Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

The Sellers bought an Oakland property to “flip.” After Vega renovated the property, they sold it to Vera, providing required disclosures, stating they were not aware of any water intrusion, leaks from the sewer system or any pipes, work, or repairs that had been done without permits or not in compliance with building codes, or any material facts or defects that had not otherwise been disclosed. Vera’s own inspectors revealed several problems. The Sellers agreed to several repairs Escrow closed in December 2011, but the sewer line had not been corrected. In January 2012, water flooded the basement. The Sellers admitted that earlier sewer work had been completed without a permit and that Vega was unlicensed. In 2014, the exterior stairs began collapsing. Three years and three days after the close of escrow, Vera filed suit, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Based on the three-year limitations period for actions based on fraud or mistake, the court dismissed and, based on a clause in the purchase contract, granted SNL attorney’s fees, including fees related to a cross-complaint against Vera’s broker and real estate agent.The court of appeal affirmed. Vera’s breach of contract claim was based on fraud and the undisputed facts demonstrated Vera’s claims based on fraud accrued more than three years before she filed suit. Vera has not shown the court abused its discretion in awarding fees related to the cross-complaint. View "Vera v. REL-BC, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants owned beachfront mobilehomes in Capistrano Shores Mobile Home Park located in the City of San Clemente. Each of their mobilehomes was a single-story residence. Between 2011 and 2013, appellants each applied for, and received, a permit from the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) to remodel their respective mobilehome. Appellants also applied for coastal development permits from the Coastal Commission. Their applications expressly indicated they were not addressing any component of the remodels for which they obtained HCD permits, including the addition of second stories. Rather, their coastal development permit applications concerned desired renovations on the grounds surrounding the mobilehome structures, including items such as carports, patio covers, and barbeques. Appellants completed their remodels at various times between 2011 and 2014. The parties disputed whether appellants received, prior to completion of construction, any communication from the Coastal Commission concerning the need for a coastal development permit for their projects.In February 2014, the Coastal Commission issued notices to appellants that the then-complete renovation of their residential structures was unauthorized and illegal without a coastal development permit. Faced with a potential need to demolish, at minimum, completed second-story additions to their mobilehomes, appellants unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of mandate declaring that the coastal development permits were deemed approved by operation of law under the Permit Streamlining Act. In denying the petition, the trial court concluded the Coastal Commission had jurisdiction to require appellants to obtain coastal development permits and the prerequisite public notice to deemed approval under the Streamlining Act did not occur. Appellants contended on appeal that the trial court erred in both respects. The Court of Appeal concluded appellants’ writ petition should have been granted. "The Coastal Commission has concurrent jurisdiction with the California Department of Housing and Community Development over mobilehomes located in the coastal zone. Thus, even though appellants obtained a permit from the latter, they were also required to obtain a permit from the former. The Coastal Commission’s failure to act on appellants’ applications for costal development permits, however, resulted in the applications being deemed approved under the Streamlining Act." Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to vacate the existing judgment and enter a new judgment granting appellants’ petition. View "Linovitz Capo Shores LLC v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

The County of Sacramento (County) filed an action to abate building and housing code violations at two properties owned or managed by Raj Singh and Kiran Rawat, individually and as trustee of the SitaRam Living Trust dated 2007 and the Sita Ram Trust. The trial court appointed a receiver under Health and Safety Code section 17980.7 to take control of and rehabilitate the properties upon the County’s motion. Singh appealed pro se the trial court’s order approving the receiver’s final account and report and discharging the receiver. The Court of Appeal addressed Singh's claims "as best as [the Court could] discern them." After careful consideration of Singh's claims, the Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court. View "County of Sacramento v. Rawat" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that he improperly obtained money and property from plaintiffs' deceased parents. The trial court concluded that defendant was unjustly enriched and entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor for more than $34 million. The parents had executed powers of attorney granting defendant authority to act on their behalf in reclaiming and selling properties in Iran. Plaintiffs contend that defendant conspired with another individual to steal their parents' properties and defraud them out of tens of millions of dollars.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the trial court properly denied defendant's renewed motion for inconvenient forum where the law of the case doctrine applies here; plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the statute of limitations; the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing discovery sanctions on defendant; and the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs equitable relief. View "Aghaian v. Minassian" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Charles Best Jr. and Robbie Johnson Best alleged that defendants (collectively the Bank), attempted to collect a debt secured by the Bests’ home, despite having no legal right to do so. They alleged that, in the process, the Bank engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent debt collection practices. Based on these allegations, they raised six causes of action, including one under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The trial court sustained the Bank’s demurrer to the entire complaint on the ground of res judicata; it ruled that the Bests were asserting the same cause(s) of action as in a prior federal action that they brought, unsuccessfully, against the Bank. In the nonpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, as to three of the Best’s causes of action (including their Rosenthal Act cause of action) the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer based on res judicata. As to the other three, the Court found the Bests did not articulate any reason why res judicata does not apply; thus, they have forfeited any such contention. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court held that the Rosenthal Act could apply to a nonjudicial foreclosure; the lower federal court opinions on which the Bank relied were superseded by controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the California Courts of Appeal. View "Best v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

ABS REO Trust II (ABS) appealed an order denying its motion to correct/vacate the portion of a prior quiet title judgment adjudicating the rights of a defaulting party, Clarion Mortgage Capital, Inc. (Clarion), despite that Clarion had not been served with the operative amended complaint and the court did not hold a hearing on the plaintiff’s claims against Clarion. The Court of Appeal concluded the court erred in denying ABS’s motion. ABS had standing to bring this motion and it met its burden to show the prior judgment was void as to Clarion. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded with directions for the court to grant ABS’s motion and strike the portions of the prior judgment relating to Clarion. View "Paterra v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Kevin Johnson, APLC, Kevin Johnson, and Jeanne MacKinnon (collectively, the attorney defendants) filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint on behalf of their clients Christian Clews (Christian), Barbara Clews (Barbara), and Clews Land & Livestock, LLC (CLL) (collectively, Clews Horse Ranch) challenging a decision of the City of San Diego (City) to approve the construction of a private secondary school adjacent to the Clews’ commercial horse ranch. The petition asserted the City’s approval of the project and adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for the project violated the California Environmental Quality Act, the San Diego Municipal Code, and the City’s land use plan. The trial court denied relief and, in Clews Land and Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego, 19 Cal.App.5th 161 (2017), the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Jan Dunning, Cal Coast Academy RE Holdings, LLC, and North County Center for Educational Development, Inc. (collectively, Cal Coast), the developers of the project and real parties in interest in the CEQA Litigation, then filed this lawsuit against Clews Horse Ranch and the attorney defendants for malicious prosecution. Cal Coast asserted the defendants lacked probable cause and acted with malice when they pursued the CEQA Litigation. The attorney defendants filed a special motion to strike Cal Coast’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, to which the Clews Horse Ranch joined. The trial court denied the motion after finding that Cal Coast established a probability of prevailing on its malicious prosecution claim. Clews Horse Ranch and the attorney defendants appealed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal concluded Cal Coast established a probability of prevailing on its malicious prosecution claim against Clews Horse Ranch, but not against the attorney defendants. Therefore, the Court affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion as to Clews Horse Ranch, and reversed the order denying the anti- SLAPP motion as to the attorney defendants. View "Dunning v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the City's new enforcement policy of short-term vacation rentals (STVRs). The trial court granted plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandate enjoining the City's enforcement of the STVR ban in the coastal zone unless it obtains a coastal development permit (CDP) or a Local Coastal Program (LCP) amendment approved by the California Coastal Commission or a waiver of such requirement.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the California Coastal Act of 1976 required the Commission's approval of a CDP, LCP amendment, or amendment waiver before the STVR ban could be imposed. Because there was no such approval, the trial court did not err by concluding that the STVR ban constituted a "development" under the Act. The court explained that the City cannot act unilaterally, particularly when it not only allowed the operation of STVRs for years but also benefitted from the payment of transient occupancy taxes. The court agreed with the trial court that the City cannot credibly contend that it did not produce a change because it deliberately acted to create a change in coastal zone usage and access. Finally, in regard to the City's argument that the Coastal Act exempts abatement of nuisances allegedly caused by STVRs, the City waived that issue by informing the trial court it was not "making the nuisance argument." Nor is the court persuaded that the political question and separation of powers doctrines apply. View "Kracke v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

After plaintiff decided to jaywalk across a five-lane highway at night and was struck by a car, she filed suit against the owner of a condominium complex she was trying to visit, alleging claims for negligence and premises liability for having too few onsite parking spaces for guests.The Court of Appeal held that a landowner does not owe a duty of care to invitees to provide adequate onsite parking, either (1) under common law principles or (2) by virtue of a 1978 city ordinance that rezoned the complex's specific parcel for multifamily dwellings and conditioned that rezoning on providing a specific number of guest parking spaces. The court explained that a landowner's common law duty of care does not encompass a duty to provide onsite parking for invitees in order to protect them from traffic accidents occurring off site as they travel to the premises, and the court did so for two reasons: (1) such a duty is foreclosed by precedent, and (2) even if not foreclosed, the so-called Rowland factors counsel against such a duty. The court rejected plaintiff's claims under Ordinance No. 151, 411 for two reasons: (1) the ordinance is a parcel-specific ordinance adopted as the final step of a multistep administrative procedure and is therefore incapable of forming the basis for a duty of care, and (2) the guest parking condition of the ordinance was aimed at preserving the aesthetic character of the surrounding neighborhood, and not at protecting invitees from traffic accidents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the condominium complex. View "Issakhani v. Shadow Glen Homeowners Ass'n., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant and his wife obtained a home mortgage in 2006, but only the wife signed the promissory note. After appellant's wife died, appellant defaulted on the loan. Appellant alleged that the mortgage servicer, Specialized Loan Servicing, refused to communicate with him about the loan because he was not the named borrower. Specialized subsequently initiated foreclosure proceedings by causing a notice of default to be recorded. Appellant filed suit under the California Homeowner Bill of Rights (HBOR), Civil Code section 2923.4 et seq., seeking to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings. After Specialized agreed to postpone the foreclosure sale and appellant failed to make his payment, the foreclosure sale proceeded as planned and the property was purchased by a third party. Appellant then filed an amended complaint against Specialized. Specialized moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that, by its terms, the HBOR creates liability only for material violations that have not been remedied before the foreclosure sale is recorded. The court held that where a mortgage servicer's violations stem from its failure to communicate with the borrower before recording a notice of default, the servicer may cure these violations by doing what respondent did here: postponing the foreclosure sale, communicating with the borrower about potential foreclosure alternatives, and fully considering any application by the borrower for a loan modification. After such corrective measures, any remaining violation relating to the recording of the notice of default is immaterial, and a new notice of default is therefore not required to avoid liability. Therefore, appellant has provided no basis for liability under the HBOR. The court also concluded that Specialized complied with section 2923.6 as a matter of law by conducting the foreclosure sale only after appellant failed to accept an offered trial-period modification plan. Finally, given the court's conclusions and the trial court's consideration of the merits of appellant's claims, the reinstatement of sections 2923.55 and 2923.6 did not warrant reconsideration. View "Billesbach v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law