Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit in 2014, alleging that Little Rock Ranch, which had proceeded to develop and plant an irrigated walnut orchard, was trespassing on 3.44 acres of plaintiffs' property. Although the trial court found that Little Rock Ranch was trespassing by encroachment on plaintiffs' property, the trial court applied the defense of laches and the "relative hardship" doctrine, denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs. The trial court fashioned an alternative equitable remedy: Little Rock Ranch was required to pay damages to plaintiffs and undertake corrective action to limit erosion of the now-excavated hillside, while plaintiffs were required to deed the strip of land at issue to Little Rock Ranch. The trial court also found the trespass by Little Rock Ranch was permanent such that the appropriate measure of damages was "diminution in value" damages, rather than other alternative measures.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that case law supports the trial court's conclusion that Little Rock Ranch's excavation of plaintiffs' hillside and encroachment amounted to a permanent trespass. Furthermore, the court found no error in the trial court's determination that the trespass was permanent and, in turn, to award damages based on the diminution in value of plaintiffs' property absent the 3.44 acres. Finally, there is no merit in plaintiffs' claim that the trial court erred in not awarding additional damages for conversion of dirt excavated from their property. View "Johnson v. Little Rock Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

A congregation of the hierarchical Church of God purchased an insurance policy from GuideOne Specialty Mutual Insurance Company (GuideOne) covering the risk of fire damage to a church building that was held by the congregation, as agent of the greater church, in trust for the benefit of the larger church body. After the local congregation voted to sever its relationship with the Church of God, a regional oversight authority took over as the agent/trustee holding the property on behalf of the greater church, after which the previously affiliated local congregation moved out, and the new agent added the property to its own insurance policy, with Church Mutual Insurance Company (Church Mutual), covering the same risk. Fire destroyed the building while both policies were in effect. Church Mutual paid the claim. GuideOne denied coverage on the ground that the former local congregation no longer had an insurable interest in the property. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal was whether Church Mutual was entitled to contribution from GuideOne. The trial court concluded the answer was no. While the appellate court disagreed with certain aspects of the trial court’s statement of decision, it concluded the trial court reached the correct result. The Court of Appeal also concluded the trial court correctly determined Church Mutual was not entitled to prevail against GuideOne on a separate subrogation cause of action. View "Church Mutual Ins. Co. v. GuideOne Specialty Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that Public Resources Code section 30610.8 requires payment of an in-lieu public access fee for each coastal development permit (CDP) applicable to Hollister Ranch. In this case, after the California Coastal Commission denied a CDP request from Jack Wall and the Wall Family Trust to build a pool and spa on their Hollister Ranch property, plaintiffs challenged the Commission's denial in a petition for writ of administrative mandate.The court concluded that plaintiffs have not shown that the Commission required public access to their property; the trial court correctly concluded that the California Coastal Act of 1976 requires payment of an in-lieu public access fee for approval of plaintiffs' CDP; and plaintiffs' alternative contention -- that even if the Coastal Act requires them to pay a $5,000 in-lieu public access fee for their CDP, imposing that requirement would be unconstitutional -- is waived. View "Wall v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Foley Investments, LP (Owner) asserted inverse condemnation and tort claims against Alisal Water Corporation dba Alco Water Service (Alco) after an Alco-owned water main that ran through a portion of Owner’s apartment complex repeatedly ruptured. In the first phase of a bifurcated bench trial, the court ruled against Owner on its inverse condemnation claim, finding the water main did not serve a “public use” for inverse condemnation purposes because Alco installed the main under a private contract with Owner’s predecessor for the sole benefit of the subject property. In the second phase, the court found the tort claims were barred by “fire protection” immunity because Alco constructed and maintained the main on the subject property in a particular way to meet the property’s particular fire protection needs. The court therefore entered judgment in Alco’s favor. On appeal, Owner contended the trial court erred by finding the water main did not serve a public use for purposes of the inverse condemnation claim, and by finding fire protection immunity barred the tort claims. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Foley Investments v. Alisal Water Corp." on Justia Law

Tax sharing agreements between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister require the city to pay the county a fixed fee (the “Additional Amount”) for each residential unit constructed on land that is annexed into the city from the county. Plaintiff entered into development agreements with the city to build residential units on land subject to the city-county tax sharing agreements, and agreed to satisfy certain obligations from the tax sharing agreements, but sued the city and the county seeking a declaration that payment of the Additional Amount is not among plaintiff’s obligations.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. The plaintiff agreed to pay the city the Additional Amount fees as part of the development agreements. Nothing in the tax sharing agreement suggests that obligations created by it would cease to exist merely because a project annexed during its effective period was not constructed until after the agreement expired. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because the Additional Amount is an obligation of the city to the county under the tax sharing agreement, it cannot be a “Developer’s obligation.” The reference to “Developer’s obligations” in the development agreement did not mean only the capital improvement and drainage fees discussed in the tax sharing agreement; the term includes the Additional Amount. View "Award Homes, Inc. v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

A tax-sharing agreement between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister requires the city to pay the county a fixed fee (Additional Amount) per residential unit constructed on land annexed into the city from the county during the period covered by that agreement. Plaintiff’s predecessor entered into an annexation agreement with the city, agreeing to comply with “all applicable provisions” of that tax sharing agreement. When the plaintiff purchased the annexed land and sought to develop it into subdivisions, the city informed the plaintiff that it was liable for the Additional Amount fees. Plaintiff paid the fees under protest, then sued, seeking a declaration of its rights and duties under various written instruments.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. Plaintiff is contractually liable for the Additional Amount by the terms of the annexation agreement. Any challenge to the calculation of the Additional Amount is beyond the scope of a declaratory relief action and time-barred. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that neither the annexation agreement nor the tax sharing agreement requires the plaintiff to pay the Additional Amount and that the fees violate the Mitigation Fee Act and federal constitutional constraints on development fees as monetary exactions. View "BMC Promise Way, LLC v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

The People filed suit against Venice Suites for violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) and for public nuisance, among other causes of action, alleging that Venice Suites illegally operates a hotel or transient occupancy residential structure (TORS).The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary adjudication in favor of Venice Suites. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the People did not raise the issue of permissive zoning in their briefing but the court exercised its discretion to consider the issue on its merits. On the merits, the court concluded that the LAMC did not prohibit the length of occupancy of an apartment house in an R3 zone. Furthermore, the court concluded that the permissive zoning scheme does not apply to the length of occupancy, and the Rent Stabilization Ordinance and Transient Occupancy Tax Ordinance do not regulate the use of an apartment house. View "People v. Venice Suites, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties have owned adjacent residential properties in the Hollywood Hills for approximately 25 years. In 2015, Wizmann installed pool and air conditioning equipment between the wall of his house and a retaining wall close to the property line underneath Chase’s bedroom window. The hard surfaces of the walls amplify the equipment's noise. Wizmann began operating his property as a short-term rental and was unresponsive to Chase’s noise concerns after moving out. Chase sometimes called the police, who would determine that the noise was excessive and instruct the tenants to turn off the equipment. In 2016, Los Angeles ordered Wizmann to move the equipment at least five feet from the retaining wall. In 2018, the city cited Wizmann’s property as a public nuisance due to repeated large, unruly parties, illegal parking, burglary, refuse in the street, and neighbor complaints of public urination, public intoxication, fistfights, and other illegal activity. In 2020, Chase obtained a personal sound level meter and measured as high as 73.5 decibels during the day.The court of appeal affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction. Chase was likely to prevail on a private nuisance claim and the balance of harms favored moving the noisy equipment. The court rejected arguments that only equipment noise that violates the Los Angeles Municipal Code can be the basis for a nuisance action and that there was no substantial evidence that the interference was substantial or caused unreasonable damage. View "Chase v. Wizmann" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and vacated in part in a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between wife, her husband, and the husband's mother. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended husband's mother's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment on the third cause of action. The court also concluded that the trial court erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment on the causes of action for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about wife's financial circumstances in 2009; and the trial court did not deprive wife of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly. The court remanded with instructions to the trial court to amend the language of the judgment to provide that its orders do not preclude wife from raising proper claims for community property interests, Epstein credits, Watts charges, or other similar claims in the family law court. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law

In this California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) case, the Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed respondent Los Angeles Superior Court to vacate its order awarding attorney fees to Charter and to conduct a new hearing to reconsider Charter's motion for attorney fees. At issue is whether an employer's arbitration agreement authorizes the recovery of attorney fees for a successful motion to compel arbitration of a FEHA lawsuit even if the plaintiff's opposition to arbitration was not frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.The court concluded that, because a fee-shifting clause directed to a motion to compel arbitration, like a general prevailing party fee provision, risks chilling an employee's access to court in a FEHA case absent Government Code section 12965(b)'s asymmetric standard for an award of fees, a prevailing defendant may recover fees in this situation only if it demonstrates the plaintiff's opposition was groundless. In this case, no such finding was made by the superior court in the underlying action before awarding real party in interest Charter its attorney fees after granting Charter's motion to compel petitioner to arbitrate his FEHA claims. View "Patterson v. Superior Court" on Justia Law