Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit organization challenged the County of Los Angeles's approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. The project included a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map. The organization alleged that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by failing to adequately analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts and by not providing proper procedural notices. They also claimed violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and local zoning laws.The Los Angeles County Superior Court granted the developer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the organization's claims were barred by the 90-day limitations period under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA. The court ruled that the organization failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map, which was required for any action challenging a subdivision decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 of the SMA did not bar the organization's CEQA claims to the extent they alleged procedural violations and failures to analyze and disclose environmental impacts, as these claims were unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that the CEQA claims challenging the adequacy of mitigation measures imposed as conditions of the project's approval were barred by the SMA's 90-day limitations period. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding the CEQA cause of action and grant it concerning the SMA and zoning law violations. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

A company, A.D. Improvements, Inc. (ADI), leased property from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Caltrans had initially acquired the property, which was undeveloped at the time, for a freeway project. ADI used the property commercially as a staging area for equipment and machinery. In 2021, Caltrans deemed the property "excess real property" as it was no longer needed for the freeway project. ADI sought to purchase the property under Streets and Highways Code section 118.1, which requires Caltrans to offer to sell excess commercial property to the current occupant. Caltrans denied the application, arguing the property was not commercial when acquired.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County agreed with Caltrans, interpreting the statute to mean that the property had to be commercial at the time of acquisition. The court denied ADI's petition for a writ of mandate to compel Caltrans to offer the property for sale.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the statute's plain language and legislative history indicated that the property only needed to be commercial at the time it was deemed excess, not when it was acquired. The court concluded that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions to issue a writ requiring Caltrans to offer the property for sale to ADI at fair market value. The court held that Caltrans must comply with its ministerial duty under section 118.1 to sell the excess commercial property to the current occupant. ADI was awarded its costs on appeal. View "A.D. Improvements v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2016, the plaintiff purchased a shopping center from the defendants, which included a dry cleaning business. Before the sale, the defendants provided a 2013 visual inspection report but did not disclose a more detailed soil vapor survey report, which the plaintiff later discovered. After the purchase, the plaintiff incurred significant costs for cleaning up hazardous substances found in the soil. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had withheld critical information about the property's condition.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2018, alleging fraud and violations of the Civil Code. During discovery, the defendants served requests for admission, which the plaintiff failed to respond to on time. The defendants moved to have the requests deemed admitted. The plaintiff later served a response with objections, but the trial court deemed the responses non-compliant and granted the defendants' motion, imposing sanctions. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to withdraw the deemed admissions was denied for failing to show mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the presence of waived objections in the plaintiff's proposed response did not necessarily prevent substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. The court found that the trial court had erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the plaintiff's responses were substantially compliant. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including vacating the order deeming the requests admitted, reconsidering sanctions, and allowing additional discovery. The plaintiff was awarded costs for the appeal. View "Katayama v. Continental Investment Group" on Justia Law

In this case, the decedents, Robert and Elise Sandiford, and Deon Detes Abrams, Sr., died after their vehicles collided on State Route 99 (SR 99) and struck a tree on land owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific). The relatives of the decedents sued Union Pacific, alleging negligence for failing to remove the tree or take measures to protect the public from the dangerous condition it posed. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to remove the tree. The trial court denied the motion, finding no judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care under Civil Code section 1714.The trial court's denial of summary judgment was based on the application of factors from Rowland v. Christian, which did not support creating an exception to the ordinary duty of care. Union Pacific then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking to overturn the trial court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that Union Pacific did not have a duty to remove the tree or take other measures to protect the driving public from the alleged dangerous condition posed by the tree. The court considered the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury, and the closeness of the connection between Union Pacific’s conduct and the injury. It also weighed public policy factors, including moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, and the availability of insurance. The court concluded that public policy clearly supported creating a judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care, thus granting Union Pacific's petition for a writ of mandate and directing the trial court to grant Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In May 2017, the City of Alameda leased residential property to Shelby Sheehan. Sheehan stopped paying rent in December 2020 and did not pay for over 17 months. On April 5, 2022, the City served Sheehan with a three-day notice to pay rent or vacate, specifying payment to be made to "City of Alameda c/o River Rock Real Estate Group." Sheehan neither paid nor vacated, prompting the City to file an unlawful detainer action.Sheehan moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the notice was defective because it did not name a natural person as the payee and was ambiguous about the payment method. The trial court agreed, finding the notice invalid for not identifying a natural person and for being ambiguous about acceptable payment methods. Consequently, the court dismissed the action, and the City appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. The court disagreed with the trial court's narrow interpretation of "person" under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161(2), holding that "person" includes corporations as well as natural persons. However, the court found the notice defective because it did not provide the correct and complete name of the corporation to whom rent should be paid, creating ambiguity and confusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Sheehan, concluding that the notice did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. The court did not address the trial court's finding of ambiguity based on payment method due to the notice's other deficiencies. View "City of Alameda v. Sheehan" on Justia Law

In 2022, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance extending the notice period for landlords pursuing at-fault evictions. The San Francisco Apartment Association and Small Property Owners of San Francisco Institute sought a writ of mandate to prevent the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance, arguing it was preempted by state law. The trial court partially granted the petition, finding the ordinance preempted only for nonpayment of rent evictions. Both parties appealed.The San Francisco Superior Court initially ruled that the ordinance conflicted with state law only regarding nonpayment of rent, citing a split in authority on notice periods for other fault-based evictions. The court referenced Tri County Apartment Association v. City of Mountain View, which invalidated extended notice periods, and Rental Housing Association of Northern Alameda County v. City of Oakland, which allowed them. The trial court felt bound by Rental Housing and limited its ruling to nonpayment of rent.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law. The court found that the ordinance was procedural, not substantive, as it extended the state-mandated three-day notice period to a minimum of 13 days, conflicting with the Unlawful Detainer Act's timelines. The court determined that state law fully occupies the field of landlord-tenant notification timelines, making the local ordinance invalid.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in part, ruling that the entire ordinance was preempted by state law, and directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate preventing the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing the ordinance. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "S.F. Apartment Assn. v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

Cheryl Lynch, the owner of a residential property in San Clemente, California, engaged a general contractor for home improvement and repairs. The contractor hired Peter & Associates, Engineers, Geologists, Surveyors, Inc. (the Peter firm) to perform a geotechnical inspection of a footing trench. The Peter firm conducted a visual inspection and used a steel probe but did not perform subsurface exploration or laboratory testing. The footing later collapsed, causing significant damage to Lynch's home.Lynch filed a lawsuit in February 2021 against multiple parties, including the Peter firm, for breach of contract, nuisance, and negligence. The Peter firm moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty of care to Lynch due to the lack of a direct contract. The Superior Court of Orange County granted the motion, heavily relying on the precedent set by Weseloh Family Ltd. Partnership v. K.L. Wessel Construction Co., Inc., which found no duty of care in the absence of privity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the Peter firm failed to meet its burden in the summary judgment motion. The court held that the firm owed a duty of care to Lynch, applying the Biakanja factors, which consider the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm, and other factors. The court also found that the trial court erred in dismissing Lynch's nuisance claim and in sustaining the Peter firm's evidentiary objections without proper basis.The Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to deny the Peter firm's motion in its entirety. View "Lynch v. Peter & Associates" on Justia Law

American Building Innovation LP (ABI) was hired by Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour Beatty) as a subcontractor for a school construction project. ABI had a workers’ compensation insurance policy when it began work, but the policy was canceled due to ABI’s refusal to pay outstanding premiums from a previous policy. This cancellation led to the automatic suspension of ABI’s contractor’s license. Despite knowing it was unlicensed and uninsured, ABI continued working on the project.The Superior Court of Orange County found that ABI was not duly licensed at all times during the performance of its work, as required by California law. ABI’s license was suspended because it failed to maintain workers’ compensation insurance. ABI later settled its premium dispute and had the policy retroactively reinstated, but the court found this retroactive reinstatement meaningless because it occurred long after the statute of limitations for any workers’ compensation claims had expired. The court ruled that ABI could not maintain its action to recover compensation for its work due to its lack of proper licensure.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The court held that ABI was not entitled to retroactive reinstatement of its license because the failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance was not due to circumstances beyond ABI’s control. ABI’s decision not to pay the premiums and its false representations to the Contractors’ State License Board were within its control. Consequently, ABI was barred from bringing or maintaining the action under section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code. The court also affirmed the award of attorney fees to Balfour Beatty under the subcontract’s prevailing party attorney fee provision. View "American Building Innovations v. Balfour Beatty Construction" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Syre appealed an order denying her motion to disqualify California Indian Legal Services (CILS) from representing defendant Mark Douglas. Syre had initially contacted CILS seeking representation for a quiet title lawsuit against Douglas but was declined due to her non-residency in Inyo County. She later filed the lawsuit with other counsel. Douglas, who is homeless and the son of the late property owner Charlotte Willett, successfully obtained representation from CILS. Syre argued that CILS had a conflict of interest due to her prior contact with them.The Superior Court of Inyo County denied Syre's motion to disqualify CILS, finding no conflict of interest. The court noted that Syre had only spoken to a non-attorney intake advocate at CILS and that no confidential information was shared with any attorney at CILS. The intake advocate had merely gathered preliminary information to determine Syre's eligibility for CILS's services, which she did not meet. The court also found that CILS had adequate screening measures in place to protect any confidential information.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Syre was a prospective client but did not communicate any confidential information to an attorney at CILS. The court emphasized that the information shared was preliminary and necessary to determine eligibility for CILS's services. Additionally, the court noted that public interest law offices like CILS are treated differently from private law firms regarding disqualification rules. The court concluded that there was no substantial relationship between Syre and any attorney at CILS and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify. View "Syre v. Douglas" on Justia Law

In 2017, Riverside Mining Limited (Riverside Mining) leased 73 acres of its property to Quality Aggregates (Quality) for mining. By 2020, disputes arose, leading Quality to sue Riverside Mining in 2021 for breach of contract, trespass, and quiet title. In 2022, Riverside Mining filed an unlawful detainer action to evict Quality for alleged lease breaches. The parties agreed that Quality would deposit monthly rent payments with the court during the litigation. Quality later made a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which Riverside Mining did not accept. Riverside Mining then dismissed the unlawful detainer action without prejudice.The Superior Court of Riverside County dismissed the unlawful detainer action and later addressed two motions: Quality's motion for attorney fees under section 998 and Riverside Mining's motion to disburse the deposited rent payments. The court denied Quality's motion for attorney fees and granted Riverside Mining's motion for disbursement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that Quality was not entitled to attorney fees under section 998 because Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), precludes awarding attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed. The court also affirmed the disbursement of the deposited funds to Riverside Mining, as Quality had no right to a setoff for attorney fees. The court's main holding was that section 998 does not independently authorize attorney fees without an underlying statutory or contractual right, and Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), prevents such an award in cases of voluntary dismissal. View "Riverside Mining Limited v. Quality Aggregates" on Justia Law