Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Schmier converted Berkley apartment units into condominiums. Berkeley ordinances then required that he record Affordable Housing Fee liens based on a formula. Schmier's lien agreements that provided, “Execution of this document shall not prejudice the right of the undersigned to challenge the validity of the Affordable Housing Fee. In the event that the Affordable Housing Fee is ... rescinded … this lien shall be void.” Schmier alleged that in 2008, Berkeley rescinded that ordinance. The new section includes a different formula. In 2019, Schmier advised Berkeley of the sale of the property. Berkeley requested an affordable housing fee of $147,202.66, calculated under the rescinded ordinance. Under the current ordinance, the fee would have been less than half of what was requested.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the suit, as barred by a 90-day statute of limitations (Subdivision Map Act, Gov. Code, 66499.37). Schmier did not challenge the requirement that he execute a lien agreement, nor did he challenge the adoption of the former ordinance, its alleged recission, or adoption of a new section; Schmier’s complaint is not subject to the Map Act’s limitations period. Even assuming the 90-day period applied, it could not have begun to run until Berkeley rejected Schmier’s assertion that the lien agreement was no longer operative when the city rescinded the former ordinance. The language of the lien agreements is ambiguous, rendering both asserted constructions arguably reasonable. View "Schmier v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

Property owners (Appellants) paid nearly $12 million in transfer taxes, penalties, and interest based on a 2014 merger that changed their parent companies. Both before and after the merger, Appellants directly owned two properties; only indirect ownership changed. They sought a refund of the sums paid under the San Francisco Business and Tax Regulations Code (SFBTRC).The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting arguments that the tax exceeded San Francisco's authority under Revenue and Taxation Code section 11911 because it uses a higher tax rate and an expanded tax base. San Francisco, as a charter city and a “city and county,” is not bound by the limitations of section 11911. The purported failure to comply with notice and hearing requirements does not entitle Appellants to a refund. At the time of the merger, SFBTRC was triggered as to Appellants’ real property by the transfer of ownership interests in Appellants’ parent entity, consistent with Revenue and Taxation Code section 64(c)(1). SFBTRC 1108 applied due to the termination of Appellants’ parent, a partnership. Appellants are not entitled to a refund based on their argument that San Francisco assessed the wrong entities View "CIM Urban REIT 211 Main Street (SF), L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit to enjoin a renovation and expansion project under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The Court of Appeal held, in light of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 519, that a disparate impact claim based on a gentrification theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. In the published portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's gentrification-based claims under the FHA and FEHA. View "Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between Som, her husband, Joshua, and Joshua's mother, Sharon, the trial court ruled in favor of Sharon. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended Sharon's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. The court reversed the judgment on the claims for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. The court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about Som's financial circumstances in 2009 and did not deprive Som of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly.The court of appeal subsequently modified its opinion to read: the judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Sharon is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Joshua, per the July 29, 2010 deed and the July 18, 2011 deed. The judgment is also reversed as to the causes of action for slander of title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Before a creditor with a money judgment may force the sale of a debtor's dwelling to satisfy that judgment, the creditor must, in addition to other procedures, obtain a court order authorizing the sale. To obtain that court order, the creditor must file an application that includes, among other things, a statement of the amount of any liens or encumbrances on the dwelling.The Court of Appeal held that this requires the creditor to list liens on the property for unpaid real property taxes, even though those liens need not be recorded because they come into being by operation of law. In this case, the trial court properly denied the creditor's application as deficient, because the creditor's application did not list the delinquent property taxes against the debtor's dwelling and went so far as to represent, under oath, that "there are no actual or purported liens or encumbrances" on the property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the creditor's application as deficient. View "Meyer v. Sheh" on Justia Law

In 2010, the city certified an environmental impact report (EIR) and approved a specific plan for property located next to San Francisco Bay. CCCR challenged the plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000, CEQA). The court identified deficiencies in the EIR. The city prepared a recirculated EIR (REIR) that remedied the deficiency. The REIR found the specific plan could have significant impacts due to the destruction of endangered species habitats and discussed the impacts of climate change and sea-level rise. The city certified the final REIR, readopted the 2010 specific plan, and executed a development agreement. In 2016, the city approved a subdivision map for 386 housing units. In 2019, another subdivision map proposed 469 additional residential lots. The city prepared a checklist comparing the REIR’s analysis of the specific plan with the impacts of the subdivision map and concluded the proposed subdivision would be consistent with the specific plan, and that no changed circumstances or new information required additional environmental review. The city posted the checklist for public comment, responded to comments, then approved the subdivision map.The court of appeal affirmed. The project was exempt from further CEQA review under Government Code 65457 because it implemented and was consistent with the specific plan. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that no project changes, changed circumstances, or new information required additional analysis. The deferral of analysis of potential flood control projects to address sea-level rise in the latter half of this century was proper. View "Citizens' Committee to Complete the Refuge v. City of Newark" on Justia Law

Appellant, defendant, and cross-complainant Earl Greif sold 10 acres of raw vacant land (Property) in Rancho Mirage to plaintiff-respondent Yardley Protective Limited Partnership, a family real estate investment partnership. A few days after Earl signed the purchase agreement (Purchase Agreement), he concluded he had sold the Property for less than its fair market value and attempted to back out of the sale. The Yardley partnership sued Earl, Earl’s wife, Shirley Greif, and Gabriel Nicholas Limited Liability Company (collectively GNLLC) to enforce the Purchase Agreement. Greif filed a cross-complaint against the Yardley partnership and one of its limited partners, Solail Ahmad (Yardley), later adding as cross-defendants Yardley’s real estate brokers, Desert Gate Real Estate, Inc. dba Four Season Realty (Desert Gate) and Desert Gate broker, Eddie Sanin (collectively Sanin). The trial court dismissed Greif’s third amended cross-complaint (Cross-complaint) on the eve of trial for failing to state any cause of action as a matter of law. After a lengthy court trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Yardley and against Greif and GNLLC. Greif filed three separate appeals. Rejecting Grief and GNLLC's contentions raised in the appeals, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Greif v. Sanin" on Justia Law

The Costa Hawkins Rental Housing Act, Civil Code section 1954.50, generally exempts newly constructed residential units, single-family homes, and condominiums from local rent increase limitations. The San Francisco Rent Ordinance acknowledges these exemptions in sections 37.3(d) and (g). Costa Hawkins expressly preserves local authority to “regulate or monitor the grounds for eviction” on all residential rental properties, including properties exempt from local rent control.Landlords challenged a measure that amended the city’s rent ordinance to make it unlawful for a landlord to seek to recover possession of a rental unit that is exempt from rent control by means of a rental increase that is imposed in bad faith to coerce the tenant to vacate the unit in circumvention of the city’s eviction laws, claiming that the amendment is preempted by Costa Hawkins because it seeks to regulate the rent a landlord may charge on exempt properties. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the challenge. The amendment is a valid exercise of the city’s authority to regulate evictions and is designed to deter landlords from attempting to avoid local eviction rules by imposing artificially high rents in bad faith. View "San Francisco Apartment Association v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Tran applied to the Department of Regional Planning for renewal of the conditional use permit (CUP) for his unincorporated Los Angeles County liquor store. Considering the store’s location and site plan, information from the California Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control, a crime report, and letters from the public, the Department recommended approval of the CUP subject to conditions. Tran objected to conditions limiting the hours of alcohol sales to 6:00 a.m.-10:00 p.m., and that distilled spirits not be sold in small containers. The Commission approved the CUP with the recommended small bottle prohibition but permitting alcohol sales from 6:00 a.m.-2:00 a.m. The County Board of Supervisors voted to review the approval. At the close of an August 1, 2017, hearing the Board voted to indicate its "intent to approve” the CUP, restricting alcohol sales to 10:00 a.m-10:00 p.m. and forbidding small bottle sales. About eight months later, the Board adopted the findings and conditions of approval prepared by county counsel and approved the CUP with the modified conditions.Tran unsuccessfully sought a judicial order to set aside the decision as untimely under the County Code, which provides that review decisions “shall be rendered within 30 days of the close of the hearing” The court of appeal vacated the Board’s decision. The 30-day time limit was mandatory, not directory. The Board failed to render its decision within 30 days. View "Tran v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law