Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Air 7, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and its owner, the Peter J. Koral Trust, owned a Gulfstream G-550 jet aircraft. Air 7’s headquarters were located at the Camarillo Airport in Ventura County. The owner was a resident of California. The County of Ventura (the “County”) imposed a tax on the aircraft that was permanently removed from California before the tax lien date of January 1 for the tax year 2017. Air 7 sued the County for a refund of the taxes, statutory interest, and penalties the County had imposed. The trial court found the aircraft was not permanently removed from Ventura County on the tax lien date because it had not established situs elsewhere. The trial court entered judgment for the County.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the aircraft was removed from California with the intent that removal be permanent, and the aircraft never returned to California during the 2017 tax year. Accordingly, the court concluded the aircraft was not “situated” or “habitually situated” in California. The tax imposed on the aircraft violates California law irrespective of whether the aircraft was situated and taxed in another state. View "Air 7, LLC v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

After the San Francisco Planning Commission approved a final mitigated negative declaration for the owner’s proposed renovation of a residence, Kaufman, the owner of an adjacent property, appealed the matter to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, which reversed the approval. The owner filed a petition for writ of mandate against the City and County, the Board, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Department, naming Kaufman as a real party in interest. In response,Kaufman filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) law (Code Civil Procedure 425.16), arguing that the petition arose from his protected petitioning activity and lacked minimal merit. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded Kaufman attorney fees as the prevailing party. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in finding the mandamus petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct, as the activities that form the basis for the petition’s causes of action are all acts or omissions of the Board. That Kaufman’s administrative appeal preceded or even triggered the events leading to the petition’s causes of action against the Board did not mean that the petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct within the contemplation of the anti-SLAPP law. View "Durkin v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In the 1970s-1980s, the County approved maps for two subdivisions bordered by a tributary of “Murderer’s Creek.” The creek is a natural watercourse that is the main receptacle for storm runoff emanating from the watershed above the properties and is the only reasonable means of collecting and conveying that runoff. Pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act, the County required the developers to make drainage improvements to collect and convey water from the subdivisions to the creek. Contributing to runoff were two private roads serving as ingress and egress to the subdivisions and one county-owned road. adjacent to one subdivision. As provided by the Map Act, the County required the developers to dedicate drainage easements to the County. When it approved the subdivision maps, however, the County did not accept the offers of dedication. The drainage improvements remained in the ownership of the developers and later the homeowners.The owners bought lots in those subdivisions in 2010 and 2016. They sued the County and a flood control district for inverse condemnation and tort claims after drainage improvements constructed more than 40 years earlier failed and serious erosion and subsidence damaged their properties. The superior court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. As a matter of law, a public entity must either own or exercise actual control over a waterway or drainage improvements to render them public works for which the public entity is responsible. View "Shenson v. County of Contra Costa" on Justia Law

In 1985, Palo Alto established the Commercial Downtown zoning district with parking regulations that allowed for “payment of an in-lieu monetary contribution to the city to defray the cost” of new, off-site parking spaces for “sites which would otherwise be precluded from development due to parking constraints.” In 1995, the city recognized the need to further mitigate insufficient downtown parking facilities and established an in-lieu parking fee for new, nonresidential development in the “University Avenue parking assessment district.” City staff has periodically submitted “five-year findings” on the parking fund, consistent with the Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code, 66000).The plaintiffs, developers who paid the fees as a condition of approval of a building project, sued, seeking a refund of their unexpended fees. The city argued that the fee was not subject to the Mitigation Fee Act; that the five-year finding and refund provisions did not apply; that, even if the Act did apply, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and that it complied with the Act’s requirements by belatedly adopting five-year findings.The court of appeal reversed the trial court, ordering a refund of the plaintiffs’ unexpended fees. The fee is subject to the Act, and the action is not time-barred. The failure to timely make five-year findings triggered the refund provision. Section 65010(b), does not require that plaintiffs make an independent showing of prejudice for a violation of section 66001(d) View "Hamilton and High, LLC v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law

Government Code 65913.4 provides for streamlined, ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified requirements. Berkeley denied Ruegg’s application for ministerial approval of a mixed-use development under section 65913.4. Ruegg alleged violations of both section 65913.4 and the Housing Accountability Act (HAA, section 65589.5). The trial court found Berkeley was not required to approve the proposed project under section 65913.4 and denied Ruegg’s petition without reaching the HAA issues. The court of appeal, without addressing the HAA, directed the trial court to grant the writ petition.On remand, the trial court reasoned that it could not avoid ruling on the HAA issues. With respect to the section 65913.4 claim the court ordered Berkeley to issue the permits; it set a briefing schedule and hearing date concerning the HAA issues. The court of appeal declined to prohibit that hearing. Berkeley issued the permit. After a hearing, the trial court found that the disapproval of the application violated the HAA and that Ruegg was entitled to the “albeit duplicative” injunctive relief. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the HAA issue, which was not forfeited nor rendered moot by the prior order. View "Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

Landlords purchased two derelict Berkeley single-family homes and converted them into triplexes. One house had been operated as an unpermitted rooming house and the other had been registered as a rooming house since 2000. After the units were rented, a dispute arose as to whether the properties were subject to Berkeley’s Rent Stabilization and Eviction Ordinance. Landlords contended the new units were exempt from local rent control under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code 1954.50, which provides an exemption for residential units that have a certificate of occupancy issued after February 1, 1995. Berkeley’s Rent Stabilization Board disagreed as to four of the six units. The Board concluded two units in each building were carved from space that had been rented for residential use before the current certificates of occupancy were issued; those units reflect a mere conversion from one form of residential use to another, rather than an expansion of the housing stock. Only an attic unit in one building and a basement unit in the other are exempt from local rent control as new constructionThe court of appeal agreed. Because the four units in dispute were converted from space long dedicated to residential use, precedent indicates that Costa-Hawkins does not exempt them from local rent control as new construction. View "NCR Properties, LLC v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

People who do not want an eldercare facility built near them have been fighting the project since 2017. Others want the facility, saying the project would fit the neighborhood and the public needs it. The trial court rejected the opponents’ challenge, which was based on Los Angeles zoning laws, the California Environmental Quality Act, and the Coastal Act. These neighbors appealed. The three respondents—the City of Los Angeles, the California Coastal Commission, and the developer— defend the trial court ruling. At issue is whether a reasonable person could agree with the City’s conclusion that adding this urban building to this urban area was compatible with the plan for Brentwood and Pacific Palisades.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that a reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion as the City: that this proposal for an urban building is compatible with the plans for this urban area. Further, the court explained that it was for the Commission to weigh conflicting evidence; and the court may reverse only if a reasonable person could not have reached the same conclusion. For example, the neighbors raise the specter of a parking calamity, but the Commission concluded the nominal increase in traffic would not significantly displace street parking for hikers bound for the trails. The eldercare facility would, after all, include underground parking. This logic is sound. Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s and the City’s decisions. View "Pacific Palisades Residents Assn., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff River’s Side at Washington Square Homeowners Association was established to manage a development consisting of 25 residential units and common areas. It sued Defendants River’s Side LLC et al. for construction defects in the residential units. Defendants demurred to six of the seven causes of action asserted against them, arguing a homeowners association lacked standing to sue on behalf of its members for defects in residential units that it did not own and had no obligation to repair. Plaintiff alleged it had standing to bring this action on behalf of its members pursuant to Civil Code section 945, Civil Code section 5980, and Code of Civil Procedure section 382. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing under Civil Code sections 945 and 5980, and that Code of Civil Procedure section 382 was inapplicable. Because the order sustaining the demurrer left one cause of action remaining, it was not immediately appealable, and Plaintiff thus challenged the order by petition for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiff had standing to bring claims for damages to the common areas pursuant to Civil Code sections 945 and 5980, and that it at least nominally alleged such damages. The Court further concluded Plaintiff might have standing to bring claims for damages to the residential units that sound in contract or fraud if it could meet the requirements for bringing a representative action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 382. The Court also determined Plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend to cure any standing defect. The Court thus granted the petition for mandamus relief and directed the trial court to reversed its order granting the demurrer. View "River's Side at Washington Sq. Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Southern California Edison Company (Edison), an investor-owned public utility, filed a complaint in eminent domain to condemn an easement across a landowner’s property for the purpose of accessing and maintaining existing power transmission lines. Edison also filed a motion for order of prejudgment possession under the quick-take provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.1 The trial court granted the motion. The landowners filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting the court vacate the order granting Edison prejudgment possession.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the order of prejudgment possession and directed the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the motion. Because the maintenance of power transmission lines is a matter of urgency, the court issued a peremptory writ in the first instance. The court explained a trial court evaluating a quick-take motion in the absence of a timely opposition shall grant the motion “if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain (B) The plaintiff deposited pursuant to Article 1 an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.”   Here, the trial court did not make express findings. Among other things, the court did not expressly find that it was necessary for the access easement to be 16 feet wide, that the 16-foot-wide access easement was compatible with the least private injury, or that it was necessary for Edison to have the right to move guy wires and anchors, crossarms, and other physical fixtures onto the property. View "Robinson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Lunada Bay Boys (Bay Boys) are a group of young and middle-aged men local to the City of Palos Verdes (the “City”), who consider themselves to be the self-appointed guardians of Lunada Bay. One of their tenets is to keep outsiders away from the surf location. They accomplish this through threats and violence. Plaintiffs are (1) two non-locals who encountered harassment by the Bay Boys when they tried to surf Lunada Bay and (2) a non-profit dedicated to preserving coastal access. They brought suit against the Bay Boys, some of its individual members, and the City itself for conspiracy to deny access under the California Coastal Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the City conspired with the Bay Boys essentially to privatize Lunada Bay, depriving nonlocals of access. The trial court granted the City judgment on the pleadings.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an unpermitted “development” in the Bay Boys’ denial of access to the beach. Further, the court explained that parties can, in fact, be liable for Coastal Act violations under the doctrine of conspiracy. Conspiracy liability is not limited to tort; defendants may be liable if they agree to engage in conduct that violates a duty imposed by statute. The court wrote, at this point, Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged an actionable conspiracy in which the City has participated. View "Spencer v. City of Palos Verdes Estates" on Justia Law