Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Anthony Mitchell was driving his Ferrari in Dana Point when he ran over large rocks that had rolled onto the road from an adjacent slope, causing damage to his car and unspecified personal injuries. Mitchell and his passenger, Scott Sieverts, sued multiple parties, including Gail B. Hutchinson, trustee of the Hutchinson Family Trust, for negligence and premises liability, alleging that the defendants failed to maintain their properties to prevent rocks from becoming hazards.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson, concluding that she met her initial burden of showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the rocks came from Hutchinson’s property or whether the defendants negligently maintained their slopes. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Hutchinson met her initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(2), by showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to show a triable issue of material fact. The court found that the plaintiffs' expert's opinion was speculative and lacked foundation, and there was no admissible evidence tying the rocks to Hutchinson’s property or proving negligence. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson was affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

The City of Oakland entered into agreements with Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal, LLC (OBOT) to develop a bulk cargo shipping terminal at the former Oakland Army Base, including a 66-year Ground Lease. Amid public backlash over potential coal transportation, the City moved to block coal, leading to extensive litigation. The City terminated OBOT’s Ground Lease, claiming OBOT failed to meet the Initial Milestone Date for construction. OBOT and its subtenant, Oakland Global Rail Enterprise (OGRE), sued the City for breach of the Ground Lease, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and sought declaratory relief, alleging the City’s actions made it impossible for OBOT to meet the milestone and triggered a force majeure provision.The Alameda County Superior Court, after a bifurcated bench trial, found the City liable for breaching the Ground Lease and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court issued a detailed statement of decision, highlighting the City’s failure to cooperate, its obstructionist actions, and its bad faith efforts to terminate the lease. The court awarded OBOT attorney fees and costs.The City appealed to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted the force majeure provision, improperly applied the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, erroneously declined to apply claim preclusion, and improperly entered judgment for OGRE. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and orders, concluding that the City’s arguments lacked merit. The court held that the City’s actions constituted force majeure events, excusing OBOT’s performance delays, and that the City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by obstructing OBOT’s efforts to develop the terminal. The court also found that claim preclusion did not apply as the federal case involved different issues and contracts. View "Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former tenants of the defendant, filed a complaint against their landlord, alleging various breaches and violations related to their tenancies. In response, the defendant filed two unlawful detainer actions against the plaintiffs for nonpayment of rent. These actions were later dismissed without prejudice. Subsequently, a jury found the defendant liable for certain claims, and the plaintiffs filed a new complaint, including a claim for malicious prosecution based on the unlawful detainer actions.The San Francisco Superior Court consolidated the cases and, after a bench trial, found in favor of the plaintiffs on their malicious prosecution claim. The court concluded that the defendant lacked probable cause to file the unlawful detainer actions and rejected the defendant's advice of counsel defense, determining that she did not rely on legal advice in good faith. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defendant had asserted a valid advice of counsel defense. The defendant had consulted an attorney, disclosed all relevant facts, and acted on the attorney's advice in good faith. The court determined that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to prove the attorney's competence and in shifting the burden of the attorney's legal research onto the defendant. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. The court declined to award costs as the respondents did not appear in the appeal. View "Ceron v. Liu" on Justia Law

Conner Applegate sued Carrington Foreclosure Services, LLC (CFS) and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB (WSF), alleging they violated Civil Code section 2924m during a foreclosure sale of a property in Mill Valley. Applegate claimed that CFS and WSF improperly handled the foreclosure process and rejected his bid, which he submitted as a prospective owner-occupant. The property was initially auctioned on May 12, 2022, with WSF winning the bid. However, the sale was rescinded at WSF's request before it was finalized. Applegate's subsequent bids did not comply with the statutory requirements, and CFS returned his funds.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CFS and WSF. The court found that Applegate's claim under section 2924m failed because the statute did not create a private right of action, the sale was lawfully rescinded before it became final, and Applegate's bids did not meet the statutory requirements. Consequently, the court also dismissed Applegate's other claims, which were based on the alleged violation of section 2924m.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that CFS acted within its authority to rescind the sale before it was finalized, as permitted under section 2924g. Additionally, Applegate's failure to comply with the affidavit requirements of section 2924m meant he could not prove he was a prospective owner-occupant eligible to submit a bid. The court also rejected Applegate's request for leave to amend his complaint, citing unexplained delay and lack of diligence. The appellate court concluded that Applegate's remaining claims were derivative of the failed section 2924m claim and thus also failed. View "Applegate v. Carrington Foreclosure Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Joseph Eshagian leased a residential unit in Van Nuys to Manuel Cepeda, who was required to pay $1,000 monthly rent. On December 20, 2022, Eshagian served Cepeda with a three-day notice to pay $8,000 in unpaid rent or quit. The notice did not specify the start date of the three-day period, nor did it clearly state that Cepeda would lose possession if he did not pay by a certain date. On December 27, 2022, Eshagian filed an unlawful detainer complaint seeking possession, unpaid rent, holdover damages, and attorney fees. Cepeda filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting affirmative defenses.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Eshagian’s motion for terminating sanctions due to Cepeda’s failure to comply with discovery orders, struck Cepeda’s answer, and entered a default against him. A possession-only judgment was entered on May 3, 2023. Cepeda’s motion to vacate the judgment was denied, and he appealed to the appellate division of the superior court, which held the possession-only judgment was appealable and reversed the judgment, finding the three-day notice defective.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case to determine if a possession-only judgment in an unlawful detainer proceeding is appealable when the landlord’s damages claims are unresolved. The court concluded that such a judgment is not appealable because it does not resolve all rights of the parties. However, the court treated Cepeda’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandate due to the uncertainty of the law on appealability at the time of filing.The court found the three-day notice invalid for failing to specify when and how Cepeda had to pay the rent and that he would lose possession if he did not cure the default. Consequently, the complaint did not state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The court dismissed the appeal, granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate the judgment in favor of Eshagian and enter a new judgment in favor of Cepeda. View "Eshagian v. Cepeda" on Justia Law

Owners of timeshare estates in a resort sued the County of Riverside, challenging the legality of an annual fee charged for separate property tax assessments. The owners argued that the fee exceeded the reasonable cost of providing the assessment, constituting a tax that required voter approval, which had not been obtained. The trial court rejected the owners' argument and ruled in favor of the County.The Superior Court of Riverside County entered judgment for the County, finding that the fee did not exceed the reasonable cost of providing the separate assessment. The court considered various costs, including those related to a new computer system and assessment appeals, even though these costs were not included in the original budget used to set the fee.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the County did not meet its burden to prove that the $23 fee was not a tax requiring voter approval under Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The court found that the County's methodology for setting the fee was flawed, as it included costs unrelated to the specific service of providing separate timeshare assessments and did not accurately reflect the actual cost of the service. The court also ruled that the trial court erred in considering costs incurred after the fiscal year used to set the fee.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate refund amount and to decide on the declaratory, injunctive, and/or writ relief sought by the owners. The County must prove the reasonable and necessary costs of providing the separate assessment service, excluding costs for valuing the timeshare project as a whole. View "Scott v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

A charter city in California entered into an agreement with a private developer to revitalize a nearly vacant mall into a multipurpose development. The city contributed approximately $51.36 million in local funds for public improvements, while the developer invested $143 million of its own funds and obtained additional loans. The developer selected the contractors and paid workers less than the prevailing wage, relying on a city ordinance exempting the project from the Prevailing Wage Law (PWL).The Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) determined that the project was subject to the PWL, as it involved public funds. The developer challenged this determination, but the Superior Court of Riverside County affirmed the DIR's decision, concluding that the project was not a municipal affair exempt from the PWL.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the project was not a municipal affair under the home rule provision of the California Constitution. The court distinguished this case from others where charter cities directly managed and funded public works projects. Here, the developer controlled the construction, selected contractors, and bore the majority of the financial burden. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the project was to benefit the developer, not the city, and thus, the PWL applied. The judgment was affirmed, and the DIR was awarded costs on appeal. View "Palm Springs Promenade, LLC v. Dept. of Industrial Relations" on Justia Law

Coyote Aviation Corporation (Coyote) entered into a 20-year lease with the City of Redlands (City) on April 4, 2000, for property at the Redlands Municipal Airport. The lease included two 15-year options to extend. An amended lease was signed on September 5, 2000, with the same termination date of April 4, 2020. Coyote believed the lease should terminate on September 5, 2020, but no written amendment was made. In June 2020, Coyote attempted to exercise the extension option, but the City rejected it, stating the lease had already terminated. The City issued a 30-day notice to quit, and Coyote filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and other claims.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County sustained the City’s demurrer to Coyote’s first amended complaint (FAC) and entered judgment against Coyote. The court found that Coyote failed to provide timely written notice to exercise the extension option as required by the lease. The court also rejected Coyote’s claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, declaratory relief, and promissory estoppel, finding no clear promise by the City to amend the lease termination date.The City filed an unlawful detainer action when Coyote did not vacate the property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, ordering Coyote to vacate. The court found no triable issues of fact regarding the timeliness of Coyote’s notice to exercise the extension option and rejected Coyote’s arguments of estoppel and waiver.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The court held that the lease’s terms were clear and unambiguous, requiring written notice to exercise the extension option. The court also found that City officials did not have the authority to amend the lease orally or accept late notice. The court upheld the trial court’s rulings on the demurrer and summary judgment, denying Coyote’s claims and requests for leave to amend. View "Coyote Aviation Corp. v. City of Redlands" on Justia Law

Leslie J. Knoles (Decedent) and Ruth Catello co-owned a property as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. In 2020, Decedent recorded a quitclaim deed to herself, which, if valid, severed the joint tenancy and created a tenancy in common. Decedent died shortly after recording the deed. Decedent's four surviving siblings initiated probate proceedings to distribute her estate, including the property. Catello filed a competing petition for letters of administration and later a petition to administer a will. Concurrently, Catello sued two siblings to cancel the quitclaim deed and quiet title to the property. The siblings filed a cross-claim to partition the property by sale.The Superior Court of San Diego County entered an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale, identifying the property owners as Catello and Decedent’s estate. The judgment ordered the sale proceeds to be distributed equally between Catello and Decedent’s estate after expenses. Catello appealed, arguing that the siblings lacked standing to sue for partition because the probate court had not yet determined ownership of the property.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court held that the siblings lacked standing to bring the partition claim because their ownership interest in the property was not confirmed and was contingent upon the outcome of the ongoing probate proceedings. The court emphasized that a party seeking partition must have clear title, which the siblings did not possess. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and directed the case to be dismissed. View "Amundson v. Catello" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a rural property in Santa Cruz County, which was accessed via a private road crossing his neighbor's property. A dispute arose when the neighbor claimed an easement over the road, leading to increased traffic due to marijuana cultivation. The neighbor filed two lawsuits asserting an easement, both of which were dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff then sued to quiet title, and the neighbor cross-complained, asserting an easement based on a 1971 deed. The trial court ruled in favor of the neighbor, finding an express easement, a decision affirmed on appeal.Plaintiff funded his defense using retirement savings after Chicago Title Insurance Company, his title insurer, denied his tender for defense, citing policy exclusions. Plaintiff sued Chicago Title for breach of contract and bad faith. The trial court found Chicago Title had a duty to defend from the initial tender but rejected Plaintiff's bad faith claim and request for punitive damages. The court awarded damages for the diminution in property value but denied damages for periods outside the litigation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, found that Chicago Title acted in bad faith by failing to defend Plaintiff despite the potential for coverage indicated by the 1971 deed. The court reversed the trial court's judgment on the bad faith claim and remanded for a determination of damages resulting from the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of punitive damages and its award of prejudgment interest on the additional diminution in value. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's findings. View "Bartel v. Chicago Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law