Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Southern California Edison Company (Edison), an investor-owned public utility, filed a complaint in eminent domain to condemn an easement across a landowner’s property for the purpose of accessing and maintaining existing power transmission lines. Edison also filed a motion for order of prejudgment possession under the quick-take provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.1 The trial court granted the motion. The landowners filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting the court vacate the order granting Edison prejudgment possession.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the order of prejudgment possession and directed the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the motion. Because the maintenance of power transmission lines is a matter of urgency, the court issued a peremptory writ in the first instance. The court explained a trial court evaluating a quick-take motion in the absence of a timely opposition shall grant the motion “if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain (B) The plaintiff deposited pursuant to Article 1 an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.”   Here, the trial court did not make express findings. Among other things, the court did not expressly find that it was necessary for the access easement to be 16 feet wide, that the 16-foot-wide access easement was compatible with the least private injury, or that it was necessary for Edison to have the right to move guy wires and anchors, crossarms, and other physical fixtures onto the property. View "Robinson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Lunada Bay Boys (Bay Boys) are a group of young and middle-aged men local to the City of Palos Verdes (the “City”), who consider themselves to be the self-appointed guardians of Lunada Bay. One of their tenets is to keep outsiders away from the surf location. They accomplish this through threats and violence. Plaintiffs are (1) two non-locals who encountered harassment by the Bay Boys when they tried to surf Lunada Bay and (2) a non-profit dedicated to preserving coastal access. They brought suit against the Bay Boys, some of its individual members, and the City itself for conspiracy to deny access under the California Coastal Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the City conspired with the Bay Boys essentially to privatize Lunada Bay, depriving nonlocals of access. The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an unpermitted “development” in the Bay Boys’ denial of access to the beach. Further, the court explained that parties can, in fact, be liable for Coastal Act violations under the doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy liability is not limited to tort; defendants may be liable if they agree to engage in conduct that violates a duty imposed by statute. The court wrote, at this point, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an actionable conspiracy in which the City has participated. View "Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates" on Justia Law

After the Arcadia City Council approved J.W.’s application to expand the first story of her single-family home and add a second story (“the project”), Arcadians for Environmental Preservation (AEP), a grassroots organization led by J.W.’s next-door neighbor, filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus challenging the City’s decision. AEP’s petition primarily alleged the city council had erred in finding the project categorically exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and CEQA’s implementing guidelines. The superior court denied the petition, ruling as a threshold matter that AEP had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that AEP failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on the question of whether the project fell within the scope of the class 1 exemption. Further, the court found that AEP’s general objections to project approval did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Moreover, the court wrote that AEP has not demonstrated the City failed to proceed in a manner required by law when it impliedly found no exception to the exemption applied. Finally, the court held that AEP has not demonstrated the City erred in concluding the cumulative effects exception did not apply. View "Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of Arcadia" on Justia Law

Defendants Churchwell White LLP, a law firm, and two of its attorneys, Barbara Brenner and Robin Baral (collectively Churchwell) represented a corporation in an action to quiet title to water rights. In the quiet title action, Churchwell sued the City of Weed (City) and the plaintiffs here, Water for Citizens of Weed California, its members, and other citizens of the City (collectively Citizens). The trial court in that action granted Citizens’s special motion to strike the complaint (an anti-SLAPP motion). Citizens then filed this action against Churchwell, alleging malicious prosecution for naming them in the quiet title action. Churchwell, in turn, filed its own anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted, concluding Citizens did not establish a probability of prevailing on their claim. The court determined Citizens did not show that Churchwell lacked probable cause or acted out of malice in naming them in the quiet title action. Citizens appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of Churchwell’s motion. View "Water for Citizens of Weed Cal. v. Churchwell White LLP" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Irvine adopted a plan to guide development of the Irvine Business Complex (the IBC), which covered roughly 2800 acres in the City. It also prepared and approved a program environmental impact report (the 2010 PEIR) that studied the effects of the development plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Several years later, real party in interest and appellant Gemdale 2400 Barranca Holdings, LLC (Gemdale), submitted a plan to redevelop a 4.95-acre parcel in the IBC. The City determined all the environmental effects of the proposed project had been studied in the 2010 PEIR, and it found the project would have no further significant environmental effects. It approved the project over the objections of Hale Holdings, LLC, the managing member of plaintiff IBC Business Owners for Sensible Development (petitioner). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court granted the writ and entered judgment in favor of petitioner. The City and Gemdale appealed, arguing the City correctly approved the project. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the contentions made on appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence showing the project’s greenhouse gas emissions were within the scope of the 2010 PEIR; and (2) no exemption applied because the project involved unusual circumstances which could cause significant environmental effects. As such, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "IBC Business Owners for Sensible Development v. City of Irvine" on Justia Law

Livermore adopted a General Plan and a Downtown Specific Plan in 2004, for which it certified an environmental impact report (EIR). A subsequent EIR (SEIR) was certified in 2009, after amendments to the Downtown Specific Plan increased the amount of development allowed. In 2018, Livermore approved a plan for redeveloping city-owned sites in the “Downtown Core” with park space, retail buildings, cultural facilities, multifamily workforce housing, a public parking garage, and a hotel. Livermore selected Eden to develop the housing. Addenda to the SEIR were prepared. The proposed housing project comprised two four-story buildings with 130 affordable housing units. . Livermore’s Planning Commission approved Eden’s application. The city approved design review and a vesting tentative parcel map, finding that no substantial changes were proposed that would require major revisions to the previous EIR, SEIR, or addenda and that the project was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000) as consistent with a specific plan for which an EIR had been certified and as infill development.The trial court required SLD to file an undertaking of $500,000 in its challenges to the approvals, finding that the action was brought for the purpose of delaying affordable housing and that the undertaking would not cause SLD undue economic harm. The court of appeal rejected arguments that the project was inconsistent with the planning and zoning law and that further review of the environmental impacts was necessary and upheld the requirement that SLD post a bond. View "Save Livermore Downtown v. City of Livermore" on Justia Law

Appellant Ventura29, LLC purchased property (the Property) in the City of San Buenaventura (City). Appellant filed a complaint against the City alleging that Appellant “is in the process of developing a multi-unit townhome project” on the Property. The first cause of action is for inverse condemnation. Appellant claims City’s modification of an approved grading plan for the Property “resulted in an unconstitutional taking for which [it] is entitled to just compensation.” The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal after the trial court had sustained a demurrer to Appellant’s second amended complaint (complaint). Appellant contends the complaint states causes of action for private nuisance, trespass, and negligence based on the City’s dumping of uncertified fill on the Property in 1977.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that these causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The court reasoned that Appellant’s “action on the case” theory is based on its claim that the primary injury to its property was not caused by the dumping of the uncertified fill. Instead, it was caused by the consequences of the dumping. Therefore, Appellant argued, the statute of limitations on the causes of action began to run when the City Engineer made the modification. The “action on the case” theory is of no assistance to Appellant. The theory, in effect, restates the first cause of action for inverse condemnation. Appellant forfeited its right to object to the modification of the grading plan because it had complied with the modification without exhausting its administrative remedies. View "Ventura29 v. City of San Buenaventura" on Justia Law

Defendant Department of General Services and real party Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly (collectively DGS) prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) to determine the environmental effects of a project they proposed which would significantly affect the California State Capitol Building in Sacramento (Historic Capitol). DGS would demolish the State Capitol Building Annex attached to the Historic Capitol and replace it with a larger new annex building, construct an underground visitor center attached to the Historic Capitol’s west side, and construct an underground parking garage east of the new Annex. Plaintiffs Save Our Capitol! and Save the Capitol, Save the Trees filed petitions for writ of mandate contending the EIR did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied the petitions. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, arguing: (1) the EIR lacked a stable project description; (2) the EIR did not adequately analyze and mitigate the project’s impacts on cultural resources, biological resources, aesthetics, traffic, and utilities and service systems; (3) the EIR’s analysis of alternatives to the project was legally deficient; and (4) DGS violated CEQA by not recirculating the EIR a second time before certifying it. The Court of Appeal reversed in part, finding the EIR’s project description, analyses of historical resources and aesthetics, and analysis of alternatives did not comply with CEQA. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Save Our Capitol! v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

The Jenkinses bought a one-bedroom home, built in 1909, with a small accessory cottage in San Anselmo. Following conversations with an architect, contractors, and the Town Planning Director, they sought permits to demolish the existing structures and build a new home with a detached studio. The Planning Commission approved the project. The Jenkinses nevertheless worked with neighbors to accommodate their concerns and submitted revised plans, which were also approved. Four individuals unsuccessfully appealed to the Town Council. Attorney Brandt-Hawley filed a mandamus petition on behalf of an unincorporated association and an individual, alleging violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), although the appeal did not include any CEQA claim and CEQA has a categorical exemption for single-family homes, and “violation of the Town Municipal Code,” without citation.The trial judge denied the petition, criticizing aspects of Brandt-Hawley’s briefing and advocacy. Petitioners appealed, then offered to dismiss the appeal for a waiver of fees and costs. The Jenkinses rejected the offer. On the day the opening brief was due, Brandt-Hawley dismissed the appeal. The Jenkinses sued Brandt-Hawley for malicious prosecution. The court denied Brandt-Hawley’s special anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed. The Jenkinses met their burden under step two of the anti-SLAPP procedure demonstrating a probability of success on their complaint. View "Jenkins v. Brandt-Hawley" on Justia Law

Division purchased two office buildings from the city that included a short-term leaseback at below-market rent. Division alleged that the assessor failed to take the leaseback into account when valuing the buildings for property tax purposes and claims this violated Revenue and Taxation Code section 402.1. After failing to persuade the City’s Assessment Appeals Board, Division filed suit. The trial court dismissed, holding that the lease did not constitute an “enforceable restriction” under section 402.1.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that Division paid $53 million, a price discounted to reflect the leaseback. While a purchase price may play a significant role in the reassessment of property upon its sale, that price is only the beginning of the inquiry; one factor that may skew the purchase price and make it an unreliable indicator of fair market value is an agreement containing restrictions on the buyer’s use of the property. Such restrictions do not bind the assessor. Government-imposed land use restrictions must be taken into account when a property is valued for assessment purposes but under section 402.1 “enforceable restrictions” are land use restrictions imposed by the government under its police power, not restrictions agreed to by a public entity selling property to a private buyer in an ordinary arm’s-length transaction. View "290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law