Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Privette doctrine limits a property owner’s potential liability for on-the-job injuries sustained by employees of an independent contractor. An exception to the Privette doctrine’s rule of nonliability in cases where: “(1) [the property owner] knows or reasonably should know of a concealed, pre-existing hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the contractor does not know and could not reasonably ascertain the condition; and (3) the landowner fails to warn the contractor.” Plaintiff-appellant Travis Blaylock argued the trial court erred by failing to recognize there was a triable issue of fact about whether DMP 250 Newport Center, LLC, the owner of the premises on which he was injured, and DMP Management, LLC, the owner’s property manager (collectively DMP) knew or should have known of the allegedly concealed hazardous condition — an access panel in the floor of the crawl space in which he was working—that he fell through. The Court of Appeal found no error: while the evidence submitted by Blaylock might be sufficient to demonstrate DMP should have known the access panel existed, there was no evidence it knew or should have known the panel was either concealed from a person in the crawl space above, or that it was hazardous. View "Blaylock v. DMP 250 Newport Center" on Justia Law

The Monte Vista Villas Project, on the site of the former Leona Quarry, has been in development since the early 2000s. The developers planned to close the 128-acre quarry site, reclaim it, and develop the land into a residential neighborhood with over 400 residential units, a community center, a park, pedestrian trails, and other recreational areas. In 2005, the developers entered into an agreement with Oakland to pay certain fees to cover the costs of its project oversight. The agreement provided that the fees set forth in the agreement satisfied “all of the Developer’s obligations for fees due to the City for the Project.” In 2016, Oakland adopted ordinances that imposed new impact fees on development projects, intended to address the effects of development on affordable housing, transportation, and capital improvements, and assessed the new impact fees on the Project, then more than a decade into development, when the developers sought new building permits.The trial court vacated the imposition of the fees and directed Oakland to refrain from assessing any fee not specified in the agreement. The court of appeal reversed, finding that any provision in, or construction of, the parties’ agreement that prevents Oakland from imposing the impact fees on the instant development project constitutes an impermissible infringement of the city’s police power and is therefore invalid. View "Discovery Builders, Inc. v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

In 2018, voters in the City of South Lake Tahoe (City) enacted Measure T, an initiative that prohibited the use of dwellings in residential zones as short-term or vacation rentals. Measure T amended the City’s vacation home rental ordinances to bar the City from issuing any new permits for vacation home rentals in residential zones except for permanent residents’ dwellings, and to declare that all such existing and new permits would expire by the end of 2021. Measure T also imposed more strict occupancy limits on vacation rental homes which were to be effective immediately. Plaintiff South Lake Tahoe Property Owners Group brought this action against the City to have Measure T declared unconstitutional. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and denied plaintiff’s motion. On appeal, contended Measure T: (1) unconstitutionally interfered with vested property rights; (2) created an unconstitutional durational residency requirement to qualify for the exception to the ban; (3) exceeded the initiative power in violation of land use authority vested in the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA); and (4) violated rights of privacy and equal protection by restricting occupancy. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court to the extent that it found Measure T’s exception for resident owners did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "South Lake Tahoe Property etc. v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

Defendant Loretta Stiles lived in a Laguna Woods residential unit (the property) owned by Dan Blechman. Stiles was permitted to live at the property by Blechman without provision for the payment of rent or the duration of her stay. Stiles had worked for Blechman for many years and, instead of being paid a salary, he allowed her to live at the property beginning in 2011 and also paid her expenses. After Blechman passed away, the administrator of his estate, plaintiff Alex Borden, served Stiles with a 30-day notice to quit the property. After Stiles refused to leave, he filed an unlawful detainer action. Borden moved for summary judgment against Stiles. Stiles in turn moved for summary judgment, arguing Borden’s notice to quit failed to state just cause for terminating her tenancy, as required by the Tenant Protection Act of 2019 at Civil Code section 1946.2. The parties agreed in their respective motions Stiles had a tenancy at will. The trial court concluded section 1946.2 applied to Stiles’s tenancy and consequently granted Stiles’s motion and denied Borden’s motion on the ground Borden’s 30-day notice failed to state just cause for terminating the tenancy as defined in the statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Stiles. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the record reflected the tenancy at issue was created by a hiring, and such a tenancy is “terminable at the pleasure of one of the parties.” The tenancy would have terminated when Stiles was notified of Blechman’s death. At that point, Stiles would have become a holdover tenant, and no longer in lawful occupation of the property. The Court found the record silent on the specifics regarding the timeframe in which Stiles performed work for Blechman in exchange for her tenancy, when Blechman passed away, when Stiles was notified of his death, and whether thereafter Borden had potentially entered into a tenant relationship with Stiles. Because triable issues of material fact existed as to whether Stiles was in lawful occupation of the property within the meaning of section 1946.2 (i)(3), summary judgment should not have been entered in either party’s favor. View "Borden v. Stiles" on Justia Law

RAR2 Villa Marina Center CA SPE, Inc., RAR2-Villa Marina Center CA, LLC, and Villa Marina Company, LLC (collectively, Villa entities) appealed from a judgment entered in this property tax refund action after the trial court sustained the demurrer filed by the County of Los Angeles (County) and denied the Villa entities’ summary judgment motion, upholding the decision of the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (Board) concerning the 2011 valuation of a shopping center owned by the Villa entities. In 2011 the Los Angeles County Assessor’s Office (Assessor) determined the value of the shopping center had decreased, setting the assessment roll value (roll value) at approximately $94 million. The Villa entities filed an assessment appeal with the Board seeking a further reduction of the assessed value to $48 million. On appeal, the Villa entities contend the Assessor had no authority to issue a raise letter recommending an increase in the property’s valuation more than one year after the initial assessment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court explained that a raise letter issued under section 1609.4 providing notice, in the context of an assessment appeal, that the assessor recommends a higher valuation than the roll value is not properly characterized as a proposal by the assessor to correct the roll value to reflect a decline in the property’s value, even if the initial assessment reflected a decline in value, and therefore, the one-year limitations period under section 4731, subdivision (c), does not apply. The court agreed that the County and the Board carried out their statutory duty in adopting the higher valuation for the property. View "RAR2 Villa Marina Center CA SPE, Inc. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Regents adopted a long-range development plan (LRDP) for UC Berkeley through the year 2020. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR, California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) noted the LRDP “represents a maximum amount of net new growth.” which the University could substantially exceed only by amending the LRDP. In 2018, the Regents approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing and certified a Supplemental EIR, which established an updated population baseline.SBN challenged decisions to increase enrollment beyond the level described in the 2005 EIR without further CEQA review. On remand, the trial court found that parts of the SEIR did not comply with CEQA and ordered the Regents to revise the SEIR and suspend enrollment increases. The Regents cited its certification of a 2021 LRDP and related EIR and Senate Bill 118, which modifies section 21080.09 to clarify that “Enrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute a project” under CEQA and limit the remedies available if a court finds deficiencies in an environmental review based on enrollment.The court of appeal vacated, holding that certification of the 2021 EIR and S.B. 118 moot SBN’s challenge to the enrollment increases and make unenforceable the orders suspending enrollment increases. The SEIR’s project description complied with CEQA and there was no error in the discussion of mitigation measures for historic resources. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Niki-Alexander Shetty purchased a home that had been foreclosed upon by a homeowners association. The home, however, was still subject to a defaulted mortgage and deed of trust between the bank and the original borrower. Defendants, the bank and mortgage servicer, recorded a notice of default and scheduled a foreclosure sale. Shetty sought to cure the default and resume regular payments on the loan. Defendants, however, refused, insisting that, as a stranger to the loan, he was not entitled to reinstate it. Shetty sued for wrongful foreclosure, arguing he had the right to reinstate the loan pursuant to California Civil Code section 2924c. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that Shetty did not have standing under the statute. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that interpretation of the statute and reversed the judgment as to all defendants except Mortgage Electronic Registration Services, Inc. (MERS), whom Shetty conceded had no liability. View "Shetty v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured by fellow fans at the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (Coliseum) near the end of a Los Angeles Rams football game. Plaintiff, his wife, and two daughters brought an action against Contemporary Services Corporation (CSC), the Los Angeles Rams (Rams) and the University of Southern California (USC), alleging causes of action for negligence, premises liability and related torts. All three Defendants obtained summary judgment in their favor. This appeal involves two of the defendants: CSC and the Rams. CSC is an entity hired to provide crowd management services at the Coliseum during certain events, including Rams football games. In granting CSC’s and the Rams’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court assumed that both Defendants had a duty to protect Plaintiff and his family and had failed to take the ameliorative steps proposed by Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment on the ground that these failures were not the cause of the assault. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs do not provide any record citation showing how response time was measured. Plaintiffs seem to assume that response time is measured from when a CSC employee first decides to seek assistance from APEX or LAPD to the time APEX or LAPD personnel arrives. However, the court explained that It is equally, if not more, likely that response time is measured from when APEX or LAPD receive the request for assistance from CSC command. Plaintiffs have not created a triable issue of fact concerning whether improving CSC communications would have prevented the assault View "Romero v. Los Angeles Rams" on Justia Law

Samsara rented San Francisco office space from Rreef for a ten-year term, to be in “delivery condition” by November 1, 2019. Samsara provided an $11,384,368.00 letter of credit as “collateral for the full performance.” In 2021, Samsara sued, asserting that in July 2019, after Rreef had certified “delivery condition,” Samsara discovered that the premises were contaminated with lead and asbestos and that after Samsara conducted testing, Rreef cut off its access to the premises. The next day, Rreef served Samsara a 5-day notice to pay rent or quit based on Samsara’s alleged failure to pay rent for August-September 2021 ($1,826,697.95). Rreef subsequently filed an unlawful detainer complaint, alleging that Samsara stopped paying rent and had created a pretext to avoid its lease obligations. In October 2021, Rreef sought a writ of attachment in the unlawful detainer action, seeking $3,796,175.51: the amount demanded in the 5-day notice and $1,784,477.53 for October-November.The court granted Rreef’s application. The court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court rejected Samsara’s arguments that the amount that Rreef sought to attach must be reduced under Code of Civil Procedure 483.015(b)(4) by the amount remaining on the letter of credit and that the trial court erroneously refused to consider Samsara’s affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel. However, the trial court declined to consider Samsara’s retaliatory eviction defense and whether Rreef sought attachment for an improper purpose. View "Rreef America Reit II Corp, YYYY v. Samsara, Inc." on Justia Law

The eight-acre San Jose City View Plaza contained nine buildings, including the Bank, built in 1971, which later housed the County Family Court. The Bank was eligible for listing on the California Register of Historic Resources and National Register of Historic Places. The site development permit provided for the demolition of all structures, followed by the construction of three, 19-story office towers, 65,000 square feet of ground-floor retail, and five levels of underground parking.The city council certified the Downtown Strategy 2040 final environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000 (CEQA)), finding that the Plaza required a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The draft SEIR identified the proposed demolition of the buildings as a “significant unavoidable impact” and presented mitigation measures, to document the structures, advertise their availability for relocation, and otherwise make the structures available for salvage. The city voted not to designate the Bank as a city landmark and approved the permit, certifying the Final SEIR and rejecting project alternatives as infeasible because the “anticipated economic, social, and other benefits” of the project outweighed its “significant and unavoidable impacts.”After the trial court denied a mandate petition filed by opponents, the Bank was demolished. The court of appeal affirmed. The Final SEIR’s discussion of mitigation for the unavoidable loss of significant historic resources complied with CEQA. San Jose did not abuse its discretion by briefly considering and rejecting additional mitigation measures. View "Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law