted to correct the car’s path but lost control, resulting in the accident. Both had been warned by their parents about the restrictions of provisional licenses, and the driver was subsequently cited for violating license restrictions and making an unsafe turn.The injured passenger, through her guardian ad litem, filed suit in Marin County Superior Court against several parties, including the City of San Rafael, alleging a dangerous condition of public property due to lack of warning signs, absence of barriers, and failure to warn of slippery conditions. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the conditions were open and obvious, and the trial court granted the motion, entering judgment for the City. The court found that the alleged dangerous condition was obvious—that the wet road and curve presented an apparent risk, and there was no duty to warn of such an open and obvious danger. The court also noted that the plaintiff’s later arguments regarding roadway defects were not pled in the operative complaint and could not be relied upon to defeat summary judgment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the risk posed by the road’s curve and wet conditions was open and obvious as a matter of law, and therefore, the City could not be held liable for failing to warn of these conditions or for the absence of a guardrail. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Pagan v. City of San Rafael" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute arising from a real estate transaction involving an 80-acre property in Livermore, California. Guinnane Construction Co., Inc. entered into a contract to purchase an interest in the property from the Petersons, after being assigned the DeLimas’ right of first refusal. Defendants, including Edmund Jin, his real estate agent Stephen Marc Chess, and Chess’s firm, interfered with this transaction by negotiating a purchase with the Petersons despite knowledge of the right of first refusal. The Petersons ultimately sold their interest to Jin, prompting Guinnane to file a successful specific performance action against the Petersons and the subsequent conveyance of the property interest to Guinnane.After prevailing in the specific performance action, Guinnane filed a new lawsuit in the Alameda County Superior Court against Jin, Chess, and Chess’s firm, seeking damages for inducement of breach of contract and intentional interference with contractual relations. Guinnane was awarded compensatory damages, including the attorney fees incurred in the specific performance action. Guinnane then sought to recover the attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this subsequent “tort of another” action against the defendants. The trial court, presided over by Judge Victoria Kolakowski, denied Guinnane’s motion for these additional fees.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed whether, under the tort of another doctrine, Guinnane could recover attorney fees incurred in the action against the tortfeasors themselves. The court held that such fees are not recoverable under the tort of another doctrine, as it allows recovery only for fees incurred in litigation with third parties necessitated by the defendant’s tort, not for fees incurred in suing the tortfeasor. The court affirmed the posttrial order denying Guinnane’s motion for these attorney fees. View "Guinnane Construction Co., Inc. v. Chess" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Department of Water Resources (DWR), a state agency with eminent domain authority, which sought entry onto private properties to perform environmental and geological studies as part of the planning for a potential water conveyance project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. DWR initiated a series of petitions under California’s precondemnation entry statutes, which authorize entities with eminent domain power to access property for investigative activities before deciding whether to acquire the property for a public project.Previously, the San Joaquin County Superior Court coordinated the petitions and permitted DWR to conduct environmental studies under certain conditions but denied entry for geological testing, reasoning that such actions constituted a taking requiring a classic condemnation action. The California Court of Appeal initially agreed, but the California Supreme Court reversed in Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 151, holding that the precondemnation entry statutes provide a constitutionally valid process for precondemnation activities, so long as landowners can obtain a jury trial on damages. Following this, the trial court approved DWR’s authority for both environmental and geological tests, and additional entry orders were issued for the Delta Conveyance Project.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether DWR was required to have an authorized and funded project under Water Code sections 250 and 11580 before undertaking precondemnation entry and testing. The court held that these requirements apply only to classic condemnation proceedings, not to precondemnation entry activities. The court affirmed that DWR need only possess general eminent domain authority to utilize the precondemnation entry process, regardless of whether the activities might constitute a taking. The trial court’s entry order was affirmed. View "Dept. of Water Resources Cases" on Justia Law

Two individuals who stayed at a San Dimas hotel challenged the hotel’s practice of enforcing a maximum 28-day stay policy. Under this policy, guests were required to check out and completely vacate the property for at least three days before being permitted to re-register, a practice the hotel’s management acknowledged was intended to avoid creating landlord-tenant relationships. The plaintiffs, who stayed at the hotel multiple times between June and November 2022, brought a putative class action alleging violations of California Civil Code section 1940.1 and other related claims, arguing that the hotel’s policy was designed to circumvent tenant protections for those using the hotel as a primary residence.The plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of all individuals who stayed at the hotel for at least 28 consecutive days but fewer than 31 days, from late 2018 to the present. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found the class was numerous, ascertainable, and that the plaintiffs’ claims were typical, but denied class certification. The trial court reasoned that individualized questions predominated, because it believed section 1940.1 required proof that each class member used the hotel as their “primary residence” for the hotel to qualify as a “residential hotel” under the statute.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the order. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by interpreting section 1940.1 to require individualized proof that each guest used the hotel as their primary residence. The court clarified that whether a hotel is a “residential hotel” under section 1940.1 is a question that focuses on the overall character and intended use of the hotel, not on each individual guest’s circumstances. The order denying class certification was reversed, and the matter was remanded for the trial court to revisit the class certification question under the correct legal standard. View "Aerni v. RR San Dimas" on Justia Law