Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The 186-acre Bollinger Valley, in rural Moraga near St. Mary’s College, is sloped; about half of the proposed project site has grades over 20 percent, and “significant portions” have grades over 35 percent. The property is used for cattle grazing and a summer equestrian day camp. Bruzzone purchased an interest in the property in 1967. Before Moraga was incorporated as a city in 1974, the property's Contra Costa County zoning designation “allowed residential development with a density of approximately three dwelling units per acre.”In 1979, Moraga adopted its first general plan. The property was denominated “Public Open Space – Study.” Permitted uses were “[a]griculture and accessory buildings thereto.” Although originally meant to be temporary, the Study designation has remained in place. For several reasons, including safety and environmental concerns, Moraga denied applications to develop housing on the property.The trial court directed Moraga to give the property a legally compliant land-use designation but otherwise rejected Bruzzones’ claims. The court of appeal affirmed. The Study designation is legally invalid under Government Code 65302, but the lack of a legally compliant land-use designation alone did not preclude Moraga from denying the project application for unrelated reasons, none of which the Bruzzones challenge. The court also upheld the rejection of claims of inverse condemnation and equal protection and due process violations. View "Lafayette Bollinger Development v. Town of Moraga" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Olen Properties Corp. owned commercial property in the City of Newport Beach (the City) within an area known as the Koll Center. The Koll Center was a mixed-use development area, near the John Wayne Airport, San Joaquin Freshwater Marsh Reserve, and the University of California, Irvine. It was located within the “Airport Area,” a portion of the City adjacent to John Wayne Airport, governed by the City’s Airport Business Area Integrated Conceptual Development Plan. In 2020 and 2021, the City considered and approved the request of Real Party in Interest TPG (KCN) Acquisition, LLC (TPG) to develop a five-story, 312-unit residential housing project (the Project) on an existing surface parking lot serving the Koll Center’s existing commercial tenants. In an effort to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the City obtained an addendum (the Addendum) to an existing environmental impact report prepared in 2006 (the 2006 EIR) as part of its general plan update. The Addendum considered a wide range of possible environmental impacts but concluded the Project’s impacts “would either be the same or not substantially greater than those described by the [2006 EIR].” Plaintiff opposed approval of the Project before the City. Among other things, plaintiff argued the City could not rely upon an addendum to the 2006 EIR and was legally required to obtain a subsequent EIR. After the City’s approval of the Project, plaintiff filed suit, seeking a writ of mandate compelling the City to void its approval for violation of CEQA, and for injunctive relief, barring construction at the site. The trial court explained its denial in an extensive written ruling, addressing and rejecting each of plaintiff's arguments. The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court's judgment and affirmed. View "Olen Properties Corp. v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

Ocie Payne Hinkle (Ocie)2 was an 89-year-old woman who owned several parcels of property in Los Angeles, California. Ocie has an adult son, Ocy. A few years earlier, Ocie had started a relationship with Roi Wilson (Wilson). Ocie was hospitalized and medicated; while in that state, Wilson prevailed upon Ocie to grant him power of attorney over her affairs. Wilson then used that power of attorney to deed away much of Ocie’s real property. As pertinent to this case, while acting as Ocie’s “attorney-in-fact,” Wilson signed a grant deed giving Ocie’s property at 1723 Buckingham Road (the Buckingham property or the property) to Edmound Daire (Daire) (the October 2010 grant deed). Daire applied to Ridec LLC (Ridec) for a $650,000 loan and offered up the Buckingham property as collateral. Ridec retained a title insurer. Ridec’s title insurer sued Daire and Citibank, seeking—and obtaining—court orders freezing the disbursed loan funds still in Daire’s Citibank account. Ridec joined that lawsuit via a cross-complaint against Daire, Ocy, and PSG, in which it sought to establish the validity of its deed of trust. Ridec challenged the trial court’s ruling declaring its deed of trust invalid.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment finding that Ridec’s deed of trust is valid. Ridec’s appeal from the posttrial order denying its motion to set aside the judgment is, therefore, moot. The court explained that because none of the trial court’s reasons for disregarding section 764.060 and Tsasu are valid, the court erred in refusing to apply the governing statute and binding precedent interpreting that statute. View "Ridec LLC v. Hinkle" on Justia Law

Part of Visitacion’s land in San Francisco’s Visitacion Valley was formerly owned by Southern Pacific, which was, at the time of conveyance (1990), conducting railroad-related business on part of the property. The land subject to an easement is bounded by the right-of-way for mainline railroad tracks. At some point, railroad activities on the dominant tenement ceased. In 2015, the railroad sold the dominant tenement and an adjacent parcel (JHP property) and expressly conveyed to JHP its rights under the easement, although the deed contained no warranty regarding the continued existence of such rights. Visitacion, planning a large, mixed-use residential development and hoping to use the land that was encumbered by the easement, brought a quiet title action, alleging that the easement has been extinguished under the doctrine of abandonment. JHP denied abandonment and sought to establish its “full and complete legal and equitable ownership.”The court of appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment to JHP. Given the ambiguity of the easement deed and the uncertain state of the evidence bearing on its origination and use, the trial court erred in construing the deed in the context of these cross-motions for summary judgment. Visitacion’s evidence, if accepted, could establish abandonment. View "Visitacion Investment LLC v. 424 Jessie Historic Properties LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Richard Lauckhart and Sharon and Ronald Baumgartner as trustees of the Baumgartner Family Revocable Trust filed suit to prevent defendant El Macero Homeowners Association, a California nonprofit mutual benefit corporation (the Association), from acquiring property as common area and subjecting the plaintiffs’ residential subdivision to the requirements of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, including the levy of assessments to maintain the common area. In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs sought to cancel due to fraud a recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) under which the Association acts, enjoin the Association from accepting real property as common area or using assessments to fund its maintenance, and receive a judicial declaration that the declaration of CC&Rs was void and that the subdivision was not subject to the Davis-Stirling Act. The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend, finding the cancelation cause of action was time barred and did not plead fraud with particularity, the Association’s acquisition of the land was protected under the business judgment rule and could not be enjoined, and the request for declaratory relief was derivative of the other dismissed causes of action. Finding no reversible error in this judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Lauckhart v. El Macero Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

The Privette doctrine limits a property owner’s potential liability for on-the-job injuries sustained by employees of an independent contractor. An exception to the Privette doctrine’s rule of nonliability in cases where: “(1) [the property owner] knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” Plaintiff-appellant Travis Blaylock argued the trial court erred by failing to recognize there was a triable issue of fact about whether DMP 250 Newport Center, LLC, the owner of the premises on which he was injured, and DMP Management, LLC, the owner’s property manager (collectively DMP) knew or should have known of the allegedly concealed hazardous condition — an access panel in the floor of the crawl space in which he was working—that he fell through. The Court of Appeal found no error: while the evidence submitted by Blaylock might be sufficient to demonstrate DMP should have known the access panel existed, there was no evidence it knew or should have known the panel was either concealed from a person in the crawl space above, or that it was hazardous. View "Blaylock v. DMP 250 Newport Center" on Justia Law

The Monte Vista Villas Project, on the site of the former Leona Quarry, has been in development since the early 2000s. The developers planned to close the 128-acre quarry site, reclaim it, and develop the land into a residential neighborhood with over 400 residential units, a community center, a park, pedestrian trails, and other recreational areas. In 2005, the developers entered into an agreement with Oakland to pay certain fees to cover the costs of its project oversight. The agreement provided that the fees set forth in the agreement satisfied “all of the Developer’s obligations for fees due to the City for the Project.” In 2016, Oakland adopted ordinances that imposed new impact fees on development projects, intended to address the effects of development on affordable housing, transportation, and capital improvements, and assessed the new impact fees on the Project, then more than a decade into development, when the developers sought new building permits.The trial court vacated the imposition of the fees and directed Oakland to refrain from assessing any fee not specified in the agreement. The court of appeal reversed, finding that any provision in, or construction of, the parties’ agreement that prevents Oakland from imposing the impact fees on the instant development project constitutes an impermissible infringement of the city’s police power and is therefore invalid. View "Discovery Builders, Inc. v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

In 2018, voters in the City of South Lake Tahoe (City) enacted Measure T, an initiative that prohibited the use of dwellings in residential zones as short-term or vacation rentals. Measure T amended the City’s vacation home rental ordinances to bar the City from issuing any new permits for vacation home rentals in residential zones except for permanent residents’ dwellings, and to declare that all such existing and new permits would expire by the end of 2021. Measure T also imposed more strict occupancy limits on vacation rental homes which were to be effective immediately. Plaintiff South Lake Tahoe Property Owners Group brought this action against the City to have Measure T declared unconstitutional. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and denied plaintiff’s motion. On appeal, contended Measure T: (1) unconstitutionally interfered with vested property rights; (2) created an unconstitutional durational residency requirement to qualify for the exception to the ban; (3) exceeded the initiative power in violation of land use authority vested in the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA); and (4) violated rights of privacy and equal protection by restricting occupancy. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court to the extent that it found Measure T’s exception for resident owners did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "South Lake Tahoe Property etc. v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

Defendant Loretta Stiles lived in a Laguna Woods residential unit (the property) owned by Dan Blechman. Stiles was permitted to live at the property by Blechman without provision for the payment of rent or the duration of her stay. Stiles had worked for Blechman for many years and, instead of being paid a salary, he allowed her to live at the property beginning in 2011 and also paid her expenses. After Blechman passed away, the administrator of his estate, plaintiff Alex Borden, served Stiles with a 30-day notice to quit the property. After Stiles refused to leave, he filed an unlawful detainer action. Borden moved for summary judgment against Stiles. Stiles in turn moved for summary judgment, arguing Borden’s notice to quit failed to state just cause for terminating her tenancy, as required by the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 at Civil Code section 1946.2. The parties agreed in their respective motions Stiles had a tenancy at will. The trial court concluded section 1946.2 applied to Stiles’s tenancy and consequently granted Stiles’s motion and denied Borden’s motion on the ground Borden’s 30-day notice failed to state just cause for terminating the tenancy as defined in the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Stiles. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the record reflected the tenancy at issue was created by a hiring, and such a tenancy is “terminable at the pleasure of one of the parties.” The tenancy would have terminated when Stiles was notified of Blechman’s death. At that point, Stiles would have become a holdover tenant, and no longer in lawful occupation of the property. The Court found the record silent on the specifics regarding the timeframe in which Stiles performed work for Blechman in exchange for her tenancy, when Blechman passed away, when Stiles was notified of his death, and whether thereafter Borden had potentially entered into a tenant relationship with Stiles. Because triable issues of material fact existed as to whether Stiles was in lawful occupation of the property within the meaning of section 1946.2 (i)(3), summary judgment should not have been entered in either party’s favor. View "Borden v. Stiles" on Justia Law

RAR2 Villa Marina Center CA SPE, Inc., RAR2-Villa Marina Center CA, LLC, and Villa Marina Company, LLC (collectively, Villa entities) appealed from a judgment entered in this property tax refund action after the trial court sustained the demurrer filed by the County of Los Angeles (County) and denied the Villa entities’ summary judgment motion, upholding the decision of the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (Board) concerning the 2011 valuation of a shopping center owned by the Villa entities. In 2011 the Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office (Assessor) determined the value of the shopping center had decreased, setting the assessment roll value (roll value) at approximately $94 million. The Villa entities filed an assessment appeal with the Board seeking a further reduction of the assessed value to $48 million. On appeal, the Villa entities contend the Assessor had no authority to issue a raise letter recommending an increase in the property’s valuation more than one year after the initial assessment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court explained that a raise letter issued under section 1609.4 providing notice, in the context of an assessment appeal, that the assessor recommends a higher valuation than the roll value is not properly characterized as a proposal by the assessor to correct the roll value to reflect a decline in the property’s value, even if the initial assessment reflected a decline in value, and therefore, the one-year limitations period under section 4731, subdivision (c), does not apply. The court agreed that the County and the Board carried out their statutory duty in adopting the higher valuation for the property. View "RAR2 Villa Marina Center CA SPE, Inc. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law