Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1994, Duncan moved into a rent-controlled unit in San Francisco. He was living there with his family when, in 2014, the landlords purchased the building and took away property-related benefits, ignored or delayed maintenance, were uncommunicative and uncooperative, and became increasingly hostile. While living in their unit, the tenants sued the landlords, alleging nuisance, breach of contract, negligence, harassment under San Francisco’s Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, and unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200). Unlawful detainer actions were then filed against the tenants, who asserted affirmative defenses of retaliation and violation of the Rent Ordinance but later vacated the premises The landlords then unsuccessfully argued that because the tenants did not file a cross-complaint in the unlawful detainer actions, they were barred from pursuing their already-pending separate action. In 2016, the tenants added an allegation of unlawful owner move-in eviction. The jurors found the landlords liable under the Rent Ordinance and awarded $2.7 million. The court of appeal affirmed in 2021.The landlords nonetheless filed motions to vacate, claiming that the trial court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the tenants’ claims after they surrendered possession of their unit. The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of that claim. The only legal claim the tenants abandoned by moving out was current possession. The tenants’ other claims were not waived and were not required to be litigated in the unlawful detainer actions. View "Duncan v. Kihagi" on Justia Law

Taptelis borrowed to purchase the property and executed a Deed of Trust (subsequently recorded) for the benefit of MERS. Taptelis defaulted on the loan. MERS executed an Assignment of Deed of Trust to Homeward. A Substitution of Trustee named Quality; Quality issued a Notice of Default and Election to Sell, asserting due diligence to contact Taptelis to assess his financial situation and explore options. Quality’s Notice of Trustee’s Sale, scheduled for December 4, 2020, was recorded in October.Taptelis challenged the foreclosure, alleging violation of the Homeowner Bill of Rights by filing the Notice while Taptelis had a loan modification application pending; failure to provide certain information before filing the Notice and submission of a declaration that was not based on reliable evidence; negligence; wrongful foreclosure; and violation of the Unfair Competition Law. Two days before the sale, Taptelis recorded a lis pendens.Quality’s Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale to Homeward was recorded. Homeward served notice to quit on Taptelis, who did not vacate. Homeward initiated an unlawful detainer suit. Reasoning that the unlawful detainer “can’t keep getting continued … for the other case,” the court concluded that Taptelis’s alleged loan modification application and lis pendens were irrelevant and awarded possession.The court of appeal reversed. Although recording a trustee’s deed is typically sufficient to raise a conclusive presumption of title under the sale as to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, Homeward purchased the property subject to Taptelis’s recorded lis pendens. Taptelis was not allowed to assert his defenses in the unlawful detainer trial. View "Homeward Opportunities Fund I Trust 2019-2 v. Taptelis" on Justia Law

Cal-Am, an investor-owned utility that supplies water to much of the Monterey Peninsula, was subject to a state order to cease its decades-long overuse of certain water sources. Cal-Am sought to comply by drawing seawater and brackish water from coastal aquifers for desalination. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), acting under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA, Pub. Resources Code, 21050), certified a final environmental impact report (EIR), and granted Cal-Am a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. The City denied Cal-Am coastal development permits to install the intake wells. Cal-Am appealed to the California Coastal Commission.The County approved a permit to construct the desalination plant in unincorporated Monterey County. Marina Coast Water District challenged that approval, arguing that the County violated CEQA by failing to prepare a subsequent or supplemental EIR and adopting an unsupported statement of overriding considerations, and violated its own general plan by approving a project that lacked a long-term sustainable water supply. The trial court ruled that the County was not required to prepare another EIR and did not violate its own general plan, but unlawfully relied on the water-related benefits of the desalination plant in its statement of overriding considerations without addressing the uncertainty introduced by the City’s denial of the coastal development permit. The court of appeal reversed; the County’s statement of overriding considerations was supported by substantial evidence and any remaining deficiency in the statement was not prejudicial. View "Marina Coast Water District v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

Respondent Paramount Pictures Corporation (Paramount) sought a refund of taxes paid on its personal property for the 2011 tax year. Paramount first appealed to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (the Board). The property was assessed a final value of $137,397,278. Following a hearing, the Board agreed with the valuation proposed by the Assessor and found that Paramount failed to carry its burden of demonstrating additional obsolescence. Paramount appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court. The trial court found: (1) the Board committed a methodological error in excluding Paramount’s initial income approach valuation and (2) the Board issued inadequate findings regarding the significance of Paramount’s pre-lien and post-lien sales of personal property. In a separate ruling, the trial court awarded Paramount attorney fees under Revenue and Taxation Code Section 1611.6, which allows a taxpayer to recover fees for services necessary to obtain proper findings from a county board. The County timely appealed both orders.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding the Board committed neither methodological error nor issued findings that were less than adequate within the meaning of section 1611.5. First, Paramount did not challenge the validity of the cost approach relied upon by the Assessor and Board, and it did not otherwise identify any legal error in the Board’s rejection of its income approach valuation. Second, the hearing transcripts adequately disclose its rulings and findings on the pre-lien and post-sales data. The court remanded so the trial court may consider the question of whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Paramount failed to establish additional obsolescence. View "Paramount Pictures Corp. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

Fitness International, LLC was operating an indoor gym and fitness center when it entered into an amended lease with KB Salt Lake III, LLC, that required Fitness International to renovate the premises. However, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted government orders that closed indoor gyms but allowed commercial construction to continue. Fitness International nevertheless stopped construction at the Chatsworth site, remained in possession of the premises, and stopped paying rent. KB Salt Lake filed an unlawful detainer action, and the trial court granted KB Salt Lake’s motion for summary judgment. Fitness International appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court explained that Fitness International argued that the lease is a “monthly installment contract” and that each month it could not operate the premises as a fitness facility, frustrated the purpose of the contract. The court wrote that neither the pandemic nor the COVID-19 closure orders, however, prevented Fitness International from reopening the gym. Thus, even if California law recognized temporary frustration of purpose, and even if the lease was an “installment contract,” Fitness International still had to make rent payments under the lease. Moreover, the court explained that Fitness International argues the purpose of section 1511 “is to excuse performance under circumstances like these,” but Fitness International cites no authority describing the purpose of section 1511, nor does Fitness International explain how the trial court’s ruling was contrary to any such purpose. View "Fitness International v. KB Salt Lake III" on Justia Law

Endeavor Operating Company, LLC (Endeavor) is a “holding company” that owns “various subsidiaries in the entertainment, sports, and fashion business sectors.” Endeavor sued the insurers for (1) declaratory relief and (2) breach of contract related to COVID-19 closures. The insurers demurred to the complaint. The trial court issued a ruling (1) sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and (2) denying Endeavor’s motion for a new trial. The court modified its initial ruling to find that the “actual” or “threatened presence” of COVID-19 or the SARS-CoV-2 virus “does not constitute a physical loss or damage required to trigger coverage for property insurance coverage” but reaffirmed its initial ruling that the contamination/pollution exclusion applied, which in the court’s view obviated its need to address the argument Endeavor raised for the first time in its new trial motion. Endeavor appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the insurance policy unambiguously requires “direct physical loss or damage to property” before Endeavor may recover under the business interruption clauses. The court held that Endeavor failed as a matter of law to plead “direct physical loss or damage to property.” The court explained that California courts are in accord that the phrase “direct physical loss or damage to property” means a “‘distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration’” of the insured property. This is the default definition to be applied where a policy does not provide a different definition of “direct physical loss or damage.” The policy here provides no different definition. View "Endeavor Operating Co., LLC v. HDI Global Ins. Co." on Justia Law

UCSF's 107-acre Parnassus Heights campus currently accommodates two hospitals, various medical clinics, four professional schools, a graduate program, and space for research, student housing, parking, and other support uses. In 2014, UCSF prepared a long-range development plan for its multiple sites around San Francisco, to accommodate most of UCSF’s growth at the Mission Bay campus. There were concerns that the Parnassus campus was overwhelming its neighborhood. In 2020, UCSF undertook a new plan for the Parnassus campus with multiple new buildings and infrastructure resulting in a 50 percent net increase in building space over 30 years.An environmental impact report (EIR) was prepared for the Plan's initial phase (California Environmental Quality Act, Pub. Resources Code 21000, identifying as significant, unavoidable adverse impacts: wind hazards, increased air pollutants, the demolition of historically significant structures, and increased ambient noise levels during construction.The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of challenges to the EIR. The EIR considers a reasonable range of alternatives and need not consider in detail an alternative that placed some anticipated development off campus. The EIR improperly declines to analyze the impact on public transit, but the error is not prejudicial. The aesthetic effects of an “employment center project on an infill site within a transit priority area” are deemed not significant. The EIR is not required to adopt a mitigation measure preserving certain historically significant buildings and its mitigation measure for wind impacts is adequate. View "Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Airbnb, Inc. and Airbnb Payments, Inc. (collectively Airbnb) is an online marketplace that connects owners of short-term rentals (STRs) with renters seeking accommodations for 30 days or less. Among Airbnb’s many rental listings are properties within California’s coastal zone. The Coastal Protection Alliance (CPA) brought an action against Airbnb for violations of the Coastal Act, alleging that STRs in the coastal zone are “developments” that require a coastal development permit (CDP) and that Airbnb was directly and vicariously liable for allowing STR owners to list and rent unpermitted STRs on its website. CPA appealed from a judgment following an order granting Airbnb’s demurrer without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed, holding that t STRs are not per se developments under the Coastal Act. The court explained that a development does not occur merely because a residence is used as an STR. Whether using a residence as an STR is a “change in the density or intensity of the use of land,” and thus, a development under the Coastal Act depends on the permissible scope of the residence’s existing use. Here, CPA’s sweeping interpretation of development to include every STR would circumvent the specifically tailored zoning ordinances in the LCPs throughout the coastal zone. Interpreting the Coastal Act in this way is neither reasonable nor consistent with the Act’s acknowledged reliance on “local government and local land use planning procedures and enforcement” in carrying out the Act’s goals. View "Coastal Protection Alliance v. Airbnb" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a residence and obtained a $1 million loan, memorialized by a note secured by a deed of trust. Years later, the property was sold through a nonjudicial foreclosure. Plaintiffs, after two prior federal suits were dismissed without prejudice, filed this state lawsuit for wrongful foreclosure, against the Buyers, and Lenders. Lenders successfully argued the action was barred by res judicata (claim preclusion), based on those dismissals; under Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(B), the “two dismissal rule,” the dismissal of the second federal suit was “an adjudication on the merits.”The court of appeal concluded the voluntary dismissal of the second federal lawsuit was not a final “adjudication on the merits” that barred the filing of this case in state court. The two-dismissal rule of Rule 41(a)(1)(B) applies when there is a voluntary dismissal in state or federal court, a second voluntary dismissal in federal court, and the subsequent filing of an action in the same federal court where the second suit was dismissed. Under California law, a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a prior action is not a final judgment on the merits that bars a subsequent suit. California does not prohibit a plaintiff from filing dismissals without prejudice in successive actions. The rule is inapplicable to this state court lawsuit alleging only state-law claims. The court nonetheless affirmed, concluding that the challenges to the foreclosure lack merit. View "Gray v. La Salle Bank" on Justia Law

Appellants LNSU #1 and LNSU #2, two homeowners in a common interest development managed by the Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Association (the Association), appealed a judgment entered against them in their action against the Association for violations of the Common Interest Development Open Meeting Act (OMA). The court rejected appellants’ claims that: (1) the Association violated the OMA when its board of directors took action in an executive session that it should have taken in a meeting open to all members; (2) the board failed to prepare minutes concerning a second executive session; and (3) certain directors discussed items of Association business via e-mails without giving all Association members notice and opportunity to participate in the discussions and without preparing related minutes. Appellants also appealed postjudgment orders denying their motion to strike or tax costs and granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error with respect to appellants' OMA violation claims. The Court determined the trial court incorrectly awarded costs under a provision of the OMA authorizing such an award to a prevailing homeowners association in an action the court finds “to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation” but that the Association was not entitled to attorney fees or costs: "appellants’ action does not meet that description, the Association is not entitled to costs." The judgment is affirmed. The order denying appellants’ motion to strike or tax costs is reversed. The order granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions: (1) to vacate the order denying appellants’ motion to strike or tax costs, and to enter a new order granting the motion and denying all costs; (2) to vacate the order granting the Association’s motion for attorney fees, and to enter a new order denying the motion; and (3) to strike the amended judgment. View "LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn." on Justia Law